#### TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

April 13, 1982

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 81-02 AND SUPPLEMENT 1, RII: JPO 50-390, -391, -438, -439, -566, -567 - WATTS BAR, BELLEFONTE, AND YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANTS

In response to your April 9, 1981 letter to H. G. Parris which transmitted OIE Bulletin 81-02, we provided submittals on July 8 and October 21, 1981. Our report dated November 25, 1981 consolidated the response for the original IEB 81-02 and Supplement 1 which was transmitted by your letter dated August 18, 1981 to H. G. Parris. This was followed by our combined response dated February 11, 1982.

Enclosed are the results of our investigations for the Watts Bar, Bellefonte, and Yellow Creek Nuclear Plants. We anticipate transmitting additional information for our Watts Bar Nuclear Plant by July 28, 1982.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,


TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager

Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555



#### ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR, BELLEFONTE, AND YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANTS
RESPONSE TO DIE BULLETIN 81-02 AND SUPPLEMENT 1
FAILURE OF GATE-TYPE VALVES TO CLOSE AGAINST DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE

## Watts Bar (Interim Report)

As reported under NCR 3793R, per 10 CFR 50.55(e), Westinghouse believes that the failure of the Limitorque motor operators on three gate valves subsequent to the modifications is a materials problem. Westinghouse is continuing the investigation via Field Deficiency Report number WATM-10165. Our final report on this matter will be provided upon receipt of revised drawings and field change notices from Westinghouse.

Our next report on this bulletin for Watts Bar will be submitted in conjunction with our next report on NCR WBN NEB 8013.

### Bellefonte (Final Report)

None of the potentially deficient valves are being supplied on the Bellefonte NSSS contract. Below is a listing of Borg Warner (NVD) valves supplied for Bellefonte Nuclear Plant which were subject to potential failure as identified in IEB 81-02 and Supplement 1. The operating conditions at Bellefonte are substantially less severe than the conditions which resulted in the component failure described in IEB 81-02. The manufacturer has shown by test that these valves will perform satisfactorily when subjected to the service conditions for which they will be used. Consequently, these valves could not have failed and adversely affected plant safety. Therefore, the valves are acceptable for use as is and no modification or repairs are necessary. For more detailed information refer to TVA's revised final report on nonconformance reports (NCRs) 0020 and BLN MEB 8005 which was filed in a letter from L. M. Mills to J. P. O'Reilly dated September 24, 1981, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

Valve Function	NVD P/N	TVA Contract No.	TVA Mark No.	Service Conditions
Component Cooling Sys - Eqpt Isol	79 190	77K38-86163-8	3BW0456- KC-30	2500 lb/in <sup>2</sup> @ 650 F & 100 gpm
Letdown Long-Term Cooling Isolation	-	77K38-86163-8	3RW0413- ND-65	2500 lb/in <sup>2</sup> @ 670 F & 50 gpm

The above-listed valves are the only valves of this type that have been furnished to TVA for any nuclear plant.

# Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant (Final Report)

TVA has determined that none of the potentially deficient valves identified in the original IEB 81-02 or Supplement 1 to this bulletin have been or will be furnished for Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant.