TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

June 18, 1981

WBRD-50-390/81-39
WBRD-50-391/81-38

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DEFICIENCIES IN BOX ANCHORS AND HANGER LUGS - WBRD-50-390/81-39, WBRD-50-391/81-38 - SECOND INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on April 10, 1981, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 2795R1. Our first interim report was submitted on May 11, 1981. Enclosed is our second interim report. We expect to provide additional information by August 27, 1981.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure) ✓
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
WELDING DEFICIENCIES ON BOX ANCHORS AND HANGER LUGS
WBRD-50-390/81-39, WBRD-50-391/81-38
10 CFR 50.55(e)
SECOND INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

The ASME Code requires that the materials used in attachments welded to the RCS pressure boundary be traceable to the Certified Materials Test Reports (CMTR). Box anchors and hanger lugs have been fabricated using materials which are not traceable to CMTR's. These materials were not verified as having valid heat numbers. In addition, ASME Code welds on box anchors and hanger lugs were made by uncertified welders, and at least two cases have occurred where uncertified welders started welds which were finished by certified welders.

Corrective Action

TVA is continuing the investigations to determine appropriate corrective actions for this deficiency. However, the following steps have been taken in order to prevent further deficiencies in these areas.

In order to prevent further problems with material traceability, better training for record keeping of CMTR's has reduced problems of traceability to isolated incidents of human error. Review before finalizing operation sheets serves to identify improper heat numbers should field errors occur.

Problems with welder certification should not recur since welders are now certified to weld greater thicknesses than would occur on welds of this type. Only a limited number of box anchors have plates over 3/4 inch thick and these anchors have been identified.