

CHAPTER 11[†]: ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the evaluation of the HI-STORM 100 System for the effects of off-normal and postulated accident conditions. The design basis off-normal and postulated accident events, including those resulting from mechanistic and non-mechanistic causes as well as those caused by natural phenomena, are identified in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. For each postulated event, the event cause, means of detection, consequences, and corrective action are discussed and evaluated. As applicable, the evaluation of consequences includes structural, thermal, shielding, criticality, confinement, and radiation protection evaluations for the effects of each design event.

The structural, thermal, shielding, criticality, and confinement features and performance of the HI-STORM 100 System are discussed in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. The evaluations provided in this chapter are based on the design features and evaluations described therein.

Chapter 11 is in full compliance with NUREG-1536; no exceptions are taken.

11.1 OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS

Off-normal operations, as defined in accordance with ANSI/ANS-57.9, are those conditions which, although not occurring regularly, are expected to occur no more than once a year. In this section, design events pertaining to off-normal operation for expected operational occurrences are considered. The off-normal conditions are listed in Subsection 2.2.2.

The following off-normal operation events have been considered in the design of the HI-STORM 100:

- Off-Normal Pressure
- Off-Normal Environmental Temperature
- Leakage of One MPC Seal Weld
- Partial Blockage of Air Inlets
- Off-Normal Handling of HI-TRAC Transfer Cask
- Malfunction of FHD System
- SCS Power Failure
- Off-Normal Loads[‡]

[†] This chapter has been prepared in the format and section organization set forth in Regulatory Guide 3.61. However, the material content of this chapter also fulfills the requirements of NUREG-1536. Pagination and numbering of sections, figures, and tables are consistent with the convention set down in Chapter 1, Section 1.0, herein. Finally, all terms-of-art used in this chapter are consistent with the terminology of the glossary (Table 1.0.1) and component nomenclature of the Bill-of-Materials (Section 1.5).

[‡] Off-normal load combinations are defined in Chapter 2, Table 2.2.14 and evaluated in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.

For each event, the postulated cause of the event, detection of the event, analysis of the event effects and consequences, corrective actions, and radiological impact from the event are presented.

The results of the evaluations performed herein demonstrate that the HI-STORM 100 System can withstand the effects of off-normal events without affecting function, and are in compliance with the applicable acceptance criteria. The following sections present the evaluation of the HI-STORM 100 System for the design basis off-normal conditions that demonstrate that the requirements of 10CFR72.122 are satisfied, and that the corresponding radiation doses satisfy the requirements of 10CFR72.106(b) and 10CFR20.

The load combinations evaluated for off-normal conditions are defined in Table 2.2.14. The load combinations include both normal and off-normal loads. The off-normal load combination evaluations are discussed in Section 11.1.5.

11.1.1 Off-Normal Pressures

The sole pressure boundary in the HI-STORM 100 System is the MPC enclosure vessel. The off-normal pressure condition is specified in Section 2.2.2.1. The off-normal pressure for the MPC internal cavity is a function of the initial helium fill pressure and the temperature obtained with maximum decay heat load design basis fuel. The maximum off-normal environmental temperature is 100°F with full solar insolation. The MPC internal pressure is evaluated with 10% of the fuel rods ruptured and 100% of the rods fill gas and 30% of the fission gases released to the cavity.

11.1.1.1 Postulated Cause of Off-Normal Pressure

After fuel assembly loading, the MPC is drained, dried, and backfilled with an inert gas (helium) to assure long-term fuel cladding integrity during dry storage. Therefore, the probability of failure of intact fuel rods in dry storage is low. Nonetheless, the event is postulated and evaluated.

11.1.1.2 Detection of Off-Normal Pressure

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to withstand the MPC off-normal internal pressure without any effects on its ability to meet its safety requirements. There is no requirement for detection of off-normal pressure and, therefore, no monitoring is required.

11.1.1.3 Analysis of Effects and Consequences of Off-Normal Pressure

Chapter 4 calculates the MPC internal pressure with an ambient temperature of 80°F, 10% fuel rods ruptured, full insolation, and maximum decay heat, and reports the maximum value of 75.0 psig in Table 4.4.14 at an average temperature of 513.6°K. Using this pressure, the off-normal temperature of 100°F (bounding temperature rise of 20°F or 11.1°K), and the ideal gas law, the off-normal resultant pressure (calculated below) is below the MPC off-normal design pressure (Table 2.2.1 in Chapter 2).

$$\frac{P_1}{P_2} = \frac{T_1}{T_2}$$

$$P_2 = \frac{P_1 T_2}{T_1}$$

$$P_2 = \frac{(75.0 \text{ psig} + 14.7)(513.6^\circ \text{ K} + 11.1^\circ \text{ K})}{513.6^\circ \text{ K}}$$

$$P_2 = 91.6 \text{ psia or } 76.9 \text{ psig}$$

It should be noted that this bounding temperature rise does not take any credit for the increase in thermosiphon action that would accompany the pressure increase that results from both the temperature rise and the addition of the gaseous fission products to the MPC cavity. As any such increase in thermosiphon action would decrease the temperature rise, the calculated pressure is higher than would actually occur.

Structural

The structural evaluation of the MPC enclosure vessel for off-normal internal pressure conditions is discussed in Section 3.4. The stresses resulting from the off-normal pressure are confirmed to be bounded by the applicable pressure boundary stress limits.

Thermal

The MPC internal pressure for off-normal conditions is calculated as presented above. As can be seen from the value above, the design basis internal pressure for off-normal conditions used in the structural evaluation (Table 2.2.1) bounds the calculated value above.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this off-normal event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this off-normal event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the off-normal pressure does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.1.1.4 Corrective Action for Off-Normal Pressure

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to withstand the off-normal pressure without any effects on its ability to maintain safe storage conditions. There is no corrective action requirement for off-normal pressure.

11.1.1.5 Radiological Impact of Off-Normal Pressure

The event of off-normal pressure has no radiological impact because the confinement barrier and shielding integrity are not affected.

11.1.2 Off-Normal Environmental Temperatures

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed for use at any site in the United States. Off-normal environmental temperatures of -40 to 100°F (HI-STORM overpack) and 0 to 100°F (HI-TRAC transfer cask) have been conservatively selected to bound off-normal temperatures at these sites. The off-normal temperature range affects the entire HI-STORM 100 System and must be evaluated against the allowable component design temperatures. The off-normal temperatures are evaluated against the off-normal condition temperature limits listed in Table 2.2.3.

11.1.2.1 Postulated Cause of Off-Normal Environmental Temperatures

The off-normal environmental temperature is postulated as a constant ambient temperature caused by extreme weather conditions. To determine the effects of the off-normal temperatures, it is conservatively assumed that these temperatures persist for a sufficient duration to allow the HI-STORM 100 System to achieve thermal equilibrium. Because of the large mass of the HI-STORM 100 System with its corresponding large thermal inertia and the limited duration for the off-normal temperatures, this assumption is conservative.

11.1.2.2 Detection of Off-Normal Environmental Temperatures

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to withstand the off-normal environmental temperatures without any effects on its ability to maintain safe storage conditions. There is no requirement for detection of off-normal environmental temperatures for the HI-STORM overpack and MPC. Chapter 2 provides operational limitations to the use of the HI-TRAC transfer cask at temperatures of $\leq 32^\circ\text{F}$ and prohibits use of the HI-TRAC transfer cask below 0°F .

11.1.2.3 Analysis of Effects and Consequences of Off-Normal Environmental Temperatures

The off-normal event considering an environmental temperature of 100°F for a duration sufficient to reach thermal equilibrium is evaluated with respect to design temperatures listed in Table 2.2.3. The evaluation is performed with design basis fuel with the maximum decay heat and the most restrictive thermal resistance. The 100°F environmental temperature is applied with full solar insolation.

The HI-STORM 100 System maximum temperatures for components close to the design basis temperatures are listed in Subsection 4.4. These temperatures are conservatively calculated at an environmental temperature of 80°F. The maximum off-normal environmental temperature is 100°F, which is an increase of 20°F. Including this as a bounding temperature increment over the 80°F ambient temperature solutions of Chapter 4, the HI-STORM temperatures are computed and provided in Table 11.1.1. As illustrated by the table, all the maximum off-normal temperatures are below the off-normal design temperatures for the HI-STORM System (Table 2.2.3). The maximum temperatures are the peak values and are based on the conservative assumptions applied in this analysis. The component temperatures for the HI-TRAC listed in Table 4.5.2 are all based on the maximum off-normal environmental temperature. The off-normal environmental temperature is of a short duration (several consecutive days would be highly unlikely) and the resultant temperatures are evaluated against short-term temperature limits. Therefore, all the HI-STORM 100 System maximum off-normal temperatures meet the design requirements.

Additionally, the off-normal environmental temperature generates a pressure that is bounded by that evaluated in Subsection 11.1.1. The off-normal MPC cavity pressure is less than the design basis pressure listed in Table 2.2.1.

The off-normal event considering an environmental temperature of -40°F and no solar insolation for a duration sufficient to reach thermal equilibrium is evaluated with respect to material design temperatures of the HI-STORM overpack. The HI-STORM overpack and MPC are conservatively assumed to reach -40°F throughout the structure. The minimum off-normal environmental temperature specified for the HI-TRAC transfer cask is 0°F and the HI-TRAC is conservatively assumed to reach 0°F throughout the structure. For ambient temperatures from 0° to 32°F, antifreeze must be added to the demineralized water in the water jacket to prevent freezing. Chapter 3, Subsection 3.1.2.3, details the structural analysis and testing performed to assure prevention of brittle fracture failure of the HI-STORM 100 System.

Structural

The effect on the MPC for the upper off-normal thermal conditions (i.e., 100°F) is an increase in the internal pressure. As shown in Subsection 11.1.1.3, the resultant pressure is below the off-normal design pressure (Table 2.2.1 in Chapter 2). The effect of the lower off-normal thermal conditions

(i.e., -40°F) requires an evaluation of the potential for brittle fracture. Such an evaluation is presented in Section 3.1.2.3.

Thermal

The resulting off-normal system and fuel assembly cladding temperatures for the hot conditions are provided in Table 11.1.1 for the HI-STORM overpack and MPC. As can be seen from this table, all temperatures for off-normal conditions are within the short-term allowable values listed in Table 2.2.3.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this off-normal event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this off-normal event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the specified off-normal environmental temperatures do not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.1.2.4 Corrective Action for Off-Normal Environmental Temperatures

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to withstand the off-normal environmental temperatures without any effects on its ability to maintain safe storage conditions. There are no corrective actions required for off-normal environmental temperatures.

11.1.2.5 Radiological Impact of Off-Normal Environmental Temperatures

Off-normal environmental temperatures have no radiological impact, as the confinement barrier and shielding integrity are not affected.

11.1.3 Leakage of One Seal

The HI-STORM 100 System has a reliable welded boundary to contain radioactive fission products within the confinement boundary. The radioactivity confinement boundary is defined by the MPC shell, baseplate, MPC lid, and vent and drain port cover plates. The closure ring provides a redundant welded closure to the release of radioactive material from the MPC cavity through the field-welded MPC lid closures. Confinement boundary welds are inspected by radiography or ultrasonic examination except for field welds that are examined by the liquid penetrant method on the root (for multi-pass welds) and final pass, at a minimum. Field welds are performed on the MPC lid, the MPC vent and drain port covers, and the MPC closure ring. The welds on the vent and drain port cover plates are leakage tested. Additionally, the MPC lid weld is subjected to a pressure test to verify its integrity.

Section 7.1 provides a discussion as to how the MPC design, welding, testing and inspection requirements meet the guidance of ISG-18 such that leakage from the confinement boundary may be considered non-credible.

11.1.3.1 Postulated Cause of Leakage of One Seal in the Confinement Boundary

There is no credible cause for the leakage of one seal in the confinement boundary. The conditions analyzed in Chapter 3 shows that the confinement boundary components are maintained within their Code-allowable stress limits under all normal and off-normal storage conditions. The MPC lid-to-shell weld meets the requirements of ISG-18, such that leakage from the confinement boundary is not considered credible. Therefore, there is no event that could cause leakage of one seal in the confinement boundary.

11.1.3.2 Detection of Leakage of One Seal in the Confinement Boundary

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed such that leakage of one seal in the confinement boundary is not considered a credible scenario. Therefore, there is no requirement to detect leakage from one seal.

11.1.3.3 Corrective Action for Leakage of One Seal in the Confinement Boundary

There is no corrective action required for the failure of one weld in the closure system of the confinement boundary. Leakage of one weld in the confinement boundary closure system is not a credible event.

11.1.3.4 Radiological Impact of Leakage of One Seal in the Confinement Boundary

The off-normal event of the failure of one weld in the confinement boundary closure system has no radiological impact because leakage from the confinement barrier is not credible.

