TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

NRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
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November 19, 1981

WBRD-50-391/81-24

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - LACK OF WESTINGHOUSE QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW ON FIELD CHANGE NOTICE - WBRD-50-391/81-24 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector K. V. Crlenjak on February 27, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR WBN NEB 8103. TVA considers this deficiency to be potentially reportable under 10 CFR Part 21. Interim reports were submitted on April 3, June 4, and August 5, 1981. Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2
LACK OF WESTINGHOUSE QA REVIEW ON FIELD CHANGE NOTICE
WBRD-50-391/81-24
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Four Anchor Darling UHI gate valves furnished by Westinghouse, which were returned to the factory for modifications, failed to receive a postmodification QA review. The problem occurred when the QA review box was not checked on the second addendum to the Field Change Notice (FCN), WBT10521, which called for the modifications. This item was due to an oversight on the part of the vendor.

A potentially significant breakdown of a portion of the Westinghouse QA review program may exist. This is illustrated by the fact that the unit 1 valves were QA reviewed, but the unit 2 valves were not.

Safety Implications

Since these valves were not QA reviewed, there is a possibility that they contain faulty or substandard components which could fail after installation. These valves are in a safety system (UHI), and their failure could impair or prevent use of this system.

Corrective Action

Westinghouse has inspected the reworked valves at the site and issued quality releases. These have been received and accepted by TVA. Westinghouse has committed to a review of the sequence of events surrounding this deficiency to ensure that their engineering, site, purchasing, and quality assurance personnel are alert to the need for proper control and documentation of modifications. This will be complete by December 31, 1981.