

R. Cochrane

2

[REDACTED]

By letters dated January 10, and 18, 2007, we received your reply to our Notice of Violation which was issued on December 11, 2006. The reply met the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201 and your corrective actions will be reviewed during an upcoming inspection.

[REDACTED]

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

/RA/

David A. Ayres, Chief
Fuel Facility Inspection Branch 1
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Docket No. 70-27
License No. SNM-42

Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation
2. NRC Inspection Report

cc w/encls:
Leah R. Morrell
Manager, Licensing and Safety Analysis
BWX Technologies
P. O. Box 785
Lynchburg, VA 24505-0785

Leslie P. Foldesi, Director
Bureau of Radiological Health
Division of Health Hazards Control
Department of Health
1500 East Main Street, Room 240
Richmond, VA 23219

Distribution w/encls: (See page 3)

[REDACTED]



Distribution w/encls:

- D. Ayres, RII
- J. Munday, RII
- A. Gooden, RII
- G. Wertz, RII
- M. Galloway, NMSS
- B. Gleaves, NMSS
- N. Baker, NMSS
- J. Cruz, NSIR



ADAMS: Yes ACCESSION NUMBER: _____

OFFICE	RII:DFFI	RII:DFFI	RII:DFFI	RII:DFFI		
SIGNATURE	A. Gooden for	/RA/	da (for)/RA/	/RA/		
NAME	GWertz:	AGooden		MCrespo		
DATE	03/21/2007	03/21/2007	03/22/2007	03/20/2007	May 19, 2008	May 19, 2008
E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\FileNet\ML070820046.wpd



[REDACTED]

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

BWX Technologies, Inc.
Lynchburg, Virginia

Docket No. 70-27
License No. SNM-42

During NRC inspection activities conducted between January 1 and February 24, 2007, three (3) violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below:

- A. Safety Condition S-1 of NRC license SNM-42 authorizes the use of nuclear materials in accordance with Chapters 1-11 of the License Application submitted on July 14, 1995, and supplements thereto. License Application, Section 5.1.2, states that activities involving special nuclear material are conducted according to the limits and controls established by Nuclear Criticality Safety and provided to the operating areas on nuclear criticality safety postings.

Nuclear Criticality Safety posting, 15-05-02, "[REDACTED] Entry Requirements," Revision 1, authorized containers inside the [REDACTED] if approved in accordance with Operating Procedure 1019574 or having an outside diameter less than or equal to [REDACTED]. Operating Procedure 1019574, for the [REDACTED] identified by the NRC inspector on January 23, required continual attendance while located within the [REDACTED].

Contrary to the above, on January 23, a [REDACTED] diameter piping elbow was found unattended within the [REDACTED].

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement VI).

- B. Safety Condition S-1 of NRC license SNM-42 authorizes the use of nuclear materials in accordance with Chapters 1-11 of the License Application submitted on July 14, 1995, and supplements thereto. License Application, Section 5.1.2, states that activities involving special nuclear material are conducted according to the limits and controls established by Nuclear Criticality Safety and provided to the operating areas on nuclear criticality safety postings.

Nuclear Criticality Safety posting, -012, Revision 3, required a log or other readily available means to verify compliance to the special nuclear material mass limit.

Enclosure 1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Contrary to the above, on February 14, special nuclear material was identified in the work area without a mass log or other readily available means to verify that the amount of special nuclear material remained with the applicable mass limit.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement VI).

- C. Safety Condition S-1 of NRC license SNM-42 authorizes the use of nuclear materials in accordance with Chapters 1-11 of the License Application submitted on July 14, 1995, and supplements thereto. License Application, Section 11.4, requires activities involving licensed material to be conducted in accordance with written and approved procedures. Operating procedure 0061450 requires workers to wear face shields when handling [REDACTED] acidic or basic substances.

Contrary to the above, on January 26, a Uranium Recovery Operator was observed transferring [REDACTED] solution without wearing a face shield.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement IV).

Regarding Violation A, pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, BWX Technologies, Inc., is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at BWX Technologies, Inc., within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Regarding Violations B and C, the NRC has concluded that information regarding the reasons for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the enclosed inspection report. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation," and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).

[REDACTED]

NOV

3

[REDACTED]

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

[REDACTED]

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working days.

Dated this 22nd day of March 2007

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No.: 70-27

License No.: SNM-42

Report No.: 70-27/2007-001

Licensee: BWX Technologies, Inc.