11.1.4 Partial Blockage of Air Inlets

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed with screens on the inlet and outlet air ducts. These screens ensure the air ducts are protected from the incursion of foreign objects. There are four air inlet ducts 90° apart and it is highly unlikely that blowing debris during normal or off-normal operation could block all air inlet ducts. As required by the design criteria presented in Chapter 2, it is conservatively assumed that two of the four air inlet ducts are blocked. The blocked air inlet ducts are assumed to be completely blocked with an ambient temperature of 80°F (Table 2.2.2), full solar insolation, and maximum SNF decay heat values. This condition is analyzed to demonstrate the inherent thermal stability of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.1.4.1 Postulated Cause of Partial Blockage of Air Inlets

It is conservatively assumed that the blocked air inlet ducts are completely blocked, although screens prevent foreign objects from entering the ducts. The screens are either inspected periodically or the outlet duct air temperature is monitored. It is, however, possible that blowing debris may block two air inlet ducts of the overpack.

11.1.4.2 Detection of Partial Blockage of Air Inlets

The detection of the partial blockage of air inlet ducts will occur during the routine visual inspection of the screens or temperature monitoring of the outlet duct air. The frequency of inspection is based on an assumed complete blockage of all four air inlet ducts. There is no inspection requirement as a result of the postulated two inlet duct blockage, because the complete blockage of all four air inlet ducts is bounding.

11.1.4.3 Analysis of Effects and Consequences of Partial Blockage of Air Inlets

The two inlet ducts blocked condition is evaluated for the hottest MPC-68. The largest temperature rise of the MPC or its contents as a result of the blockage of two air inlet ducts is 25°F, for the MPC shell. Conservatively adding the largest component temperature rise to all cask system component temperatures, the resultant bounding temperatures for the complete blockage of two air inlet ducts are provided in Table 11.1.2.

As stated above, the largest temperature rise of the MPC or its contents as a result of the blockage of two air inlet ducts is 25°F, for the MPC shell. A bounding MPC internal pressure as a result of this calculated temperature increase is computed, based on initial conditions presented previously in Subsection 11.1.1.3, as follows:

$$P_2 = P_1 \frac{T_1 + \Delta T}{T_1}$$

where:

P_2 = Bounding MPC Cavity Pressure (psia)

P_1 = Initial MPC Cavity Pressure (89.7 psia)
 T_1 = Initial MPC Cavity Average Temperature (513.6°K)
 ΔT = Bounding MPC Temperature Rise (25°F or 13.9°K)

Substituting these values into the equation above, the bounding MPC internal pressure is obtained as:

$$P_2 = 89.7 \frac{513.6 + 13.9}{513.6} = 92.1 \text{ psia}$$

Structural

There are no structural consequences as a result of this off-normal event.

Thermal

Using the methodology and model discussed in Section 4.4, the thermal analysis for the two air inlet ducts blocked off-normal condition is performed. The analysis demonstrates that under steady-state conditions, no system components exceed the short-term allowable temperatures in Table 2.2.3.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this off-normal event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this off-normal event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the specified off-normal partial blockage of air inlet ducts event does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.1.4.4 Corrective Action for Partial Blockage of Air Inlets

The corrective action for the partial blockage of air inlet ducts is the removal, cleaning, and replacement of the affected screens. After clearing of the blockage, the storage module temperatures

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will return to the normal temperatures reported in Chapter 4. Partial blockage of air inlet ducts does not affect the HI-STORM 100 System's ability to operate safely.

Periodic inspection of the HI-STORM overpack air duct screen covers is required. Alternatively, the outlet duct air temperature is monitored. The frequency of inspection is based on an assumed blockage of all four air inlet ducts analyzed in Subsection 11.2.

11.1.4.5 Radiological Impact of Partial Blockage of Air Inlets

The off-normal event of partial blockage of the air inlet ducts has no radiological impact because the confinement barrier is not breached and shielding is not affected.

11.1.5 Off-Normal Handling of HI-TRAC

During upending and/or downending of the HI-TRAC transfer cask, the total lifted weight is distributed among both the upper lifting trunnions and the lower pocket trunnions. Each of the four trunnions on the HI-TRAC therefore supports approximately one-quarter of the total weight. This even distribution of the load would continue during the entire rotation operation.

If the lifting device is allowed to "go slack", the total weight would be applied to the lower pocket trunnions only. Under this off-normal condition, the pocket trunnions would each be required to support one-half of the total weight, doubling the load per trunnion. This condition is analyzed to demonstrate that the pocket trunnions possess sufficient strength to support the increased load under this off-normal condition.

This off-normal condition does not apply to the HI-TRAC 125D and 100D, which does not have lower pocket trunnions. Upending and downending of the HI-TRAC 125D and 100D is performed using an L-frame.

11.1.5.1 Postulated Cause of Off-Normal Handling of HI-TRAC

If the cable of the crane handling the HI-TRAC is inclined from the vertical, it would be possible to unload the upper lifting trunnions such that the lower pocket trunnions are supporting the total cask weight and the lifting trunnions are only preventing cask rotation.

11.1.5.2 Detection of Off-Normal Handling of HI-TRAC

Handling procedures and standard rigging practice call for maintaining the crane cable in a vertical position by keeping the crane trolley centered over the lifting trunnions. In such an orientation it is not possible to completely unload the lifting trunnions without inducing rotation. If the crane cable were inclined from the vertical, however, the possibility of unloading the lifting trunnions would exist. It is therefore possible to detect the potential for this off-normal condition by monitoring the incline of the crane cable with respect to the vertical.

11.1.5.3 Analysis of Effects and Consequences of Off-Normal Handling of HI-TRAC

If the upper lifting trunnions are unloaded, the lower pocket trunnions will support the total weight of the loaded HI-TRAC. The analysis of the pocket trunnions to support the applied load of one-half of the total weight is provided in Subsection 3.4.4.3.3.1 of this FSAR. The consequence of off-normal handling of the HI-TRAC is that the pocket trunnions safely support the applied load.

Structural

The stress evaluations of the lower pocket trunnions are discussed in Subsection 3.4.4.3.3.1 of this FSAR. All stresses are within the allowable values.

Thermal

There is no effect on the thermal performance of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this off-normal event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this off-normal event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the specified off-normal handling of the HI-TRAC does not affect the safe operation of the system.

11.1.5.4 Corrective Action for Off-Normal Handling of HI-TRAC

The HI-TRAC transfer casks are designed to withstand the off-normal handling condition without any adverse effects. There are no corrective actions required for off-normal handling of HI-TRAC other than to attempt to maintain the crane cable vertical during HI-TRAC upending or downending.

11.1.5.5 Radiological Consequences of Off-Normal Handling of HI-TRAC

The off-normal event of off-normal handling of HI-TRAC has no radiological impact because the confinement barrier is not breached and shielding is not affected.

11.1.6 Malfunction of FHD System

The FHD system is a forced helium circulation device used to effectuate moisture removal from loaded MPCs. For circulating helium, the FHD system is equipped with active components requiring external power for normal operation.

11.1.6.1 Postulated Cause of FHD Malfunction

Likely causes of FHD malfunction are (i) a loss of external power to the FHD System and (ii) an active component trip. In both cases a stoppage of forced helium circulation occurs. Such a circulation stoppage does not result in any helium leakage from the MPC or the FHD itself.

11.1.6.2 Detection of FHD Malfunction

The FHD System is monitored during its operation. The FHD operator would detect any FHD malfunction.

11.1.6.3 Analysis of Effects and Consequences of FHD Malfunction

Structural

The FHD System is required to be equipped with safety relief devices§ to prevent the MPC structural boundary pressures from exceeding the design limits. Consequently there is no adverse effect.

Thermal

Malfunction of the FHD System is categorized as an off-normal condition, for which the applicable peak cladding temperature limit is 1058°F (Table 2.2.3). The FHD System malfunction event is evaluated assuming the following bounding conditions:

- 1) Steady state maximum temperatures have been reached
- 2) Design basis heat load
- 3) Standing column of air in the annulus

§ The relief pressure is below the off-normal design pressure (Table 2.2.1) to prevent MPC overpressure and above 5 atm to enable MPC pressurization for adequate heat transfer.

4) MPCs backfilled with the minimum helium pressure required by the Technical Specifications

It is noted that operator action may be required to raise the helium regulator set point to ensure that condition 4 above is satisfied. These conditions are the same as for the normal on-site transfer in a vertically oriented HI-TRAC, discussed in Section 4.5.2. The steady state results are provided in Table 11.1.3. The results demonstrate that the peak fuel cladding temperatures remain below the limit for the event of a prolonged unavailability of the FHD system.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this off-normal event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, the structural boundary pressures cannot exceed the design limits.

Radiation Protection

As there is no adverse effect on the shielding or confinement functions, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this off-normal event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the FHD malfunction does not affect the safe operation of the MISSOURI 100 System.

11.1.64 Corrective Action for FHD Malfunction

The MISSOURI 100 System is designed to withstand the FHD malfunction without an adverse effect on its safety functions. Consequently no corrective action is required.

11.1.65 Radiological Impact of FHD Malfunction

The event has no radiological impact because the confinement barrier and shielding integrity are not affected.

11.1.7 SCS Power Failure

The SCS system is a forced fluid circulation device used to provide supplemental HI-TRAC cooling. For fluid circulation, the SCS system is equipped with active components requiring power for normal operation.

11.1.7.1 Postulated Cause of SCS Power Failure

The SCS is normally operated from an external source of power such as from site utilities or a feed from a heavy haul vehicle carrying the HI-TRAC. Occasional interruption in power supply is possible.

11.1.7.2 Detection of SCS Power Failure

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to withstand a power failure without affecting its ability to meet safety requirements. Consequently SCS monitoring and failure detection is not required.

11.1.7.3 Analysis of Effects and Consequences of SCS Power Failure

The SCS System is required to be equipped with a backup power supply (See SCS specifications in Chapter 2, Appendix 2.C). This ensures uninterrupted operation of the SCS following a power failure. Consequently, a power failure does not effect SCS operation.

Structural

There is no effect on the structural integrity.

Thermal

There is no effect on thermal performance.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function.

Radiation Protection

As there is no effect on the shielding or confinement functions, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the SCS failure does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.1.7.4 Corrective Action for SCS Power Failure

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to withstand a power failure without an adverse effect on its normal operation. Consequently no corrective action is required.

11.1.7.5 Radiological Impact of SCS Power Failure

The event has no radiological impact because the confinement barrier and shielding integrity are not affected.

Table 11.1.1

MAXIMUM TEMPERATURES CAUSED BY OFF-NORMAL
ENVIRONMENTAL TEMPERATURES

Location	Temperature [°F]	Design Basis Limits [°F]
HI-STORM 100		
Fuel Cladding	711 (PWR) 760 (BWR)	1058 short-term
MPC Basket	740	950 short-term
MPC Shell	371	775 short-term
Overpack Air Outlet	226	N/A
Overpack Inner Shell	219	350 short-term (overpack concrete)
Overpack Outer Shell	165	350 short-term (overpack concrete)
HI-STORM 100S Version B		
Fuel Cladding	632 (PWR) 693 (BWR)	1058 short-term
MPC Basket	673	950 short-term
MPC Shell	425	775 short-term
Overpack Air Outlet	220	N/A
Overpack Inner Shell	266	350 short-term (overpack concrete)
Overpack Outer Shell	160	350 short-term (overpack concrete)

Table 11.1.2

BOUNDING TEMPERATURES CAUSED BY PARTIAL BLOCKAGE OF
AIR INLET DUCTS [°F]

Temperature Location	No Blockage of Inlet Ducts	Partial Blockage of Inlet Ducts
		2 Ducts Blocked
Fuel Cladding	740	765
MPC Basket	720	745
MPC Shell	351	376
Overpack Air Outlet	206	231
Overpack Inner Shell	199	224
Overpack Outer Shell	145	170

Table 11.1.3

BOUNDING STEADY-STATE FUEL CLADDING TEMPERATURES
FOLLOWING AN FHD FAILURE

MPC	Computed Peak Clad Temp. (°F)	Off-Normal Temperature Limit (°F)
All	872	1058

11.2 ACCIDENTS

Accidents, in accordance with ANSI/ANS-57.9, are either infrequent events that could reasonably be expected to occur during the lifetime of the HI-STORM 100 System or events postulated because their consequences may affect the public health and safety. Section 2.2.3 defines the design basis accidents considered. By analyzing for these design basis events, safety margins inherently provided in the HI-STORM 100 System design can be quantified.

