

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION H 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

JUL 2 1 1981



Gentlemen:

The enclosed information notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE circular or bulletin will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely, James P. U'Reilly

James P. U'Reil Director

Enclosures:

- 1. IE Information Notice No. 81-21
- 2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

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Distribution for IE Information Notice No. 81-21

July 21, 1981

# Addresses

In Reference To

50-348 Farley Unit 1

50-364 Farley Unit 2

- Alabama Power Company Attn: R. P. McDonald Vice President-Nuclear Generation Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, AL 35291
- Carolina Power and Light Company Attn: J. A. Jones Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602
- Duke Power Company Attn: L. C. Dail, Vice President Design Engineering P. O. Box 33189 Charlotte, NC 28242
- Duke Power Company Attn: W. O. Parker, Jr. Vice President, Steam Production P. O. Box 2178 Charlotte, NC 28242
- Florida Power and Light Company Attn: R. E. Uhrig, Vice President Advanced Systems and Technology P. O. Box 529100 Miami, FL 33152
- Florida Power Corporation Attn: J. A. Hancock. Assistant Vice President Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 14042, Mail Stop C-4 St. Petersburg, FL 33733

50-325 Brunswick Unit 1 50-324 Brunswick Unit 2 50-400 Harris Unit 1 50-401 Harris Unit 2 50-402 Harris Unit 3 50-403 Harris Unit 4 50-261 Rabinson Unit 2 50-491 Cherokee Unit 1 50-492 Cherokee Unit 2 50-493 Cherokee Unit 3 50-488 Perkins Unit 1 50-489 Perkins Unit 2 50-490 Perkins Unit 3 50-369 McGuire Unit 1 50-370 McGuire Unit 2 50-269 Oconee Unit 1 50-270 Oconee Unit 2 50-287 Oconee Unit 3 50-413 Catawba Unit 1 50-414 Catawba Unit 2 50-335 St. Lucie Unit 1 50-389 St. Lucie Unit 2 50-250 Turkey Point Unit 3 50-251 Turkey Point Unit 4

50-302 Crystal River Unit 3

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## Addresses

- Georgia Power Company Attn: J. H. Miller, Jr. Executive Vice President 270 Peachtree Street Atlanta, GA 30303
- Mississippi Power and Light Company Attn: N. L. Stampley Vice President of Production P. O. Box 1640 Jackson, MS 39205
- Offshore Power Systems Attn: A. R. Collier, President P. O. Box 8000 Jacksonville, FL 32211
- South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Attn: T. C. Nichols, Jr., Vice President Power Production and System Operations
   P. O. Box 764 Columbia, SC 29218
- II. Tennessee Valley Authority Attn: H. G. Parris Manager of Power 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattancoga, TN 37401

12. Virginia Electric and Power Company Attn: J. H. Ferguson Executive Vice President-Power P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, VA 23261 In Reference To

- 50-321 Hatch Unit 1 50-366 Hatch Unit 2 50-424 Vogtle Unit 1 50-425 Vogtle Unit 2
- 50-416 Grand Gulf Unit 1 50-417 Grand Gulf Unit 2

50-437 FNP 1-3

50-395 Summer Unit 1

50-438 Bellefonte Unit 1 50-439 Bellefonte Unit 2 50-259 Browns Ferry Unit 1 50-260 Browns Ferry Unit 2 50-296 Browns Ferry Unit 3 50-518 Hartsville Unit 1 50-519 Hartsville Unit 2 50-520 Hartsville Unit 2 50-521 Hartsville Unit 4 50-553 Phipps Bend Unit 1 50-554 Phipps Bend Unit 2 50-327 Sequoyah Unit 1 50-328 Sequoyah Unit 2 50-390 Watts Bar Unit 1 50-391 Watts Bar Unit 2 50-566 Yellow Creek Unit 1 50-567 Yellow Creek Unit 2 50-338 North Anna Unit 1 50-339 North Anna Unit 2 50-404 North Anna Unit 3 50-280 Surry Unit 1 50-281 Surry Unit 2

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#### (INSURMATION)

