

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

June 9, 1981. 0

WBRD-50-390/81-52

WBRD-50-391/81-50

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - WELDER QUALIFICATION -
WBRD-50-390/81-52, WBRD-50-391/81-50 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
R. V. Crlenjak on May 8, 1981, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as
NCR 3248R. Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at
FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L M Mills JDSK

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
WELDER QUALIFICATION
WBRD-50-390/81-52, WBRD-50-391/81-50
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

This deficiency identifies the failure of TVA's Division of Construction at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant to conform to criteria stated in TVA's General Construction Specification G-29C. TVA welding employees were not properly certified in accordance with the requirements of AWS D1.1, Section 5.0, as required by TVA General Construction Specification G-29C for performing fabrication of TVA Class I (limited) seismic pipe supports. All welders involved were qualified by radiographic examination of the test assembly to the requirements of the ASME Code for pipe of the appropriate thickness.

Safety Implications

Welders certified to G-29M (ASME Section IX) may have welded on seismic pipe supports to be fabricated under G-29C (AWS D1.1). These supports support essential mechanical piping systems which are not required for safe shutdown of the plant. However, the failure of these supports and related failure of the piping system could result in damage to a system essential to the safe shutdown of the plant.

Corrective Action

TVA has reviewed the acceptance criteria for AWS D1.1 and ASME Section IX, and determined that they are essentially equivalent in regard to welder qualification. We believe that the ASME acceptance criteria is actually more restrictive. TVA has concluded that these welders, qualified to ASME, are also qualified to AWS. TVA will update the certification records of these welders to reflect AWS certification. Certification records will be updated by August 29, 1981.