The results of the evaluations performed herein demonstrate that the HI-STORM 100 System can withstand the effects of all credible and hypothetical accident conditions and natural phenomena without affecting safety function, and are in compliance with the acceptable criteria. The following sections present the evaluation of the design basis postulated accident conditions and natural phenomena which demonstrate that the requirements of 10CFR72.122 are satisfied, and that the corresponding radiation doses satisfy the requirements of 10CFR72.106(b) and 10CFR20.

The load combinations evaluated for postulated accident conditions are defined in Table 2.2.14. The load combinations include normal loads with the accident loads. The accident load combination evaluations are provided in Section 3.4.

11.2.1 HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Handling Accident

11.2.1.1 Cause of HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Handling Accident

During the operation of the HI-STORM 100 System, the loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask can be transported to the ISFSI in the vertical or horizontal position. The loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask is typically transported by a heavy-haul vehicle that cradles the HI-TRAC horizontally or by a device with redundant drop protection that holds the HI-TRAC vertically. The height of the loaded overpack above the ground shall be limited to below the horizontal handling height limit determined in Chapter 3 to limit the inertia loading on the cask in a horizontal drop to less than 45g's. Although a handling accident is remote, a cask drop from the horizontal handling height limit is a credible accident. A vertical drop of the loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask is not a credible accident as the loaded HI-TRAC shall be transported and handled in the vertical orientation by devices designed in accordance with the criteria specified in Subsection 2.3.3.1 as required by the Technical Specification.

11.2.1.2 HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Handling Accident Analysis

The handling accident analysis evaluates the effects of dropping the loaded HI-TRAC in the horizontal position. The analysis of the handling accident is provided in Chapter 3. The analysis shows that the HI-TRAC meets all structural requirements and there is no adverse effect on the confinement, thermal or subcriticality performance of the contained MPC. Limited localized damage to the HI-TRAC water jacket shell and loss of the water in the water jacket may occur as a result of the handling accident. The HI-TRAC top lid and transfer lid housing (pool lid for the HI-TRAC 125D and 100D) are demonstrated to remain attached by withstanding the maximum deceleration.

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The transfer lid doors (not applicable to HI-TRAC 125D and 100D) are also shown to remain closed during the drop. Limiting the inertia loading to 60g's or less ensures the fuel cladding remains intact based on dynamic impact effects on spent fuel assemblies in the literature [11.2.1]. Therefore, demonstrating that the 45g limit for the HI-TRAC transfer cask is met ensures that the fuel cladding remains intact.

Structural

The structural evaluation of the MPC for 45g's is provided in Section 3.4. As discussed in Section 3.4, the MPC stresses as a result of the HI-TRAC side drop, 45g loading, are all within allowable values.

As discussed above, the water jacket enclosure shell could be punctured which results in a loss of the water within the water jacket. Additionally, the HI-TRAC top lid, transfer lid (pool lid for the HI-TRAC 125D and 100D), and transfer lid doors (not applicable to HI-TRAC 125D and 100D) are shown to remain in position under the 45g loading. Analysis of the lead in the HI-TRAC is performed in Appendix 3.F and it is shown that there is no appreciable change in the lead shielding.

Thermal

The loss of the water in the water jacket causes the temperatures to increase slightly due to a reduction in the thermal conductivity through the HI-TRAC water jacket. The temperatures of the MPC in the HI-TRAC transfer cask as a result of the loss of water in the water jacket are presented in Table 11.2.8. As can be seen from the values in the table, the temperatures are below the short-term allowable fuel cladding and material temperatures provided in Table 2.2.3 for accident conditions.

Shielding

The loss of the water in the water jacket results in an increase in the radiation dose rates at locations adjacent to the water jacket. The shielding analysis results presented in Section 5.1.2 demonstrate that the requirements of 10CFR72.106 are not exceeded. As the structural analysis demonstrates that the HI-TRAC top lid, transfer lid (pool lid for the HI-TRAC 125D and 100D), and transfer lid doors (not applicable to HI-TRAC 125D and 100D) remain in place, there is no change in the dose rates at the top and bottom of the HI-TRAC.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this accident event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this accident event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

There is no degradation in the confinement capabilities of the MPC, as discussed above. There are increases in the local dose rates adjacent to the water jacket. The dose rate at 1 meter from the water jacket after the water is lost is calculated in Table 5.1.10. Immediately after the drop accident a radiological inspection of the HI-TRAC will be performed and temporary shielding shall be installed to limit the exposure to the public. Based on a minimum distance to the controlled area boundary of 100 meters, the 10CFR72.106 dose rate requirements at the controlled area boundary (5 Rem limit) are not exceeded (Section 5.1.2).

11.2.1.3 HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Handling Accident Dose Calculations

The handling accident could cause localized damage to the HI-TRAC water jacket shell and loss of the water in the water jacket as the neutron shield impacts the ground.

When the water jacket is impacted, the HI-TRAC transfer cask surface dose rate could increase. The HI-TRAC's post-accident shielding analysis presented in Section 5.1.2 assumes complete loss of the water in the water jacket and bounds the dose rates anticipated for the handling accident.

If the water jacket of the loaded HI-TRAC is damaged beyond immediate repair and the MPC is not damaged, the loaded HI-TRAC may be unloaded into a HI-STORM overpack, a HI-STAR overpack, or simply unloaded in the fuel pool. If the MPC is damaged, the loaded HI-TRAC must be returned to the fuel pool for unloading. Depending on the damage to the HI-TRAC and the current location in the loading or unloading sequence, less personnel exposure may be received by continuing to load the MPC into a HI-STORM or HI-STAR overpack. Once the MPC is placed in the HI-STORM or HI-STAR overpack, the dose rates are greatly reduced. The highest personnel exposure will result from returning the loaded HI-TRAC to the fuel pool to unload the MPC.

As a result of the loss of water from the water jacket, the dose rates at 1 meter adjacent to the water jacket mid-height increase (Table 5.1.10). Increasing the personnel exposure for each task affected by the increased dose rate adjacent to the water jacket by the ratio of the one meter dose rate increase results in a cumulative dose of less than 15.0 person-rem, for the 125-ton HI-TRAC or 100-ton HI-TRAC. Using the ratio of the water jacket mid-height dose rates at one meter is very conservative. Dose rate at the top and bottom of the HI-TRAC water jacket would not increase as much as the peak mid-height dose rates. In the determination of the personnel exposure, dose rates at the top and bottom of the loaded HI-TRAC are assumed to remain constant.

The analysis of the handling accident presented in Section 3.4 shows that the MPC confinement barrier will not be compromised and, therefore, there will be no release of radioactive material from the confinement vessel. Any possible rupture of the fuel cladding will have no effect on the site boundary dose rates because the magnitude of the radiation source has not changed.

11.2.1.4 HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Handling Accident Corrective Action

Following a handling accident, the ISFSI operator shall first perform a radiological and visual inspection to determine the extent of the damage to the HI-TRAC transfer cask and MPC to the maximum practical extent. As appropriate, place temporary shielding around the HI-TRAC to reduce radiation dose rates. Special handling procedures will be developed and approved by the ISFSI operator to lift and upright the HI-TRAC. Upon uprighting, the portion of the overpack not previously accessible shall be radiologically and visually inspected. If damage to the water jacket is limited to a local penetration or crushing, local repairs can be performed to the shell and the water replaced. If damage to the water jacket is extensive, the damage shall be repaired and re-tested in accordance with Chapter 9, following removal of the MPC.

If upon inspection of the damaged HI-TRAC transfer cask and MPC, damage of the MPC is observed, the loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask will be returned to the facility for fuel unloading in accordance with Chapter 8. The handling accident will not affect the ability to unload the MPC using normal means as the structural analysis of the 60g loading (HI-STAR Docket Numbers 71-9261 and 72-1008) shows that there will be no gross deformation of the MPC basket. After unloading, the structural damage of the HI-TRAC and MPC shall be assessed and a determination shall be made if repairs will enable the equipment to return to service. Subsequent to the repairs, the equipment shall be inspected and appropriate tests shall be performed to certify the equipment for service. If the equipment cannot be repaired and returned to service, the equipment shall be disposed of in accordance with the appropriate regulations.

11.2.2 HI-STORM Overpack Handling Accident

11.2.2.1 Cause of HI-STORM Overpack Handling Accident

During the operation of the HI-STORM 100 System, the loaded HI-STORM overpack is lifted in the vertical orientation. The height of the loaded overpack above the ground shall be limited to below the vertical handling height limit determined in Chapter 3. This vertical handling height limit will maintain the inertial loading on the cask in a vertical drop to 45g's or less. Although a handling accident is remote, a drop from the vertical handling height limit is a credible accident.

11.2.2.2 HI-STORM Overpack Handling Accident Analysis

The handling accident analysis evaluates the effects of dropping the loaded overpack in the vertical orientation. The analysis of the handling accident is provided in Chapter 3. The analysis shows that the HI-STORM 100 System meets all structural requirements and there are no adverse effects on the structural, confinement, thermal or subcriticality performance of the HI-STORM 100 System.

Limiting the inertia loading to 60g's or less ensures the fuel cladding remains intact based on dynamic impact effects on spent fuel assemblies in the literature [11.2.1].

Structural

The structural evaluation of the MPC under a 60g vertical load is presented in the HI-STAR TSAR and SAR [11.2.6 and 11.2.7] and it is demonstrated therein that the stresses are within allowable limits. The structural analysis of the HI-STORM overpack is presented in Section 3.4. The structural analysis of the overpack shows that the concrete shield attached to the underside of the overpack lid remains attached and air inlet ducts do not collapse.

Thermal

As the structural analysis demonstrates that there is no change in the MPC or overpack, there is no effect on the thermal performance of the system as a result of this event.

Shielding

As the structural analysis demonstrates that there is no change in the MPC or overpack, there is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the vertical drop of the HI-STORM Overpack with the MPC inside does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.2.3 HI-STORM Overpack Handling Accident Dose Calculations

The vertical drop handling accident of the loaded HI-STORM overpack will not cause any change of the shielding or breach of the MPC confinement boundary. Any possible rupture of the fuel cladding

will have no effect on the site boundary dose rates because the magnitude of the radiation source has not changed. Therefore, the dose calculations are equivalent to the normal condition dose rates.

11.2.2.4 HI-STORM Overpack Handling Accident Corrective Action

Following a handling accident, the ISFSI operator shall first perform a radiological and visual inspection to determine the extent of the damage to the overpack. Special handling procedures, as required, will be developed and approved by the ISFSI operator.

If upon inspection of the MPC, structural damage of the MPC is observed, the MPC is to be returned to the facility for fuel unloading in accordance with Chapter 8. After unloading, the structural damage of the MPC shall be assessed and a determination shall be made if repairs will enable the MPC to return to service. Likewise, the HI-STORM overpack shall be thoroughly inspected and a determination shall be made if repairs will enable the HI-STORM overpack to return to service. Subsequent to the repairs, the equipment shall be inspected and appropriate tests shall be performed to certify the HI-STORM 100 System for service. If the equipment cannot be repaired and returned to service, the equipment shall be disposed of in accordance with the appropriate regulations.

11.2.3 Tip-Over

11.2.3.1 Cause of Tip-Over

The analysis of the HI-STORM 100 System has shown that the overpack does not tip over as a result of the accidents (i.e., tornado missiles, flood water velocity, and seismic activity) analyzed in this section. It is highly unlikely that the overpack will tip-over during on-site movement because of the low handling height limit. The tip-over accident is stipulated as a non-mechanistic accident.

For the anchored HI-STORM designs (HI-STORM 100A and 100SA), a tip-over accident is not possible. As described in Chapter 2 of this FSAR, these system designs are not evaluated for the hypothetical tip-over. As such, the remainder of this accident discussion applies only to the non-anchored designs (i.e., the 100 and 100S designs only).

11.2.3.2 Tip-Over Analysis

The tip-over accident analysis evaluates the effects of the loaded overpack tipping-over onto a reinforced concrete pad. The tip-over analysis is provided in Section 3.4. The structural analysis provided in Appendix 3.A demonstrates that the resultant deceleration loading on the MPC as a result of the tip-over accident is less than the design basis 45g's. The analysis shows that the HI-STORM 100 System meets all structural requirements and there is no adverse effect on the structural, confinement, thermal, or subcriticality performance of the MPC. However, the side impact will cause some localized damage to the concrete and outer shell of the overpack in the radial area of impact.

Structural

The structural evaluation of the MPC presented in Section 3.4 demonstrates that under a 45g loading the stresses are well within the allowable values. Analysis presented in Chapter 3 shows that the concrete shields attached to the underside and top of the overpack lid remains attached. As a result of the tip-over accident there will be localized crushing of the concrete in the area of impact.

