Facility	/: <u> </u>	ermi 2	<b>Scenario No.</b> <u>1</u> <b>Op-Test No</b> : <u>2008-1</u>		
Exami	ners: <u>M. Bielb</u> <u>C. Moor</u> B. Pillag	e	Operators:		
Initial C	Conditions: <u>IC-</u>	<u>18, MOL, 75</u>	5% Rx. Power		
Therma Genera to servi >85% c for anot (Rev 77	<ul> <li>Turnover: The plant has been operating for 103 days. Reactor Power is currently 75% of Rated Thermal Power with Control Rods at the 86% Rod Line following rod pattern adjustment. General Service Water Pump #4 is out of service for motor replacement with an expected return to service in 2 days. This shift will start the East Heater Feed Pump and raise Reactor Power to &gt;85% of rated with Recirculation flow. Reactor Engineering will be ready in one hour to pull rods for another rod pattern adjustment. GOP 22.000.03, "Plant Operation 25% to 100% to 25%" (Rev 77) actions for power increase are complete through Step 4.2.18.2.</li> <li>NOTE: The crew's Pre-job Briefing for the reactor power increase is to be conducted prior to entering the simulator. (Suggested time 30 minutes prior to beginning the scenario.)</li> </ul>				
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description		
1.	N/A	N (BOP) N (SRO)	Start the Third HFP using SOP 23.107, "Reactor Feedwater and Condensate Systems", Section 5.5.		
2.	N/A	R (ATC) R (SRO)	Increase Reactor Power With Recirculation Flow per GOP 22.000.03,"Power Operation 25% To 100% To 25%".		
3.	B31RF0018	C (ATC) C (SRO)	RRMG "B" Walkaway Uncontrolled RRMG "B" Speed Change (>10%), crew trips the affected RRMG (Immediate Action per AOP 20.138.03, "Uncontrolled Recirc Flow Change"). Crew enters AOP 20.138.01, "Recirc Pump Trip", Condition C & D. <b>NOTE:</b> OPRMs are operable and initiate when ≥ 57% speed on both recirc pumps CRS directs increased core monitoring for instability. He also directs increasing speed on the operating RRMG to raise core flow (>43%) and exit the Scram/Exit Region of the Power to Flow Map. CRS reviews TS 3.4.1.A, Recirc Loops Operating, 2 hours to declare loop inop and 4 hours to adjust RPS trip setpoints to single loop values.		
4. * (N)o	E51MF0009 rmal, (R)eactiv	I (BOP) I (SRO) /ity, (I)nstr	Spurious RCIC Initiation Spurious start of RCIC, BOP verifies no valid actuation signal and trips RCIC when directed. CRS reviews TS 3.5.3.A, RCIC System, (Immediately verify HPCI operable and 14 day LCO). rument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor		

Scenario Outline

Facility: Fermi 2 Examiners: M. Bielby C. Moore			Scenario No1 Op-Test No: 2008-1 Operators:
	B. Pillaggi		
	nditions: <u>IC-18</u> Continued from		<u> </u>
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description
5.	R14MF0001 N20MF0023	M (All)	Loss of Div 2 Offsite Power / EDGs start / Loss of all Heater Feed Pumps, and Reactor Feed Pumps. Loss of all Div 2 Buses. EDGs 13 & 14 auto start and re- energize ESF buses only. CRS enters AOP 20.300.345kV, Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN, and performs AOP 20.000.21, "Reactor Scram". CRS enters EOP 29.100.01, "RPV Control", Sheet 1 (Level 3).
	E41MF0009 E41MF0005	C (BOP) C (SRO)	HPCI Auto Start Failure HPCI fails to start on Level 2. The crew will identify and manually start HPCI using SOP 23.202, "HPCI System", Encl C (Hard Card). <b>NOTE</b> : After about 1 min of operation HPCI will isolate.
	N21MF0031 N21RF0019	C (BOP) C (SRO)	SBFW F001 Fails As Is BOP will start SBFW Pump A, for level control, and identify a F001 failure to open. The valve remains closed and subsequently loses power. The BOP will direct an operator to investigate, and when directed, the operator will restore power. <b>NOTE:</b> SBFW Pump A is the only available SBFW pump. Crew re-starts RCIC by resetting the Trip Throttle Valve due to spurious initiation still in 23.206, RCIC, Sect 7.1 or Encl B Hard Card.
	B31MF0066	M (All)	Recirc Loop A Rupture LOCA - A Recirculation leak will cause High Drywell Pressure and level to decrease. EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1 re-entry on high Drywell Pressure and EOP Primary Containment Control, Sheet 2 entry on High Drywell Pressure. The crew will start all available high pressure injection systems. (SLC). At ~100" RPV Water Level BOP reports water level cannot be maintained > TAF. CRS briefs crew for Emergency Depressurization.
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor			

Scenario Outline

Facility:       Fermi 2       Scenario No.       1       Op-Test No:       2008-1         Facility:       M. Dialka       Operations       Operations       Operations				
Examiners: <u>M. Bielby</u> <u>C. Moore</u>			Operators:	
B. Pillaggi				
Initial C	onditions: IC-1	<u>8, MOL, 75%</u>	<u> </u>	
NOTE:	Continued from	page 2		
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description	
8b.	N/A	M (ALL)	At TAF crew Emergency Depressurizes (EOP C-2) EOP 29.100.01, RF/ED/SC, Sheet 3 <b>(CT)</b> . BOP opens 5 SRVs ADS preferred.	
			Crew restores water level 173 – 214" with available High Pressure and Low Pressure ECCS Systems. (CT)	
9.	EOPRF0038	I (ATC) I (SRO)	Div 2 EECW Hi Drywell Pressure Lead Lifted. ATC verifies EECW initiated and isolated to the Drywell in accordance with EOP PCC, Sheet 2. Determines Div 2 EECW is not isolated, and isolates by closing the P4400- F606B. He then restores cooling to CRD.	
10.	N/A	M (ATC) M (SRO)	Crew sprays the Torus using SOP 23.205, "RHR System", Encl A. (Hard Card) Crew sprays the Drywell using SOP 23.205, "RHR System", Encl A. (Hard Card) <b>(CT)</b>	
* (N)or	mal, (R)eactivi	ty, (I)nstru	iment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor	

## ILO NRC Initial Exam Scenario 1 Narrative Summary

Initial conditions establish Reactor Power at 75%, necessary to best facilitate the RR Pump uncontrolled speed increase malfunction >10% (Malfunction 1). The CRS will be directing crew actions per the GOP, which produces a Normal activity for BOP to start a HFP, and a Reactivity maneuver for the RO to increase power (10-15%) with RR flow.

The BOP's start of HFP will be evaluated to its completion, followed by the RO's adjustment of RR flow. After the reactivity maneuver has been evaluated (following RR MG Set speeds  $\geq$  57%) the RR speed control malfunction will be initiated. The CRS will direct crew response via AOP 20.138.03, Uncontrolled Recirc Flow Change (trip the affected recirc pump > 10% speed change).

This will result in single-loop operation and entry into AOP 20.138.01, Recirc Pump Trip and require CRS to comply with TS LCOs. Depending where the crew was on the power to flow map, they will probably find themselves in the Scram Region. With OPRMs operable they should monitor for instability and exit the region as soon as possible. The best way to accomplish this is to raise speed on the operating Recirc Pump until  $\geq$  43% core flow. **NOTE:** The operating Recirc Pump Speed will be  $\geq$  57% and it will be in the desired single loop speed range of 50 - 75%.

In response to a Loss of Heater Drains resulting from the transient, the CRS will also direct evaluation of the effects on Feedwater Heating and determine Loss of Feedwater Heating AOP inapplicability.

A malfunction will result in spurious auto-initiation and injection by RCIC. It is expected that the BOP will trip RCIC under CRS direction. This establishes conditions which will later require manual re-start of RCIC, if selected, for level-control post LOCA. CRS will evaluate and comply with TS LCOs, and should coordinate with support personnel to control/protect unaffected ECCS equipment.

An electrical fault on the 345kV distribution system will result in an interruption of Division 2 electrical power, a coincidental loss of feedwater, and Rx Scram (either manual or automatic). The Division 2 EDGs will re-energize the ESF Buses. The crew will enter AOPs 20.300.345kv, Loss of 345 Kv, and 20.000.21, Reactor Scram. After Scram Reports, the CRS will enter EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1 (Level 3).

The loss of feedwater/scram will challenge RPV Level Control, which will be complicated by the LOCA, a loss of all Heater Feed Pumps and two Condenser Pumps, an auto start failure of HPCI, a loss of power to the Standby Feedwater discharge valve, and the earlier trip of RCIC.

Options available to restore RPV level include manual start of HPCI, re-starting RCIC, or opening the discharge valve and restoring Standby Feedwater (either manually or electrically after resetting overloads). If HPCI is manually started it will isolate after ~1 minute. When the only SBFW Pump A is started, the discharge valve will fail to open (N2103-F001). The valve will lose power shortly after receiving the open signal.

The only available high pressure injection sources available will be CRD A Pump, SLC A Pump, and RCIC, when re-started.

A Recirc leak will require the CRS to direct EOP actions to recover RPV level and protect the primary containment from overpressure. EOPs 29.100.01, RPV Control and Primary Containment Control, Sheets 1 & 2 will be entered on high drywell pressure. Most typically the ATC will be tasked with containment sprays, and BOP assigned to restore and maintain level.

When the CRS directs the ATC to, "Verify EECW is initiated, isolated from the drywell, and restore cooling to CRD", the ATC will discover the P4400-F606B failed to isolate. He will report and close the valve.

At ~100" RPV Water Level, the BOP will report that RPV Water Level cannot be maintained >TAF. This will prompt the CRS to brief the crew for Emergency Depressurization.

At TAF, the crew will Emergency Depressurize (EOP C-2) (**CT**) in accordance with 29.100.01, RF/ED/SC, Sheet 3. BOP will be directed to open 5 SRVs, ADS preferred. The crew will then brief and develop a plan for water level recovery, while the plant is being monitored during depressurization.

When LP sources inject and water level is restored >TAF, the crew will coordinate removal of injection systems to maintain RPV Water Level 173 - 214". (CT)

When level is recovered and stabilized, ATC will spray the Torus and Drywell to control Primary Containment Pressure. (CT)

The scenario will be terminated when the plant is stabilized, and evaluation activities are complete.

Op-Test No.:         2008-1         Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         N/A         Page         5 of 25					
Event Description: <u>Overview</u>					
<i>Initial Conditions:</i> Reactor Power is 75% of RTP with control rods at the 86% Rod Line, following a rod pattern adjustment. GSW Pump #4 is out of service for motor replacement. It is scheduled to be returned to service in 2 days. This shift will start the E. HFP and continue to raise reactor power to >85% of RTP with Recirc Flow. GOP 22.000.03, "Plant Operation 25% to 100% to 25%" (Rev 77) actions for power increase are complete <b>up to</b> Step 4.2.18.2.					
The objectives of this scenario are to:					
<ol> <li>Recognize, respond to, and take the required actions for an instrument / equipment failures requiring the use of operator and Tech Spec actions.</li> </ol>					
2. Operate RHR in all modes for Primary Containment Control.					
3. Recognize and respond to an Uncontrolled Recirc Flow Change.					
4. Recognize and respond to a Recirc Pump Trip.					
5. Recognize and respond to a Loss of 345kV Power.					
6. Initiate HPCI Manually after failure to Auto Start.					
7. Recover RCIC from a Manual Trip and manually start RCIC.					
<ol> <li>Execute steps in Primary Containment Control and operate the RHR System to control Drywell and Torus Temperature and Pressure.</li> </ol>					
9. Execute the steps of RPV Control for level (L) and pressure (P).					
<ol> <li>Direct and supervise the Shift team during Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency operations.</li> </ol>					
The crew will be required to respond to the following order of events:					
Recirc Motor Generator "B" Walkaway (TS 3.4.1)					
Spurious RCIC Initiation (TS 3.5.3.A)					
Loss of 345 KV Offsite Power					
HPCI Auto Start Failure					
Failure of N2103-F001, SBFW Disch To RPV Iso Valve					
LOCA – Recirc Loop A Rupture					
Failure of Div 2 EECW Hi Drywell Pressure Isolation.					

Op-Test No.:	2008-1	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         1/2         Page         6 of 25		
Event Des	cription:	Increase Reactor Power With Recirculation Flow		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
0 min	SRO	<ul> <li>Briefs (short) on raising reactor power using recirc flow IAW SOP 23.138.01,"Reactor Recirculation System" Section 6.1 and GOP 22.000.03, "Power Operation 25% To 100% To 25%".</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Directs BOP to start the E. Heater Feed Pump (HFP) IAW GOP 22.000.03, "Power Operation 25% To 100% To 25%".</li> </ul>		
		• Directs ATC to raise reactor power (after the Heater Feed Pump start) using recirc flow IAW SOP 23.138.01, Sect. 6.1, Speed Control, not to exceed 5% Jet Pump Loop Flow differential.		
	BOP	Coordinates with ATC to monitor RPV water level during evolution.		
		<ul> <li>Starts the Third HFP IAW GOP 22.000.03, "Power Operation 25% To 100% To 25%", step 4.2.18.2:</li> </ul>		
		1. Notifies TB Rounds of E. HFP start and requests walkdown.		
		<b>ROLE PLAY</b> : TB Rounds reports E. HFP is ready for a start.		
		2. Starts East Heater Feed Pump and monitors RPV water level.		
		<b>ROLE PLAY</b> : TB Rounds reports good start on the E. HFP.		
		<ol> <li>Places East HFP Aux Lube Oil Pump CMC switch in OFF/RESET for Heater Feed Pump started.</li> </ol>		
		<ol> <li>Places East HFP Aux Lube Oil Pump CMC switch in AUTO for Heater Feed Pump started.</li> </ol>		
		<ol> <li>May verify N20-F404, Cond Min Flow Ctrl Valve, throttles to maintain Condensate flow rate at least 9000 gpm.</li> </ol>		
		<ol> <li>May direct TB Rounds to adjust TBCCW as required to maintain E HFP lube oil temperature 90°F – 120°F.</li> </ol>		
		<b>ROLE PLAY</b> : TB Rounds reports will monitor and adjust E. HFP oil temperature as necessary.		
		May direct RB Rounds to check RPS Alt EPA Breakers are not tripped.		
		ROLE PLAY: RB Rounds reports RPS Alternate EPA Breakers are not tripped.		
		Adjusts Turbine Flow Limiter to maintain 5% greater than reactor power.		

7 of <u>25</u>	No.: <u>2008-1</u>	
Event Desc	ription: <u>In</u>	crease Reactor Power With Recirculation Flow
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ATC	<ul> <li>NOTE: When the examiner is satisfied of the candidate's abilities to control reactivity, and recirc pump speeds are both &gt; 57%, he can proceed with the scenario at any time.</li> <li>Raises reactor power IAW SOP 23.138.01, "Reactor Recirc System", Section 6.1, by adjusting North and South RR MG Set speeds using B31-R621A and B, N and S RR MG Set Speed Controllers. [Speed will be incrementally increased on N and S RR Pumps to achieve an increase of &gt; 5% RTP.]</li> <li>Contacts RB Rounds to monitor and adjust RR Pump Lube Oil Temperatures.</li> <li>ROLE PLAY: RB Rounds reports N and S RRMG Lube Oil Temperatures have been adjusted to 120°F and bearing oil pressures are ~ 35 psig.</li> </ul>

Op-Test No.: <u>2008</u> <u>8</u> of <u>25</u>	- <u>1</u> Scenario No.: <u>1</u>	Event No.:	3	Page
Event Description:	Uncontrolled RRMG B Speed Cha	ange (> 10%)		

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
+15 min	ATC	Malf – B31RF0018 – RRMG "B" Walk-away		
		<ul> <li>Identifies and responds to annunciator 3D136, RECIRC SYS B FLUID DRIVE SCOOP TUBE LOCK.</li> </ul>		
		Verifies that South RR MG Set Scoop Tube is locked.		
		<ul> <li>Determines RRMG B speed increased by ≥ 10%.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Reports information to CRS AND announces, "Tripping RRMG B".</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Trips RRMG "B". (Immediate Action IB.1 of AOP 20.138.03, "Uncontrolled Recirc Flow Change".)</li> </ul>		
		Monitors reactor power and flow conditions.		
		<b>NOTE</b> : ATC may find the plant is operating in the Scram/Exit Region of the Power/Flow Map. With OPRMs operable, a scram is not required.		
		<ul> <li>May direct RB Rounds to investigate the cause for RRMG B walk-away, informs him of the trip, and to adjust lube oil temperature.</li> </ul>		
		ROLE PLAY: RB Rounds reports cannot determine reason for RRMG B speed change and lube oil has been adjusted to maintain 120°F.		
		When directed, performs AOP 20.138.01, Condition C Actions:		
		1. Verifies operating RR MG Set speed $\leq$ 75%.		
		2. Verifies Reactor Power < 67.2%.		
		<ol> <li>Verifies 3D129, RECIRC A and B FLOW LIMITER 2/3 DEFEATED, alarmed.</li> </ol>		
		<ol> <li>Places Recirc A and B Flow Limiter 2/3 Defeat Switch in DEFEAT.</li> </ol>		
		<ol> <li>Closes B3105-F031B for tripped RR Pump. (Requests a peer check.)</li> </ol>		
		<ol> <li>After 5 minutes fully opens B3105-F031B. (Requests a peer check.)</li> </ol>		
		7. Maintains operating RR MG Set speed 50-75%.		
		8. Verifies not in the Exit or Scram region of power/flow map.		

