J. R. Johnson
Vice President – Farley

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SOUTHERN COMPANY
Energy to Serve Your World™

July 29, 2008

Docket Nos.: 50-364

NL-08-1096

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant – Unit 2
Licensee Event Report 2008-001-00
Condition Prohibited by TS 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.

Sincerely,

J. R. Johnson
Vice President – Farley

JRJ/CHM

Enclosure: Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2008-001-00

IE22
NRR

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Mr. J. T. Gasser, Executive Vice President
Mr. J. R. Johnson, Vice President – Farley
Mr. D. H. Jones, Vice President – Engineering
RTYPE: CFA04.054; LC # 14798

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator
Mr. R. A. Jervey, NRR Project Manager – Farley
Mr. E. L. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector – Farley

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant – Unit 2
Licensee Event Report 2008-001-00
Condition Prohibited by TS 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters

Enclosure

Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2008-001-00

NRC FORM 366 (9-2007) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. PAGE
Joseph M Farley Nuclear Plant – Unit 2	05000 364	1 of 3

4. TITLE

Condition Prohibited by TS 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
06	06	2008	2008	- 001 -	00	07	29	2008	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE

1

10. POWER LEVEL

100

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: *(Check all that apply)*

- ☐ 20.2201(b)
- ☐ 20.2201(d)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(1)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(4)
- ☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
- ☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
- ☐ 50.36(c)(2)
- ☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
- ☒ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- ☐ 73.71(a)(4)
- ☐ 73.71(a)(5)
- ☐ OTHER

Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
J. R. Johnson – Vice President	334 899-5156

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
E	EJ	BTRY	C173	Y					

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

☐ YES *(If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)* ☒ NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)*

On February 11, 2008 the quarterly surveillance testing procedure (STP) was performed on the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building B-Train Battery [EJ]. The STP was signed off as satisfactory. This quarterly STP was repeated on May 7, 2008 and Cell number 33 of B-Train Battery was determined to have a voltage of 2.06 V which is below the minimum allowed cell voltage of 2.08 V. Technical Specifications (TS) Action statements were entered which resulted in Cell number 33 being replaced on June 3, 2008. On June 6, 2008 during the review of the paper work associated with this Cell replacement, SNC determined that the February 11, 2008 STP was approved in error since the recorded voltage for Cell number 33 was 2.06 V which is below the minimum allowed voltage of 2.08 V. The recorded voltage was transcribed illegibly by the journeymen and subsequently misread by the journeymen and supervisor as 2.16 V. This error resulted in the B-Train battery being inoperable between February 11 and May 7, 2008 due to not completing the required TS Action Statement.

Cell number 33 of the 2B Auxiliary Building Battery was replaced on June 3, 2008. Personnel involved in the event have been coached on the importance of attention to detail when using procedures and legibility of recorded data.

Westinghouse -- Pressurized Water Reactor
Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as [XX]

Description of Event

On February 11, 2008 the quarterly surveillance testing was performed on the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building B-Train Battery [EJ]. The surveillance test was signed off as satisfactory. This quarterly surveillance test was repeated on May 7, 2008 and Cell number 33 of B-Train Battery was determined to have a voltage of 2.06 V which is below the minimum allowed cell voltage of 2.08 V. Technical Specifications (TS) Action statements were entered which required surveillance every seven days and the restoration of Cell number 33 within 31 days. Cell number 33 was replaced on June 3, 2008. On June 6, 2008 during the review of the paper work associated with this Cell replacement, SNC determined that the February 11, 2008 surveillance test was approved in error since the recorded voltage for Cell number 33 was 2.06 V which is below the minimum allowed voltage of 2.08 V. The recorded voltage was transcribed illegibly by the journeymen and subsequently misread by the journeymen and supervisor as 2.16 V. This error resulted in the B-Train battery being inoperable between February 11 and May 7, 2008 due to not completing the required TS Action Statement.

Cause of Event

The journeymen involved in taking the voltage reading failed to follow the procedure and compare the voltage to the correct acceptance criteria. Additionally, the journeymen and supervision failed to ensure the procedure was correctly completed.

Safety Assessment

This event had no adverse effect on the safety and health of the public.

The Auxiliary Building 125 Volt Direct Current (VDC) system consists of two independent and redundant subsystems (A-Train and B-Train) which supply Direct Current (DC) power to various Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems throughout the plant. Each Auxiliary Building subsystem (train) consists of a 125 Volt battery, an associated full capacity battery charger and all associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling. During normal operation, the 125 VDC load is powered from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. In case of loss of normal power to the battery charger, the DC load is automatically powered from the station batteries.

The Auxiliary Building batteries are stationary type consisting of 60 individual lead-calcium cells electrically connected in series to establish a nominal 125 VDC power supply. Under both normal and accident conditions the batteries are capable of providing the required voltage for component operation. The battery float voltage is 2.20 V per cell average and 132 V total terminal voltage.

Although not a requirement for the mitigation of design basis events, each battery is capable of providing Loss of Off Site Power (LOSP) or LOSP plus Safety Injection (SI) loads for a period of two hours assuming the single failure loss of the battery charger aligned at the onset of the event.

Cell number 33 of the 2B Auxiliary Building battery was replaced, surveillance testing was completed satisfactorily and the battery was returned to service on June 3, 2008. A test was performed on the removed Cell number 33 that demonstrated the Cell would have provided the energy needed to meet its safety function for a period of two hours as required by the design of the system. In addition, an engineering evaluation documented that the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building B-Train Battery would have met its safety function with Cell number 33 jumpered out of the battery. This engineering evaluation and actual test results of Cell number 33 provided reasonable assurance that the safety and health of the public was not adversely affected by this event.

Corrective Action

Cell number 33 of the 2B Auxiliary Building Battery was replaced on June 3, 2008.

As an interim measure, additional supervisory personnel (Maintenance Team Leader) reviews are performed on Technical Specifications battery surveillance test packages.

Personnel involved in the event have been coached on the importance of attention to detail when using procedures and legibility of recorded data.

Additional Information

Previous Similar Events

LER 2007-001-00	Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.8.1 Violation Due to Failure of Breaker / Mechanism-Operated Cell Switch
LER 2008-001-00	Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator 1B Exhaust Pipe Failure
LER 2008-002-00	Unit 1 TS 3.0.3 Entry Due to Inoperability of Residual Heat Removal System