TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

82 JUN 14 P1:30
USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

June 10, 1982

WBRD-50-390/81-75
WBRD-50-391/81-71

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - FAILURE TO ERECT PLATFORMS, LADDERS, AND STAIRS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE DRAWINGS - WBRD-50-390/81-75, WBRD-50-391/81-71 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector P. Taylor on September 3, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 3579R. Interim reports were submitted on October 5, 1981 and March 16, 1982. Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

OFFICIAL COPY

IE 27

8206210245 820610
PDR ADOCK 05000390
S PDR

An Equal Opportunity Employer

ENCLOSURE
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
FAILURE TO ERECT PLATFORMS, LADDERS, AND STAIRS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE DRAWINGS
NCR 3579R
WBRD-50-390/81-75, WBRD-50-391/81-71
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Early in 1981, a program was initiated to define all remaining work at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. A work package system of work control was also instituted during this period. During implementation of these programs, it was discovered that many miscellaneous and structural items, such as platforms, stairs, and ladders did not conform to the drawings. The discrepancies are mainly connection details and welds which are different from the original design. Documents recording related or similar occurrences are NCRs 2375R, 3001R1, and 3523R which were reported separately. All structural and miscellaneous features could possibly have similar defects. The root cause of this deficiency was failure to follow procedures which require strict adherence to drawing requirements and failure to properly document drawing changes for variations.

Safety Implications

If these discrepancies remained uncorrected, deficiencies might exist which could jeopardize the structural stability of these items. During a seismic event, the structures might collapse and damage safety-related systems. This condition therefore could have jeopardized the safe operation of the plant.

Corrective Action

A listing has been prepared showing where field configuration disagrees with that shown on applicable drawings. Review of the inspection of the subject structures has been completed with the following results:

1. Auxiliary building, control building, reactor building - Approximately 18 percent of features required rework and 72 percent required drawing changes to meet drawing requirements;

2. All rework will be documented per current applicable procedures;

3. Previously generated documentation for features which required no rework and/or drawing changes has been evaluated and determined acceptable.

From June 1, 1981, to present, approximately 400 Field Change Requests (FCRs) have been written for rework/redocumentation of features which are affected by this deficiency. This number represents a detailed effort to obtain drawing configuration control for these features. Corrective measures for unit 1 and common features have been scheduled for completion by December 31, 1982, and corrective action for unit 2 is scheduled for completion before unit 2 fuel load.

To prevent recurrence, Construction Civil Engineering Unit inspectors and iron worker craftsmen have been instructed to build and accept all items in strict accordance with applicable drawings.