Facility: Nuclear Products Division

Location: Lynchburg, Virginia

Dates: January 1 through February 24, 2007

Inspectors: G. Wertz, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Crespo, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector

Approved by: David A. Ayres, Chief
Fuel Facilities Inspection Branch 1
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Enclosure 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BWX Technologies, Inc., Nuclear Products Division
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 70-27/2007-001

This inspection included periodic observations conducted by the Senior Resident Inspector during normal and off-normal shifts in the areas of Plant Operations, Management Organization and Controls, Maintenance and Surveillance, Radiation Protection, and Material Control and Accounting. A specialized inspection and review of documentation were conducted by a regional inspector in the areas of Management Organization and Controls, and Transportation (January 29 through February 2, 2007).

Plant Operations

- The emergency organization responded effectively to a service water line rupture which flooded several manufacturing [REDACTED]. Nuclear criticality safety and radiation protection concerns were assessed and no adverse issues were identified. The rupture resulted in an Item Relied On For Safety being rendered inoperable, but other Items Relied On For Safety were available to ensure that the overall safety function was maintained. A fire protection impairment compensation was implemented until the service water system was repaired (Paragraph 2.a).
- Immersion operations involving special nuclear material [REDACTED] were performed in accordance with the procedure. Items Relied On For Safety were maintained to ensure a criticality accident remained highly unlikely (Paragraph 2.b).
- Operational controls used to support processing special nuclear material containing Technetium-99 were properly evaluated and implemented (Paragraph 2.c).
- A violation of the [REDACTED] Entry Requirements was identified when an unattended [REDACTED] was found within the [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] exceeded the dimensions allowed by the applicable Nuclear Criticality Safety posting and had not been maintained in accordance with the requirements of the [REDACTED] operating procedure (Paragraph 2.d).
- A violation was identified when a special nuclear material mass log was not maintained as required by the applicable nuclear criticality safety posting. The planned corrective actions were adequate (Paragraph 2.e).

Management Organization and Controls

- Modification of the [REDACTED] system was done in accordance with the Change Management System. The modified [REDACTED] system was operated and tested in accordance with the revised operating procedure (Paragraph 3.a).
- [REDACTED]



- Review of the corrective action program identified an event involving the over-loading of a [REDACTED] in Uranium Recovery with special nuclear material. The licensee properly evaluated the root cause and identified adequate planned corrective actions to prevent recurrence (Paragraph 3.b).
- The licensee's management organization met license requirements, audits were performed as required, and facility changes were properly evaluated (Paragraph 3.c).

Maintenance and Surveillance

- Functional testing of active engineered controls was properly performed to ensure that the associated Items Relied on For Safety would perform as designed (Paragraph 4.).

Radiation Protection

- Work involving the potential for airborne radiation exposure was performed in accordance with proper radiological safety controls and radiation control oversight (Paragraph 5.a).
- A violation was identified when a worker transferred [REDACTED] solution without wearing a face shield as required by the operating procedure. The completed corrective actions were adequate (Paragraph 5.b).

Material Control and Accounting

- [REDACTED]

Transportation

- Radioactive shipments were prepared according to procedures. Shipment records were properly completed and maintained. Workers were adequately trained. Container use requirements were properly performed (Paragraph 7).

Attachment:

- Partial Listing of Persons Contacted
- List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed
- Inspection Procedures Used



[REDACTED]

REPORT DETAILS

1. Summary of Plant Status

Routine fuel manufacturing operations and maintenance activities were conducted in the fuel process areas and in the [REDACTED]. Uranium recovery was conducted in the [REDACTED] facility.

2. Plant Operations (Inspection Procedure (IP) 88135)

a. Service Water Line Leak

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

On January 11, at approximately 7:50 a.m., water was reported leaking from below the floor in [REDACTED]. The Emergency Management Organization (EMO) assembly alarm was activated and the EMO promptly staffed the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The inspectors observed water leaking from the floor and responded to the EOC. Plant maintenance personnel determined that the leak was probably due to a nearby service water line and isolated the leak by closing fire water valves [REDACTED]. Several [REDACTED] reported minor flooding which the EOC evaluated for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) and radiation protection (RP) ramifications. None were identified. However, lack of service water rendered a local fire sprinkler system, designated as an Item Relied On For Safety (IROFS), inoperable. The inspectors evaluated the disabled IROFS described in Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) 15.5 and 15.9 with licensee safety personnel and agreed with their conclusion that other IROFS were available to ensure that the intended safety function remained effective.