	Op-Test No.:       2008-1       Scenario No.:       1       Event No.:       3       Page       9 of 25         Event Description:       Uncontrolled RRMG B Speed Change (> 10%)				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
	SRO	<ul> <li>Announces entry into AOP 20.138.03, "Uncontrolled Recirculation Flow Change" and AOP 20.138.01 "Recirculation Pump Trip". (Crew Update)</li> <li>Hi-Com announcements of events.</li> <li>Conducts AOP briefs.</li> <li>Directs ATC to perform 20.138.01, Condition C Actions.</li> <li>When informed in the Scram/Exit Region of the Power/Flow Map, He directs actions per 20.138.01, Condition D, to raise speed on the operating Recirc Pump to exit the restricted area.</li> <li>Directs BOP to verify feedwater heating changes are due to the power change IAW ARP 5D85, "Loss of Heater Drains".</li> <li>Notifies Reactor Engineer (RE) of the unplanned power change and requests his assistance.</li> <li>ROLE PLAY: RE states he will come to the control room as soon as possible. Until he gets there, increase monitoring for instabilities.</li> <li>Notifies RP and Chemistry of power change &gt;15%. (Condition E)</li> <li>Reviews TS 3.4.1, requirements for SLO. (4 hrs for adjustment of RPS setpoints and Thermal Limits for SLO)</li> <li>Notifies Work Control personnel of RRMG "B" problem, requests a Condition Assessment Resolution Document (CARD) be written, protected system signs be posted for RRMG "A", and</li> </ul>			
	ВОР	<ul> <li>Responds to annunciator 5D85, LOSS OF HEATER DRAINS</li> <li>Reports loss of Heater Drains due to Recirc Pump Trip.</li> </ul>			
		<ul> <li>Reviews ARP 5D85.</li> <li>Reviews AOP 20.107.02, "Loss of Feedwater Heating", Enclosure A.</li> <li>Reports Feedwater temperature change is consistent with power change.</li> </ul>			
		<ul><li>Peer checks closure of B3105-F031B.</li><li>Peer checks re-opening of B3105-F031B.</li></ul>			

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Op-Test No.:         2008-1         Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         4         Page         10 of 25					
Event Des	Event Description: RCIC Spurious Initiation				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
+35 min		Malf – E51MF0009 – Spurious RCIC Initiation			
	BOP	Observes Alarm 1D24, RCIC SYSTEM ACTUATED.			
		Announces alarm for CRS.			
		Observes RCIC starts and commences to inject to the RPV.			
		<ul> <li>Verifies no valid actuation Level 2 signal by checking:</li> </ul>			
		1. Wide Range Level Indicators B21-R604A/B and/or			
		Post Accident Recorders B21-R623A/B.			
		Reports information to CRS.			
		<b>NOTE: IF</b> directed to shutdown RCIC, the candidate will use SOP 23.206. <b>IF</b> the CRS directs tripping RCIC, the candidate will perform Step 3 only.			
		<ul> <li>Manually shuts down RCIC by performing actions per SOP 23.206, "RCIC System", Section 8.1:</li> </ul>			
		<ol> <li>Places E51-K615, RCIC Discharge Flow Controller, in MANUAL.</li> </ol>			
		<ol> <li>Using E51-K615, RCIC Discharge Flow Controller, lowers turbine speed until indicating approximately 3000 rpm.</li> </ol>			
		3. Trips RCIC turbine as follows:			
		<ul> <li>a. Places RCIC Turbine Trip pushbutton collar in ARMED.</li> <li>Verifies Annunciator 1D90, RCIC TURBINE TRIP PUSHBUTTON ARMED, alarms.</li> </ul>			
		<ul> <li>b. Depresses RCIC Turbine Trip pushbutton, and verifies:</li> <li>Annunciator 1D94, RCIC TURBINE TRIPPED, alarms.</li> <li>IF open, E5150-F059, RCIC Turbine Trip Throttle VIv,</li> </ul>			
		closes.			
		<ul> <li>RCIC Turbine speed is decreasing or is at zero.</li> <li>RCIC Turbine Trip Solenoid ENERGIZED white light is ON.</li> </ul>			
		<ul> <li>IF open, E5150-F013, RCIC Disch to FW Inbd Iso Valve, closes.</li> </ul>			
		• IF open, E5150-F019, RCIC Min Flow VIv, closes.			

Op-Test No.:	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         4         Page         11 of         25		
Event Des	cription:	RCIC Spurious Initiation		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	BOP (cont'd)	<ul> <li>Reviews ARPs 1D24, "RCIC System Actuated" and 1D94, "RCIC Turbine Tripped".</li> </ul>		
		• Discusses applicable Tech Specs listed in the ARPs with CRS.		
	SRO	Acknowledges 1D24, RCIC SYSTEM ACTUATED alarm report.		
		<ul> <li>When BOP reports RCIC started on an invalid actuation signal, then directs BOP to trip RCIC.</li> </ul>		
		Announces the event over the Hi-Com.		
		Reviews TS 3.5.3, RCIC System, Condition A.		
		<ul> <li>Declares RCIC Inop, immediately verifies HPCI operable, and enters a 14 day LCO.</li> </ul>		
		Conducts a crew brief.		
		<ul> <li>Notifies Work Control personnel of RCIC problem, requests a CARD be written, protected system signs be posted for HPCI, and a review of POD for activities that might affect current plant conditions.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>May review reportability. (General Regulatory Reporting Requirements List)</li> </ul>		
	ATC	Monitors RPV water level, power, pressure, steam flow and feed flow.		
		Reports power, level, and pressure are stable.		

Op-Test No.:         2008-1         Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         5         Page         12 of 25						
Event Des	Event Description: Loss of 345 KV with loss of Heater Feed and Reactor Feed Pumps					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
Time +40 min	ATC	Applicant's Actions or Behavior         Malf – R14MF0001 – Loss of 345 KV Offsite Power Malf – N20MF0023 – C. HFP Trip         Places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.         Verifies all rods in.         Verifies power decreasing.         Announces Scram Report.         Performs a walkdown of the electrical panels with Hard Card from H11-P811.         Reports, "Loss 345 KV Offsite Power, Div 2 EDGs have started and are loaded."         Continues walkdown of back panels.         Directs operator to walkdown and investigate loss of 345 KV.         ROLE PLAY: Outside Rounds reports nothing abnormal on 345 KV Mat.         Reports results of electrical walkdown to CRS.         Performs actions as directed by the CRS IAW AOP 20.300.345KV, "Loss of 345 KV" actions:         1. Verifies N & S RR MG Emergency L. O. Pumps running. (Conditions B & C)         2. Closes CW Pump #1, 2, & 3 Discharge Iso Valves (N7100-F601, F602, & F603). (Condition E)         3. Places CW Pump #1, 2, & 3 CMC Switches in OFF/Reset.				
		<ul> <li>closed 72E Pos 2A, 72E Pos 5B, and 72EC Pos 2C (Condition G).</li> <li>5. Verifies EDG 14 Output Breaker closed (ED-3) and verifies closed 72ED Pos 2D and 72F Pos 3A (Condition I).</li> <li>May cross-tie V and W buses for SBFW restoration, when directed. (Condition L)</li> </ul>				

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         5         Page         13 of 25	
Event Description: Loss of 345 KV with loss of Heater Feed and Reactor Feed Pumps			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	SRO	<ul> <li>Directs ATC to place the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.</li> <li>Announces events over Hi-Com.</li> <li>Requests Scram Reports.</li> <li>Directs ATC to electrical panels to investigate.</li> <li>Announces EOP entry into 29.100.01, "RPV Control", Sheet 1, Level 3. (Crew Update)</li> <li>Directs BOP to confirm isolations and actuations for level as they occur.</li> <li>Directs BOP to restore and maintain level 173-214 inches.</li> <li>Directs BOP to control pressure 900-1050 psig.</li> <li>Consults with ATC to determine extent of equipment loss and which AOP(s) to enter.</li> </ul>	
	ВОР	<ul> <li>Announces scram report.</li> <li>Assesses systems available for injection and uses any available systems.</li> </ul>	

Op-Test No.	<u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         6         Page         14 of         25	
Event Description: Loss of all high pressure feed / HPCI Auto Start Failure			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
+40 min	SRO	Malf – E41MF0009 – HPCI System Auto Start Failure Malf – E41MF0005 – HPCI Isolation	
		<ul> <li>Directs BOP to restore level 173 – 214 inches per 29.100.01, "RPV Control", Sheet 1, using Table 1 Injection Systems (HPCI, RCIC, SBFW, CRD, SLC).</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>May give new level band 0-214 inches.</li> </ul>	
		May direct start of HPCI, RCIC, or SBFW.	
		<ul> <li>Directs start of CRD IAW 29.ESP.04, "RPV Injection Using CRD Pumps".</li> </ul>	
		Directs injecting SLC.	
	BOP	Reports loss of Reactor Feed Pumps.	
		Reports HPCI auto start failure on Level 2.	
		Manually starts HPCI, IAW 23.202, "HPCI System", Enclosure C (Hard Card):	
		<ol> <li>Places E4101-C003, HPCI Baro Cndr Vacuum Pump, in RUN, and verifies pump starts.</li> </ol>	
		2. Opens E4150-F003, HPCI Stm Sply Otbd Iso VIv.	
		3. Opens E4150-F059, HPCI Lube Oil Clg Wtr Sply Vlv.	
		<ol> <li>Initiates a start of HPCI System by performing the next two steps simultaneously:</li> </ol>	
		<ul> <li>Places E4101-C005, HPCI Turbine Aux Oil Pump, in RUN, and verifies pump starts.</li> </ul>	
		b. Opens E4150-F001, HPCI Turb Stm Supply Iso Valve.	
		5. Opens E4150-F006, HPCI Pmp Inbd Disch Iso Valve.	
		<ol><li>Adjusts flow as necessary on E41-K615, HPCI Pump Flow Controller.</li></ol>	
		<ol> <li>Performs or verifies complete steps of Section 5.0, Manual Initiation.</li> </ol>	
		<ul> <li>Manually starts CRD IAW 29.ESP.04, "RPV Injection Using CRD Pumps":</li> </ul>	
		1. Places C11-K612, CRD Flow Controller, in MANUAL.	

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         6         Page         15 of 25	
Event Description: Loss of all high pressure feed / HPCI Auto Start Failure			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	BOP (cont'd)	2. Starts the Standby Control Rod Drive Pump.	
		<ol> <li>Throttles open Flow Control Valve using C11-K612, CRD Flow Controller.</li> </ol>	
		<ol> <li>Opens C1152-F003, CRD Drive/Clg Water PCV, to maximize cooling water flow.</li> </ol>	
		5. Monitors RPV Level.	
		<ul> <li>Injects SLC (From memory per ODE-10):</li> </ul>	
		<ol> <li>Places SLC System Initiation key-lock switch to PMP A (PMP B).</li> </ol>	
		2. Verifies SLC Injection:	
		Selected pump is ON.	
		<ul> <li>Squib-Continuity Lamp for each explosive valve goes OFF.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Annunciator 3D11, SLC IGNITION CONTINUITY LOSS, alarms, indicating that the squibs have fired.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>G3352-F004, RWCU Supply Otbd Iso VIv and G3352- F220, RWCU To Fw Otbd Cntm Iso VIv close.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>C4100-F006, SLC Inj Line Otbd Check Valve, is open</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>C41-R600, SLC Pumps A &amp; B Disch Press Ind, is greater than Reactor pressure.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>SLC Storage Tank level is decreasing on C41-R601, SLC Storage Tank Level Ind.</li> </ul>	

Op-Test No.	: 2008-1	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         7         Page         16 of         25	
Event Description: SBFW N2103-F001, Disch To RPV Iso Valve Failure			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
+45 min	SRO	Malf – N21MF0031 – SBFW F001 Fails As Is Malf – N21RF0019 – N2103-F001 Breaker	
		<ul> <li>May direct BOP send an operator to investigate N2103-F001 power failure.</li> </ul>	
	BOP	<ul> <li>Starts SBFW Pump "B" (From memory per ODE-10)</li> <li>1. Starts N2103-C003A (B), West (East) Pump A (B) Aux Lube Oil Pump, if available.</li> <li>2. Starts N2103-C001 (2), West (East) Standby Feedwater</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Pump A (B).</li> <li>3. N2103-F001, SBFW Disch To RPV Iso Valve, does not automatically open (first pump) and subsequently loses power.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Observes and reports N2103-F001 failure (SBFW Discharge Valve).</li> </ul>	
		Shuts down running SBFW Pumps while investigating N2103- F001 failure.	
		<ul> <li>Directs TB Rounds or other operator to investigate the loss of power to N2103-F001, at MCC 2PC-1 Pos 5A.</li> </ul>	
		ROLE PLAY: TB Rounds reports that he is in the BOP Switchgear Room and will investigate right away. Moments later TB Rounds reports he's at the MCC and can attempt to reset the thermal overloads, if desired. When BOP directs the reset, TB Rounds resets the thermal overloads. (Power to the valve is restored and valve opens.)	
		NOTE: Booth Operator coordinates Role Play with restoration. Ensure SBFW Pumps are OFF. (CLEAR N21MF0031 & N21RF0019)	
		Observes N2103-F001 opening and reports the same to CRS.	
		Opens N2103-F002, SBFW 6" Discharge Flow Control Valve.	
		<ul> <li>Starts systems per 29.100.01, "RPV Control", Sheet 1, Table 1 to restore / maintain level 173-214 inches. (HPCI, RCIC, SBFW, CRD, SLC)</li> </ul>	

Op-Test No.:	2008-1	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         7         Page <u>17</u> of <u>25</u>		
Event Description: SBFW N2103-F001, Disch To RPV Iso Valve Failure				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		<ul> <li>May reset RCIC Turbine Trip to inject, IAW SOP 23.206, "RCIC System", Section 7.1, as follows:</li> </ul>		
		<b>NOTE</b> : RCIC will have a spurious initiation signal locked in.		
		1. Re-starts RCIC by performing the following:		
		<ul> <li>Place RCIC Turbine Trip pushbutton collar in DISARMED.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>b. Closing and re-opening E5150-F059, RCIC Trip Throttle Valve.</li> </ul>		
		2. Monitors system operation and verifies flow path.		
		3. Reports RCIC is injecting at 650 gpm.		

