

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

February 22, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT
50-390/84-01, 50-391/84-01 - RESPONSE TO VIOLATION


The subject inspection report cited TVA with a Severity Level V Violation
(391/84-01-01) in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201. Enclosed is our response
to the subject violation.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS
858-2688.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are
complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

**WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
NRC-OIE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT
50-390/84-01 AND 50-391/84-01
RESPONSE TO VIOLATION**

Severity Level V Violation--391/84-01-01

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as implemented by Watts Bar FSAR Section 17, paragraph 17.1A.5 requires that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures and drawings and be accomplished in accordance with these procedures and drawings.

Watts Bar QCP 4.23-4, QCP 4.23-5 and QCP 4.23-8 provide the procedures and acceptance criteria for inspection of the safety-related pipe supports and restraints.

Contrary to the above, between January 3-6, 1983, activities affecting quality were not being accomplished in accordance with documented procedures and drawings in that a reinspection of six hangers revealed two hangers with deviations from the documented requirements.

Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation

TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.

Reason for the Violation

The inspectors failed to properly verify snubber cold setting on hanger 2072-72-2CS-R9, and snubber transition tube and weld configuration on hanger 2072-72-2CS-R36, apparently due to a lack of attention to drawing requirements.

Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved

The inspection activities cited in this violation were performed on March 30 and May 5, 1983. These deficiencies have been documented in NCR 5307, which required rework in accordance with design drawings and/or vendor catalogs, and redocumentation in accordance with procedures WBNP-QCP-4.23-5, "Support Shock Suppressors," and WBNP-QCP-4.23-4, "Support Visual Examination of Weld Joints." These hangers have been reworked and this NCR was closed.