TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

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December 2, 1981

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - ANCHOR BOLTS INSTALLED NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPACING SPECIFICATIONS - WBRD-50-390/81-36, WBRD-50-391/81-35 - FIFTH INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on March 31, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR SWP 8106. TVA considers 10 CFR 21 applicable to this deficiency. Interim reports were submitted on April 30, May 21, June 4, and September 16, 1981. We expect to provide additional information by January 26, 1982.

TVA has completed a design review of the calculations used to derive the reduced minimum self-drilling expansion shell (SSD) anchor spacing for drawing 47A050-17. Based on the results of the design review, TVA has accepted the reduced minimum SSD spacing for adjacent plates with the addition of a note to restrict the drawing use to support base plates that have spacings between SSD anchors on each individual base plate that meet G-32 spacings for individual base plates.

TVA is initiating a field survey to determine the extent of the problem of support (SSD) anchors interfering with other adjacent (SSD) support anchors due to less than minimum spacing.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

for L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

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21. 6-33: The AFAS-1, AFAS-2 are maintained switches due to the AFAS design and functional criteria. When actuated the AFAS-1 & -2 signals modulates the auxiliary feedwater valves full open/full closed. Because of this on-off action, this switch cannot be momentary as the others are designed to be.
22. 6-34: The ESFAS manual actuation switches have no position function. They trip their channel logic when turned. There movement conforms to standard control design for actuation, and is left to right. If an operator attempts to turn these to the left, they will not turn. The indication of successful operation is the ESFAS logic trip annunciation on that panel directly above the switch.
23. 6-35: The writing by grease pencil on the metal plates of the simulator addressable trend recorders was hastily put on when the machine was delivered a year ago. With proper application, there is enough contrast with this method to be suitable; training will reinforce this concept.
24. 6-44: The bus designator on each label indicates the proper unit number on Busses S05 and S06. Also, the breaker numbers on the source and alternate source labels carry a unit designator.
25. 6-46: All the Motor Operated Disconnect (MOD) switch controls are placed next to their respective MOD mimic designators.
26. 7-3, 7-4: A keyboard is a single device where the keys are used as necessary to perform a communication with a computer. Its design and function are consistent with computer utilization anywhere in the industry. It is consistent with operator training and experience.
27. 7-12: The computer will indicate when the operator gives a command it cannot perform. There are no instructions prompted by the computer because the machine does not know what the operator desires to occur. Training and the user's manual in conjunction with error messages will provide the operator with the knowledge to utilize the computer.
28. 7-13: The only operation that takes longer than 3 to 5 seconds to respond is the printing of logs. The operator knows this is occuring by observing the log typer functioning immediately to his right. Training will show those items that take 5 seconds to respond and the operator will be aware, so a prompting is superfluous.
29. 7-18: In our review of the control board and operator actions, this was not identified as necessary information.
30. 8-2: The Reactor Protection System (RPS) Pretrip/Trip indicators are diagnostic in nature, and are intended to show what parameter in each channel caused the problem. There is no functional grouping associated with their use.
31. 8-4, 8-6, 8-7, 8-8, 9-4, 9-6: The Systems Factors Group's review of the configuration of plant systems and of the current and new board configuration to the operator tasks has shown the new configuration is optimal for proper systems operation.