Op-Test No.:	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         8         Page         18 of 25			
Event Des	Event Description: Recirc Loop A Rupture				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
+55 min		Malf – B31MF0066 – Recirc Loop A Rupture			
	DOD	Reports High Drywell pressure EOP entry.			
	BOP	Reports lowering RPV level.			
		Reports Level 3 EOP re-entry.			
		• If HPCI was not previously manually started due to lowering level, operator reports HPCI auto start failure on high Drywell Pressure and Level 2.			
		<ul> <li>Manually starts HPCI, IAW SOP 23.202, "HPCI System", Enclosure C. (Hard Card)</li> </ul>			
		<ol> <li>Places E4101-C003, HPCI Baro Cndr Vacuum Pump, in RUN, and verify pump starts.</li> </ol>			
		2. Opens E4150-F003, HPCI Stm Sply Otbd Iso VIv.			
		3. Opens E4150-F059, HPCI Lube Oil Clg Wtr Sply VIv.			
		<ol> <li>Initiates a start of HPCI System by performing the next two steps simultaneously:</li> </ol>			
		a. Places E4101-C005, HPCI Turbine Aux Oil Pump, in RUN,			
		and verifies pump starts.			
		b. Opens E4150-F001, HPCI Turb Stm Supply Iso Valve.			
		5. Opens E4150-F006, HPCI Pmp Inbd Disch Iso Valve.			
		6. Adjusts flow as necessary on E41-K615, HPCI Pump Flow Controller.			
		<ol> <li>Performs or verifies complete steps of Section 5.0, Manual Initiation.</li> </ol>			
		<ul> <li>Starts 29.100.01, "RPV Control", Sheet 1, Table 1 Injection Systems to restore/maintain level 173-214 inches. (SBFW, HPCI, RCIC, CRD, SLC)</li> </ul>			
		Reports Level 2.			
CRITICAL		• If Level 1 is reached, reports Level 1, and Inhibits ADS, when directed, if not previously inhibited.			
TASK		• If Level 1 is reached, verifies MSIVs are closed.			
CRITICAL		Opens 5 SRVs (ADS preferred). (CT)			
TASK		Bypasses and restores Drywell pneumatics if necessary.			
		Maximizes injection and restores reactor water level to 173- 214". (CT)			

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         8         Page         19 of 25	
Event Description: Recirc Loop A Rupture			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	SRO	<ul> <li>Assigns BOP level (173-214") and pressure control (900- 1050 psig).</li> </ul>	
		Re-adjusts pressure band to 500 -1000 psig.	
		<ul> <li>Announces EOP entry on high Drywell Pressure, Drywell Temperature, Torus Pressure, Torus Level, and Torus Temperature. (Crew Updates)</li> </ul>	
		• Directs BOP to manually start HPCI (if not already started).	
		• Directs BOP to Inhibit ADS, if level is close to 32 inches.	
CRITICA		Conducts an EOP brief in preparation for ED.	
L TASK		<ul> <li>Directs BOP to open 5 SRVs, ADS preferred [EOP 29.000.01, RF/ED/SC Sheet 3 (Emergency Depressurization EOP C-2)]. (CT)</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Directs BOP to bypass and restore Drywell pneumatics if necessary.</li> </ul>	
		Briefs crew on water level restoration and control.	
CRITICA L TASK		<ul> <li>Directs BOP to maximize injection with available Table 1 &amp; 3 sources, and restore and maintain reactor water level 173-214". (CT)</li> </ul>	

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         9         Page         20 of 25			
Event Des	Event Description: Div 2 EECW isolation to the Drywell / Restoration of Cooling to CRD				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
+60 min	SRO	Malf – EOPRF0038 – Div 2 EECW Hi Drywell Pressure Lead Lifted			
		• Directs ATC to verify EECW initiated, isolated to the Drywell, and restore cooling to CRD.			
		• <b>IF</b> necessary, may direct closure of P4400-F606B.			
	ATC	• Verifies Div 1 (2) EECW initiated and isolated to the Drywell by checking the indications of the following equipment:			
		1. The white Emergency Mode Light is ON for Div 1 (2).			
		2. EECW Pump A (B) is running.			
		3. EESW Pump A (B) is running.			
		4. P4400-F603A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Supply Iso VIv is closed.			
		5. P4400-F601A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Return Iso VIv is closed.			
		<ol> <li>P4400-F602A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Makeup Tnk Iso VIv is open.</li> </ol>			
		<ol> <li>P4400-F605A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW To SE (NW) Sump Hx Iso VIv is closed.</li> </ol>			
		<ol> <li>P4400-F608, Div 2 EECW To DW Sump Hx Iso VIv is closed.</li> </ol>			
		9. P4400-F604, Div 2 EECW To CRD Sply Iso VIv is closed.			
		10. P4400-F614, Div 1 EECW To Penet Clr's Iso VIv is closed.			
		11. P4400-F613, Div 1 EECW To Batt Rm's A/C Iso VIv is closed.			
		12. P4400-F606A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW DW Otbd Supply VIv is closed.			
		Reports D2 EECW not isolated to the Drywell. (P4400-F606B is open)			
		<ul> <li>Isolates D2 EECW to the Drywell by closing P4400-F606B.</li> </ul>			

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         9         Page         21 of 25	
Event Description: Div 2 EECW isolation to the Drywell / Restoration of Cooling to CRD			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	ATC	<ul> <li>Restores cooling to CRD pumps as follows:</li> </ul>	
		5 1 1	
		<ol> <li>High DW Pressure is present, places Div 2 EECW Manual Override keylock switch to OVERRIDE.</li> </ol>	
		1. High DW Pressure is present, places Div 2 EECW Manual	

Op-Test No.	2008-1	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         10         Page         22 of 25		
Event Description: Recirc Loop A Rupture / Containment Sprays				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
+65 min	SRO	Assigns ATC containment pressure control.		
		<ul> <li>Directs ATC to Place Div 1 RHR in Torus Cooling and Torus Spray.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>After report from ATC, directs ATC to stop spraying the Torus before Torus Pressure is 0 psig. (EOP Override)</li> </ul>		
CRITICAL		<ul> <li>Directs ATC to shutdown Drywell Cooling Fans</li> </ul>		
TASK		• Directs ATC to spray the Drywell with Div 1 RHR. (CT)		
		<ul> <li>After report from ATC, directs to stop spraying the Drywell before Drywell Pressure is 0 psig. (EOP Override)</li> </ul>		
	ATC	<ul> <li>Places D1 RHR in Torus Cooling/Torus Spray Mode IAW SOP 23.205, "RHR System", Enclosure A (Hard Card)</li> </ul>		
		<ol> <li>If High Drywell Pressure or RPV Level 1 actuation exist, place the Containment Spray Mode Select switch in MANUAL.</li> </ol>		
		<ol> <li>If RPV level is below Level 0, place selected division Containment Spray 2/3 Core Height Override keylock switch in MANUAL OVERRIDE.</li> </ol>		
		3. If initiating Torus Cooling Mode, perform the following:		
		<ul> <li>Unlocks and opens E1150-F028A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Iso VIv.</li> </ul>		
		b. Starts one RHR Pump.		
		<ul> <li>c. Throttles E1150-F024A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Clg Iso, to desired flow.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>d. When flow is &gt; 3000 gpm, verifies E1150-F007A (B), Div</li> <li>1 (2) RHR Pmps Min Flow VIv, closes.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>e. Starts RHR Service Water System. (RHRSW Flow may be delayed until after Torus Spray is established.)</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>f. To increase cooldown rate, throttles closed E1150- F048A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Hx Bypass VIv.</li> </ul>		

Op-Test No.	<u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         10         Page         23 of 25	
Event Description: Recirc Loop A Rupture / Containment Sprays			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	ATC	4. If initiating Torus Spray Mode, perform the following:	
		<ul> <li>a. Verifies RHR is in LPCI or Torus Cooling Mode. (RHRSW Flow may be delayed until after Torus Spray is established.)</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>b. Verifies open or unlocks and opens E1150-F028A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Iso VIv.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>C. Opens E1150-F027A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Spray Iso. VIv.</li> </ul>	
		d. Verifies RHR flow increases by approximately 500 gpm.	
CRITICAL		Shuts down Drywell Cooling Fans.	
TASK		<ul> <li>Places D1 RHR in Drywell Spray Mode IAW IAW SOP 23.205, "RHR System", Enclosure A (Hard Card) (CT)</li> </ul>	
		5. If initiating Drywell Spray Mode, perform the following:	
		a. Opens E1150-F021A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR DW Spray Inbd Iso VIv.	
		b. Starts or verifies started RHR Pump A or C (B or D).	
		c. Unlocks and throttles open E1150-F016A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR DW Spray Otbd Iso VIv, and ensures that RHR flow does not exceed 14,000 gpm per RHR Pump.	
		<ol> <li>Performs or verifies complete the following sections of SOP 23.205 as applicable:</li> </ol>	
		<ul> <li>Torus Cooling Mode, Emergency Operation</li> </ul>	
		Torus Spray Mode	
		Drywell Spray Mode	
		<ol> <li>Verifies complete RHRSW Manual Operation, Enclosure B of 23.208, "RHRSW System".</li> </ol>	

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         1         Event No.:         10         Page         24 of         25		
Event Description: Recirc Loop A Rupture (Reset / Restart RCIC)				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	SRO	May need to direct BOP to re-start of RCIC.		
	BOP	<b>NOTE</b> : Level will likely be < Level 2 and RCIC will also have a spurious initiation signal locked in.		
		Resets the RCIC Turbine Trip to inject, IAW SOP 23.206, "RCIC System", Section 7.1, as follows:		
		1. Re-starts RCIC by performing the following:		
		<ul> <li>Places RCIC Turbine Trip pushbutton collar in DISARMED.</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>b. Closes and re-opens E5150-F059, RCIC Trip Throttle Valve.</li> </ul>		
		2. Monitors system operation and verifies flow path.		
		3. Reports RCIC is injecting at 650 gpm.		

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## Scenario #1

Lesson "Scenario #1.lsn" Malfunction List:

Label	Description	Target	Delay	Ramp	Step
H_P807_A008_3	GSW #4 OFF Light	0	0	0	1
P807_A008_1	GSW #4 OFF/RESET Switch	1	0	0	1
P602_B131_3	E. DWEDT Pump	1	0	0	1
P602_A094_3	W. DWEDT Pump	1	0	0	1
P602_B131_3	E. DWEDT Pump	-1	240	0	1
P602_A094_3	W. DWEDT Pump	-1	240	0	1
B31RF0018	RRMG B Scoop Tube Hand Crank	55	0	7	2
	cd='BBBDB3101C001B_MZMLNA GT 942'				
E51MF0009	RCIC Spurious Initiation	ACTIVE	0	0	3
R14MF0001	Loss of Div 2 Offsite Power	ACTIVE	0	0	4
N20MF0023	Heater Feed Pump C Trip	ACTIVE	0	0	4
E41MF0009	HPCI Auto Start Failure	ACTIVE	0	0	4
N21MF0031*	SBFW N2103-F001 Fail As-Is	0	0	0	4
EOPRF0038	RBCCW High Drywell Isolation Defeat	DEFEAT	0	0	4
N21RF0019*	MOV N2103-F001 Breaker	OPEN	8	0	4
	cd='P601_A290_2 OR P601_A291_2 EQ 1'				
E41MF0005	HPCI Spurious Isolation	ACTIVE	45	0	4
	cd='H_P602_A131_2 EQ 1'				
B31MF0006	Recirc Loop A Rupture	1	0	300	5

\* Delete to reset thermal overload trip (simulated) of N21-F001 breaker.

Step 1 = Setup

Step 2 = Recirc Runaway

Step 3 = RCIC Initiation

- Step 4 = Loss of Power (w/ HPCI & SBFW Failures)
- Step 5 = LOCA

Simulator Instructions:

- 1. Initialize simulator to **IC-18**, and place in **RUN**.
- 2. Open and Execute Lesson **Scenario #1.lsn**.
- 3. **Trigger Step 1, Setup**. (Drywell Equipment Drain Tank will complete pumping down in about 4 minutes.
- 4. Place an RT dot near GSW Pump #4 CMC switch.
- 5. Bring crew into simulator and begin scenario when ready.
- 6. **Trigger Step 2, Recirc Runaway, when the Recirc Pump speed increase starts**. (The runaway begins when RRMG Set B speed reaches 57%.)
- 7. Trigger other steps as cued by examiner.

Facility	·· Fe	armi 2	Scenario No. 2 Op-Test No: 2008-1		
-					
	Examiners: <u>M. Bielby</u> Operators:				
	B. Pillago				
Initial C	enditioner IC 0				
	Conditions: <u>IC-2</u>				
			ating for 23 days. Reactor Power is 100% of Rated / Pump is out of service for motor replacement. It is		
			Plans are to shift from Division 1 CCHVAC to Division 2		
			vivision 2 CCHVAC equipment.		
			CCHVAC shift is to be conducted prior to entering the 30 minutes prior to beginning the scenario.)		
Event	Malf. No.	Event	Event		
No.		Type*	Description		
	N/A	N (BOP)	Crew shifts from Division 1 CCHVAC to Division 2		
1.		N (SRO)	CCHVAC		
2.	C11MF0381	C (ATC)	Control Rod 22-31 Drifts OUT		
		C (SRO)	CRS enters AOP 20.106.07, "Control Rod Drift" and		
			determines TS 3.1.3.C, Control Rod Operability, (3 hrs		
			to insert and 4 hrs to disarm).		
			ATC inserts, holds, and directs disarming control rod 22-31.		
3.	C97MF1087		Seismic System Event / Trouble Alarm 6D69		
			Crew monitors the plant and performs AOP Actions.		
			CRS enters AOP 20.000.01, "Acts of Nature".		
	MF EBAORL		BOP starts RHRSW MDCT Fans. When MDCT Fan B		
	_TCTVSP 1		is started, it trips. CRS enters TS 3.7.2.B, Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS), (72 hr LCO).		
4.	N61MF0003	M (ALL)	East Condenser Air Leak		
1.			CRS enters AOP 20.125.01, "Loss of Condenser		
			Vacuum".		
			BOP starts an additional SJAE and OG Ring Water		
			Pump.		
		C (ATC) C (SRO)	Due to Loss of Vacuum, ATC is directed and attempts		
	PO P603_	R (ATC)	Rapid Power Reduction. He determines failure of Manual Runback, and takes individual manual control to		
	A317_1	R (SRO)	reduce recirc speeds to 55-60% core flow.		
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor					

Scenario Outline

Facility:       Fermi 2         Examiners:       M. Bielby         C. Moore         B. Pillaggi		/ 9	Scenario No2 Op-Test No: 2008-1 Operators:	
	Conditions: <u>IC-2</u>		0% Rx. Power.	
NOTE:	Continued from	i page 1.		
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description	
5.		M (ALL)	Reactor Scram Performs override action 20.125.01 and places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN ≤ 2.5 psia. After Scram Reports, CRS enters EOP 29.100.01 RPV Control, Sheet 1 (Level 3) and directs entry into AOP 20.000.21, Reactor Scram. BOP controls water level 173 – 214 inches.	
6.	C97MF1087 B21MF0059 B21MF0060 B21MF0073	M (ALL)	Aftershock Seismic Event / Event Trouble Alarm (6D69) Loss of all level indication. Div 1 and Div 2 Level Instrument Reference Leg Ruptures. Flood up Level Indication fails upscale high. (Level 8 trip on Main Turbine, RFPs, HPCI, RCIC, and SBFW.) CRS enters (EOP C-4) EOP RPV Flooding, 29.100.01, Sheet 3. (Level cannot be determined, adequate core cooling cannot be assured) CRS enters EOP 29.100.01, Primary Containment Control, Sheet 2. (High Drywell Pressure)	
7.	B21MF0037	C (BOP) C (SRO)	To prepare for RPV Flooding and provide adequate core cooling, BOP is directed to open 5 SRVs <b>(CT)</b> . SRV "R" fails to open. BOP will select and open another SRV and report this to the CRS.	
8.	N/A	ALL	The crew floods to the Main Steam Lines and establishes RPV Flooding conditions using Feedwater, SBFW, and Low Pressure ECCS Systems. <b>(CT)</b>	
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor				

## ILO NRC Initial Exam Scenario 2 Narrative Summary

Initial conditions establish Reactor Power at 100%, with a plan to shift the operating divisions of CCHVAC to support maintenance. The crew will have briefed this activity prior to entering the simulator. The CCHVAC shift in accordance with SOP 23.413, Control Center HVAC is a Normal activity for BOP.

A Control Rod Drift, which will initially be identified and responded to by the ATC. Subsequent actions will be directed by the CRS from AOP 20.106.07, Control Rod Drift. The CRS will review and take actions per TS.

A Seismic Event will occur, and be followed by a subsequent aftershock. The CRS will initially direct Normal BOP response actions per the "Acts of Nature" AOP 20.000.01, Act of Nature, Earthquake. When the BOP starts the MDCT Fans, per the AOP, MDCT Fan B will trip. The CRS will review and take actions per TS.

A resultant condenser leak will be identified by lowering Main Condenser vacuum, at which time the CRS will direct actions per AOP 20.125.01, Loss of Condenser Vacuum. The CRS will direct ATC to lower power via Rapid Power Reduction (SOP 23.623, Reactor Manual Control System, Section 9.7). The Manual Runback pushbutton, on P603, malfunctions and ATC must take individual manual control of both Recirc Controllers to accomplish the Recirc Runback. BOP attempts to restore vacuum by operation of various Off-Gas System components and controls under CRS direction.

Continually lowering Main Condenser vacuum is expected to result in a manual scram ( $\leq 2.5$  psia), prior to a main turbine trip. The Mode Switch will be taken to Shutdown and all rods will insert. After Scram Reports the CRS will enter EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1 (Level 3) and AOP 20.000.21, Reactor Scram. The crew controls RPV Water Level 173 – 214".

A second seismic event (aftershock) results in failure of both Div 1 and 2 RPV Level instrumentation reference legs and Floodup Level indication. This causes a loss of all RPV level indication. The crew will ascertain that, RPV Level <u>CANNOT</u> be determined. NOTE: Main Turbine, RFPs, HPCI, RCIC, and SBFW will all have Level 8 trips.