Thermal

The thermal analysis of the overpack and MPC is based on vertical storage. The thermal consequences of this accident while the overpack is in the horizontal orientation are bounded by the burial under debris accident evaluated in Subsection 11.2.14. Damage to the overpack will be limited as discussed above. As the structural analysis demonstrates that there is no significant change in the MPC or overpack, once the overpack and MPC are returned to their vertical orientation there is no effect on the thermal performance of the system.

Shielding

The effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this event is two-fold. First, there may be a localized decrease in the shielding thickness of the concrete in the body of the overpack. Second, the bottom of the overpack, which is normally facing the ground and not accessible, will now be facing the horizon. This orientation will increase the off-site dose rate. However, the dose rate limits of 10CFR72.106 are not exceeded.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

There is no effect on occupational or public exposures from radionuclide release as a result of this accident event since the confinement boundary integrity of the MPC remains intact.

Immediately after the tip-over accident a radiological inspection of the HI-STORM will be performed and temporary shielding shall be installed to limit exposure from direct radiation. Based on a minimum distance to the controlled area boundary of 100 meters, the 10CFR72.106 dose rate requirements at the controlled area boundary (5 Rem limit) are not exceeded.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.3.3 Tip-Over Dose Calculations

The analysis of the tip-over accident has shown that the MPC confinement barrier will not be compromised and, therefore, there will be no release of radioactivity or increase in site-boundary dose rates from release of radioactivity.

The tip-over accident could cause localized damage to the radial concrete shield and outer steel shell where the overpack impacts the surface. The overpack surface dose rate in the affected area could increase due to the damage. However, there should be no noticeable increase in the ISFSI site or boundary dose rate as a result of the localized damage on the side of the overpack.

The tip-over accident will also cause a re-orientation of the bottom of the overpack. As a result, radiation leaving the bottom of the overpack, which would normally be directed into the ISFSI pad, will be directed towards the horizon and the controlled area boundary. The dose rate at 100 meters from the bottom of the overpack, the minimum distance to the controlled area boundary, was calculated for the HI-STORM 100S Version B with an MPC-24 for assumed accident duration of 30 days. The burnup and cooling time of the fuel was 60,000 MWD/MTU and 3 years, which is more conservative than the off-site dose analysis reported in Chapter 10, Table 10.4.1 and the burnup and cooling time used in Chapter 5 for off-site dose calculations. The results presented below demonstrate that the regulatory requirements of 10CFR72.106 are easily met.

Distance	Dose Rate (mrem/hr)	Accident Duration	Total Dose (mrem)	10CFR72.106 Limit (mrem)
100 meters	2.36	720 hours or 30 days	1699.2	5000

11.2.3.4 Tip-Over Accident Corrective Action

Following a tip-over accident, the ISFSI operator shall first perform a radiological and visual inspection to determine the extent of the damage to the overpack. Special handling procedures, including the use of temporary shielding, will be developed and approved by the ISFSI operator.

If upon inspection of the MPC, structural damage of the MPC is observed, the MPC shall be returned to the facility for fuel unloading in accordance with Chapter 8. After unloading, the structural damage of the MPC shall be assessed and a determination shall be made if repairs will enable the MPC to return to service. Likewise, the HI-STORM overpack shall be thoroughly inspected and a determination shall be made if repairs are required and will enable the HI-STORM overpack to return to service. Subsequent to the repairs, the equipment shall be inspected and

appropriate tests shall be performed to certify the HI-STORM 100 System for service. If the equipment cannot be repaired and returned to service, the equipment shall be disposed of in accordance with the appropriate regulations.

11.2.4 Fire Accident

11.2.4.1 Cause of Fire

Although the probability of a fire accident affecting a HI-STORM 100 System during storage operations is low due to the lack of combustible materials at the ISFSI, a conservative fire has been assumed and analyzed. The analysis shows that the HI-STORM 100 System continues to perform its structural, confinement, thermal, and subcriticality functions.

11.2.4.2 Fire Analysis

11.2.4.2.1 Fire Analysis for HI-STORM Overpack

The possibility of a fire accident near an ISFSI is considered to be extremely remote due to an absence of combustible materials within the ISFSI and adjacent to the overpacks. The only credible concern is related to a transport vehicle fuel tank fire, causing the outer layers of the storage overpack to be heated by the incident thermal radiation and forced convection heat fluxes. The amount of combustible fuel in the on-site transporter is limited to a volume of 50 gallons.

With respect to fire accident thermal analysis, NUREG-1536 (4.0,V,5.b) states:

“Fire parameters included in 10 CFR 71.73 have been accepted for characterizing the heat transfer during the in-storage fire. However, a bounding analysis that limits the fuel source thus limits the length of the fire (e.g., by limiting the source of the fuel in the transporter) has also been accepted.”

Based on this NUREG-1536 guidance, the fire accident thermal analysis is performed using the 10 CFR 71.73 parameters and the fire duration is determined from the limited fuel volume of 50 gallons. The entire transient evaluation of the storage fire accident consists of three parts: (1) a bounding steady-state initial condition, (2) the short-duration fire event, and (3) the post-fire temperature relaxation period.

As stated above, the fire parameters from 10 CFR 71.73 are applied to the HI-STORM fire accident evaluation. 10 CFR 71 requirements for thermal evaluation of hypothetical accident conditions specifically define pre- and post-fire ambient conditions, specifically:

“the ambient air temperature before and after the test must remain constant at that value between -29°C (-20°F) and +38°C (100°F) which is most unfavorable for the feature under consideration.”

The ambient air temperature is therefore set to 100°F both before (bounding steady state) and after (post-fire temperature relaxation period) the short-duration fire event.

During the short-duration fire event, the following parameters from 10CFR71.71(c)(4), also from Reference [11.2.3], are applied:

1. Except for a simple support system, the cask must be fully engulfed. The ISFSI pad is a simple support system, so the fire environment is not applied to the overpack baseplate. By fully engulfing the overpack, additional heat transfer surface area is conservatively exposed to the elevated fire temperatures.
2. The average emissivity coefficient must be at least 0.9. During the entire duration of the fire, the painted outer surfaces of the overpack are assumed to remain intact, with an emissivity of 0.85. It is conservative to assume that the flame emissivity is 1.0, the limiting maximum value corresponding to a perfect blackbody emitter. With a flame emissivity conservatively assumed to be 1.0 and a painted surface emissivity of 0.85, the effective emissivity coefficient is 0.85. Because the minimum required value of 0.9 is greater than the actual value of 0.85, use of an average emissivity coefficient of 0.9 is conservative.
3. The average flame temperature must be at least 800°C (1475°F). Open pool fires typically involve the entrainment of large amounts of air, resulting in lower average flame temperatures. Additionally, the same temperature is applied to all exposed cask surfaces, which is very conservative considering the size of the HI-STORM cask. It is therefore conservative to use the 1475°F temperature.
4. The fuel source must extend horizontally at least 1 m (40 in), but may not extend more than 3 m (10 ft), beyond the external surface of the cask. Use of the minimum ring width of 1 meter yields a deeper pool for a fixed quantity of combustible fuel, thereby conservatively maximizing the fire duration.
5. The convection coefficient must be that value which may be demonstrated to exist if the cask were exposed to the fire specified. Based upon results of large pool fire thermal measurements [11.2.2], a conservative forced convection heat transfer coefficient of 4.5 Btu/(hr×ft²×°F) is applied to exposed overpack surfaces during the short-duration fire.

Due to the severity of the fire condition radiative heat flux, heat flux from incident solar radiation is negligible and is not included. Furthermore, the smoke plume from the fire would block most of the solar radiation.

Based on the 50 gallon fuel volume, the overpack outer diameter and the 1 m fuel ring width, the fuel ring surrounding the overpack covers 147.6 ft² and has a depth of 0.54 in. From this depth and a linear fuel consumption rate of 0.15 in/min, the fire duration is calculated to be 3.622 minutes (217 seconds). The linear fuel consumption rate of 0.15 in/min is the smallest value given in a Sandia

Report on large pool fire thermal testing [11.2.2]. Use of the minimum linear consumption rate conservatively maximizes the duration of the fire.

It is recognized that the ventilation air in contact with the inner surface of the HI-STORM overpack with design-basis decay heat under maximum normal ambient temperature conditions varies between 80°F at the bottom and 206°F at the top of the overpack. It is further recognized that the inlet and outlet ducts occupy only 1.25% of area of the cylindrical surface of the massive HI-STORM overpack. Due to the short duration of the fire event and the relative isolation of the ventilation passages from the outside environment, the ventilation air is expected to experience little intrusion of the fire combustion products. As a result of these considerations, it is conservative to assume that the air in the HI-STORM overpack ventilation passages is held constant at a substantially elevated temperature of 300°F during the entire duration of the fire event.

The HI-STORM 100 System is modeled, as it is both taller than and has larger inlet and outlet ducts than the HI-STORM 100S Version B. The shorter Version B will absorb less fire heat flux, as a result of its smaller exposed surface area, and the smaller ducts of the Version B would likely intake a smaller amount of fire combustion products, lowering temperatures in the ventilation passages.

The thermal transient response of the storage overpack is determined using the ANSYS finite element program. Time-histories for points in the storage overpack are monitored for the duration of the fire and the subsequent post-fire equilibrium phase.

Heat input to the HI-STORM overpack while it is subjected to the fire is from a combination of an incident radiation and convective heat fluxes to all external surfaces. This can be expressed by the following equation:

$$q_F = h_{fc} (T_A - T_s) + 0.1714 \times 10^8 \varepsilon [(T_A + 460)^4 - (T_s + 460)^4]$$

where:

q_F = Surface Heat Input Flux (Btu/ft²-hr)

h_{fc} = Forced Convection Heat Transfer Coefficient (4.5 Btu/ft²-hr-°F)

T_A = Fire Condition Temperature (1475°F)

T_s = Transient Surface Temperature (°F)

ε = Average Emissivity (0.90 per 10 CFR 71.73)

The forced convection heat transfer coefficient is based on the results of large pool fire thermal measurements [11.2.2].

After the fire event, the ambient temperature is restored to 100°F and the storage overpack cools down (post-fire temperature relaxation). Heat loss from the outer surfaces of the storage overpack is determined by the following equation:

$$q_s = h_s (T_s - T_A) + 0.1714 \times 10^8 \varepsilon [(T_s + 460)^4 - (T_A + 460)^4]$$

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where:

- q_s = Surface Heat Loss Flux (Btu/ft²-hr)
- h_s = Natural Convection Heat Transfer Coefficient (Btu/ft²-hr-°F)
- T_s = Transient Surface Temperature (°F)
- T_A = Ambient Temperature (°F)
- ε = Surface Emissivity

In the post-fire temperature relaxation phase, the surface heat transfer coefficient (h_s) is determined by the following equation:

$$h_s = 0.19 \times (T_A - T_s)^{1/3}$$

where:

- h_s = Natural Convection Heat Transfer Coefficient (Btu/ft²-hr-°F)
- T_A = External Air Temperature (°F)
- T_s = Transient Surface Temperature (°F)

As discussed in Subsection 4.5.1.1.2, this equation is appropriate for turbulent natural convection from vertical surfaces. For the same conservative value of the Z parameter assumed earlier (2.6×10^5) and the HI-STORM overpack height of approximately 19 feet, the surface-to-ambient temperature difference required to ensure turbulence is 0.56 °F.

A two-dimensional, axisymmetric model was developed for this analysis. Material thermal properties used were taken from Section 4.2. An element plot of the 2-D axisymmetric ANSYS model is shown in Figure 11.2.1. The outer surface and top surface of the overpack are exposed to the ambient conditions (fire and post-fire), and the base of the overpack is insulated. The transient study is conducted for a period of 5 hours, which is sufficient to allow temperatures in the overpack to reach their maximum values and begin to recede.

Based on the results of the analysis, the maximum temperatures at several points near the overpack mid-height are summarized in Table 11.2.2 along with the corresponding peak temperatures in the MPC.

The primary shielding material in the storage overpack is concrete, which can suffer a reduction in neutron shielding capability at sustained high temperatures due to a loss of water. Less than 1 inch of the concrete near the outer overpack surface exceeds the material short-term temperature limit. This condition is addressed specifically in NUREG-1536 (4.0,V,5.b), which states:

“The NRC accepts that concrete temperatures may exceed the temperature criteria of ACI 349 for accidents if the temperatures result from a fire.”

These results demonstrate that the fire accident event does not substantially affect the HI-STORM overpack. Only localized regions of concrete are exposed to temperatures in excess of the allowable short-term temperature limit. No portions of the steel structure exceed the allowable temperature limits.

