



Fort Calhoun Station
P.O. Box 550
Fort Calhoun, NE 68023

LIC-08-0047
May 14, 2008

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Subject: Licensee Event Report 2008-002 Revision 0 for the Fort Calhoun Station

Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2008-002, Revision 0, dated May 14, 2008. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

The root cause information contained in this report is preliminary; therefore, the Omaha Public Power District plans to provide a supplement describing the final root cause by June 13, 2008. If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

T. R. Nellenbach
Division Manager - Nuclear Operations

TRN/RMC/rmc

Attachment

c: E. E. Collins, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV
M. T. Markley, NRC Senior Project Manager
J. D. Hanna, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Fort Calhoun Station	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000285	3. PAGE 1 OF 3
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4. TITLE
Loss of Containment Integrity Due to a Leaking Isolation Valve

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTI AL NUMBER	REV NO	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	15	2008	2008	- 002 -	00	05	14	2008	FACILITY NAME	05000
									FACILITY NAME	05000

9. OPERATING MODE 03	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)									
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
10. POWER LEVEL 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)						
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A							

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME	Erick Matzke, Compliance Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)	402-533-6855
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13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
D	CB	RV	Dresinv a	Y					

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED	15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input type="checkbox"/> NO		06	13	2008

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On March 15, 2008 at 0833 CDT, following a plant trip from 85% power, relief valve CH-223 lifted and failed to reclose, thus causing a two to three gallon per minute reactor coolant system leak through the letdown system into the pressurizer quench tank. CH-223 is a two inch relief valve located on a branch line between two automatic containment isolation valves; therefore, this valve is classified as part of the containment boundary. The operators did not immediately recognize CH-223 as a containment boundary valve governed by technical specifications.

On March 16, 2008 at 1355, operators determined CH-223 to be a containment boundary valve. At that time operators entered abnormal operating procedure AOP-12, "Loss of Containment Integrity" and Technical Specification 2.6(1)a. At 1401 the appropriate containment isolation valve was locked closed thus restoring containment integrity.

The preliminary root cause of this event was determined to be the failure to translate containment integrity design requirements from the Final and Updated Safety Analysis Reports into appropriate plant operating procedures and guidance. Corrective actions to correct the root cause of this event will be specified in the completed root cause analysis.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Fort Calhoun Station	05000285	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	2 OF 3
		2008 -	002 -	00	

NARRATIVE

BACKGROUND

Containment integrity is defined in the Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Technical Specifications as:

- (1) All non-automatic containment isolation valves which are not required to be open during accident conditions and blind flanges, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 2.6(1)a, are closed.
- (2) The equipment hatch is properly closed and sealed.
- (3) The personnel air lock satisfies Specification 2.6(1)b.
- (4) All automatic containment isolation valves are operable, locked closed, or deactivated and secured in their closed position (or isolated by locked closed valves or blind flanges as permitted by a limiting condition for operation).
- (5) The uncontrolled containment leakage satisfies Specification 3.5, and
- (6) The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows or O-rings) is operable.

The Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specifications Section 2.6(1)a, "Containment Integrity" requires that containment integrity shall be maintained unless the reactor is in a cold or refueling shutdown condition. Containment integrity is maintained through normally locked or sealed-closed valves during power operation. Without containment integrity, it must be restored within one hour or the plant must be in at least hot shutdown within the next six hours, or be subcritical and less than 300 degrees F within the next six hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. Normally locked or sealed-closed valves (except for PCV-742A/B/C/D) may be opened intermittently under administrative control without constituting a violation of containment integrity.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 15, 2008 at 0833 CDT, following a plant trip from 85% power (described in FCS LER 2008-001), a "Relief Valve CH-223 Discharge Temperature High Alarm" was received in the control room due to a closure of HCV-204, "Letdown Heat Exchanger CH-7 Inlet Valve", from a letdown system pressure transient. At 0903, with the plant in hot shutdown (mode 3), operators restored the letdown system in accordance with station procedures. At 1315 operators noted a two to three gallon per minute (gpm) reactor coolant system (RCS) leak and entered procedure AOP-22, "Reactor Coolant Leak". An investigation revealed that valve CH-223, "Regenerative Heat Exchanger CH-6 Letdown Relief Valve to Pressurizer Quench Tank", lifted and had not resealed. This allowed RCS leakage through CH-223 into the pressurizer quench tank, which is located within the containment building. Several attempts were made to manually seat CH-223, but leakage past the seat continued. On March 16, 2008 at 0115, operators secured the letdown system by closing the upstream isolation valve, TCV-202, "RCS Loop 2A Letdown Temperature Control Valve", and began intermittent charging to maintain pressurizer level. TCV-202 is the inboard isolation valve located in the containment, and HCV-204 is the outboard isolation valve located in the auxiliary building. HCV-204 was left in the open position.

CH-223 is located within a branch connection between automatic isolation valves HCV-204 and TCV-202 and is classified as part of the containment boundary.

On March 16, 2008 at 1355, operators determined that CH-223 is a containment boundary valve and AOP-12, "Loss of Containment Integrity" and Technical Specification 2.6(1)a, "Containment Integrity" were entered.

At 1401 valve HCV-204 was closed restoring containment integrity. This was a conservative action since the automatic containment isolation valves were operable. Since containment integrity was not restored within the technical specification requirements this event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

CONCLUSION

The preliminary root cause of the event was determined through an in-depth investigation. The Technical Specifications, licensing and design basis, and related procedures were reviewed. The Fort Calhoun Station Final and Updated Safety Analysis Reports section 5.9.5 states, "Branch connections between the containment and the isolation valves are only included when necessary for system functioning or to enhance reliability, testing, or leak tightness. Such branch lines are equipped with valves to provide isolation integrity equal to at least that of the main system." The investigation concluded that since relief valve CH-223 is located on a branch line between two containment isolation valves, this valve is part of the containment boundary. This was not identified as such in plant procedures. Therefore, the preliminary root cause of this event is that containment integrity design requirements were not adequately translated from the Final and Updated Safety Analysis Reports into appropriate plant operating procedures and guidance.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Upon discovery that CH-223 is part of the containment boundary, containment isolation valve HCV-204 was closed to re-establish containment integrity.

The completed root cause analysis will specify appropriate corrective actions to correct the root cause of this event.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The completed root cause analysis will determine the appropriate safety significance of this event.

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Fort Calhoun Station	05000285	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	3 OF 3
		2008 -	002 -	00	

NARRATIVE

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE

This event does not constitute a safety system functional failure as described in NEI-99-02.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

Fort Calhoun Station reported a similar loss of containment integrity event in LER 2006-01.