The CRS enters (EOP C-4) EOP 29.100.01, RF/ED/SC, Sheet 3 (RPV Flooding). Flooding will be complicated during the depressurization phase when one of the preferred SRVs (R) fails to open. BOP is expected to identify this failure and take action to open an alternate valve.

The crew floods to the Main Steam Lines using Feedwater, SBFW, (CRS may use EOP defeat 29.ESP.19 or direct BOP to depress and hold N2103-F001 pushbutton to defeat the SBFW L8), and Low Pressure ECCS Systems. The scenario will be terminated after RPV Flooding conditions are established.

Op-Test	No.: <u>2008-1</u> Scenario No.: <u>2</u> Event No.: <u>N/A</u> Page <u>1</u> of <u>15</u>			
Event [	Description: Overview			
	al Conditions:			
Pow to be	plant has been operating for 23 days. Reactor Power is 100% of Rated Thermal rer. The South TBCCW Pump is out of service for motor replacement. It is scheduled e restored tomorrow. Plans are to shift from Division 1 CCHVAC to Division 2 to collect ine vibration data on Division 2 CCHVAC equipment.			
The	objectives of this scenario are to:			
1.	Recognize, respond to, and take the required actions for an instrument / equipment failures requiring the use of operator and Tech Spec actions.			
2.	Recognize and respond to a Control Rod Failure to Latch (Rod Drift).			
3.	Recognize and respond to an Earthquake.			
4.	Recognize and respond to a Loss of Condenser Vacuum.			
5.	Execute steps of RPV Control to control Reactor Water Level (L) and Pressure (P).			
6.	May require the execution of steps in Primary Containment Control and operation of the RHR System to control Drywell and Torus temperature and pressure.			
7.	Execute the steps of Secondary Containment Temperature Control (SCT).			
8.	Execute steps of Reactor Pressure Vessel Flooding (RF).			
9.	Direct and Supervise the Shift team during Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operations.			
The	crew will be required to respond to the following order of events:			
• (	Control Rod Drift (22-31) - (Tech Spec 3.1.3.C)			
• 6	Earthquake			
• -	• Trip of RHRSW MDCT Fan B – (Tech Spec 3.7.2.B)			
• 6	East Condenser Air Leak			
• F	<ul> <li>Failure of Manual Runback (pushbutton)</li> </ul>			
• 6	Reactor Scram			
• 1	Loss of ALL RPV Level Instruments – RPV Flooding			
• 6	Failure of SRV "R" to OPEN			

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.: Event No.: Page 2_ of 15		
Event Des	Event Description: CCHVAC Shift			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	SRO	Directs BOP to shift CCHVAC from Div 1 to Div 2 for ISI vibration data collection.		
0 min	BOP	<ul> <li>Shifts CCHVAC from Div 1 to Div 2 using SOP 23.413, "Control Center HVAC", Section 6.1</li> </ul>		
		<ol> <li>Directs operators to perform an operational check of Div 2 CCHVAC radiation monitors. (checked and independently verified)</li> </ol>		
		ROLE PLAY: Report CCHVAC rad monitors have been verified by Reece/Kuttig.		
		<ol> <li>Documents performance in the Unit Log.</li> <li>Contacts RB Rounds to verify Div 2 CCHVAC ready for starting.</li> </ol>		
		<b>ROLE PLAY</b> : RB Rounds reports Div 2 CCHVAC is ready for a start.		
		4. Verifies the following switches:		
		Div 2 Mode Select Switch in NORMAL.		
		<ul> <li>Emergency Air Intake Selector Switch in AUTO.</li> </ul>		
		<ol> <li>Verifies Div 2 CCHVAC equipment CMC Switches are in AUTO.</li> </ol>		
		<ol><li>Places the Div 2 Mode Select Switch in ALL AUTO and verifies:</li></ol>		
		CCHVAC Supply Fan, starts		
		CCHVAC Chilled Water Pump starts.		
		7. Places the Div 1 Mode Select Switch in ALL STOP.		
		8. Verifies the following Div 2 equipment starts:		
		<ul> <li>CCHVAC Return Air Fan starts. (After supply fan establishes flow.)</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>CCHVAC Chiller starts (after ~40 sec) and remains running.</li> </ul>		
		<b>ROLE PLAY:</b> RB Rounds reports good start on Div 2 CCHVAC.		
		<b>NOTE</b> : Examiner may elect to move on after candidate starts next step. No physical actions are required by the candidate.		
		• Verifies Damper alignment. (SOP 23.413, Enclosure A)		

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.: Event No.: Page <u>3</u> of <u>15</u>			
Event Des	Event Description: Control Rod 22-31 Drifts into the Core.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
+10 min	ATC	Malf - C11MF0381 – Control Rod 22-31 Drifts Out         Responds to Annunciator 3D80, CONTROL ROD DRIFT.         Places Rod Select Power ON.         Determines that Control Rod 22-31, is drifting out of the core.         Reports rod 22-31 drifting out of the core.         Reviews ARP 3D80.         Directs RB Rounds to HCU 22-31, to standby for isolation.         ROLE PLAY: RB Rounds reports standing by at HCU 22-31.         When directed, performs AOP 20.106.07, "Control Rod Drift" Condition B:         1. Fully Inserts Rod 22-31 holding Rod Out Notch Override Switch in EMER ROD IN.         2. Directs RB Rounds to disarm the control rod by:         • Closing C11-F103 at HCU 22-31.         • NOTE: Booth Operator steps the scenario to clear/delete the Malfunction just before the RB Rounds report.         ROLE PLAY: When directed and complete, RB Rounds reports C11-F103 and F105 are closed for HCU 22-31.         • Routes and discusses ARP Tech Specs with CRS.         • Reviews and discusses ARP Tech Specs with CRS.			
	SRO	<ul> <li>Announces entry into AOP 20.106.07, "Control Rod Drift".</li> <li>Conducts AOP Brief.</li> <li>Directs ATC to perform AOP 20.106.07, Condition B.</li> <li>Complies with TS 3.1.3 C, Control Rod Operability by: <ol> <li>Fully inserting Control Rod 22-31 within 3 hours.</li> <li>Disarming Control Rod 22-31 within 4 hours.</li> </ol> </li> <li>Notifies the Reactor Engineer (RE) that rod 22-31 drifted into the core, was fully inserted, and disarmed.</li> </ul>			

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Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         2         Event No.:         2         Page         4         of         15
Event Des	cription: (	Control Rod 22-31 Drifts out of the Core.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		ROLE PLAY: IF the RE is consulted about the decision to insert rod 22-31, state that it is acceptable to fully insert the rod. Do not raise power until further research is done.
		May notify Tagging Center that Control Rod 22-31 is inoperable and needs an STR (Tagging Record) to reflect isolation.
		Exits the AOP.

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.: <u>2</u> Event No.: <u>3</u> Page <u>5</u> of <u>15</u>			
Event Des	Event Description: Seismic Event				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
+25 min		NOTE: The Booth Operator will play the Earthquake Sound if available.         Malf - C97MF1087 – 06D69 Seismic System Event / Trouble Alarm			
	BOP	<ul> <li>Responds to Annunciator 6D69, SEISMIC SYSTEM / EVENT TROUBLE.</li> <li>Reviews ARP 6D69.</li> <li>Directs an operator to the Seismic Monitor Panel in the Relay Room (H11-P831) to evaluate printout IAW 23.612, "Seismic Manitaring"</li> </ul>			
		Monitoring". <b>ROLE PLAY</b> : Report the Seismic Monitor red ERROR LED is OFF and the printout indicates 0.03G vertical and 0.05G horizontal.			
		<ul> <li>Reviews and discusses ARP TRM list with CRS.</li> <li>When directed, performs AOP 20.000.01, Condition AC:         <ol> <li>Directs all operators to inspect plant for structural damage and leaks.</li> <li>Directs RB Rounds to reset the following:                 <ul> <li>Div 1 CCHVAC Purge Compressor (23.413).</li> <li>Div 2 CCHVAC Purge Compressor (23.413).</li> </ul> </li> </ol></li></ul> <li>ROLE PLAY: After approximately 3 minutes, RB Rounds reports CCHVAC Purge Compressors have been reset.</li>			
		<ul> <li>3. Starts all RHRSW MDCT Fans and checks for proper running indication IAW 23.208, "RHR Complex Service Water Systems", Section 5.11 as follows:</li> <li>Contacts Outside Rounds to inform him MDCT Fans will be started and to have him check the fans ready for a start.</li> <li>ROLE PLAY: Outside Rounds reports he is in the RHR Complex and has completed his rounds on the equipment. It is ready to be started.</li> </ul>			

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.: <u>2</u> Event No.: <u>3</u> Page <u>6</u> of <u>15</u>
Event Des	cription: S	Seismic Event
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	BOP	• Depresses and holds vibration reset for the MDCT fan.
		• Within 5 seconds, starts the MDCT fan in LOW-SPEED.
		• After MDCT Fan has started, releases the reset pushbutton.
		Malf – EBAORL_TCTVSP – MDCT Fan B Trip
		4. RHRSW MDCT Fan B trips when started.
		Reports trip to CRS
		Contacts Outside Rounds to investigate fan trip.
		<b>ROLE PLAY</b> : Outside Rounds reports after several minutes that MDCT Fan B breaker relay indicates overload.
	SRO	<ul> <li>Announces entry into AOP 20.000.01, "Acts of Nature". (Earthquake) (Crew Update)</li> </ul>
		Conducts AOP Brief.
		Makes Hi-Com announcement.
		<ul> <li>Directs BOP to perform AOP 20.000.01, Condition AC (selected steps).</li> </ul>
		Directs ATC to perform AOP 20.000.01, Condition AA.
		<ul> <li>Reviews TRM section TR 3.3.7.2, Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation.</li> </ul>
		Performs AOP 20.000.01, Condition AC (selected steps)
		<ol> <li>Contacts Tagging Center to initiate a CARD to remove plates from Passive Seismic Detectors for data evaluation.</li> </ol>
		<ol> <li>Contacts the University of Michigan Seismic Observatory and Davis Besse.</li> </ol>
		<b>ROLE PLAY</b> : U of M and Davis Bessie report after evaluating their seismic activity data, the results are 0.03G vertical and 0.05G horizontal.
		Acknowledge report of MDCT Fan trip.
		<ul> <li>Reviews TS 3.7.2.B, Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) – (72 hr LCO)</li> </ul>
Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.: <u>2</u> Event No.: <u>3</u> Page <u>7</u> of <u>15</u>
Event Des	cription: S	Seismic Event
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior

ATC	<ul> <li>Monitors plant parameters IAW 20.000.01 (Earthquake) Condition AA.</li> </ul>
	<ol> <li>Reactor Vessel Level.</li> <li>Reactor Vessel Pressure.</li> <li>Reactor Power.</li> <li>Drywell Pressure.</li> <li>Torus Water Level.</li> <li>Drywell Unidentified Leakage.</li> <li>Process Radiation Monitors.</li> </ol>

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         2         Event No.:         4         Page         8 of         15			
Event Des	Event Description: Condenser Vacuum Leak				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
+35 min	ВОР	<ul> <li>Malf - N61MF0003 - E. Condenser Air Leak</li> <li>Responds to Annunciators: <ol> <li>6D19, OFFGAS DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE HIGH.</li> <li>6D39, OFFGAS CHARCOAL UNITS FLOW HIGH.</li> <li>6D45, OFFGAS SOUTH VALVE F406B CLOSED.</li> <li>6D46, OFFGAS DELAY PIPE PRESSURE HIGH.</li> </ol> </li> <li>Observes Delay Pipe pressure high and Charcoal Units flow high.</li> <li>Reviews ARPs for the alarm windows.</li> <li>Reports lowering condenser vacuum.</li> <li>Performs AOP 20.125.01 Condition A Actions: <ol> <li>Starts additional SJAEs IAW 23.125, "Condenser Vacuum System" Section 5.2, as follows:     <ul> <li>Opens N6200-F605 (606, 607, 608) SJAE Disch to 18"</li> </ul> </li> </ol></li></ul>			
		<ul> <li>Manifold Valve.</li> <li>b. Opens N6200-F601 (602, 602, 603) SJAE Main Steam Supply Valve.</li> <li>Performs AOP 20.125.01 Condition F Actions: <ol> <li>Contacts TB Rounds to prime the North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump.</li> </ol> </li> <li>ROLE PLAY: After 2 minutes, TB Rounds reports the North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump is primed.</li> </ul>			

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Op-Test No.		Scenario No.: Event No.: Page <u>9</u> of <u>15</u>			
Event Des	cription:	Condenser Vacuum Leak			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
		<ol> <li>Starts an additional Off-Gas Ring Water Pump IAW SOP 23.712, "Off- Gas System" Section 6.5.</li> </ol>			
		<ul> <li>Verifies N6200-F665, North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump Cooling Water Valve at 10% open.</li> </ul>			
		Starts the North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump.			
		<ul> <li>Verifies the N6200-F663, N. Absolute Filter Inlet Valve, N6200-F667, N. Buffer Tank Outlet Valve and P4300- F606, TBCCW To North Off-Gas Ring Water Cooler Inlet Valve open.</li> </ul>			
		<b>ROLE PLAY:</b> TB Rounds reports good start on the North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump.			
	SRO	Announces event over the Hi-Com.			
		<ul> <li>Announces entry into AOP 20.125.01, "Loss of Condenser Vacuum".</li> </ul>			
		Conducts AOP Brief.			
		Directs BOP to perform AOP 20.125.01, Condition A and F to start additional SJAEs and the North Off-Gas Ring Water Pump.			
		Directs ATC to perform AOP 20.125.01, Condition C for Rapid     Power Reduction and H to monitor potential causes.			
		Conducts a Pre-Scram Brief.			

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.: <u>2</u> Event No.: <u>4</u> Page <u>10</u> of <u>15</u>					
Event Des	Event Description: Condenser Vacuum Leak						
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior					
	ATC	Performs AOP 20.125.01, Condition C Actions:					
		1. Contacts the CSS to notify of load reduction.					
		<ol> <li>Performs a rapid power reduction IAW 23.623, "Reactor Manual Control System", Section 9.6, by depressing the Reactor Recirculation RECIRC MANUAL RUNBACK pushbutton.</li> </ol>					
		PO – P603_A317_1 – Manual Runback Pushbutton OFF					
		Determines Manual Runback failure.					
		<ul> <li>Takes individual manual control to reduce recirc speeds to 55-60% core flow.</li> </ul>					
		• Performs AOP 20.125.01, Condition H Actions to verify status of:					
		1. Condenser vacuum breakers.					
		2. Proper Feedwater Heater levels.					
		3. Condenser Pump seal water flow, etc.					
		Monitors Main Condenser Vacuum for 2.5 psia indication.					
		Notifies crew Condenser Vacuum is 2.5 psia. (Crew Update)					
		Places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN when condenser vacuum indicates 2.5 psia or when directed.					

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Op-Test No.:	<u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.: <u>2</u> Event No.: <u>5</u> Page <u>11</u> of <u>15</u>		
Event Desc	cription: I	Reactor Scram		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
+50 min	ATC SRO	<ul> <li>Performs AOP 20.000.21, "Reactor Scram" actions: (Should perform all or most of the following)</li> <li>1. Verifies all rods in. (Rod Worth Minimizer)</li> <li>2. Verifies power decreasing.</li> <li>3. Verifies SDV Vent and Drain Valves closed.</li> <li>4. Verifies Post Scram Feedwater Logic and Post Scram Water Level Setdown sealed in.</li> <li>5. Inserts IRMs and SRMs to monitor reactor power.</li> <li>6. Directs RB Rounds to verify Scram Discharge Volume integrity.</li> <li>7. Stops all Heater Drain Pumps.</li> <li>Enters 29.100.01 Sheet 1, "RPV Control" (Level 3).</li> </ul>		
	BOP	<ul> <li>Requests Scram Reports.</li> <li>Directs BOP to Confirm Isolations and actuations for level as they occur.</li> <li>Assigns BOP RPV Level Band (173-214 inches) and pressure band (900-1050 psig).</li> <li>Directs ATC to perform AOP 20.000.21, "Reactor Scram".</li> <li>Gives Scram Report.</li> <li>Monitors and controls RPV Level 173-214 inches.</li> </ul>		
		Monitors and controls RPV Pressure 900-1050 psig.		

