

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

February 22, 1985

35 FEB 26 P2:55
WBRD-50-390/84-52
WBRD-50-391/84-46

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:


**WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - INCORRECT POSITIONING OF
OVERCURRENT PROTECTION DEVICES - WBRD-50-390/84-52, WBRD-50-391/84-46 -
FINAL REPORT**

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
D. M. Verrelli on November 28, 1984 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)
as NCR 5864. Our first interim report was submitted on December 26, 1984.
Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


J. W. Hurham, Manager
Licensing and Regulations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
INCORRECT POSITIONING OF OVERCURRENT PROTECTION DEVICES
NCR 5864
WBRD-50-390/84-52 AND WBRD-50-391/84-46
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During the process of working workplan No. 3916, TVA personnel in the Office of Construction (OC) found several load breakers in the 480V shutdown boards which were not the proper size and type called for in the design drawings. This was due to insufficient control over breaker location.

Safety Implications

Use of incorrect circuit breakers in safety-related circuits could allow overcurrent conditions which could damage safety-related equipment and cable before the circuit breaker tripped.

Corrective Action

TVA has completed its reinspection of the 480V safety-related rack-out type Westinghouse breakers and all installed breakers of this type are now in their proper locations. Future installations will be controlled by Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) quality control procedure (QCP) 3.06-1, "Overload Protection Verification," which has been revised to clarify amptector sensor and frame size inspection requirements and by Operation Section Letter OSLP-15, "480V Shutdown Board ACB Substitution Guideline," issued in January 1985.

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