

REGION II  
ATLANTA, GA  
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street, Tower II

82 JUN 7  
June 3, 1982

WBRD-50-390/82-48  
WBRD-50-391/82-45

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II

Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - INCORRECT SUPPORTS IN ANALYSIS  
OF 3-INCH CVCS LINE - WBRD-50-390/82-48, WBRD-50-391/82-45 - FIRST INTERIM  
REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
D. Quick on May 5, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR  
WBN CEB 8209. Inspector R. V. Crlenjak was notified on May 19, 1982 that  
10 CFR Part 21 is not applicable to this deficiency. This superseded our  
initial notification that 10 CFR Part 21 was applicable. Enclosed is our  
first interim report. The submittal date of this report was discussed with  
Mr. Crlenjak on June 3, 1982. We expect to submit our next report by  
December 20, 1982.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at  
PTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*DS Kammer for*  
L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
INCORRECT SUPPORTS IN ANALYSIS OF 3-INCH CVCS LINE  
NCR WBN CER 8209  
WBRD-50-390/82-48, WBRD-50-391/82-45  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

The 3-inch letdown line in the CVCS system from the crossover leg loop No. 3 to the regenerative heat exchanger has two inline isolation valves (node points 51 and 150 of EDS Nuclear, Incorporated's analysis 0600200-08-10) which were analyzed with rigid supports on the valve operators in one direction. The as-designed supports for these locations are snubbers. This condition results in the analysis being incorrect with respect to pipe movements, pipe stresses, and support loads. EDS Nuclear, Inc., performed the original analysis; however, TVA had instructed EDS to design the supports based on loads generated with rigid supports on valve operators.

Interim Progress

TVA will reanalyze the subject supports and piping to determine if any field modifications are necessary.