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         2         Event No.:         6/7         Page 12 of 15				
Event Des	cription:	Loss of Level Indication / RPV Flooding				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
+60 min		NOTE: Booth Operator will play the Earthquake Sound.				
		Malf - C97MF1087 - Seismic Event / Trouble Alarm (6D69) B21MF0059 - Rx Nozzle 12A Sensing Line Rupture B21MF0060 - Rx Nozzle 12B Sensing Line Rupture B21MF0073 - RPV Level Floodup Fails Hi B21MF0037- SRV "R" Fails Closed				
		Determines all Narrow Range Level Indication (C32R606A-D) is lost.				
		Determines Flood Up (B21R605) indication is lost.				
	ATO	When directed, injects with Condensate and Feedwater through the SULCV, restarting Heater Feed Pumps <b>IF</b> required.				
	ATC	<ul> <li>When directed, injects with both SBFW Pumps by continuously depressing the F001 valve open pushbutton. (May not be directed)</li> </ul>				
		Orders 29.ESP.19, SBFW Level 8 Defeat. (May not perform due to other priorities)				
		<b>NOTE:</b> Booth Operator will activate <b>EOPRF0047</b> (DEFEAT)				
		<b>ROLE PLAY</b> : After 5 min report 29.ESP.19 defeats are installed.				
		IF High Drywell pressure signal is received:				
		<ol> <li>Verifies initiation of EECW and isolation to the Drywell by verifying the following:</li> </ol>				
		a. The white Emergency Mode Light is ON for Div 1 (2).				
		b. EECW Pump A (B) is running.				
		c. EESW Pump A (B) is running.				
		d. P4400-F603A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Supply Iso VIv is closed.				
		e. P4400-F601A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Return Iso VIv is closed.				

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Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         2         Event No.:         6/7         Page         13         of         15			
Event Description: Loss of Level Indication / RPV Flooding					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
	ATC	f. P4400-F602A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW Makeup Tnk Iso VIv is open.			
		g. P4400-F605A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW To SE (NW) Sump Hx Iso VIv is closed.			
		h. P4400-F606A (B), Div 1 (2) EECW DW Otbd Supply VIv is closed.			
		<ol> <li>P4400-F608, Div 2 EECW To DW Sump Hx Iso VIv is closed.</li> </ol>			
		j. P4400-F604, Div 2 EECW To CRD Sply Iso VIv is closed.			
		<ul> <li>P4400-F614, Div 1 EECW To Penet Clr's Iso VIv is closed.</li> </ul>			
		<ol> <li>P4400-F613, Div 1 EECW To Batt Rm's A/C Iso VIv is closed.</li> </ol>			
		2. Restores Cooling to CRD by performing the following:			
		a. High DW Pressure is present, places Div 2 EECW Manual			
		Override keylock switch to OVERRIDE. b. Depresses RESET pushbutton for Div 2 EECW Isolation			
		Valves. c. Opens P4400-F604, Div 2 EECW To CRD Supply Iso Valve.			
	SRO	Announces entry into EOP 29.100.01 Sheet 3, "RPV Flooding".			
		Directs BOP to open 5 SRVs, ADS preferred.			
CRITICAL TASKS		Directs BOP to Close MSIVs and Steam Line Drains. (Could be closed on loss of vacuum).			
		<ul> <li>Directs BOP to isolate HPCI and RCIC Steam Lines. (HPCI previously isolated).</li> </ul>			
		<ul> <li>Directs starting LP ECCS Systems in preparation for when pressure is low enough for injection.</li> </ul>			
		• Directs shutting down injection systems, when flooded to Main Steam Lines, while maintaining SRVs open and RPV Pressure as low as practical.			

Op-Test No	.: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.: Event No.: Page <u>14</u> of <u>15</u>
Event Des	scription:	Loss of Level Indication / RPV Flooding
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
CRITICAL TASK CRITICAL TASK CRITICAL TASK	BOP	<ul> <li>Responds to Seismic System/Event Trouble alarm. (6D69)</li> <li>Directs an operator to investigate in the Relay Room.</li> <li>Determines all Wide Range level instrumentation is lost.</li> <li>Reports RPV Level cannot be determined.</li> <li>When directed, opens 5 ADS Valves.</li> <li>Determines SRV "R" does not open.</li> <li>Opens an additional SRV.</li> <li>Reports 5 SRVs are open and SRV R did not open.</li> <li>When directed, closes MSIVs and Main Steam Line Drains. (Could be closed on loss of vacuum).</li> <li>When directed, closes RCIC and HPCI Steam Line isolation valves. (HPCI previously isolated).</li> <li>NOTE: Core Spray and RHR may automatically align on High Drywell Pressure.</li> <li>Starts LP ECCS (CS and RHR) Systems before pressure is low enough for injection as follows:         <ol> <li>CS is started and aligned for injection IAW SOP 23.203, "Core Spray System", Enclosure A. (Hard Card)</li></ol></li></ul>

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Op-Test No.:	2008-1	Scenario No.: 2	Event No.:	6/7	Page <u>15</u> of <u>15</u>	
Event Desc	Event Description: Loss of Level Indication / RPV Flooding					
Time     Position     Applicant's Actions or Behavior						

F

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         2         Event No.:         6/7         Page 15 of 15
Event Des	cription: L	oss of Level Indication / RPV Flooding
	BOP	<ol> <li>RHR/LPCI is started and aligned for injection IAW 23.205, "RHR System", Enclosure B. (Hard Card)</li> </ol>
		<ul> <li>a. Starts RHR Pumps A and C (B and D)</li> <li>b. Closes B3105-F031A(B), N(S) RR Pump Discharge Vlv, for loop where injection is desired.</li> <li>c. When Reactor Pressure decreases below 461 psig, opens E1150-F015A(B), Div 1(2) LPCI Inbd Iso Vlv.</li> <li>d. When RHR Loop A(B) Flow Indicator, E11-R603A(B) is &gt;3000 gpm, verifies E1150-F007A(B), Div 1(2) RHR Pmps Min Flow Vlv, closes.</li> <li>e. Determines that Reactor vessel is flooded to the Main Steam Lines.</li> <li>e. Establishes RPV pressure as low as practical to maintain SRVs open, by stearing and starting injection systems as proceeding.</li> </ul>
CRITICAL TASK		by stopping and starting injection systems as necessary.

## Scenario # 2

Lesson "Scenario #2.lsn" Mal	function List:
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Label	Description	Target	Delay	Ramp	Step
H_P805_B058_3	South TBCCW Pump OFF Light	0	0	0	1
C11MF0381	Control Rod 22-31 Drift	ACTIVE	0	0	2
C97MF1087*	06D69 Seismic System Event/Trouble Alarm	1	0	0	3
EBAORL_TCTVSP	MDCT Fan Trip	1	0	0	4
N61MF0003	East Condenser Vacuum Leak	2.5	0	3	5
P603_A317_1	Manual Recirc Runback Pushbutton	0	0	0	5
B21MF0037	Main Steam SRV Failure B21-F013R	0	0	0	6
C97MF1087*	06D69 Seismic System Event/Trouble Alarm	1	0	0	6
B21MF0059	Reactor Nozzle 12A Sensing Line Rupture	ACTIVE	30	0	6
B21MF0060	Reactor Nozzle 12B Sensing Line Rupture	ACTIVE	60	0	6
B21MF0073	RPV Lvl Xmtr Fail As-Is Floodup Div 2 B21-N027	570	75	0	6

\* Deletes automatically after 60 seconds.

Step 1 = Setup

Step 2 = CR 22-31 Drift Out

Step 3 = Seismic Event

Step 4 = MDCT Fan Trip

Step 5 = Loss of Vacuum

Step 6 = Loss of Level Indication

Simulator Instructions:

- 1. Initialize simulator to **IC-20**, and place in **RUN**.
- 2. Open and Execute Lesson **Scenario** #2.lsn.
- 3. **Trigger Step 1, Setup**.
- 4. Place an RT dot near the South TBCCW Pump CMC switch.
- 5. Bring crew into simulator and begin scenario when ready.
- 6. Trigger other steps as cued by examiner.

Scenario Outline

Facility	r: <u> </u>	ni 2	Scenario No. <u>3</u> Op-Test No: <u>2008-1</u>				
Examiners: <u>M. Bielby</u>			Operators:				
C. Moore B. Pillaggi							
Initial (	Conditions: IC-	19. EOL. 1	00% Rx. Power				
Turnov		<u> </u>					
			403 days. Reactor Power is currently 100% of Rated Thermal				
			01% Rod Line following rod pattern adjustment. The N. is out of service for motor replacement. The plan for the shift				
is to rer	move the North	TBCCW P	ump from service for lubrication and outboard motor bearing				
			perform 27.109.01, "Turbine Steam Valves Test",				
NOTE:		onducted p	ng for the reactor power decrease and "Turbine Steam Valves prior to entering the simulator. (Suggested time 30 minutes nario.)				
Event	Malf.	Event	Event				
No.	No.	Type*	Description				
1.	N/A	N (BOP) N (SRO)	Crew shifts TBCCW Pumps due to scheduled maintenance on North TBCCW Pump.				
2	C51MF0002	I (ATC)	#2 APRM fails upscale high.				
		I (SRO)	When directed, ATC removes APRM #1 from bypass and bypasses #2 APRM per 23.605, "Average Power Range Monitoring (APRM) System", Sect 6.4. CRS reviews TS to determine tracking LCO.				
3.	N/A	R (ATC) R (SRO)	Lower reactor power to 93% with Recirculation Flow per GOP 22.000.03, "Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%", in preparation to perform 27.109.01, Turbine Steam Valves Test.				
4.	C51MF0001		#1 APRM fails downscale low.				
			APRM downscale and control rod block in alarms.				
			SRO reviews TS 3.3.1.1.A (Place instrument in tripped condition in 12 hrs.)				
5.	B21MF0029	C (BOP)	SRV G fails open.				
		C (SRO)	BOP takes immediate actions per AOP 20.000.25, "Failed Safety Relief Valve (SRV)", by depressing the open and				
			closed pushbuttons repeatedly. The SRV will close.				
			The CRS reviews TS 3.4.3.A, SRVs (tracking LCO), TS 3.6.1.6.A, Low-Low Set Valves (14 day LCO), and TS 3.6.1.8, Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers (SR 3.6.1.8.2, 12 hrs to perform the vacuum breaker test after a SRV discharge to Torus).				
* (N)o	* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor						

Facility: Fermi 2		2	Scenario No. 3 Op-Test No: 2008-1		
Examiners: <u>M. Bielby</u> <u>C. Moore</u> B. Pillaggi			Operators:		
	onditions: <u>IC-1</u> Continued from		<u>% Rx. Power.</u>		
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description		
5. (cont'd)			SRV G fails open a second time. BOP again takes immediate actions per AOP 20.000.25, "Failed Safety Relief Valve (SRV)", by depressing the open and closed pushbuttons repeatedly. The SRV will again close. SRO/BOP directs removing fuses to prevent recurrence per AOP 20.000.25, Enclosure A.		
6.	C102SENS OR571916T VNOISE	C (ATC) C (SRO)	CRD Flow Control Valve begins operating erratically. ATC observes and reports. SRO enters AOP 20.106.03, "CRD Flow Control Valve Failure", Condition A. ATC takes manual control, and adjusts CRD Pressure as required.		
7.	N30MF0044 C71MF0006 C11MF0001	M (ALL) C (ATC) C (SRO)	Turbine Trips / Failure to Scram (ATWS) Failure to scram is reported and the crew enters the EOPs on Scram Condition with power >3%. CRS directs actions from 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control-ATWS. ATC performs FSQ 1-8 actions, all are unsuccessful. (Manual rod insertion will be successful).		
			BOP inhibits ADS, bypasses and restores drywell pneumatics, and if MSIVs not shut, orders 29.ESP.11.		
8.	C41MF0003 C41MF0004	C (ATC) C (SRO)	Initial SLC Pump selected trips. When ATC is ordered to inject SLC. He informs CRS and starts second SLC Pump. SLC is successfully injected. <b>(CT)</b>		
9.	N/A	M (ALL)	BOP lowers water level and maintains 0-50 inches on Core Level (EOP C-5, Level / Power Control). EOP 29.100.01, PC Control, Sheet 2 ATC performs manual rod insertion <b>(CT).</b> When 29.ESP.10		
			(Defeat of ARI Logic Trips) is complete and ARI Trip Logic is reset, the scram discharge volume will drain (3D94 clear). The ATC will perform the Scram-Reset-Scram section of 29.ESP.03, "Alternate Control Rod Insertion", which will insert all rods. <b>(CT)</b>		
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor					

Initial conditions establish Reactor Power at 100% with the N. Turbine Lube Oil Vapor Extractor out of service for motor replacement. The crew plans to shift the operating TBCCW Pumps to remove the North for scheduled maintenance. The crew will have briefed this activity prior to entering the simulator. The TBCCW shift is in accordance with SOP 23.128, TBCCW System and is a Normal activity for BOP.

APRM #2 Fails High. ATC will evaluate alarms and report the failure. The CRS will evaluate and direct bypassing the APRM. The ATC will bypass the APRM per 23.605, "APRM System", Section 6.4. An operator will be directed to the Relay Room to investigate and report all indications. The CRS will evaluate the failure and apply Tech Specs. (Tracking LCO)

Power will be lowered to 93% in accordance with GOP 22.000.03, Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%, to support the performance of surveillance 27.109.01, Turbine Steam Valves.

Next APRM #1 will fail downscale. ATC will report observed conditions and alarms. The crew will investigate the event. The CRS will review and determine applicable Tech Spec actions.

SRV G will fail open. BOP will perform immediate actions to close the SRV. He should repeatedly depress the OPEN and then the Close pushbuttons, observing plant response, between cycles of the pushbuttons. The CRS will enter AOP 20.000.25, Failed SRV. After several attempts, the SRV will close. The SRV will fail open a second time, and the BOP and CRS will repeat the previous actions. he CRS should declare the SRV inoperable and take actions per the AOP Enclosure A (remove fuses) to ensure the SRV remains closed. The CRS will review and take actions per TS.

The CRD Flow Control Valve will begin oscillating, resulting in oscillating flow. The ATC will observe and report. The CRS will enter AOP 20.106.03, CRD Flow Control Valve Failure. The crew takes action by placing the valve controller in manual. The valve/flow will stop oscillating, and ATC will manually adjust CRD flow as necessary.

The Main Turbine trips, but RPS fails to actuate resulting in a failure to scram (ATWS). RPV Water Level decreases rapidly to below Level 1, and the MSIVs close. ATC reports Failure to Scram, and the crew enters the EOPs on Scram Condition and Rx power cannot be determined to be <3%. After Scram Reports, the CRS directs actions from 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control-ATWS. ATC performs FSQ 1-8 actions (unsuccessful). The success path for the ATWS is manual rod insertion and level-power control.

The BOP inhibits ADS, and if time allows before MSIV closure, he bypasses and restores Drywell Pneumatics. When directed, he controls level 0-50 inches on Core Level (to maintain power low) until SLC is injected and rods are inserted. He maintains pressure 900-1050 psig using Low-Low Set.

When ATC reports FSQ 1-8 is complete, the CRS directs SLC initiation. ATC initiates SLC, but the first pump trips. He starts the other pump, reports the events, and gives his Standard SLC Report, also reports that the first pump tripped. He then attempts to drift rods and then drives rods.

When 29.ESP.10 defeats are installed, ATC resets ARI and drains the SDV per 29.ESP.03, Scram-Reset-Scram, Section 4.0, so the reactor can be re-scrammed. When the SDV is drained (3D94 clear), the reactor is re-scrammed (using ARI), and all rods are fully inserted.

The scenario may be terminated after all rods are in.

