TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

85 JAN 22 P1:53 January 17, 1985

WBRD-50-390/84-51

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - INSULATION NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS OF 1-INCH BORATION LINE - 50-390/84-51 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector P. E. Fredrickson on November 14, 1984 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR WBN CEB 8422. This was followed by our interim report dated December 7, 1984. Enclosed is our final report.

TVA no longer considers the condition documented in this NCR adverse to the safe operation of the plant. Therefore, we will amend our records to delete this nonconformance as a 10 CFR 50.55(e) item.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

David L. Lambert Jr

J. W. Hufham, Manager
Licensing and Regulation

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
INSULATION NOT CONSIDERED IN ANALYSIS OF 1-INCH BORATION LINE
10CFR50.55(e) REPORT NO. 2 (FINAL)
NCR WBNCEB8422

Description of Deficiency

On TVA piping analysis problem N3-62-3A for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), the mass of the insulation/heat tracing (I/HT) which is required for a section of 1-inch alternate boration piping was not considered. This deficiency occurred only for that section of 1-inch schedule 40 piping from joints AA1 to A18 as shown on TVA drawing 47W406-200. The I/HT doubles the mass of the affected piping, and, therefore, invalidated the seismic qualification of the piping since it was not considered in the analysis.

Safety Implications

TVA reanalyzed problem N3-62-3A per engineering change notice (ECN) 5272, to account for the weight of I/HT. The reanalysis resulted in slight increases in support loads. However, support modification is not required since the increase in loads was so small. The supports are acceptable to use-as-is, and the 1-inch alternate boration piping is seismically qualified as is. Therefore, had this condition remained uncorrected, the safe operation of the plant could not have been adversely affected. TVA no longer considers this to be a condition that is reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e).