The Emergency Director identified appropriate post-event actions, and ensured proper safety and safeguards notification requirements were reviewed, before terminating the EOC activities at 9:23 a.m. Procedure HS-03-10, "Control of Fire Protection System Impairments" was implemented to compensate for the loss of service water to the fire protection system. The inspectors reviewed the associated impairment report noting that effective fire protection controls had been established pending restoration of the fire protection system. Unusual Incident Report (UIR) 2013927 was opened for overall event review. Included in the UIR was a request to evaluate the root cause of the failure and perform an "extent of condition review" to evaluate the possibility of a similar failure elsewhere in the facility. Service water was restored to the fire sprinkler system IROFS later that day and the ruptured section was repaired on January 16.

(2) Conclusions

The EOC responded effectively to a service water line rupture which flooded several manufacturing [REDACTED]. NCS and RP concerns were assessed and no adverse issues were identified. The rupture resulted in an IROFS being rendered inoperable, but other [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IROFS were available to ensure that the overall safety function was maintained. A fire protection impairment compensation was implemented until the service water system was repaired.

b. NCS Process Review

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed operations involving the immersion of special nuclear material (SNM) [REDACTED]. The inspectors reviewed analysis NCS-2001-212 and observed operators prepare a [REDACTED] in accordance with Operating Procedure (OP)-0020905. Upset conditions were evaluated and documented in SAR 15.37, Appendix A. IROFS were available to ensure a criticality accident remained highly unlikely. The Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) K-effective, as described in License Application (LA), Section 5.2.3, "Nuclear Safety Limits," was maintained.

(2) Conclusions

Immersion operations involving an SNM [REDACTED] were performed in accordance with the OP. IROFS were maintained to ensure a criticality accident remained highly unlikely.

c. Special Nuclear Material Processing Operations

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed the analyses used to support SNM processing operations involving the solidification of uranyl nitrate (UN) solution in Downblending. The UN material was remnant from the processing of SNM which contained elevated amounts of Technetium (Tc)-99 (reference NRC Inspection Report 2006-006). NCS analysis 2006-175 and Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 06-0071 properly evaluated the material processing operation and provided sampling requirements to ensure minimal [REDACTED] was discharged to the environment. The inspectors reviewed the material mass balances for both Uranium (U)-235 and Tc-99 with the responsible engineer. Effluent samples of both U-235 and Tc-99 were below the minimum detectable activity (MDA). The inspectors observed operations noting proper adherence to the RWP by the operator and implementation of the required NCS postings.

(2) Conclusions

Operations to support processing SNM containing Tc-99 were properly evaluated and implemented.

[REDACTED]

d. Area Review(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

On January 23, during a routine tour of UR, the inspectors identified an unattended assortment of piping components which lacked the visible indicators. [REDACTED] used to authorize entry within the [REDACTED]. One [REDACTED] elbow) exceeded the dimensions allowed by [REDACTED] NCS posting 15-05-002. The inspectors notified the area foreman who promptly removed the elbow from the [REDACTED]. Corrective action BWX 2014282 was initiated and the resulting Human Performance Investigation (HPI) identified that the piping components had been approved for entry into the [REDACTED] in accordance with OP-1019574, [REDACTED]. Specific [REDACTED] requirements, listed on Form E61-465, required that the piping components be attended at all times and removed from the [REDACTED] at the end of the work day. However, these requirements were not promulgated to the maintenance workers nor the operator assigned to provide job oversight. In addition, the operator was not cognizant of their [REDACTED] responsibility which the operator's foreman failed to communicate.

The inspectors performed an extent of condition review noting that corrective action BWX 2008982 documented an event involving another unapproved container found in the [REDACTED] on June 1, 2006. Both HPIs indicated similar event causal factors of miscommunication, inadequate understanding and unclear roles and responsibilities. In addition, the current [REDACTED] program had evolved following a container control failure identified in NRC Violation (VIO) 70-27/2004-201-01. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions to ensure proper control of unfavorable geometry containers in an area that processes SNM [REDACTED] solutions had not been effective.