Op-Test No.:     2008-1     Scenario No.:     3     Event No.:     N/A     Page 4 of 18					
Event Description: Overview					
<i>Initial Conditions:</i> The plant has been operating for 403 days. Reactor Power is currently 100% of Rated					
Thermal Power with Control Rods at the 101% Rod Line following rod pattern adjustment. The N. Turbine Lube Oil Vapor Extractor is out of service for motor replacement. The plan for the shift is to remove the North TBCCW Pump from service for lubrication and outboard motor bearing replacement. The shift is also to perform 27.109.01, "Turbine Steam Valves Test." The crew will begin with the LPSV and LPCV portion of the test because I&C support will not be available to perform the on-line valve position calibration on #1 LPIV later in the shift.					
The objectives of this scenario are to:					
<ol> <li>Recognize, respond to, and take the required actions for an instrument / equipment failures requiring the use of operator and Tech Spec actions.</li> </ol>					
2. Recognize and respond to a Failed SRV.					
3. Recognize and respond to a CRD FCV Failure.					
<ol> <li>Execute steps of RPV Control-ATWS to control Reactor Pressure Vessel level (FSL) Reactor Pressure (FSP) and Reactor Power (FSQ).</li> </ol>					
<ol> <li>May require the execution of steps in Primary Containment Control and operation of the RHR System to control Drywell and Torus temperature and pressure.</li> </ol>					
<ol><li>Direct and supervise the Shift team during Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency operations.</li></ol>					
The crew will be required to respond to the following order of events:					
APRM #2 Fails Upscale (TS 3.3.1.1.F)					
APRM #1 Fails Downscale (TS 3.3.1.1.A)					
• SRV G Fails Open (TS 3.4.3.A, 3.6.1.6.A, & SR 3.6.1.8.2)					
CRD FCV Oscillation					
Main Turbine Trip / ATWS, with total failure of RPS					
SLC Pump A / B Failure					
EOP Contingency 5 (Level / Power Control)					

		Scenario No.: _3_       Event No.: _1_       Page _5_ of _18_         ew shifts TBCCW Pumps to remove the N. TBCCW Pump from service for
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
0 min	SRO	<ul> <li>Short brief/discussion on crew evolution.</li> <li>Directs BOP to shift TBCCW Pumps.</li> <li>Makes Hi-Com announcement.</li> </ul>
	ВОР	<ul> <li>Crew Update: "Shifting TBCCW Pumps"</li> <li>Shifts pumps IAW 23.128, "TBCCW System", Section 6.0, Alternating Pumps</li> <li>Starts Standby P4300-C003, South TBCCW Pump.</li> <li>Stops pump to be removed from service, P4300-C001, North TBCCW Pump.</li> <li>Verifies Supply Header Pressure is approximately 36 to 43 psig.</li> <li>Verifies P43-F405, TBCCW DP Control Vlv, is maintaining a differential pressure across the TBCCW Pumps of 20 to 30 psid (COP H11-P805)</li> <li>Periodically monitors system using the following instruments: <ul> <li>P43-R805, TBCCW Headers Pressure Indicator.</li> <li>P43-R803, TBCCW Heat Exchangers Temperature recorder</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Op-Test No Event Desci		Scenario No.:     _3_     Event No.:     _2_     Page _6_ of _18_       M #2 Fails Upscale High
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
5 min	SRO	C51MF0002 - APRM #2 Fails Upscale         • Announces the event over the Hi-Com.         • Directs ATC to bypass APRM #2.         • Reviews TS 3.3.1.1.F, and declares APRM #2 inoperable. (Mode 2 within 6 hours Tracking LCO.) Discusses with the crew.
	ATC	<ul> <li>Acknowledges and reports alarms:</li> <li>3D097, APRM NEUTRON FLUX UPSCALE TRIP</li> <li>3D101, APRM THERM PWR UPSCL TRIP</li> <li>3D102, APRM SIM THERM PWR UPSCL</li> <li>3D113, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWL BLOCK</li> <li>Crew Update, "APRM #2 Failed Upscale."</li> <li>Bypasses APRM #2 IAW 23.605, "Average Power Range Monitoring (APRM) System", Section 6.4, Bypassing APRM Channel</li> <li>Place APRM Bypass Joy-Stick (2) (H11-P603) in position corresponding to APRM channel to be bypassed.</li> <li>Verify the following for APRM channel in bypass:</li> <li>APRM 2 BYPASS light is ON at H11-P603.</li> <li>BYP is displayed in inverse video in the header for APRM 2 instrument at RR H11-P608 and/or ODA on H11-P603.</li> <li>Blue BYPASSED LED is ON for APRM 2 on each 2/4 Logic Module (4) at RR H11-P608.</li> <li>Contacts operator to verify Relay Room indications.</li> </ul> <b>ROLE PLAY:</b> Operator reports, Blue BYPASSED LED is ON for APRM 2 on each 2/4 Logic Module (4) at RR H11-P608. Relay Room indications confirmed APRM #2 has failed upscale high.

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Op-Test No.	: _2008-1_	Scenario No.: _3_         Event No.: _3_         Page _7_ of _18_
Event Descr	iption: <u>Crew</u>	lowers reactor power to 93% for Turbine Valves Surveillance
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
15 min	SRO	Short brief/discussion on crew evolution.
		• Directs BOP to contact the System Supervisor to notify him of the load decrease.
		• Directs ATC to maintain Turbine Flow Limiter 5% above reactor power, throughout power decrease.
		• Assigns BOP as backup/verifier of Turbine Flow Limiter adjustment, throughout power decrease.
		• Assigns BOP to have TB Rounds monitor, adjust, and verify > 2000 gpm through each inservice Condensate Filter Demin.
		• Assigns BOP to maintain Condensate Header $D/P > 25$ psid.
		• Directs ATC to lower reactor power to 93% by lowering recirc pump flow.
		Makes Hi-Com announcement.
	ATC	Acknowledges SRO direction.
		• Commences power reduction IAW 23.138.01, "Reactor Recirculation System", Section 6.1 Speed Control.
		• If desired place B31-R621A (B), N (S) RR MG Set Speed Controller, in AUTO. (Verifies RRMG speed controller in AUTO.)
		Crew Update "Commenced Lowering Reactor Power."
		• Adjust setpoint (SP) of B31-R621A (B), N (S) RR MG Set Speed Controllers to desired speed. (By intermittently depressing the setpoint down arrow on the speed controller.)
		• Monitors the speed indicator on the speed controller and maintains both controllers approximately matched.
		<ul> <li>Monitors power on the APRMs and adjusts the Turbine Flow Limiter to maintain ~5% above reactor power.</li> </ul>
	BOP	Acknowledges SRO direction.
		• Contacts the System Supervisor to notify him of the load decrease.
		ROLE PLAY: System Supervisor acknowledges the load decrease. Asks, "Approximately how many MWe decrease."
		<ul> <li>Contacts TB Rounds to monitor, adjust, and verify &gt; 2000 gpm through each inservice Condensate Filter Demin.</li> </ul>
		ROLE PLAY: TB Rounds acknowledges direction from BOP.
		• Acts as backup/verifier of Turbine Flow Limiter adjustment, throughout power decrease.
		• Acts as backup/verifier for RRS speed adjustment.
		• Monitors and maintains Condensate Header D/P > 25 psid.

-	.: <u>2008-1</u> iption:	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
30 min	SRO	C51MF0001 - APRM #1 Fails Downscale
		• Announces the event over the Hi-Com.
		• Reviews TS 3.3.1.1.A, and declares APRM #1 inoperable. (Place in trip condition within 12 hours.) Discusses with the crew.
	ATC	Acknowledges and reports alarms:
		3D098, APRM NEUTRON FLUX DOWNSCALE
		3D113, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWL BLOCK
		Crew Update, "APRM #1 Failed Downscale."

Op-Test No.		Scenario No.:         3_         Event No.:         5_         Page         9_         of         18_
	ription: <u>SRV</u>	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
35 min		B21MF0029 – SRV "G" Fails Open
	SRO	• Directs BOP to close SRV "G".
		• Announces the event over the Hi-Com.
		Crew Update, "Entering SRV Failure AOP."
		Conducts AOP brief.
		• Directs BOP to perform AOP 20.000.25, Condition E.
		• May direct SRV G fuse removal IAW 20.000.25, Enclosure A, to de-activate SRV G and maintain closed.
		• Reviews TS and declares SRV G Inop:
		• TS 3.4.3.A, SRVs, Tracking LCO.
		• TS 3.6.1.6.A, Low-Low Set Valves, 14 Day LCO.
		• TS 3.6.1.8, Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers. Determines SR 3.6.1.8.2 applies, perform vacuum breaker test within 12 hrs. after SRV discharge to Torus.
		<b>NOTE</b> : When SRV lifts the second time, the above steps will be repeated.
		• Directs SRV G fuse removal IAW 20.000.25, Enclosure A, to de-activate SRV G and maintain closed.
		• Contacts FSS to inform him of the SRV problem and to have him contact maintenance for troubleshooting.
		• Contacts WWM to request a review of scheduled maintenance that may be affected by SRV "G" being inoperable. May contact the Emergent Issues Team (EIT) Leader to develop a troubleshooting plan IAW MWC05.
		• May discuss preparations for shutdown based on results of investigation.
	ATC	Reports steam flow / feed flow mismatch.
		Reports MWe decrease.
		• Reports steam flow and feed flow have returned to original values after SRV closure.
		• Reports MWe returned to original value after SRV closure.
		<b>NOTE</b> : When SRV lifts the second time, the above steps will be repeated.
	BOP	Crew Update, "SRV "G" has failed open."
		• Performs immediate actions for AOP 20.000.25, "Failed SRV".
		Depresses OPEN pushbutton.
		• Depresses CLOSE pushbutton.
		• Repeats as necessary until the SRV "G" closes.
		• Crew Update, "SRV "G" is closed".
		<b>NOTE</b> : When SRV lifts the second time, the above steps will be repeated.

Op-Test No.: _2008-1_       Scenario No.: _3_       Event No.: _5_       Page _10_ of _1         Event Description:SRV G Fails Open (Continued)       SRV G Fails Open (Continued)       SRV G Fails Open (Continued)			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	BOP	<ul> <li>When directed to Perform Condition E:</li> <li>Depresses Div I and Div II Low-Low Set Logic reset pushbuttons.</li> <li>Directs an operator to the Relay Room to monitor SRV Tailpipe Temperatures.</li> <li><b>ROLE PLAY:</b> Operator reports SRV G Tailpipe Temp is 285°F and slowly lowering.</li> <li>When directed, directs an operator to pull SRV "G" fuses.</li> <li><b>ROLE PLAY:</b> Report removing fuses on SRV "G". 2 min later, report fuses are removed.</li> </ul>	

-	.: <u>2008-1</u> iption: <u>CR</u>	Scenario No.: _3_         Event No.: _6_         Page _11_ of _18_           D Flow Oscillation
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
45 min	SRO	C102SENSOR571916TVNOISE – CRD Controller Noise
		<ul> <li>Announces the event over the Hi-Com.</li> <li>Crew Update, "Entering AOP 20.106.03, "CRD FCV Failure."</li> <li>Conducts AOP Brief.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Directs ATC to perform AOP 20.106.03, "CRD FCV Failure", Condition A.</li> <li>Contacts FSS to inform him of the CRD FCV problem and to have him contact maintenance for troubleshooting.</li> </ul>
	ATC	<ul> <li>Observes and reports CRD flow oscillations. Crew Update, "CRD FCV is oscillating."</li> <li>When directed, performs AOP 20.106.03, "CRD FCV Failure", Condition A:</li> <li>Place CRD Flow Controller in MANUAL.</li> <li>Adjust CRD Flow Controller to establish 37-63 gpm on C11-R800.</li> </ul>
	BOP	• Directs an operator to the CRD FCV to investigate.

Op-Test No.	: _2008-1_	Scenario No.: _3_         Event No.: _7_         Page _12_ of _18_
Event Descr	iption: <u> </u>	urbine Trips / Failure to Scram ATWS
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
55 min	SRO	N30MF0044 – Main Turbine Trip C71MF0006 – Total Scram Failure C11MF0001 – All Rods Stuck 93%
		<ul> <li>Announces the event over the Hi-Com.</li> <li>Crew Update, "Entering EOP 29.100.01, RPV Contol–ATWS, Sheet 1A, based on Failure to Scram Condition."</li> </ul>
		Requests Scram Reports and records on EOP Chart.
		• Directs ATC to perform FSQ 1-8.
		• Directs BOP to confirm isolations and actuations as they occur.
		• Directs BOP to inhibit ADS, bypass and restore DW Pneumatics, and perform 29.ESP.11.
	ATC	Observes P603 alarms and indications.
		• Places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN, observes scram failure.
		• Depresses Manual Scram pushbuttons, observes scram failure.
		• Crew Update, "Failure to scram."
		• When asked, gives Scram Report.
		• When directed, Performs FSQ 1-8, (Rx will not shutdown, success path is through manual control rod insertion.)
		<b>NOTE:</b> ARI will insert the withdrawn control rods a couple notches.
		• Reports FSQ 1-8 is complete and Reactor Power is ~20%.
	BOP	• When asked, gives Scram Report.
		• When directed, confirms isolations and actuations as they occur.
		• When directed, inhibits ADS, bypasses and restores DW Pneumatics, and performs 29.ESP.11.

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u> _	Scenario No.:     3_     Event No.:     8_     Page _13_ of _18_
Event Descr	ipuon:	Initial SLC Pump Selected Trips
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
58 min	SRO	Directs ATC to inject SLC.
		Acknowledge SLC Report and records on EOP Chart.
CRITICAL TASK	ATC	<ul> <li>After FSQ 1-8 are complete, ATC reports, "Standing by to inject SLC."</li> <li>Starts first SLC pump, observes pump trips.</li> <li>Starts remaining SLC Pump, observes proper operation, and RWCU is isolated.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>(G3352-F004 &amp; G3352-F220 are CLOSED.)</li> <li>Reports, "SLC is injecting, Time, SLC Tank level is <u>69 - 72 inches</u>, and RWCU is isolated."</li> <li>Reports failure of first SLC Pump.</li> </ul>

Op-Test No.	: _2008-1_	Scenario No.: _3_         Event No.: _9_         Page _14_ of _18_
Event Descr	iption: <u>A</u>	TWS (Continued)
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
60 min	SRO	• Directs BOP to maintain RPV Water Level 0-50" on Core level indication.
		• Directs BOP to maintain pressure band 900-1050 psig, use Low-Low Set.
		• Directs ATC to order 29.ESP.10 (ARI Logic Defeats), use 29.ESP.03 to insert rods.
		• When ALL rods are reported in, directs BOP to raise RPV Water Level to 173-214 inches.
		• Crew update, "Entering EOP 29.100.01, PC Control, Sheet 2, due to high DW and Torus temperatures.
		• Directs BOP to restart DW Cooling Fans.
		• Directs BOP to align for 1 division of SGTS and CCHVAC.
	ATC	• Contacts RTC and directs 29.ESP.10 (ARI Logic Defeats) to be performed.
		• Inserts rods using 29.ESP.03.
		ROLE PLAY: Booth operator will perform 29.ESP.03 Defeats. After 5 min, report 29.ESP.10 is complete.
		• 29.ESP.03 "Alternate Control Rod Insertion Methods", for existing conditions, per 29.ESP.03 Enclosure A:
		1. Increase CRD Cooling Water D/P (Section 2.0)
		2. Manual Control Rod Insertion (Section 3.0)
		3. Scram Reset Scram (Section 4.0)
		4. Vent CRD Over piston Volume (Section 8.0)
		Increase CRD Cooling Water D/P (Section 2.0):
		1. Place C11-R600, CRD Flow Controller, in MANUAL.
		2. Start standby Control Rod Drive pump.
		3. Open Flow Control Valve using C11-R600, CRD Flow Controller.
		<ol> <li>Open C1152-F003, CRD Drive/Clg Water PCV, to maximize cooling water flow.</li> </ol>
CRITICAL		Manual Control Rod Insertion (Section 3.0):
TASK		1. Place C11-R600, CRD Flow Controller, in MANUAL
		2. Start both CRD pumps.
		<ol> <li>If no CRD pump can be started, exit this method of Alternate Control Rod Insertion.</li> </ol>
		<ol> <li>Direct an Operator to close C1100-F034, CRD Charging Water Header Isolation Valve. (RB1-G10)</li> </ol>
		<b>ROLE PLAY:</b> After 2 minutes RB Rounds reports C1100-F034 is closed. (Booth Operator will perform C11RF0123, Charging Water Header Isolation Valve F034, 0% with a 30 sec ramp.)

Op-Test No.	: _2008-1_	Scenario No.: _3_         Event No.: _9_         Page _16_ of _18_	
Event Descri	iption:	ATWS (Continued)	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
CRITICAL TASK	ATC	<ol> <li>As necessary, throttle C1152-F003, CRD Drive/Clg Water PCV, to maintain sufficient drive water D/P for rod motion.</li> </ol>	
		<ol> <li>As necessary, adjust C11-R600, CRD Flow Controller, to maintain sufficient drive water D/P for rod motion</li> </ol>	
		7. Place the Rod Worth Minimizer keylock switch in BYPASS.	
		8. Insert the Cram Array using EMERGENCY IN.	
		<ol><li>When the Cram Array has been inserted, attempt to achieve a checkerboard control rod pattern using EMERGENCY IN as follows:</li></ol>	
		<ul> <li>Select and fully insert control rods in a spiral out from center pattern, other concurrent actions may preclude obtaining an actual checkerboard pattern.</li> </ul>	l
		10. Continue to fully insert all remaining control rods using EMERGENCY IN as follows:	
		a. Select and fully insert control rods in a spiral out from center pattern.	
		Scram Reset Scram (Section 4.0):	
		1. Reset ARI as follows:	
		<ul> <li>Verify or defeat ARI logic trips in accordance with 29.ESP.10,</li> <li>"Defeat of ARI Logic Trips".</li> </ul>	
		b. Depress ATWS ARI/RPT Div I (II) RESET pushbuttons.	
		c Verify ARI is reset	$\neg$
		<b>NOTE:</b> When ARI is reset, malfunction C11MF0001 will automatically clear to allow the control rods to be inserted.	
		2. Verify the SDV vent and drain valves are open.	
		<b>NOTE:</b> It is not required to fully drain the scram discharge volume prior to reinitiating a manual reactor scram.	
CRITICAL		3. Allow the scram discharge volume to drain. (3D94 Clear)	
TASK		4. Initiate a manual scram by performing the following:	
		<ul> <li>Arm and depress the four ATWS ARI/RPT manual initiation pushbuttons.</li> </ul>	
		5. IF control rods move inward, return to Step 1	
		Crew Update, "ALL rods are IN."	

