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Docket Hos. 50-390/391 50-289

L. Manning Muntzing, Director of Regulation

CAUSE OF DELAYS - THREE MILE ISLAND 1/HATTS BAR 1 & 2

The following information is in response to your request concerning delays reported by applicants for the Three Mile Island 1 and Watts Bar 1 & 2 facilities.

## Three Mile Island 1

In April 1974 Metropolitan Edison Company reported that they were unable to maintain their test schedule (Met Ed was granted an OL for Three Mile Island 1 on April 19, 1974).

In the two months or so preceding this action, the applicant suffered repeated unexpected delays in the test program schedule which in turn resulted in delays in licensing. The delays were incurred primarily because the applicant's test schedule did not reflect a significant accumulation of outstanding items. As such, these delays were not caused by Regulatory.

Some of the principal delays incurred immediately prior to licensing include:

- Testing of the reactor containment to demonstrate a leak rate of 0.1% per day. This leak rate, which is about half that normally used, was a Regulatory requirement resulting from the site's relatively small exclusion area boundary and low population zone distances.
- 2. Failure of the nuclear service river water pumps.
- 3. Main condenser repairs.
- 4. Wiring problems with the meteorology tower.
- 5. Chlorine monitor installation.

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One other significant problem occurred at the plant was the collapse of a spray additive tank but this event did not delay licensing.

## Watts Bar 1 1 2

In May 1974 TVA reported (Watts Bar Units 1 and 2) a projected 5-month construction slippage due to the redesign of the containment to accommodate higher transient pressures.

The 5-month construction slippage for Watts Bar 1 and 2 (which received a CP on January 23, 1973) is a result of redesign of the ice condenser containment and resultant construction delays. This redesign was necessitated by modified containment design criteria established by the Regulatory staff and agreed to by the applicant during the CP hearings. Specifically, the criteria were changed to assure adequate design margins (100% liquid entrainment and a 40% safety factor for differential pressure loadings) to compensate for design uncertainties.

As a result of this redesign, TVA apparently incurred delays in obtaining steel anchor bolts and reinforcing rods, and is scheduling additional time to erect and weld thicker plate for the containment shell.

Subsequent analysis and testing has shown that the requirements imposed by Regulatory were adequate and were justified.

Original Signed By E. G. Casa

Edson G. Case Acting Director of Licensing

cc: R. S. Boyd

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