LA Section 5.1.2, required activities involving SNM to be conducted according to the limits and controls established by NCS and provided to the operating areas on NCS postings. NCS posting 15-05-002, [REDACTED], "authorized containers inside the [REDACTED] if approved in accordance with OP-1019574 or having an outside diameter less than or equal to [REDACTED]. OP-1019574 required the piping items identified by the inspectors on January 23 to be attended at all times or removed from the [REDACTED] at the end of the work day. Failure to remove the unattended [REDACTED] diameter piping elbow from the [REDACTED] was a violation of the [REDACTED] Entry Requirements as specified in NCS posting 15-05-002 (VIO 70-27/2007-01-01: Failure to Maintain [REDACTED] Requirements).

(2) Conclusions

A violation of the [REDACTED] Entry Requirements was identified when an unattended [REDACTED] was found in the [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] exceeded the dimensions allowed by the applicable NCS posting and had not been maintained in accordance with the requirements of the [REDACTED] OP.

e. NCS Posting Review(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

During routine inspection on February 14, the inspectors observed that the SNM mass log for a work area was missing. When questioned, the responsible area supervisor indicated that the mass log was not being used. The applicable NCS posting, -012, Rev. 3, required the use of a log or other readily available methods to indicate compliance to the NCS posting mass limit for the work area. The supervisor indicated that SNM was present in the work area and no other means of mass limit verification was available. As such, the inspectors determined that the failure to use a log or other readily available means to verify SNM mass limit compliance was a violation of the NCS posting (VIO 70-27/2007-01-02: Failure to Maintain SNM Mass Log). The inspectors reviewed planned corrective action BWX 2014975 to revise the NCS posting with NRC Headquarters NCS inspectors who determined the changes were adequate.

(2) Conclusions

A violation was identified when a SNM mass log was not maintained as required by the NCS posting. The planned corrective actions were adequate.

3. Management Organization and Controls (IPs 88135 and 88005)a. ██████████ and Operational Testing(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed modifications to the ██████████ ██████████ with the responsible engineer, against the criteria described in the change management system, and observed ██████████ operation over several days of testing. Change Requests (CR) 1025397 and 1025413, properly evaluated and documented the physical changes to the ██████████ vents, and valve and piping configurations, respectively. The inspectors reviewed Safety Analysis Report (SAR) 15.5 and concurred with the licensee's assessment that no SAR changes were needed. The inspectors reviewed OP-1018680 and observed operation of the ██████████ in accordance with the OP which had been adequately revised to incorporate the modified configuration.

(2) Conclusions

Modification of the ██████████ system was done in accordance with the Change Management System. The modified ██████████ system was operated and tested in accordance with the revised ██████████.

b. Corrective Action Review

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed corrective action BWX 2013396 involving a "double batching" of [REDACTED] into a [REDACTED] which then exceeded the NCS posting mass limit. The inspectors discussed the issue with the cognizant engineer who indicated that the operator who inadvertently added the second batch had forgotten to transfer the initial batch from the [REDACTED] following a work break. The immediate corrective action was to discontinue the SNM processing until the root cause assessment was completed and the final corrective actions were implemented. The planned corrective actions included implementation of a mass material log to ensure better SNM control and enhancements to OP 1018680 and process data sheets. The inspectors reviewed SAR table 15.5.4.1.1 and NCS Analysis 2007-02 noting that [REDACTED] mass limit had not been exceeded. The inspectors also reviewed the associated process hazards analysis scenarios and determined that a criticality accident remained highly unlikely.

(2) Conclusions

The review of the corrective action program identified an event involving the overloading of a [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] with SNM. The licensee properly evaluated the root cause and identified adequate planned corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

c. Organizational Structure, Procedure Controls, Internal Reviews and Audits, Safety Committees, Quality Assurance Programs; and Audit and Inspection (IP 88066)

(1) Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed changes in personnel responsibilities and functions that occurred in the past year and verified that license application requirements for personnel qualifications were met. The inspectors reviewed several transportation and fuel processing procedures and noted that they were properly reviewed and updated at the required biennial frequency.

The inspectors determined that safety audits conducted in 2006 were properly performed and audit findings were properly tracked. The inspectors concluded that the safety review committee was functioning in accordance with license conditions. The inspectors reviewed several facility change requests and verified that safety evaluation reports, OP revisions and operator training were properly performed.

(2) Conclusions

The licensee's management organization met license requirements, audits were performed as required, and facility changes were properly evaluated.