-	.: <u>2008-1</u>	
Event Descr	ription:	ATWS (Continued)
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	BOP	Control RPV Water Level 0-50 inches on Core Level.
		NOTE: MSIVs will be closed on Level 1 due to rapid level decrease and RFPTs will coast down. Pressure will be controlled by SRVs (Low-Low Set)
		• Dials down HPCI to stop injection. (Eventually Trips HPCI)
		• Dials down RCIC to 200-300 gpm.
		• Water level will be controlled with RCIC, SLC, & CRD.
		Restarts all DW Cooling Fans.
		Aligns for 1 division of SGTS and shuts down CCHVAC Emergency Makeup Fan.
		Controls pressure in pressure band with Low-Low Set.
		• When all rods are reported in and when directed, raises water level to 173- 214 inches, using available high pressure systems. (RCIC, HPCI, SBFW)
80 min		END SCENARIO

## Scenario # 3

Label	Description	Target	Delay	Ramp	Step
H_P804_A173_4	North TLO Vapor Extractor OFF Light	0	0	0	1
C11MF0001	All Rods Stuck (ATWS)	93	0	0	1
C71MF0006	Total Scram Failure	ACTIVE	0	0	1
C41MF0003	SLC Pump A Trip cd='P603_B002_1 EQ 1	ACTIVE	0	0	1
	AND C41MF0004 EQ 0'				
C41MF0004	SLC Pump B Trip cd='P603_B002_3 EQ 1	ACTIVE	0	0	1
	AND C41MF0003 EQ 0'				
C51MF0002	APRM Channel 2 Failure	130	0	0	2
C51MF0001	APRM Channel 1 Failure	-5	0	0	3
B21MF0029*	Main Steam SRV Failure B21-F013G	100	0	0	4
B21MF0029*	Main Steam SRV Failure B21-F013G	100	0	0	5
H_P601_B223_2	SRV G Div 2 OPEN Light	0	0	0	6
H_P601_B224_2	SRV G Div 2 CLOSE Light	0	0	0	6
B21MF0029*	Main Steam SRV Failure B21-F013G	0	0	0	6
C102SENSOR571916T	CRD Flow Controller Noise Amplitude	0.3	0	60	7
VNOISE**	-				
N30MF0044	Main Turbine Trip	ACTIVE	0	0	8
C11RF0123	C11-F034, Charging Water Hdr Isol. Vlv	0	0	30	9
EOPRF0011	Division 1 ARI Level 2 Isolation Defeat	DEFEAT	0	0	10
EOPRF0012	Division 1 ARI Pressure Isolation Defeat	DEFEAT	0	0	10
EOPRF0013	Division 2 ARI Level 2 Isolation Defeat	DEFEAT	0	0	10
EOPRF0014	Division 2 ARI Pressure Isolation Defeat	DEFEAT	0	0	10

Lesson "Scenario #3.lsn" Malfunction List:

\* Auto deletes when SRV is manually closed.

\*\* Auto deletes when controller is placed in Manual.

Step 1 = Setup Step 6 = Pull SRV Fuses

Step 2 = APRM Fails High Step 7 = CRD FCV Oscillations

Step 3 = APRM Fails Low Step 8 = Main Turbine Trip

Step 4 = SRV Failure #1 Step 9 = Close C11-F034

Step 5 = SRV Failure #2 Step 10 = 29.ESP.10

Simulator Instructions:

- 1. Initialize simulator to **IC-19**, and place in **RUN**.
- 2. Open and Execute Lesson **Scenario #3.lsn**.
- 3. **Trigger Step 1, Setup**.
- 4. Place an RT dot near the N. Turbine Lube Oil Vapor Extractor CMC switch.
- 5. Bring crew into simulator and begin scenario when ready.
- 6. Trigger Step 6 when directed to pull SRV fuses.
- 7. Trigger Step 9 when directed to close C11-F034.
- 8. Trigger Step 10 when directed to perform 29.ESP.10.
- 9. Trigger all other steps as cued by examiner.

Appen	dix D		Required Operator Actions	Form ES-D-2
Apper	ndix D		Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1
Facility Examir	r:Ferm ners: C. Moore B. Pillaggi			<b>Dp-Test No</b> : <u>2008-1</u>
Turnov <u>100% o</u> adjustm center p	<u>f Rated Thermal P</u> lent. The plan for t pump. The crew's Pre-jo	been opera ower with Co he shift is to b Briefing fo	<u>Rx. Power</u> ting at 100% power for 400 days. Ro ontrol Rods at the 109% Rod Line fo shift RBCCW Pumps for scheduled r the reactor power increase is to be ested time 30 minutes prior to beginn	Ilowing rod pattern maintenance on the conducted prior to
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Descriptio	n
1.	N/A	N (BOP) N (SRO)	Shift RBCCW Pumps in accordanc Section 6.1	e with SOP 23.127,
2.	B21MF0067	I (SRO)	ECCS Level 3 & 8 NR Div 2 B21-N BOP responds to alarm 1D32 and verifies power level and pressure. of TS to CRS. CRS declares instru TS 3.3.2.2.A (7 days) and TS 3.3.5	reviews ARP. ATC BOP gives ARP with list ument inop and reviews
3.	N21MF0029	R (ATC) R (SRO) C (BOP)	Spurious N. RFP Trip / RRS Runba Drains CRS enters AOP 20.107.01, "Loss Feedwater Control". The crew veri SBFW and injects at 1200 gpm, an to lower reactor power to ≤ 65%. (~	of Feedwater or fies RR runs back, starts id inserts the Cram Array
4.	C51MF0198	I (ATC) I (SRO)	RBM B Fails High The crew bypasses RBM B per 23. Monitoring System", Section 5.1. T inoperable and enters TS 3.3.2.1.A	The CRS declares RBM B
5. * (N)or	B21MF0103 B21MF0015 B21MF0009 B21MF0054	(l)pstrum	RB Steam Tunnel Leak / MSIVs Fa Crew observes increasing tempera on IPCS. Crew should attempt to is closing the MSIVs, when the area t (MNO), to isolate all systems disch area temp is ≥ 200 °F and the MSIN the crew should close them due to <b>NOTE:</b> MSL C MSIVs do not fully of ent, (C)omponent, (M)ajor	ture in RB Steam Tunnel solate the steam leak, by comperature is $\geq 160$ °F arging into the area. <b>IF</b> Vs are not closed, then the auto isolation failure.

Facility	r: Ferm	i 2	Scenario No. 4	<b>Op-Test No:</b> <u>2008-1</u>
Exami	ners: <u>M. Bielby</u>		Operators:	
	C. Moore B. Pillage			
		<u> </u>		
	Conditions:		<u></u>	
NOTE:	Continued from	n page 1		
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Descript	
6.	N/A	M (ALL)	Reactor Manual Scram (Mode Sw Before the RB Steam Tunnel Are Max Safe Operating Temperature briefs and places the Mode Switc When Scram Reports are comple 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1 20.000.21, Reactor Scram.	a temperature reaches the e (MSO) of 210 °F, the crew h in Shutdown. <b>(CT)</b> the the crew enters EOP
7a.	E41MF0007 EOPRF0022 E41MF0001 E41MF0008		HPCI Steam Leak & E4150-F002 E4150-F600 Thermal Overload Fire Alarm in the HPCI Quad, the 20.000.22, "Plant Fires". When 3 HIGH – HIGH EOP ENTRY alarm 29.100.01, SC/RR, Sheet 5 due t greater than Max Normal Operati	crew may enter AOP D34, SEC CONTM TEMP is the crew will enter EOP o HPCI Area temperature
7b.			NOTE: 1D66, STEAM LEAK DET HIGH alarms at ≥ 154 °F in HPCI signal is generated.	
			When BOP attempts to isolate, E (failed as is), and when E4150-F6 is depressed or an isolation signa loses power. The leak cannot be	600 valve close pushbutton al is received, the valve
8.	N/A	M (ALL)	When Area Temperatures are > I EOP directs Emergency Depress RPV Flood/ED, Sheet 3 (EOP Co	urization, EOP 29.100.01
			CRS directs BOP to open 5 SRV while the plant is depressurizing t restoration and control.	· · · · ·
9.	N/A		The crew restores and maintains	water level 173 – 214".
* (N)o	rmal, (R)eactiv	vity, (I)nstr	ument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor	

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Required Operator Actions

**Scenario Outline** 

Form ES-D-1

## ILO NRC Initial Exam Scenario 4 Narrative Summary

Initial conditions establish Reactor Power at 100%, with a plan to shift the operating RBCCW Pumps to support maintenance. This is a Normal for BOP.

A Jet Pump 5/6 Failure will occur. ATC reports changes in Jet Pump and Recirc Loop Flows. He will determine that it is a Jet Pump failure and not a Recirc Pump issue. The CRS will enter AOP 20.138.02, Jet Pump Failure and direct actions per the AOP. The CRS declares JP #5 inop and takes actions per TS. He will direct the ATC to monitor for thermal hydraulic instabilities.

A spurious trip of the North Reactor Feed Pump (N. RFP) occurs, which results in a Reactor Recirc Runback and a Loss of Heater Drains. The CRS enters AOP 20.107.01, Loss of Feedwater or Feedwater Control. ATC verifies Recirc Runs back and RPV Water Level is maintained. The CRS directs BOP to start SBFW and inject at 1200 gpm to increase the margin from low suction pressure trip on the running RFP. The ATC will be directed to insert the Cram Array to lower reactor power to  $\leq 65\%$ . **NOTE:** If power were allowed to rise fully, from loss of feedwater heating, power would increase to 72%. The ATC will insert a number of Cram Rods to decrease power  $\leq 65\%$ . (Power decrease of about 15% when Cram Rod insertion is complete.)

While the ATC is inserting rods, RBM B will fail upscale high. This will cause an RBM Upscale/Inop alarm and a rod block. RBM downscale alarms are expected during this evolution. The crew should observe and determine the alarm is incorrect for the situation. The CRS will direct the RBM to be bypassed. The ATC will bypass RBM B per SOP 23.607, Rod Block Monitoring System. The CRS declares the RBM inop and takes action per TS.

A steam leak will occur in the HPCI Room. This will cause 16D27, FIRE ALARM and the panel will indicate it is in the HPCI Quad. The shift will direct an operator to investigate the alarm. The CRS may enter AOP 20.000.22, "Plant Fires" and brief the AOP in the event it is a real fire. (The ARP allows shift discretion to deem it a confirmed fire). The crew may look at IPCS HPCI Room temperature, but they may think the room temperature is increasing due to a fire. The field operator will report there is steam rising from the NE RB quad stairwell.

**NOTE:** Depending on room temperature at the time of this report the CRS may direct HPCI steam Line isolation before 3D34 alarms.

When HPCI Room Temperature increases to 148 °F, 3D34, SEC CONTM TEMP HIGH – HIGH EOP ENTRY alarm is received. The CRS will enter EOP 29.100.01, SC/RR, Sheet 5. The EOP steps direct isolating systems discharging into the area when any area temperature exceeds Max Normal Operating Value (MNO) (148 °F for HPCI). The CRS should direct isolating the HPCI Steam Line now, if not previously performed.

**NOTE:** When HPCI Room Temperature is > 154 °F an isolation signal is generated and 1D66, STEAM LEAK DETECTION AMBIENT TEMP HIGH alarms

When the BOP attempts to isolate the HPCI Steam Line the E4150-F002 will not close. If he attempts to isolate, before the isolation signal, the E4150-F600 will lose power when he depresses the close pushbutton. If it is after the isolation signal, he will discover the E4150-F600 has no power. In any case the isolation attempt will be unsuccessful.

The CRS should brief the crew for plant scram. The EOP directs the plant must be scrammed before HPCI Room Temp reaches the Max Safe Operating Value (MSO) (210 °F) **(CT)**. The crew can scram the plant anytime after the failure to isolate and commence a plant cool down to minimize the potential for rad release. When Scram Reports are complete the crew enters EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1 (Level 3) and AOP 20.000.21, Reactor Scram.

After the plant is scrammed a second steam leak will occur in the RB Steam Tunnel. The crew should be monitoring IPCS Temperatures and observe the Main Steam Tunnel Temperature increase. When temperature is above 160 °F (MNO), or before, the crew should attempt to isolate the MSIVs.

**NOTE:** If temperature is above 200 °F, and the MSIVs haven't been closed, the crew should close the MSIVs due to auto isolation failure.

When area temperatures are > MSO in 2 or more areas the EOP directs Emergency Depressurization. The CRS enters EOP 29.100.01, RF/ED/SC, Sheet 3 (Emergency Depressurization EOP C-2). The CRS directs BOP to open 5 SRVs, ADS preferred. **(CT)** 

The crew restores, controls, and maintains RPV Water Level 173 – 214".

The scenario will be terminated after Emergency Depressurization and plant conditions are stable.

Op-Te:	st No.: <u>2008-1</u> Scenario No.: <u>4</u> Event No.: <u>N/A</u> Page <u>6</u> of <u>17</u>
Event ]	Description: Overview
Initi	al Conditions:
Pow	plant has been operating at 100% power for 400 days. Reactor Power is currently 100% of Rated Thermal ver with Control Rods at the 109% Rod Line following rod pattern adjustment. The plan for the shift is to shift CCW Pumps for scheduled maintenance on the center pump.
The	objectives of this scenario are to:
1.	Recognize, respond to, and take the required actions for an instrument / equipment failures requiring the use of operator and Tech Spec actions.
2.	Recognize and respond to a Jet Pump Failure.
3.	Recognize and respond to a spurious N. RFP Trip.
4.	Recognize and respond to a RBM Failure High.
5.	Execute steps of RPV Control to control Reactor Water Level (L) and Pressure (P).
6.	Execute the steps of Secondary Containment Temperature Control (SCT).
7.	Execute steps of Reactor Pressure Vessel Flooding (RF).
8.	Direct and Supervise the Shift team during Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operations
The	crew will be required to respond to the following order of events:
•	ECCS NR Div 2 B21-N095B Fails Low (RPV LvI Xmtr L3 & L8) (TS 3.3.2.2.A and TS TS 3.3.5.1.E.2)
•	Spurious RFP Trip
•	RBM Failure High - (Tech Spec 3.3.2.1.A)
•	RB Steam Tunnel Leak
•	Failure of MSIVs to Isolate
•	Reactor Scram
•	HPCI Steam Leak
•	Failure of E4150-F002 to Auto Isolate
•	E4150-F600 Thermal Overload

Required Operator Actions

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No	.: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.: <u>4</u> Event No.: <u>1</u> Page <u>7</u> of <u>17</u>
Event Desc	ription:	RBCCW Pump Shift
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+0 min	SRO	• Directs BOP to shift RBCCW Pumps for scheduled maintenance on the center pump.
	BOP	• Shifts RBCCW Pumps in accordance with 23.127, Section 6.1:
		<ol> <li>Directs Rounds Operator to place T4100-B033, Battery Rooms AC Unit, switch in OFF and to verify RPS MG Set doors are closed.</li> </ol>
		<b>ROLE PLAY:</b> After ~1 minutes, RB Rounds reports T4100-B033 switch is in OFF and RPS MG Set Doors are closed.
		2. Closes P4400-F613, Div 1 EECW To Batt Rm's A/C Iso Vlv (H11-P808).
		<b>NOTE: 2D119, RBCCW PUMPS DIFF PRESS HIGH/LOW,</b> may alarm during pump shift.
		3. Starts the South RBCCW Pump.
		4. Stops the Center RBCCW Pump.
		5. If necessary reviews ARP 2D119.
		6. Verifies P42-F403, RBCCW DP Control Vlv, is maintaining proper differential pressure by verifying annunciators 2D100 and 2D104 are clear.
		7. Opens P4400-F613, Div 1 EECW To Batt Rm's A/C Iso Vlv (H11-P808).
		<ol> <li>Direct the Rounds Operator to place T4100-B033, Battery Rooms AC Unit, switch in AUTO, and to verify RPS MG Set doors are closed.</li> </ol>
		<b>ROLE PLAY:</b> After ~1 minutes, RB Rounds reports T4100-B033 switch is in AUTO and RPS MG Set doors are closed.
		• Periodically monitors RBCCW system temperatures and pressures to ensure proper system operation.

