

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

October 1, 1982

WBRD-50-390/82-97

WBRD-50-391/82-93

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II

Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - UNTERMINATED CABLES -
WBRD-50-390/82-97, WBRD-50-391/82-93 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector D. Quick on September 1, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR W-93-P. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next report on or about November 23, 1982.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
UNTERMINATED CABLES
NCR W-93-P
WBRO-50-390/82-97, WBRO-10-391/82-93
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During TVA's Division of Nuclear Power (NUC PR) final walkthrough associated with the transfer package X030(5) of the emergency gas treatment system (EGTS) from TVA's Division of Construction (CONST), several cables which were required to be terminated were not. The following list indicates which cables were not terminated as required:

<u>Cables</u>	<u>Panels</u>	<u>Cables</u>	<u>Panels</u>
1PS111	1-R-48	1PM1857	1-R-49
1PS112	1-R-48	1PS152	1-R-51
1PM1850	1-R-49	1PS153	1-R-51
1PM1852	1-R-49		

These cables provide pressure input signals to the solid state protection system. The EGTS system transfer documentation did not indicate the subject cables were terminated. These cables were shown as being terminated on "as constructed" connection drawings.

The apparent cause is the transfer punch list did not identify specifically which cables nor indicate the total number of cables to be terminated. During the research to identify which cables were required to be terminated before system transfer, CONST personnel inadvertently overlooked three connection diagrams which resulted in the failure to terminate the subject cables.

Safety Implication

Had this condition remained uncorrected, failure to terminate the subject cables of the solid state protection system could have resulted in the EGTS system not performing its intended safety function. This condition could have adversely affected the safe operation of the plant.

Interim Progress

The subject cables have been terminated and inspected as per the "as-constructed" drawings.

To prevent recurrence, the CONST Electrical Engineering Unit has been retrained in the requirements of WNP Quality Control Instruction 1.22, "Transfer of Permanent Features to the Division of Nuclear Power." This training emphasized the requirements for thorough walkdowns of features to be transferred and the requirements for verification of configuration before assembling "as-constructed" drawings. TVA is continuing to investigate the subject NCR to determine if any additional corrective action is necessary. Our next report will provide the results of this investigation.