Having evaluated the effects of the fire on the overpack, we must now evaluate the effects on the MPC and contained fuel assemblies. Guidance for the evaluation of the MPC and its internals during a fire event is provided by NUREG-1536 (4.0,V,5.b), which states:

“For a fire of very short duration (i.e., less than 10 percent of the thermal time constant of the cask body), the NRC finds it acceptable to calculate the fuel temperature increase by assuming that the cask inner wall is adiabatic. The fuel temperature increase should then be determined by dividing the decay energy released during the fire by the thermal capacity of the basket-fuel assembly combination.”

The time constant of the cask body (i.e., the overpack) can be determined using the formula:

$$\tau = \frac{c_p \times \rho \times L_c^2}{k}$$

where:

- c_p = Overpack Specific Heat Capacity (Btu/lb-°F)
- ρ = Overpack Density (lb/ft³)
- L_c = Overpack Characteristic Length (ft)
- k = Overpack Thermal Conductivity (Btu/ft-hr-°F)

The concrete contributes the majority of the overpack mass and volume, so we will use the specific heat capacity (0.156 Btu/lb-°F), density (142 lb/ft³) and thermal conductivity (1.05 Btu/ft-hr-°F) of concrete for the time constant calculation. The characteristic length of a hollow cylinder is its wall thickness. The characteristic length for the HI-STORM overpack is therefore 29.5 in, or approximately 2.46 ft. Substituting into the equation, the overpack time constant is determined as:

$$\tau = \frac{0.156 \times 142 \times 2.46^2}{1.05} = 127.7 \text{ hrs}$$

One-tenth of this time constant is approximately 12.8 hours (766 minutes), substantially longer than the fire duration of 3.622 minutes, so the MPC is evaluated by considering the MPC canister as an adiabatic boundary. The temperature of the MPC is therefore increased by the contained decay heat only.

Table 4.5.5 lists lower-bound thermal inertia values for the MPC and the contained fuel assemblies of 4680 Btu/°F and 2240 Btu/°F, respectively. Applying an upper-bound decay heat load of 28.74

kW (98,090 Btu/hr) for the 3.622 minute (0.0604 hours) fire duration results in the contained fuel assemblies heating up by only:

$$\Delta T_{fuel} = \frac{98090 \times 0.0604}{4680 + 2240} = 0.86^\circ F$$

This is a negligible increase in the fuel temperature. Consequently, the impact on the MPC internal helium pressure will be negligible as well. Based on a conservative analysis of the HI-STORM 100 System response to a hypothetical fire event, it is concluded that the fire event does not significantly affect the temperature of the MPC or contained fuel. Furthermore, the ability of the HI-STORM 100 System to cool the spent nuclear fuel within design temperature limits during post-fire temperature relaxation is not compromised.

Structural

As discussed above, there are no structural consequences as a result of the fire accident condition.

Thermal

As discussed above, the MPC internal pressure increases a negligible amount and is bounded by the 100% fuel rod rupture accident in Section 11.2.9. As shown in Table 11.2.2, the peak fuel cladding and material temperatures are well below short-term accident condition allowable temperatures of Table 2.2.3.

Shielding

With respect to concrete damage from a fire, NUREG-1536 (4.0,V,5.b) states: "the loss of a small amount of shielding material is not expected to cause a storage system to exceed the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 72.106 and, therefore, need not be estimated or evaluated in the SAR." Less than one-inch of the concrete (less than 4% of the total overpack radial concrete section) exceeds the short-term temperature limit.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is a very localized reduction in shielding and no effect on the confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this accident event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the overpack fire accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.4.2.2 Fire Analysis for HI-TRAC Transfer Cask

To demonstrate the fuel cladding and MPC pressure boundary integrity under an exposure to a hypothetical short duration fire event during on-site handling operations, a fire accident analysis of the loaded 100-ton HI-TRAC is performed. This analysis, because of the lower mass of the 100-ton HI-TRAC, bounds the effects for the 125-ton HI-TRAC. In this analysis, the contents of the HI-TRAC are conservatively postulated to undergo a transient heat-up as a lumped mass from the decay heat input and heat input from the short duration fire. The rate of temperature rise of the HI-TRAC depends on the thermal inertia of the cask, the cask initial conditions, the spent nuclear fuel decay heat generation, and the fire heat flux. All of these parameters are conservatively bounded by the values in Table 11.2.3, which are used for the fire transient analysis.

Using the values stated in Table 11.2.3, a bounding cask temperature rise of 5.509°F per minute is determined from the combined radiant and forced convection fire and decay heat inputs to the cask. During the handling of the HI-TRAC transfer cask, the transporter is limited to a maximum of 50 gallons. The duration of the 50-gallon fire is 4.775 minutes. Therefore, the temperature rise computed as the product of the rate of temperature rise and the fire duration is 26.3°F, and the fuel cladding temperature limit is not exceeded (see Table 11.2.5).

The elevated temperatures as a result of the fire accident will cause the pressure in the water jacket to increase and cause the overpressure relief valves to vent steam to the atmosphere. Based on the fire heat input to the water jacket, less than 11% of the water in the water jacket can be boiled off. However, it is conservatively assumed, for dose calculations, that all the water in the water jacket is lost. In the 125-ton HI-TRAC, which uses Holtite in the lids for neutron shielding, the elevated fire temperatures would cause the Holtite to exceed its design accident temperature limits. It is conservatively assumed, for dose calculations, that all the Holtite in the 125-ton HI-TRAC is lost.

Due to the increased temperatures the MPC experiences as a result of the fire accident in the HI-TRAC transfer cask, the MPC internal pressure increases. Table 11.2.4 provides the MPC maximum internal pressure, as a result of the HI-TRAC fire accident, for a conservatively bounding initial steady state condition of the highest normal operating pressure and minimum cavity average temperature. The computed accident pressure is substantially below the accident design pressure (Table 2.2.1). The values presented in Table 11.2.4 are determined using a bounding temperature rise of 43.2°F, instead of the calculated 26.3°F temperature rise, and are therefore conservative.

Table 11.2.5 provides a summary of the loaded HI-TRAC bounding maximum temperatures for the hypothetical fire accident condition.

Structural

As discussed above, there are no structural consequences as a result of the fire accident condition.

Thermal

As discussed above, the MPC internal pressure and fuel temperature increases as a result of the fire accident. The fire accident MPC internal pressure and peak fuel cladding temperature are substantially less than the accident limits for MPC internal pressure and maximum cladding temperature (Tables 2.2.1 and 2.2.3).

The loss of the water in the water jacket causes the temperatures to increase due to a reduction in the thermal conductivity through the HI-TRAC water jacket. The temperatures of the MPC in the HI-TRAC transfer cask as a result of the loss of water in the water jacket are presented in Table 11.2.8 based on an assumed start at normal on-site transport conditions and assuming that a steady state is reached. As can be seen from the values in the table, the temperatures are below the accident temperature limits.

Shielding

The assumed loss of all the water in the water jacket results in an increase in the radiation dose rates at locations adjacent to the water jacket. The assumed loss of all the Holtite in the 125-ton HI-TRAC lids results in an increase in the radiation dose rates at locations adjacent to the lids. The shielding analysis results presented in Section 5.1.2 demonstrate that the requirements of 10CFR72.106 are not exceeded.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event, since the internal pressure does not exceed the accident condition design pressure and the MPC confinement boundary temperatures do not exceed the short-term allowable temperature limits.

Radiation Protection

There is no degradation in confinement capabilities of the MPC, as discussed above. There are increases in the local dose rates adjacent to the water jacket. HI-TRAC dose rates at 1 meter and 100 meters from the water jacket, after the water is lost, have already been reported in Subsection

11.2.1.3. Immediately after the fire accident a radiological inspection of the HI-TRAC will be performed and temporary shielding shall be installed to limit the exposure to the public.

11.2.4.3 Fire Dose Calculations

The complete loss of the HI-TRAC neutron shield along with the water jacket shell is assumed in the shielding analysis for the post-accident analysis of the loaded HI-TRAC in Chapter 5 and bounds the determined fire accident consequences. The loaded HI-TRAC following a fire accident meets the accident dose rate requirement of 10CFR72.106.

The elevated temperatures experienced by the HI-STORM overpack concrete shield is limited to the outermost layer. Therefore, any corresponding reduction in neutron shielding capabilities is limited to the outermost layer. The slight increase in the neutron dose rate as a result of the concrete in the outer inch reaching elevated temperatures will not significantly increase the site boundary dose rate, due to the limited amount of the concrete shielding with reduced effectiveness and the negligible neutron dose rate calculated for normal conditions at the site boundary. The loaded HI-STORM overpack following a fire accident meets the accident dose rate requirement of 10CFR72.106.

The analysis of the fire accident shows that the MPC confinement boundary is not compromised and therefore, there is no release of airborne radioactive materials.

11.2.4.4 Fire Accident Corrective Actions

Upon detection of a fire adjacent to a loaded HI-TRAC or HI-STORM overpack, the ISFSI operator shall take the appropriate immediate actions necessary to extinguish the fire. Fire fighting personnel should take appropriate radiological precautions, particularly with the HI-TRAC as the pressure relief valves may have opened and water loss from the water jacket may have occurred resulting in an increase in radiation doses. Following the termination of the fire, a visual and radiological inspection of the equipment shall be performed.

As appropriate, install temporary shielding around the HI-TRAC. Specific attention shall be taken during the inspection of the water jacket of the HI-TRAC. If damage to the HI-TRAC is limited to the loss of water in the water jacket due to the pressure increase, the water may be replaced by adding water at pressure. If damage to the HI-TRAC water jacket or HI-TRAC body is widespread and/or radiological conditions require, the HI-TRAC shall be unloaded in accordance with Chapter 8, prior to repair.

If damage to the HI-STORM storage overpack as the result of a fire event is widespread and/or as radiological conditions require, the MPC shall be removed from the HI-STORM overpack in accordance with Chapter 8. However, the thermal analysis described herein demonstrates that only the outermost layer of the radial concrete exceeds its design temperature. The HI-STORM overpack may be returned to service if there is no increase in the measured dose rates (i.e., the overpack's shielding effectiveness is confirmed) and if the visual inspection is satisfactory.

11.2.5 Partial Blockage of MPC Basket Vent Holes

Each MPC basket fuel cell wall has elongated vent holes at the bottom and top. The partial blockage of the MPC basket vent holes analyzes the effects on the HI-STORM 100 System due to the restriction of the vent openings.

11.2.5.1 Cause of Partial Blockage of MPC Basket Vent Holes

After the MPC is loaded with spent nuclear fuel, the MPC cavity is drained, vacuum dried, and backfilled with helium. There are only two possible sources of material that could block the MPC basket vent holes. These are the fuel cladding/fuel pellets and crud. Due to the maintenance of relatively low cladding temperatures during storage, it is not credible that the fuel cladding would rupture, and that fuel cladding and fuel pellets would fall to block the basket vent holes. It is conceivable that a percentage of the crud deposited on the fuel rods may fall off of the fuel assembly and deposit at the bottom of the MPC.

Helium in the MPC cavity provides an inert atmosphere for storage of the fuel. The HI-STORM 100 System maintains the peak fuel cladding temperature below the required long-term storage limits. All credible accidents do not cause the fuel assembly to experience an inertia loading greater than 60g's. Therefore, there is no mechanism for the extensive rupture of spent fuel rod cladding.

Crud can be made up of two types of layers, loosely adherent and tightly adherent. The SNF assembly movement from the fuel racks to the MPC may cause a portion of the loosely adherent crud to fall away. The tightly adherent crud is not removed during ordinary fuel handling operations. The MPC vent holes that act as the bottom plenum for the MPC internal thermosiphon are of an elongated, semi-circular design to ensure that the flow passages will remain open under a hypothetical shedding of the crud on the fuel rods. For conservatism, only the minimum semi-circular hole area is credited in the thermal models (i.e., the elongated portion of the hole is completely neglected).

The amount of crud on fuel assemblies varies greatly from plant to plant. Typically, BWR plants have more crud than PWR plants. Based on the maximum expected crud volume per fuel assembly provided in reference [11.2.5], and the area at the base of the MPC basket fuel storage cell, the maximum depth of crud at the bottom of the MPC-68 was determined. For the PWR-style MPC designs (see Table 1.2.1), 90% of the maximum crud volume was used to determine the crud depth. The maximum crud depths calculated for each of the MPCs is listed in Table 2.2.8. The maximum amount of crud was assumed to be present on all fuel assemblies within the MPC. Both the tightly and loosely adherent crud was conservatively assumed to fall off of the fuel assembly. As can be seen by the values listed in the table, the maximum amount of crud depth does not totally block any of the MPC basket vent holes as the crud accumulation depth is less than the elongation of the vent holes. Therefore, the available vent holes area is greater than that used in the thermal models.