4. **Maintenance and Surveillance (IP 88135)**

a. **Inspection Scope and Observations**

The inspectors reviewed the management measures involving functional testing of active engineered IROFS designed to prevent an explosive gas atmosphere, described in Safety Analysis Report table 15.5.4.2.1. The functional tests were adequately detailed and performed to ensure the IROFS's safety function was maintained. Workers performing the tests were trained and qualified. In addition, the inspectors reviewed calculation ISA 94-0123-02 which was credited as a control method to ensure a [REDACTED] atmosphere was maintained.

b. **Conclusions**

Functional testing of active engineered controls was properly performed to ensure that the associated IROFS would perform as designed.

5. **Radiation Protection (IP 88135)**

a. **[REDACTED] Cleaning**

(1) **Inspection Scope and Observations**

On January 10, the inspectors observed workers cleaning an [REDACTED] in accordance with the radiological safety requirements listed in OP-0006505 for potential airborne radiation exposure. The area was properly posted and the responsible area radiation control technician provided effective oversight.

(2) **Conclusions**

Work involving the potential for airborne radiation exposure was performed in accordance with proper radiological safety controls and radiation control oversight.

b. **[REDACTED] Activities**

(1) **Inspection Scope and Observations**

On January 26, the inspectors observed a [REDACTED] operator transferring [REDACTED] solution in an open container without wearing a face shield. When questioned, the operator indicated the need to wear a face shield when performing this activity and subsequently donned one. OP-0061450 required a face shield when transferring [REDACTED] acidic or basic solutions. Failure to wear a face shield was a violation of the operating procedure (VIO 70-27/2007-01-03: Failure to Wear a Face Shield When Transferring Hazardous Solution).




The inspector reviewed the corrective actions, documented in BWX 2014495, which included counseling the operator and reiterating the procedural requirement to the staff. The inspectors concluded the corrective actions were adequate.

(2) Conclusions

A violation was identified when a worker transferred solvent extraction solution without wearing a face shield as required by the OP. The completed corrective actions were adequate.

6. Material Control and Accounting (IP 88135)



7. Transportation (IP 86740)

a. Preparation, Delivery Packages for Shipment, Delivery of Completed Packages to Carriers, Receipt of Packages, Certificates of Compliance, Management Controls, Records and Reports

(1) Scope and Observations

The inspectors observed SNM preparation of shipment packages for delivery noting they were performed in accordance with the OPs. Training records for the workers were current and employees interviewed were familiar with the inspection and packaging requirements. Shipment and container maintenance records were current and pre-shipment inspections were properly documented in the Container Specification and Inspection Report. Radiological surveys of shipments were properly performed.

(2) Conclusions

Radioactive shipments were prepared according to procedures. Shipment records were properly completed and maintained. Workers were adequately trained. Container use requirements were properly performed.



8. **Exit Meeting**

The inspection scope and results were summarized on February 2, and March 2, 2007, with R. Cochrane, General Manager, and/or other members of the licensee's staff. Although proprietary information and processes were reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information was not included in this report. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. However, the Safety and Licensing Manager did not agree with the inspector's assessment of the potential health risks associated with handling SNM [REDACTED] solutions without face shield protection. As such, additional NRC review was performed by a regional Health Physics inspector the week of March 5 through 9, 2007. Those results will be included in a subsequent NRC Inspection Report.

[REDACTED]

ATTACHMENT

1. **LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED**

J. Burch, Manager, Operations
R. Cochrane, General Manager
J. Creasey, Manager, Uranium Processing
R. Hogg, Acting Manager, Nuclear Criticality Safety
L. Morrell, Manager, Licensing & Safety Analysis
T. Nicks, Manager, Security
S. Schilthelm, Manager, Safety and Licensing
D. Spangler, Manager, Radiation Protection
M. Suwala, Manager, Nuclear Materials Control
D. Ward, Manager, Environment, Safety, Health and Safeguards

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, production staff, security, and office personnel.

2. **LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED**

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Description</u>
70-27/2007-01-01	Open	VIO - Failure to Maintain [REDACTED] Entry Requirements (Paragraph 2.d).
70-27/2007-01-02	Open	VIO - Failure to Maintain SNM Mass Log (Paragraph 2.e).
70-27/2007-01-03	Open	VIO - Failure to Wear a face Shield When Transferring Hazardous Solution (Paragraph 5.b.)

3. **INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED**

IP 88135 Resident Inspection Program for Category I Fuel Cycle Facilities
IP 88005 Management Organization and Controls
IP 86740 Transportation

[REDACTED]