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# Addresses

#### In Reference, To

-3-

- 13. Institute of Nuclear Power Operation Attn: R W. Fack Lakeside Complex 1820 Waterplace Atlanta, GA 30339
- 24. Southern Company Services, Inc. ATTN: O. Batum, Manager Nuclear Safety & Licensing Department P. O. Box 2625 Birmingham, AL 35202
- 11. Dapa tment of Energy Clinch Rever Breeder Reactor Plant Project Office ATTN: Chief, Quality Improvement P. O. Box d Oak Ridge, TW 37830
- EDS, Nuclear, Inc.
  ATTN: E. H. Verdery
  330 Technology Park/Atlanta
  Norcross, GA 30092

SSIM No.: 6835 Accession No.: 810330402 IN 81-21

## UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMPISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

#### July 21, 1981

# IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 81-21: POTENTIAL LOSS OF DIRECT ACCESS TO ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

## Description of Circumstances:

IE Bulletin 81-03, issued April 10, 1981, requested licensees to take certain actions to prevent and detect flow blockage caused by Asiatic clams and mussels. Since then, one evant at San Onofre Unit 1 and two events at the Brunswick Station have indicated that situations not explicitly discussed in Bulletin 81-03 may occur and result in a loss of direct access to the ultimate heat sink. Tiese situ tions are:

- Debris from shell fish other than Asiatic clams and mussels may cause flow blockage problems essentially identical to those described in the bulletin.
- 2. Flow blockage in heat exchangers can cause high pressure drops that, in turn, deform baffles, allowing bypass flow and reducing the pressure drop to near normal values. Once this occurs, heat exchanger flow blockage may not be detectable by pressure drop measurements. J
- 3. Change in operating conditions. (A lengthy outage with no flrw through seawater systems appears to have permitted a buildup of muserls in systems where previous periodic inspections ov\_r more than a ten year period showed no appreciable problem.)

We are currently reviewing these events and the responses of the licensees to IEB 81-03. We expect licensees are performing the actions specified in IEB 81-03 such that cooling water flow blockage from any shell fish is prevented or minimized, and is detected before safety components become inoperable.

On June 9, 1981, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 1 reported that as a result of a low saltwater coolant flow rate indication and an apparent need for valve maintenance, a piping elbow on the saltwater discharge line from component cooling heat exchanger E-20A was removed by the licensee just upstream of Lutterfly valve 12"-50-415 to permit visual inspection. An examination revealed growth of some form of sea mollusk such that the cross-sectional diameter of the piping was reduced. The movement of the butterfly valve was impaired and some blockage of the heat exchanger tube sheet had occurred. Evaluation of the event at San Onofre is continuing. However, the prolonged (since April 1980) reactor shutdown for refueling and steam generator repair is believed to have caused the problem since previous routi inspections conducted since 1968 at 18 month intervals had not revealed moliusks during normal periods of operation.

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Two events at Brunswick involved service water flow blockage and inoperability of redundant residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers, primarily due to oyster shalls blocking the service water flow through the heat exchanger tubes. On April 25, 1981, at Brunswick Unit 1, while in cold shutdown during a maintenance outage, the normal decay heat removal system was lost when the single RHR heat exchanger in service failed. The failure occurred when the starting of a second RHR service water pump caused the failure of a baffle in the waterbox of the RHR heat exchanger, allowing cooling water to bypass the tube bundle. The heat exchanger is U-tube type, with the service water inlet and outlet separated by a baffle. The copper-nickel baffle which was welded to the copper-nickel tubesheet deflected and failed when increased pressure was produced by starting the second service water pump. The redundant heat exchanger was inoperable due to maintenance in progress to repair its baffle which had previously deflected (LER 1-81-32, dated May 19, 1931). The licensee promptly established an alternate heat removal alignment using the spent fuel pool pumps and heat exchangers.

As a result of the problems discovered with Unit 1 RHR heat exchangers, a special inspection of the Unit 2 RHR heat exchangers was performed while Unit 2 was at power. Examination of RHR heat exchanger 2A using ultrasonic techniques indicated no baffle displacement but flow testing indicated an excessive pressure drop across the heat exchanger. This heat exchanger was declared inoperable. Examination of the 2B RHR heat exchanger using ultrasonic and differential pressure measurements indicated that the baffle plate was damaged. The licensee initiated a shutdown using the 2A RHR heat exchanger at reduced capacity (LER 2-81-49, dated May 20, 1981).