11.2.5.2 Partial Blockage of MPC Basket Vent Hole Analysis

The partial blockage of the MPC basket vent holes has no effect on the structural, confinement and thermal analysis of the MPC. There is no effect on the shielding analysis other than a slight increase of the gamma radiation dose rate at the base of the MPC due to the accumulation of crud. As the MPC basket vent holes are not completely blocked, preferential flooding of the MPC fuel basket is not possible, and, therefore, the criticality analyses are not affected.

Structural

There are no structural consequences as a result of this event.

Thermal

There is no effect on the thermal performance of the system as a result of this event.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this accident event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this accident event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this accident event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this accident event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the partial blockage of MPC vent holes does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.5.3 Partial Blockage of MPC Basket Vent Holes Dose Calculations

Partial blockage of basket vent holes will not result in a compromise of the confinement boundary. Therefore, there will be no effect on the site boundary dose rates because the magnitude of the radiation source has not changed. There will be no radioactive material release.

11.2.5.4 Partial Blockage of MPC Basket Vent Holes Corrective Action

There are no consequences that exceed normal storage conditions. No corrective action is required for the partial blockage of the MPC basket vent holes.

11.2.6 Tornado

11.2.6.1 Cause of Tornado

The HI-STORM 100 System will be stored on an unsheltered ISFSI concrete pad and subject to environmental conditions. Additionally, the transfer of the MPC from the HI-TRAC transfer cask to the overpack may be performed at the unsheltered ISFSI concrete pad. It is possible that the HI-STORM System (storage overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask) may experience the extreme environmental conditions of a tornado.

11.2.6.2 Tornado Analysis

The tornado accident has two effects on the HI-STORM 100 System. The tornado winds and/or tornado missile attempt to tip-over the loaded overpack or HI-TRAC transfer cask. The pressure loading of the high velocity winds and/or the impact of the large tornado missiles act to apply an overturning moment. The second effect is tornado missiles propelled by high velocity winds which attempt to penetrate the storage overpack or HI-TRAC transfer cask.

During handling operations at the ISFSI pad, the loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask, while in the vertical orientation, shall be attached to a lifting device designed in accordance with the requirements specified in Subsection 2.3.3.1. Therefore, it is not credible that the tornado missile and/or wind could tip-over the loaded HI-TRAC while being handled in the vertical orientation. During handling of the loaded HI-TRAC in the horizontal orientation, it is possible that the tornado missile and/or wind may cause the rollover of the loaded HI-TRAC on the transport vehicle. The horizontal drop handling accident for the loaded HI-TRAC, Subsection 11.2.1, evaluates the consequences of the loaded HI-TRAC falling from the horizontal handling height limit and consequently this bounds the effect of the roll-over of the loaded HI-TRAC on the transport vehicle.

Structural

Section 3.4 provides the analysis of the pressure loading which attempts to tip-over the storage overpack and the analysis of the effects of the different types of tornado missiles. These analyses show that the loaded storage overpack does not tip-over as a result of the tornado winds and/or tornado missiles.

Analyses provided in Section 3.4 also shows that the tornado missiles do not penetrate the storage overpack or HI-TRAC transfer cask to impact the MPC. The result of the tornado missile impact on the storage overpack or HI-TRAC transfer cask is limited to damage of the shielding.

Thermal

The loss of the water in the water jacket causes the temperatures to increase slightly due to a reduction in the thermal conductivity through the HI-TRAC water jacket. The temperatures of the MPC in the HI-TRAC transfer cask as a result of the loss of water in the water jacket are presented in Table 11.2.8. As can be seen from the values in the table, the temperatures are well below the short-term allowable fuel cladding and material temperatures provided in Table 2.2.3 for accident conditions.

Shielding

The loss of the water in the water jacket results in an increase in the radiation dose rates at locations adjacent to the water jacket. The shielding analysis results presented in Section 5.1.2 demonstrate that the requirements of 10CFR72.106 are not exceeded.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event.

Radiation Protection

There is no degradation in confinement capabilities of the MPC, since the tornado missiles do not impact the MPC, as discussed above. There are increases in the local dose rates adjacent water jacket as a result of the loss of water in the HI-TRAC water jacket. HI-TRAC dose rates at 1 meter and 100 meters from the water jacket, after the water is lost, have already been discussed in Subsection 11.2.1.3. Immediately after the tornado accident a radiological inspection of the HI-TRAC will be performed and temporary shielding shall be installed to limit the exposure to the public.

11.2.6.3 Tornado Dose Calculations

The tornado winds do not tip-over the loaded storage overpack; damage the shielding materials of the overpack or HI-TRAC; or damage the MPC confinement boundary. There is no affect on the radiation dose as a result of the tornado winds. A tornado missile may cause localized damage in the concrete radial shielding of the storage overpack. However, the damage will have a negligible effect on the site boundary dose. A tornado missile may penetrate the HI-TRAC water jacket shell causing the loss of the neutron shielding (water). The effects of the tornado missile damage on the loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask is bounded by the post-accident dose assessment performed in Chapter 5, which conservatively assumes complete loss of the water in the water jacket and the water jacket shell.

11.2.6.4 Tornado Accident Corrective Action

Following exposure of the HI-STORM 100 System to a tornado, the ISFSI operator shall perform a visual and radiological inspection of the overpack and/or HI-TRAC transfer cask. Damage sustained by the overpack outer shell, concrete, or vent screens shall be inspected and repaired. Damage sustained by the HI-TRAC shall be inspected and repaired.

11.2.7 Flood

11.2.7.1 Cause of Flood

The HI-STORM 100 System will be located on an unsheltered ISFSI concrete pad. Therefore, it is possible for the storage area to be flooded. The potential sources for the flood water could be unusually high water from a river or stream, a dam break, a seismic event, or a hurricane.

11.2.7.2 Flood Analysis

The flood accident affects the HI-STORM 100 overpack structural analysis in two ways. The flood water velocity acts to apply an overturning moment, which attempts to tip-over the loaded overpack. The flood affects the MPC by applying an external pressure.

Structural

Section 3.4 provides the analysis of the flood water applying an overturning moment. The results of the analysis show that the loaded overpack does not tip over if the flood velocity does not exceed the value stated in Table 2.2.8.

The structural evaluation of the MPC for the accident condition external pressure (Table 2.2.1) is presented in Section 3.4 and the resulting stresses from this event are shown to be well within the allowable values.

Thermal

For a flood of sufficient magnitude to allow the water to come into contact with the MPC, there is no adverse effect on the thermal performance of the system. The thermal consequence of such a flood is an increase in the rejection of the decay heat. Because the storage overpack is ventilated, water from a large flood will enter the annulus between the MPC and the overpack. The water would actually provide cooling that exceeds that available in the air filled annulus, due to water's higher thermal conductivity, density and heat capacity, and the forced convection coefficient associated with flowing water. Since the flood water temperature will be within the off-normal temperature range specified in Table 2.2.2, the thermal transient associated with the initial contact of the floodwater will be bounded by the off-normal operation conditions.

For a smaller flood that blocks the air inlet ducts but is not sufficient to allow water to come into contact with the MPC, a thermal analysis is included in Subsection 11.2.13 of this FSAR.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this event. The flood water acts as a radiation shield and will reduce the radiation doses.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event. The criticality analysis is unaffected because under the flooding condition water does not enter the MPC cavity and therefore the reactivity would be less than the loading condition in the fuel pool which is presented in Section 6.1.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the flood accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.7.3 Flood Dose Calculations

Since the flood accident produces no leakage of radioactive material and no reduction in shielding effectiveness, there are no adverse radiological consequences.

11.2.7.4 Flood Accident Corrective Action

As shown in the analysis of the flood accident, the HI-STORM 100 System sustains no damage as a result of the flood. At the completion of the flood, surfaces wetted by floodwater shall be cleared of debris and cleaned of adherent foreign matter.

11.2.8 Earthquake

11.2.8.1 Cause of Earthquake

The HI-STORM 100 System may be employed at any reactor or ISFSI facility in the United States. It is possible that during the use of the HI-STORM 100 System, the ISFSI may experience an earthquake.

11.2.8.2 Earthquake Analysis

The earthquake accident analysis evaluates the effects of a seismic event on the loaded HI-STORM 100 System. The objective is to determine the stability limits of the HI-STORM 100 System. Based on a static stability criteria, it is shown in Chapter 3 that the HI-STORM 100 System is qualified to seismic activity less than or equal to the values specified in Table 2.2.8. The analyses in Chapter 3 show that the HI-STORM 100 System will not tip over under the conditions evaluated. The seismic activity has no adverse thermal, criticality, confinement, or shielding consequences.

Some ISFSI sites will have earthquakes that exceed the seismic activity specified in Table 2.2.8. For these high-seismic sites, anchored HI-STORM designs (the HI-STORM 100A and 100SA) have been developed. The design of these anchored systems is such that seismic loads cannot result in tip-over or lateral displacement. Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the anchored systems design.

Structural

The sole structural effect of the earthquake is an inertial loading of less than 1g. This loading is bounded by the tip-over analysis presented in Section 11.2.3, which analyzes a deceleration of 45g's and demonstrates that the MPC allowable stress criteria are met.

Thermal

There is no effect on the thermal performance of the system as a result of this event.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event.

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Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the earthquake does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.8.3 Earthquake Dose Calculations

Structural analysis of the earthquake accident shows that the loaded overpack will not tip over as a result of the specified seismic activity. If the overpack were to tip over, the resultant damage would be equal to that experienced by the tip-over accident analyzed in Subsection 11.2.3. Since the loaded overpack does not tip-over, there is no increase in radiation dose rates or release of radioactivity.

11.2.8.4 Earthquake Accident Corrective Action

Following the earthquake accident, the ISFSI operator shall perform a visual and radiological inspection of the overpacks in storage to determine if any of the overpacks have tipped-over. In the unlikely event of a tip-over, the corrective actions shall be in accordance with Subsection 11.2.3.4.

11.2.9 100% Fuel Rod Rupture

This accident event postulates that all the fuel rods rupture and that the appropriate quantities of fission product gases and fill gas are released from the fuel rods into the MPC cavity.

11.2.9.1 Cause of 100% Fuel Rod Rupture

Through all credible accident conditions, the HI-STORM 100 System maintains the spent nuclear fuel in an inert environment while maintaining the peak fuel cladding temperature below the required short-term temperature limits, thereby providing assurance of fuel cladding integrity. There is no credible cause for 100% fuel rod rupture. This accident is postulated to evaluate the MPC confinement barrier for the maximum possible internal pressure based on the non-mechanistic failure of 100% of the fuel rods.

11.2.9.2 100% Fuel Rod Rupture Analysis

The 100% fuel rod rupture accident has no thermal, structural, criticality or shielding consequences. The event does not change the reactivity of the stored fuel, the magnitude of the radiation source which is being shielded, the shielding capability, or the criticality control features of the HI-STORM 100 System. The determination of the maximum accident pressure is provided in Chapter 4. The MPC design basis internal pressure bounds the pressure developed assuming 100% fuel rod rupture.

The structural analysis provided in Chapter 3 evaluates the MPC confinement boundary under the accident condition internal pressure.

Structural

The structural evaluation of the MPC for the accident condition internal pressure presented in Section 3.4 demonstrates that the MPC stresses are well within the allowable values.

Thermal

The MPC internal pressure for the 100% fuel rod rupture condition is presented in Table 4.4.14. As can be seen from the values, the design basis accident condition MPC internal pressure (Table 2.2.1) used in the structural evaluation bounds the calculated value.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the non-mechanistic 100% fuel rod rupture accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.9.3 100% Fuel Rod Rupture Dose Calculations

The MPC confinement boundary maintains its integrity. There is no effect on the shielding effectiveness, and the magnitude of the radiation source is unchanged. However, the radiation source could redistribute within the sealed MPC cavity causing a slight change in the radiation dose rates at certain locations. Therefore, there is no release of radioactive material or significant increase in radiation dose rates.

11.2.9.4 100% Fuel Rod Rupture Accident Corrective Action

As shown in the analysis of the 100% fuel rod rupture accident, the MPC confinement boundary is not damaged. The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to withstand this accident and continue performing the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel under normal storage conditions. No corrective actions are required.

11.2.10 Confinement Boundary Leakage

The MPC uses redundant confinement closures to assure that there is no release of radioactive materials for postulated storage accident conditions. The analyses presented in Chapter 3 and this chapter demonstrate that the MPC remains intact during all postulated accident conditions. The discussion contained in Chapter 7 demonstrates that MPC is designed, welded, tested and inspected to meet the guidance of ISG-18 such that leakage from the confinement boundary is considered non-credible.