Required Operator Actions

Form ES-D-2

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otion: Position	ECCS NR Div 2 B21-N095B Fails Low (RPV Lvl Xmtr L3 & L8 Applicant's Actions or Behavior	<u>8)</u>
Position	Applicant's Actions or Pahavior	
	Applicant's Actions of Denavior	
SRO	Malf – B21MF0067 – B21-N095B Fails Low – 150"	
	• Reviews 23.601, "Instrument Trip sheets".	
	Declares instrument inop.	
	• Reviews TS 3.3.2.2.A (7 days) and TS 3.3.5.1.E.2 (8 days).	
BOP	• Responds to alarm 1D32, ADS REACTOR H2O LEVEL L	.3
	• Reviews ARP and gives to CRS for TS review or reads app	licable TS to CRS.
	• Verifies B21-R604B indicates < Level 3 (173.4 inches) on	COP H11-P602.
	• Directs an operator to D2 testability cabinets.	
	Relays information to CRS.	
ATC	<ul> <li>Announces power, level, and pressure are sat.</li> <li>Monitors his control panel</li> </ul>	
	ВОР	SRO       Malf – B21MF0067 – B21-N095B Fails Low – 150"         • Reviews 23.601, "Instrument Trip sheets".         • Declares instrument inop.         • Reviews TS 3.3.2.2.A (7 days) and TS 3.3.5.1.E.2 (8 days).         • Conducts brief, reports TS and LCO time restraints. Inform will have a confirmatory L3 locked in and SBFW will not r         • Requests FSS to write a LCO, review 23.601, & to generate instrument in a tripped condition. Has FSS contact WWM, with them to generate a trouble shooting game plan.         BOP         • Responds to alarm 1D32, ADS REACTOR H20 LEVEL L         • Reviews ARP and gives to CRS for TS review or reads app         • Verifies B21-R604B indicates < Level 3 (173.4 inches) on

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Op-Test No	.: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         4         Event No.:         3         Page 9 of 17
Event Descr	ription:	N. RFP Trip / Reactor Recirc Runback / Loss of Heater Drains
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
+20 min	ATC	Malf – N21MF0029 – Reactor Feed Pump N Trip
		Responds to plant conditions; diagnoses and reports loss of N. RFP.
		Verifies Recirc Runback:
		1. Verifies RR runs back to 2/3 Limiter.
		2. Places Recirc A & B Limiter 2/3 Defeat Switch in NORMAL.
		• Inserts CRAM Array to lower reactor power to $\leq 65\%$ . (First 2 sheets plus others.)
		• Reports power level to CRS when $\leq 65\%$ .
		• At $\leq$ 65%, when directed, places Recirc A & B Flow Limiter 2/3 Defeat Switch to
		DEFEAT.
	BOP	• Responds to plant conditions; diagnoses and reports loss of N. RFP.
	_	• Starts SBFW and injects at 1200 gpm:
		1. Starts West Pump A Aux Lube Oil Pump.
		2. Starts East Pump B Aux Lube Oil Pump.
		3. Starts West Standby Feedwater Pump A.
		4. Verifies N2103-F001, SBFW Disch to RPV Iso Vlv, automatically opens.
		5. Starts East Standby Feedwater Pump B.
		<ol> <li>Throttles open N2103-F002, SBFW 6" Disch Flow Ctrl Vlv, until 1200 gpm is achieved.</li> </ol>
		• May complete shutdown of N. RFP in accordance 23.107:
		1. Opens or verifies open the N. RFPT drain valves.
		<ol> <li>Pushes Reactor Feed Pump Turbine North green SPEED DECREASE pushbutton until backlight is ON and speed demand is 0%.</li> </ol>
		• Direct Rounds Operator to verify Feedwater Heaters 3, 4, 5, and 6 relief valves closed.
		ROLE PLAY: After ~2 minutes, Rounds Operator reports Feedwater Heaters 3, 4, 5, and 6 relief valves are closed.
		• Shuts down SBFW when reactor power level is $\leq 65\%$ :
		1. Shuts down West Standby Feedwater Pump A.
		2. Closes N2103-F002, SBFW 6" Disch Flow Ctrl Vlv.
		3. Shuts down East Standby Feedwater Pump B.
		4. Verifies N2103-F001, SBFW Disch to RPV Iso Vlv, automatically closes.
		5. After SBFW pumps have been shut down for 5 minutes, shuts down West &

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A	spend	ПX	υ

		East Pump A & B Aux Lube Oil Pumps.
Op-Test No	.: 2008-1	Scenario No.:         4         Event No.:         3         Page 10 of 17
Event Desci	ription:	N. RFP Trip / Reactor Recirc Runback / Loss of Heater Drains
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		• Shuts down a HFP IAW GOP 22.000.03, Power Decrease Section, when RFP suction pressure is ≥ 700 psig.
		<ol> <li>Verify or transfer Hydrogen injection to a HFP that will remain operating following HFP shutdown in accordance with 23.143,"Hydrogen Water Chemistry System."</li> </ol>
		<ol> <li>Close or verify closed N2000-F830A, B, or C, East, Center, or West HFP Suction Hydrogen Inj Iso Valve, for the HFP to be shutdown (TB1-N14).</li> </ol>
		<ol> <li>Adjust/verify Heater Drain Pump Seal pressure in accordance with 23.108, "Extraction Steam And Heater Drains."</li> </ol>
		4. Place the associated Auxiliary Oil Pump in RUN.
		5. Stop the Heater Feed Pump.
		6. Verify N20-F405A (B, C), East (Center, West) HFP Min Flow Ctrl Vlv, closes.
		<ol> <li>Adjust/verify Heater Drain Pump Seal pressure in accordance with 23.108, "Extraction Steam And Heater Drains."</li> </ol>
	SRO	• Announces entry into AOP 20.107.01, Loss of Feedwater or Feedwater Control.
		Conducts AOP Brief.
		• Directs ATC to verify RR Runback to 2/3 Limiter.
		• Directs BOP to inject with SBFW at 1200 gpm.
		• Directs ATC to insert CRAM Array to lower reactor power to $\leq 65\%$ .
		• May direct BOP to perform Condition K of AOP 20.107.01.
		• When reactor power level is verified $\leq 65\%$ , directs BOP to shutdown SBFW.
		Notifies SNE.
		ROLE PLAY: SNE acknowledges report.
		Monitors Core Thermal Limits.
		• Directs Chemistry to perform required sampling for reactor power change >15%.
		ROLE PLAY: Chemistry acknowledges report.
		<ul> <li>Contacts Radiation Protection about &gt;15% power reactor change.</li> </ul>
		ROLE PLAY: Radiation Protection acknowledges report.
		<ul> <li>Directs BOP to maintain Turbine Flow Limiter 5% &gt; Reactor power.</li> </ul>
		• Directs BOP to shutdown a HFP.
		• At 65% Reactor Power, as indicated on APRMs, directs ATC place Recirc A & B

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Required Operator Actions

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.: 2008-1         Scenario No.: 4         Event No.: 4         Page 12 of 17						
Event Description:     RBM B Fails High						
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
+40 min	ATC	<ul> <li>Malf - C51MF0198 - RBM B Failure</li> <li>Responds to 3D109, RBM UPSCALE/INOP and 3D113, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWL BLOCKED alarms.</li> <li>Reports failure of RBM B upscale high to CRS.</li> <li>Bypasses RBM B in accordance with 23.607: <ol> <li>Places RBM Bypass switch in B.</li> <li>Verifies white Bypassed light for RBM B is ON.</li> <li>Verifies BYPASS is displayed in inverse video on RBM Instrument Chassis header.</li> </ol> </li> </ul>				
	SRO	<ul> <li>Directs ATC to bypass RBM B.</li> <li>Evaluates compliance with Tech Spec 3.3.2.1.A (24 hr LCO).</li> <li>Declares RBM B inoperable and enters LCO.</li> </ul>				

Required Operator Actions

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.:         2008-1         Scenario No.:         4         Event No.:         5         Page 13 of 17						
Event Descr	Event Description: RB Steam Tunnel Leak / MSIVs Fail to Isolate					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
+50 min	ВОР	Malf – B21MF0103 – Steam Line Rupture in the Tunnel B21MF0015 – Inboard MSIV Failure-B2103F022C B21MF0009 – Inbd MSIV Fails Shut B21-F022A B21MF0054 – Outboard MSIV Failure-B2103F028C				
		<ul> <li>Responds to 1D66, STEAM LEAK DETECTION AMBIENT TEMP HIGH alarm. Reports potential EOP entry. (Main Steam Tunnel Temp 160°F.)</li> </ul>				
		• Responds to IPCS alarm for Main Steam Tunnel high temperature.				
		Manually closes MSIVs when directed.				
		Observes RB Tunnel temperature continuing to rise.				
	ATC	<ul> <li>Responds to 3D34, SEC CONTM TEMP HIGH-HIGH EOP ENTRY alarm. Reports potential EOP entry. (Main Steam Tunnel Temp 160°F.)</li> </ul>				
		• Responds to 3D18, IPCS MONITORED INPUTS ABNORMAL. (High area temp alarm.)				
		Monitors IPCS Area Temperatures.				
	SRO	• Directs BOP to isolate Main Steam Lines when temperature is $\geq 160^{\circ}$ F.				
		Monitors RB Steam Tunnel temperature.				
		• Announces entry into EOP 29.100.01, SC/RR, Sheet 5, when RB Steam Tunnel temperature reaches 160°F.				
		Before RB Steam Tunnel temperature reaches 210°F, briefs crew on reactor shutdown.				

Op-Test No.:         2008-1         Scenario No.:         4         Event No.:         6         Page 14 of 17						
Event Descrip	Event Description: Reactor Scram					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
+60 min <b>CRITICA</b>	ATC	• Places Mode Switch in Shutdown <b>BEFORE</b> RB Steam Tunnel Temperature reaches 210°F ( <b>CT</b> ).				
L		• Verifies all control rods fully inserted.				
TASK		Verifies reactor power decreasing.				
		Gives Scram Report.				
		Verifies Recirc Pumps runback to minimum.				
		• Verifies SDV Vent and Drain Valves closed.				
		• Verifies Post Scram Feedwater Logic and Post Scram Water Level Logic Setdown are sealed in.				
	BOP	Gives scram report.				
		• Maintains reactor water 173-214" using RFPs, SBFW, RCIC or HPCI.				
		• Maintains reactor pressure 900-1050 psig allowing Low-Low Set to control pressure.				
	SRO	Requests Scram Reports.				
		• Before RB Steam Tunnel temperature reaches 210°F, announces entry into EOP 29.100.01, RPV Control, Sheet 1, step RC-1 and AOP 20.000.21, Reactor Scram. Directs the ATC to place the Mode Switch in Shutdown.				
		• Directs BOP to maintain reactor water 173-214" using RFPs, SBFW, RCIC or HPCI.				
		• Directs BOP to maintain reactor pressure 900-1050 psig allowing Low-Low Set to control pressure.				
		Makes Hi-Com announcement of event.				
		<ul> <li>Declares a Site Area Emergency per EP-101, when RB Steam Tunnel Temp &gt; MSO. (FS1)</li> </ul>				

Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.:         4         Event No.:         7         Page 15 of 17					
Event Descri	iption:	HPCI Steam Leak / E4150-F002 Failure to Isolate / E4150-F600 Thermal Overload					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior					
+70 min	ВОР	Malf – E41MF0007 – HPCI Steam Line Leak EOPRF0022 – E410F002 Isolation Defeat for RPV Venting E41MF0001 – E4150F600 Thermal Overload Failure E41MF0008 – E4150F002 Fails As-Is					
		Responds to 16D27 (Plant Fire). Observes Fire Light in HPCI Room.					
	• May direct an operator to investigate fire alarm in HPCI Room.						
		<b>ROLE PLAY:</b> Operator reports steam in RB SE Quad stairwell.					
		• Diagnoses steam leak in HPCI Room after operator reports steam in RB SE Quad stairwell.					
	• Recognizes failure of HPCI to isolate.						
		• Attempts to manually isolate HPCI steam line.					
		• Discovers and reports that E41-F002 will not close, and E41-F600 breaker has tripped.					
		• May open an SRV to lower pressure to 500 psig, when directed.					
	ATC	Monitors HPCI Room and Main Steam Tunnel Temps on IPCS.					
		May Place RHR in Torus Cooling.					
	SRO	Directs BOP to manually isolate HPCI steam line.					
		• May enter AOP 20.000.22, Plant Fires.					
	• May direct BOP to open an SRV and decrease reactor pressure to 500 psig to reduce steam leak.						
		Before HPCI Room temperature reaches 210°F, brief crew on Emergency Depressurization.					
Op-Test No.	: <u>2008-1</u>	Scenario No.: <u>4</u> Event No.: <u>8/9</u> Page <u>15</u> of <u>17</u>					
Event Descri	ption:	Area Temperature > 210°F in 2 Areas (HPCI Rm & Steam Tunnel)					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior					
+75 min	BOP	• Opens 5 SRVs (ADS preferred). (CT)					
CRITICA L		Bypasses and restores Drywell pneumatics if necessary.					
TASK		• Restores reactor water level 173-214".					

Appendix D			Required Operator Actions	Form ES-D-2	
	SRO	•	When area temperatures are >MSO in 2 or more areas, directs B0 SRVs, ADS preferred [EOP 29.000.01, RF/ED/SC Sheet 3 (Eme Depressurization EOP C-2)]. ( <b>CT</b> )		
		•	Directs BOP to bypass and restore Drywell pneumatics if necessary	ary.	
		•	Briefs crew on water level restoration and control.		
		•	Directs BOP to restore and maintain reactor water level 173-214	".	

## Scenario #1

Lesson "Scenario #1.lsn" Malfunction List:

Label	Description	Target	Delay	Ramp	Step
H_P807_A008_3	GSW #4 OFF Light	0	0	0	1
P807_A008_1	GSW #4 OFF/RESET Switch	1	0	0	1
P602_B131_3	E. DWEDT Pump	1	0	0	1
P602_A094_3	W. DWEDT Pump	1	0	0	1
P602_B131_3	E. DWEDT Pump	-1	240	0	1
P602_A094_3	W. DWEDT Pump	-1	240	0	1
B31RF0018	RRMG B Scoop Tube Hand Crank	55	0	7	2
	cd='BBBDB3101C001B_MZMLNA GT 942'				
E51MF0009	RCIC Spurious Initiation	ACTIVE	0	0	3
R14MF0001	Loss of Div 2 Offsite Power	ACTIVE	0	0	4
N20MF0023	Heater Feed Pump C Trip	ACTIVE	0	0	4
E41MF0009	HPCI Auto Start Failure	ACTIVE	0	0	4
N21MF0031*	SBFW N2103-F001 Fail As-Is	0	0	0	4
EOPRF0038	RBCCW High Drywell Isolation Defeat	DEFEAT	0	0	4
N21RF0019*	MOV N2103-F001 Breaker	OPEN	8	0	4
	cd='P601_A290_2 OR P601_A291_2 EQ 1'				
E41MF0005	HPCI Spurious Isolation	ACTIVE	45	0	4
	cd='H_P602_A131_2 EQ 1'				
B31MF0006	Recirc Loop A Rupture	1	0	300	5

\* Delete to reset thermal overload trip (simulated) of N21-F001 breaker.

Step 1 = Setup

Step 2 = Recirc Runaway

Step 3 = RCIC Initiation

Step 4 = Loss of Power (w/ HPCI & SBFW Failures)

Step 5 = LOCA

Simulator Instructions:

- 1. Initialize simulator to **IC-18**, and place in **RUN**.
- 2. Open and Execute Lesson **Scenario #1.lsn**.
- 3. **Trigger Step 1, Setup**. (Drywell Equipment Drain Tank will complete pumping down in about 4 minutes.)
- 4. Place an RT dot near GSW Pump #4 CMC switch.
- 5. Bring crew into simulator and begin scenario when ready.
- 6. **Trigger Step 2, Recirc Runaway, when the Recirc Pump speed increase starts**. (The runaway begins when RRMG Set B speed reaches 57%.)
- 7. Trigger other steps as cued by examiner.