The failure of the baffle was attributed to excessive differential pressure caused by blockage of the heat exchanger tubes. The blockage was caused by the shells of oysters with minor amounts of other types of shells which were swept into the heads of the heat exchangers since they are the low point in the service water system. The shells resulted from an infestation of oysters growing primarily in the 30" header from the intake structure to the reactor building. As the oysters died their upper shells detached and were swept into the RHR heat exchangers where they collected. Small amounts of shells were found in other heat exchangers in the RHR system. (The heat exchangers used at Brunswick were manufactured by Perflex Corporation and are identified as type CEU, size 52-8-144.)

The observed failures raise a question on the adequacy of the baffle design to withstand differential pressures that could reasonably be expected during long term post accident operation. However, it should be noted that since the baffles at Brunswick are solid copper-nickel as are the tubesheats and the water boxes are copper-nickel clad, the strength of the baffles and the baffle welds is somewhat less than similar heat exchangers made from carbon steel. Therefore, heat exchangers in other BWR's may be able to tolerate higher differential pressure than that at Brunswick without baffle deflection. (Brunswick opted for copper-nickel due to its high corrosion and fouling resistance in a salt water environment.)

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The use of differential pressure (dp) sensing between inlet and outlet of determine heat exchanger operability should consider that baffle failure could give an acceptable dp and flow indications and thereby mask incapability for heat removal. However, it is noted that shell blockage in a single-pass, straight-through heat exchanger can readily be detected by flow and dp measurement.

Evaluation of the events at Brunswick is still continuing. Under conditions of an inoperable RHR system, heat rejection to the ultimate heat sink is typically through the main condenser or through the spent fuel pool coolers. This latter path consists of the spent fuel pool pumps and heat exchanger with the reactor building closed cooling water system as an intermadiate system which transfers the heat to the service water system via a single pass heat exchanger. These two means (i.e., main condenser or spent fuel pool) are not considered to be reliable long term system alignments under accident conditions.

This information is provided as a notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff. The events at Brunswick and fan Onofie emphasize the need for licensees to initiate appropriate actions as requested by IEB 81-03 for any credible type of shell fish or other marine organisms; e.g., fresh water sponges, (not only asiatic clams and mussels). In case the continuing NRC review finds that specific licensee actions would be appropriate, a supplement to IEB Bulletin 81-04 may be issued. In the interim, we expect that licensees will review this information for applicability to their facilities.

No written response to this information is required. If you need additional information regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Attachment: Recently issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 14 51-21 July 21, 1981

# RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information		Date of	
Notice No.	Subject	Issue	Issued to
81-20	Test Failures of Electrical Penetration Assemblies	7/13/81	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
81-19	Lost Parts in Primary Coolant System	7/6/81	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
81-18	Excessive Radiation Exposures to the Fingers of Three Individua's Incurred During Cleaning and Wipe Testing of Radioactive Sealed Sources at a Sealed- Source Manufacturing Facility	6/23/81	Specified licensees holding Byproduct licenses
81-16	Control Rod Drive System Malfunctions	4/23/81	All BWR facilities with an OL or CF
31-15	Degradation of Automatic ECCS Actuation Capability by Isolation of Instrument Lines	4/22/81	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
81-14	Potential Overstress of Shafts on Fisher Series 9200 Butterfly Valves with Expandable T Rings	4/17/81	All power reactor facilities with an OL
81-13	Cammed Source Rack in a Gamma Irradiator	4/14/81	Specified irradiator licensess
81 -12	Guidance on Order Issued January 9, 1981 Regarding Automatic Control Rod Insertion on Low Control Air Pressure	3/31/81	All BWR facilities with an OL or CP
81-11	Alternate Rod Insertion for BWR Scram Reprosents a Potential Path for Loss of Primary Scolant	3/30/81	All BWR facilities with an OL or CP

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OL = Operating Licenses CP = Construction Permits