11.2.10.1 Cause of Confinement Boundary Leakage

There is no credible cause for confinement boundary leakage. The accidents analyzed in this chapter show that the MPC confinement boundary withstands all credible accidents. There are no man-made or natural phenomena that could cause failure of the confinement boundary restricting radioactive material release. Additionally, because the MPC lid-to-shell weld satisfies the criteria specified in Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 18, there is no credible leakage that would occur from the confinement boundary.

11.2.10.2 (DELETED)

11.2.10.3 (DELETED)

11.2.10.4 Confinement Boundary Leakage Accident Corrective Action

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to withstand this accident and continue performing the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel. No corrective actions are required.

11.2.11 Explosion

11.2.11.1 Cause of Explosion

An explosion within the bounds of an ISFSI is improbable since there are no explosive materials within the site boundary. An explosion as a result of combustion of the fuel contained in cask transport vehicle is possible. The fuel available for the explosion would be limited and therefore, any explosion would be limited in size. Any explosion stipulated to occur beyond the site boundary would have a minimal effect on the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.11.2 Explosion Analysis

Any credible explosion accident is bounded by the accident external pressure of 60 psig (Table 2.2.1) analyzed as a result of the flood accident water depth in Subsection 11.2.7 and the tornado missile accident of Subsection 11.2.6, because explosive materials will not be stored within close proximity to the casks. The HI-STORM Overpack does not experience the 60 psi external pressure since it is not a sealed vessel. However, a pressure differential of 10.0 psi (Table 2.2.1) is applied to the overpack. Section 3.4 provides the analysis of the accident external pressure on the MPC and overpack. The analysis shows that the MPC can withstand the effects of the accident condition external pressure, while conservatively neglecting the MPC internal pressure.

Structural

The structural evaluations for the MPC accident condition external pressure and overpack pressure differential are presented in Section 3.4 and demonstrate that all stresses are within allowable values.

Thermal

There is no effect on the thermal performance of the system as a result of this event.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the explosion accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.11.3 Explosion Dose Calculations

The bounding external pressure load has no effect on the HI-STORM 100 overpack and MPC. Therefore, no effect on the shielding, criticality, thermal or confinement capabilities of the HI-STORM 100 System is experienced as a result of the explosion pressure load. The effects of explosion generated missiles on the HI-STORM 100 System structure is bounded by the analysis of tornado generated missiles.

11.2.11.4 Explosion Accident Corrective Action

The explosive overpressure caused by the explosion is bounded by the external pressure exerted by the flood accident. The external pressure from the flood is shown not to damage the HI-STORM 100 System. Following an explosion, the ISFSI operator shall perform a visual and radiological inspection of the overpack. If the outer shell or concrete is damaged as a result of explosion generated missiles, the concrete material may be replaced and the outer shell repaired.

11.2.12 Lightning

11.2.12.1 Cause of Lightning

The HI-STORM 100 System will be stored on an unsheltered ISFSI concrete pad. There is the potential for lightning to strike the overpack. This analysis evaluates the effects of lightning striking the overpack.

11.2.12.2 Lightning Analysis

The HI-STORM 100 System is a large metal/concrete cask stored in an unsheltered ISFSI. As such, it may be subject to lightning strikes. When the HI-STORM 100 System is hit with lightning, the lightning will discharge through the steel shell of the overpack to the ground. Lightning strikes have high currents, but their duration is short (i.e., less than a second). The overpack outer shell is composed of conductive carbon steel and, as such, will provide a direct path to ground.

The MPC provides the confinement boundary for the spent nuclear fuel. The effects of a lightning strike will be limited to the overpack. The lightning current will discharge into the overpack and directly into the ground. Therefore, the MPC will be unaffected.

The lightning accident shall have no adverse consequences on thermal, criticality, confinement, shielding, or structural performance of the HI-STORM 100 System.

Structural

There is no structural consequence as a result of this event.

Thermal

There is no effect on the thermal performance of the system as a result of this event.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the lightning accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.12.3 Lightning Dose Calculations

An evaluation of lightning strikes demonstrates that the effect of a lightning strike has no effect on the confinement boundary or shielding materials. Therefore, no further analysis is necessary.

11.2.12.4 Lightning Accident Corrective Action

The HI-STORM 100 System will not sustain any damage from the lightning accident. There is no surveillance or corrective action required.

11.2.13 100% Blockage of Air Inlets

11.2.13.1 Cause of 100% Blockage of Air Inlets

This event is defined as a complete blockage of all four bottom inlets. Such blockage of the inlets may be postulated to occur as a result of a flood, blizzard snow accumulation, tornado debris, or volcanic activity.

11.2.13.2 100% Blockage of Air Inlets Analysis

The immediate consequence of a complete blockage of the air inlet ducts is that the normal circulation of air for cooling the MPC is stopped. An amount of heat will continue to be removed by localized air circulation patterns in the overpack annulus and outlet ducts, and the MPC will continue to radiate heat to the relatively cooler storage overpack. As the temperatures of the MPC and its contents rise, the rate of heat rejection will increase correspondingly. Under this condition, the temperatures of the overpack, the MPC and the stored fuel assemblies will rise as a function of time.

As a result of the large mass, and correspondingly large thermal capacity, of the storage overpack (in excess of 170,000 lbs), it is expected that a significant temperature rise is only possible if the completely blocked condition is allowed to persist for a number of days. This accident condition is, however, a short duration event that will be identified and corrected by scheduled periodic surveillance at the ISFSI site. Thus, the worst possible scenario is a complete loss of ventilation air during the scheduled surveillance time interval in effect at the ISFSI site.

It is noted that there is a large thermal margin, between the maximum calculated fuel cladding temperature with design-basis fuel decay heat (Tables 4.4.9, 4.4.10, 4.4.26 and 4.4.27) and the short-term fuel cladding temperature limit (Table 2.2.3), to meet the transient short-term fuel cladding temperature excursion. In other words, the fuel stored in a HI-STORM system can heat up by over 300°F before the short-term peak temperature limit is reached. The concrete in the overpack and the MPC and overpack structural members also have significant, margins between their calculated maximum long-term temperatures and their short-term temperature limits, with which to withstand such extreme hypothetical events.

To rigorously evaluate the minimum time available before the short-term temperature limits of either the concrete, structural members or fuel cladding are exceeded, a transient thermal model of the HI-STORM System is developed. The HI-STORM system transient model with all four air inlet ducts completely blocked is created as an axisymmetric finite-volume (FLUENT) model. With the exceptions of the inlet air duct blockage and the specification of thermal inertia properties (i.e., density and heat capacity), the model is identical to the steady-state models discussed in Chapter 4 of this FSAR. The model includes the lowest MPC thermal inertia of any MPC design.

In the first step of the transient solution, the decay heat load is set equal to 22.25 kW, and the MPC internal convection (i.e., thermosiphon) is suppressed. This evaluation provides the peak temperatures of the fuel cladding, the MPC confinement boundary and the concrete overpack shield wall, all as a function of time. Because the MPC with the lowest thermal inertia is used in the analysis, the temperature rise results obtained from evaluation of this transient model, therefore, bound the temperature rises for all MPC designs (Table 1.2.1) under this postulated event. The results of the blocked duct thermal transient evaluation are presented in Table 11.2.9.

The concrete section average (i.e., through thickness) temperature remains below the short-term temperature limit through 72 hours of blockage. Both the fuel cladding and the MPC confinement

boundary temperatures remain below their respective short-term temperature limits at 72 hours, the fuel cladding by over 150°F and the confinement boundary by almost 175°F. Table 11.2.9 summarizes the temperatures at several points in the HI-STORM System at 33 hours and 72 hours after complete inlet air duct blockage. These results establish the design-basis minimum surveillance interval for the duct screens. As soon as one or more ducts are part open convection flow is restarted, convective heat dissipation begins and temperatures trend downwards to approach normal conditions as the ducts are fully cleared.

Incorporation of the MPC thermosiphon internal natural convection, as described in Chapter 4, enables the maximum design basis decay heat load to rise to about 29 kW. The thermosiphon effect also shifts the highest temperatures in the MPC enclosure vessel toward the top of the MPC. The peak MPC closure plate outer surface temperature, for example, is computed to be about 450°F in the thermosiphon-enabled solution compared to about 210°F in the thermosiphon-suppressed solution, with both solutions computing approximately the same peak clad temperature. In the 100% inlet duct blockage condition, the heated MPC closure plate and MPC shell become effective heat dissipaters because of their proximity to the overpack outlet ducts and by virtue of the fact that thermal radiation heat transfer rises at the fourth power of absolute temperature. As a result of this increased heat rejection from the upper region of the MPC, the time limit for reaching the short-term peak fuel cladding temperature limit (72 hours) remains applicable.

It should be noted that the rupture of 100% of the fuel rods and the subsequent release of the contained rod gases has a significant positive impact on the MPC internal thermosiphon heat transport mechanism. The increase in the MPC internal pressure accelerates the thermosiphon, as does the introduction of higher molecular weight gaseous fission products. The values reported in Table 11.2.9 do not reflect this improved heat transfer and will actually be lower than reported. Crediting the increased MPC internal pressure only and neglecting the higher molecular weights of the gaseous fission products, the MPC bulk average gas temperature will be reduced by approximately 34.5°C (62.1°F).

Under the complete air inlet ducts blockage accident condition, it must be demonstrated that the MPC internal pressure does not exceed its design-basis accident limit during this event. Chapter 4 presented the MPC internal pressure calculated at an ambient temperature of 80°F, 100% fuel rods ruptured, full insolation, and maximum decay heat. This calculated pressure is 174.8 psia, as reported in Table 4.4.14, at an average temperature of 513.6°K. Using this pressure, an increase in the MPC cavity bulk temperature of 184°F (102.2°K, maximum of MPC shell or fuel cladding temperature rise 33 hours after blockage of all four ducts, see Table 11.2.9), the reduction in the bulk average gas temperature of 34.5°C, and the ideal gas law, the resultant MPC internal pressure is calculated below.

$$\frac{P_1}{P_2} = \frac{T_1}{T_2}$$

$$P_2 = \frac{P_1 T_2}{T_1}$$

$$P_2 = \frac{(174.8 \text{ psi } a) (513.6^\circ \text{ K} + 102.2^\circ \text{ K} - 34.5^\circ \text{ K})}{513.6^\circ \text{ K}}$$

$$P_2 = 197.8 \text{ psia or } 183.1 \text{ psig}$$

The accident MPC internal design pressure (Table 2.2.1) bounds the resultant pressure calculated above. Therefore, no additional analysis is required.

Structural

There are no structural consequences as a result of this event.

Thermal

Thermal analysis is performed to determine the time until the concrete section average and peak fuel cladding temperatures approach their short-term temperature limits. At the specified time limit, both the concrete section average and peak fuel cladding temperatures remain below their short-term temperature limits. The MPC internal pressure for this event is calculated as presented above. As can be seen from the value above, the design basis internal pressure for accident conditions used in the structural evaluation bounds the calculated value above.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this event, since the concrete temperatures do not exceed the short-term condition design temperature provided in Table 2.2.3.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the 100% blockage of air inlets accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System, if the blockage is removed in the specified time period.

11.2.13.3 100% Blockage of Air Inlets Dose Calculations

As shown in the analysis of the 100% blockage of air inlets accident, the shielding capabilities of the HI-STORM 100 System are unchanged because the peak concrete temperature does not exceed its short-term condition design temperature. The elevated temperatures will not cause the breach of the confinement system and the short term fuel cladding temperature limit is not exceeded. Therefore, there is no radiological impact.

11.2.13.4 100% Blockage of Air Inlets Accident Corrective Action

Analysis of the 100% blockage of air inlet ducts accident shows that the overpack concrete section average and fuel cladding peak temperatures are within the accident temperature limits if the blockage is cleared within 72 hours. Upon detection of the complete blockage of the air inlet ducts, the ISFSI operator shall assign personnel to clear the blockage with mechanical and manual means as necessary. After clearing the overpack ducts, the overpack shall be visually and radiologically inspected for any damage.

If exit air temperature monitoring is performed in lieu of direct visual inspections, the difference between the ambient air temperature and the exit air temperature will be the basis for assurance that the temperature limits are not exceeded. A measured temperature difference between the ambient air and the exit air that exceeds the design-basis maximum air temperature rise, calculated in Section 4.4.2, will indicate blockage of the overpack air ducts.

For an accident event that completely blocks the inlet or outlet air ducts, a site-specific evaluation or analysis may be performed to demonstrate that adequate heat removal is available for the duration of the event. Adequate heat removal is defined as overpack concrete section average and fuel cladding temperatures remaining below their short term temperature limits. For those events where an evaluation or analysis is not performed or is not successful in showing that temperatures remain below their short term temperature limits, the site's emergency plan shall include provisions to address removal of the material blocking the air inlet ducts and to provide alternate means of cooling prior to exceeding the time when the fuel cladding temperature reaches its short-term temperature limit. Alternate means of cooling could include, for example, spraying water into the air outlet ducts using pumps or fire-hoses or blowing air into the air outlet ducts using fans, to directly cool the MPC. Another example of supplemental cooling, for sufficiently low decay heat loads, would be to remove the overpack lid to increase free-surface natural convection.

