

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

October 22, 1982

WBRD-50-390/82-65

WBRD-50-391/82-62

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II

Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DEFICIENT WESTINGHOUSE W-2
HANDSWITCH PULL GUIDES AND PULL GUIDE COVERS - WBRD-50-390/82-65,
WBRD-50-391/82-62 - SECOND INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
R. V. Crlenjak on June 4, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR
WBN SWP 8226. Our first interim report was submitted on July 6, 1982.
Enclosed is our second interim report. We expect to submit our next report
on or about February 2, 1983. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 to be applicable
to this deficiency.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
DEFICIENT WESTINGHOUSE W-2 HANDSWITCH PULL GUIDES AND PULL GUIDE COVERS
NCR WBN SWP 8226

WBRD-50-390/82-65, WBRD-50-391/82-62
10 CFR 50.55(e)

SECOND INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Westinghouse (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) manufactured W-2 handswitches used in nonsafety-related circuits which were identified to have either cracked or broken pull guides and pull guide covers. Further investigations disclosed that W-2 handswitches used in safety-related circuits also have the same deficiency. Attachment 1 is a list of switches on a unit control board checked by site personnel. Of 24 switches, 21 were found to have cracked pull guide covers. TVA uses the same type of switches in other safety-related circuits on the 480-volt motor control centers and 6900-volt switchgears.

Interim Progress

Westinghouse has stated that the cause of the cracked covers is a result of excessive tightening of the cover screws and/or excessive force used in slamming the switch closed. TVA will inspect the W-2 pull guide covers and furnish Westinghouse with a list of the covers that are defective. Westinghouse will supply replacement covers and furnish a torque value for the cover screws.

TVA is still investigating the underlying cause of this problem and the actions necessary to prevent recurrence.

ATTACHMENT 1

<u>Identifier</u>	<u>Condition</u>
1-HS-63-10A	Cracked
1-HS-63-15A	Cracked
1-HS-72-10A	Cracked
1-HS-72-27A	Cracked
2-HS-74-10A	Cracked
2-HS-74-20A	Cracked
2-HS-63-10A	Cracked
2-HS-63-15A	Cracked
2-HS-62-230A	Cracked
2-HS-62-232A	O.K.
2-HS-72-10A	Cracked
2-HS-72-27A	Cracked
2-HS-3-118A	Cracked
2-HS-3-128A	Cracked
2-HS-54-9B1	Cracked
2-HS-54-9A1	O.K.
2-HS-6-117A	Cracked
2-HS-6-112A	Cracked
2-HS-6-191A	Cracked
2-HS-6-197A	Cracked
2-HS-6-122A	Cracked
2-HS-2-105A	Cracked
2-HS-2-107A	Cracked
2-HS-2-109A	O.K.