

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

April 12, 1982

SQRD-50-328/81-26
WBRD-50-390/81-31, -391/81-30

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 AND WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT -
REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY - INCONSISTENT ESTABLISHMENT OF INSPECTION
PROGRAM - SQRD-50-328/81-26, - WBRD-50-390/81-31, -391/81-30

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE, Region II, Inspector P. A. Taylor on March 24, 1981 as NCR's SNP NEB 8117 and WBN NEB 8108. Our final report on the subject deficiency for the Sequoyah and Watts Bar Nuclear Plants was submitted to your office February 26, 1982. As discussed with A. Hardin and R. Butcher on March 22, 1982 and with R. Butcher on April 6, 1982, we are enclosing our revised final report for Sequoyah (Enclosure 1) and our first supplemental report for Watts Bar (Enclosure 2). Our next report for Watts Bar will be transmitted on or before June 29, 1982.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with Ralph Shell at FTS 858-2676.

Very truly yours,


TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosures

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosures)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555



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ENCLOSURE 1
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2
REVISED FINAL REPORT
INCONSISTENT ESTABLISHMENT OF INSPECTION PROGRAM
NCR SNP NEB 8117
SQRD-50-328/81-26

Description of Deficiency

Before January 16, 1979, TVA's Office of Engineering Design and Construction (OEDC) Procedure OEDC-QAP 10.0, Revision 0, required that the Division of Construction (CONST) be responsible for providing construction inspection requirements. On January 16, 1979, OEDC-QAP 10.0 R1 was issued to require that the Division of Engineering Design (EN DES) supply inspection requirements to CONST. Subsequently, OEDC-QAP 10.0 R1 was superseded by the OEDC QA Program Requirements Manual (PRM) which also required that EN DES supply inspection requirements to CONST.

In actual practice, EN DES has specified certain inspection requirements (both general and specific) to CONST both before and since January 16, 1979, and CONST has implemented these requirements; however, EN DES has failed to develop a comprehensive, documented program to implement the OEDC QA PRM requirement. Therefore, EN DES's current program does not ensure that adequate inspection requirements are or have been supplied to CONST.

Safety Implications

Most of the inspection requirements for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SNP), were established before January 16, 1979, when the responsibility for establishing the construction inspection requirements was changed from CONST to EN DES. Even though EN DES did not have a complete program for establishing inspection requirements for CONST, EN DES has specified certain requirements and CONST has implemented them. In those instances where inspection requirements have not been established by EN DES, CONST has established and implemented the requirements.

Before Sequoyah Nuclear Plant unit 2 fuel load, EN DES reviewed selected inspection requirements established and implemented by CONST at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. This review dealt primarily with ascertaining whether or not the inspection requirements were adequate to ensure that the affected equipment was ready for preoperational tests. Results of this sample review indicated that the inspection requirements established and implemented by CONST were adequate to ensure that the affected equipment was ready for preoperational tests.

The above results provide assurance that the inspection requirements specified by both EN DES and CONST are sufficient to ensure that there are no safety-related concerns which could adversely affect the safe operation of the SNP unit 2. Thus, TVA has concluded the subject report need not be reopened for SNP. In addition, since SNP and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) are similar, any deficient areas identified during TVA's investigation of the subject deficiency for WBN will also be investigated at SNP. Any deficiencies identified at SNP will be resolved under the existing QA program.

Corrective Action

None required.

ENCLOSURE 2
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT
UNITS 1 AND 2
INCONSISTENT ESTABLISHMENT OF INSPECTION PROGRAM
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
WBRD-50-390/81-31, -391/81-30

Description of Deficiency

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Safety Implications

Since EN DES has failed to develop after January 16, 1979, a documented program which would consistently establish inspection requirements of activities affecting quality for CONST, there could be some components installed after that date in essential safety-related systems that have not been adequately inspected. These components may be defective and could fail, which could result in multiple failures of safety-related systems. Such a condition could, if left uncorrected, jeopardize the safe operation of the plant.

Interim Progress

TVA has determined that certain inadequacies exist in the Watts Bar Construction Requirements Manual. TVA is investigating the inadequacies.