11.2.14 Burial Under Debris

11.2.14.1 Cause of Burial Under Debris

Burial of the HI-STORM System under debris is not a credible accident. During storage at the ISFSI, there are no structures over the casks. The minimum regulatory distance of 100 meters from the ISFSI to the nearest site boundary and the controlled area around the ISFSI concrete pad precludes the close proximity of substantial amounts of vegetation.

There is no credible mechanism for the HI-STORM System to become completely buried under debris. However, for conservatism, complete burial under debris is considered. Blockage of the HI-STORM overpack air inlet ducts has already been considered in Subsection 11.2.13.

11.2.14.2 Burial Under Debris Analysis

Burial of the HI-STORM System does not impose a condition that would have more severe consequences for criticality, confinement, shielding, and structural analyses than that performed for the other accidents analyzed. The debris would provide additional shielding to reduce radiation doses. The accident external pressure encountered during the flood bounds any credible pressure loading caused by the burial under debris.

Burial under debris can affect thermal performance because the debris acts as an insulator and heat sink. This will cause the HI-STORM System and fuel cladding temperatures to increase. A thermal analysis has been performed to determine the time for the fuel cladding temperatures to reach the short term accident condition temperature limit during a burial under debris accident.

To demonstrate the inherent safety of the HI-STORM System, a bounding analysis that considers the debris to act as a perfect insulator is considered. Under this scenario, the contents of the HI-STORM System will undergo a transient heat up under adiabatic conditions. The minimum time required for the fuel cladding to reach the short term design fuel cladding temperature limit depends on the amount of thermal inertia of the cask, the cask initial conditions, and the spent nuclear fuel decay heat generation.

As stated in Subsection 11.2.13.2, there is a margin of over 300°F between the maximum calculated fuel cladding temperature and the short-term fuel cladding temperature limit. If a highly conservative 150°F is postulated as the permissible fuel cladding temperature rise for the burial under debris scenario, then a curve representing the relationship between the time required and decay heat load can be constructed. This curve is shown in Figure 11.2.6. In this figure, plots of the burial period at different levels of heat generation in the MPC are shown based on a 150°F rise in fuel cladding temperature resulting from transient heating of the HI-STORM System. Using the values stated in Table 11.2.6, the allowable time before the cladding temperatures meet the short-term fuel cladding temperature limit can be determined using:

$$\Delta t = \frac{m \times c_p \times \Delta T}{Q}$$

where:

Δt = Allowable Burial Time (hrs)

m = Mass of HI-STORM System (lb)

c_p = Specific Heat Capacity (Btu/lb \times °F)

ΔT = Permissible Fuel Cladding Temperature Rise (150°F)

Q = Total Decay Heat Load (Btu/hr)

The allowable burial time as a function of total decay heat load (Q) is presented in Figure 11.2.6.

The MPC cavity internal pressure under this accident scenario is bounded by the calculated internal pressure for the hypothetical 100% air inlets blockage previously evaluated in Subsection 11.2.13.2.

Structural

The structural evaluation of the MPC enclosure vessel for accident internal pressure conditions bounds the pressure calculated herein. Therefore, the resulting stresses from this event are well within the allowable values, as demonstrated in Section 3.4.

Thermal

With the cladding temperature rise limited to 150°F, the corresponding pressure rise, bounded by the calculations in Subsection 11.2.13.2, demonstrates large margins of safety for the MPC vessel structural integrity. Consequently, cladding integrity and confinement function of the MPC are not compromised.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the burial under debris accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System, if the debris is removed within the specified time (Figure 11.2.6). The 24-hour minimum duct inspection interval ensures that a burial under debris condition will be detected long before the allowable burial time is reached.

11.2.14.3 Burial Under Debris Dose Calculations

As discussed in burial under debris analysis, the shielding is enhanced while the HI-STORM System is covered.

The elevated temperatures will not cause the breach of the confinement system and the short term fuel cladding temperature limit is not exceeded. Therefore, there is no radiological impact.

11.2.14.4 Burial Under Debris Accident Corrective Action

Analysis of the burial under debris accident shows that the fuel cladding peak temperatures will not exceed the short term limit if the debris is removed within 45 hours. Upon detection of the burial under debris accident, the ISFSI operator shall assign personnel to remove the debris with mechanical and manual means as necessary. After uncovering the storage overpack, the storage overpack shall be visually and radiologically inspected for any damage. The loaded MPC shall be removed from the storage overpack with the HI-TRAC transfer cask to allow complete inspection of the overpack air inlets and outlets, and annulus. Removal of obstructions to the air flow path shall be performed prior to the re-insertion of the MPC. The site's emergency action plan shall include provisions for the performance of this corrective action.

11.2.15 Extreme Environmental Temperature

11.2.15.1 Cause of Extreme Environmental Temperature

The extreme environmental temperature is postulated as a constant ambient temperature caused by extreme weather conditions. To determine the effects of the extreme temperature, it is conservatively assumed that the temperature persists for a sufficient duration to allow the HI-STORM 100 System to achieve thermal equilibrium. Because of the large mass of the HI-STORM 100 System, with its corresponding large thermal inertia and the limited duration for the extreme temperature, this assumption is conservative.

11.2.15.2 Extreme Environmental Temperature Analysis

The accident condition considering an environmental temperature of 125°F for a duration sufficient to reach thermal equilibrium is evaluated with respect to accident condition design temperatures listed in Table 2.2.3. The evaluation is performed with design basis fuel with the maximum decay heat and the most restrictive thermal resistance. The 125°F environmental temperature is applied with full solar insolation.

The HI-STORM 100 System maximum temperatures for components close to the design basis temperatures are listed in Section 4.4. These temperatures are conservatively calculated at an environmental temperature of 80°F. The extreme environmental temperature is 125°F, which is an increase of 45°F. Conservatively bounding temperatures for all the MPC designs are obtained and reported in Table 11.2.7. As illustrated by the table, all the temperatures are well below the accident condition design basis temperatures. The extreme environmental temperature is of a short duration (several consecutive days would be highly unlikely) and the resultant temperatures are evaluated against short-term accident condition temperature limits. Therefore, the HI-STORM 100 System extreme environmental temperatures meet the design requirements.

Additionally, the extreme environmental temperature generates a pressure that is bounded by the pressure calculated for the complete inlet duct blockage condition because the duct blockage condition temperatures are much higher than the temperatures that result from the extreme environmental temperature. As shown in Subsection 11.2.13.2, the accident condition pressures are below the accident limit specified in Table 2.2.1.

Structural

The structural evaluation of the MPC enclosure vessel for accident condition internal pressure bounds the pressure resulting from this event. Therefore, the resulting stresses from this event are bounded by that of the accident condition and are well within the allowable values, as discussed in Section 3.4.

Thermal

The resulting temperatures for the system and fuel assembly cladding are provided in Table 11.2.7. As can be seen from this table, all temperatures are within the short-term accident condition allowable values specified in Table 2.2.3.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this event, since the concrete temperature does not exceed the short-term temperature limit specified in Table 2.2.3.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the extreme environment temperature accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.15.3 Extreme Environmental Temperature Dose Calculations

The extreme environmental temperature will not cause the concrete to exceed its normal design temperature. Therefore, there will be no degradation of the concrete's shielding effectiveness. The elevated temperatures will not cause a breach of the confinement system and the short-term fuel cladding temperature is not exceeded. Therefore, there is no radiological impact on the HI-STORM 100 System for the extreme environmental temperature and the dose calculations are equivalent to the normal condition dose rates.

11.2.15.4 Extreme Environmental Temperature Corrective Action

There are no consequences of this accident that require corrective action.

11.2.16 Supplemental Cooling System (SCS) Failure

The SCS system is a forced fluid circulation device used to provide supplemental HI-TRAC cooling. For fluid circulation, the SCS system is equipped with active components requiring power for normal operation. Although an SCS System failure is highly unlikely, for defense-in-depth an accident condition that renders it inoperable for an extended duration is postulated herein.

11.2.16.1 Cause of SCS Failure

Possible causes of SCS failure are: (a) Simultaneous loss of external and backup power, or (b) Complete *loss of annulus water* from an uncontrolled leak or line break.

11.2.16.2 Analysis of Effects and Consequences of SCS Failure

Structural

See discussion under thermal evaluation below.

Thermal

In the event of a SCS failure due to (a), the following sequence of events occur:

- i) The annulus water temperature rises to reach its boiling temperature (~212°F).
- ii) A progressive reduction of water level and dryout of the annulus.

In the event of an SCS failure due to (b), a rapid water loss occurs and annulus is replaced with air. For the condition of a vertically oriented HI-TRAC with air in the annulus, the maximum steady-state temperatures are below the accident temperature limit (1058°F) (see Subsection 11.1.6 and Table 11.1.3). For a horizontally oriented HI-TRAC with air in the annulus, the maximum steady-state temperatures are also below the accident temperature limit (see Subsection 4.5.2.1). In Supplemental Cooling LCO 3.1.4 a time limit of 24 hours is specified to upend the HI-TRAC. This places the cask system in an analyzed condition where, as cited above, the fuel cladding temperature remains below the limit.

To confirm that the MPC design pressure limits (Table 2.2.1) are not exceeded, a bounding gas pressure is computed assuming fuel heatup from normal temperatures (Tables 4.4.9, 4.4.10, 4.4.26 and 4.4.27) to a clad temperature limit (1058°F). For conservatism, the MPC average gas temperature is assumed to elevate from normal conditions to 1058°F. The results, summarized in Table 11.2.10, show that the MPC pressure is below the design pressure.

Shielding

There is no adverse effect on the shielding effectiveness of the system.

Criticality

There is no adverse effect on the criticality control of the system.

Confinement

There is no adverse effect on the confinement function of the MPC. As discussed in the evaluations above, the structural boundary pressures are within design limits.

Radiation Protection

As there is no adverse effect on the shielding or confinement functions, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this off-normal event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the SCS failure does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100 System.

11.2.16.3 SCS Failure Dose Calculations

The event has no radiological impact because the confinement barrier and shielding integrity are not affected.

11.2.16.4 SCS Failure Corrective Action

In the vertical orientation the HI-TRAC is designed to withstand an SCS failure without an adverse effect on its safety functions. For a horizontally oriented HI-TRAC, LCO 3.1.4 requires HI-TRAC upending within 24 hours.

Table 11.2.1

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Table 11.2.2

HI-STORM 100 OVERPACK BOUNDING TEMPERATURES
AS A RESULT OF THE HYPOTHETICAL FIRE CONDITION

Material/Component	Initial[†] Condition (°F)	During Fire (°F)	Post-Fire^{††} Cooldown (°F)
Fuel Cladding	691 (MPC-24) 691 (MPC-24E) 691 (MPC-32) 740 (MPC-68)	692 (MPC-24) 692 (MPC-24E) 692 (MPC-32) 741 (MPC-68)	692 (MPC-24) 692 (MPC-24E) 692 (MPC-32) 741 (MPC-68)
MPC Fuel Basket	650 (MPC-24) 650 (MPC-24E) 660 (MPC-32) 720 (MPC-68)	651 (MPC-24) 651 (MPC-24E) 661 (MPC-32) 721 (MPC-68)	651 (MPC-24) 651 (MPC-24E) 661 (MPC-32) 721 (MPC-68)
Overpack Inner Shell	195	300	195
Overpack Radial Concrete Inner Surface	195	281	282
Overpack Radial Concrete Mid-Surface	173	173	184
Overpack Radial Concrete Outer Surface	157	529	530
Overpack Outer Shell	157	570	570

[†] Bounding 195°F uniform inner surface and 157°F uniform outer surface temperatures assumed.

^{††} Maximum temperature during post-fire cooldown.

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Table 11.2.3

SUMMARY OF INPUTS FOR HI-TRAC FIRE ACCIDENT HEAT-UP

Minimum Weight of Loaded HI-TRAC with Pool Lid (lb)	180,436
Lower Heat Capacity of Carbon Steel (Btu/lbm·°R)	0.1
Heat Capacity UO ₂ (Btu/lbm·°R)	0.056
Heat Capacity Lead (Btu/lbm·°R)	0.031
Maximum Decay Heat (kW)	28.74
Total Fuel Assembly Weight (lb)	40,320
Lead Weight (lb)	52,478
Water Weight (lb)	7,595

Table 11.2.4

BOUNDING HI-TRAC HYPOTHETICAL
FIRE CONDITION PRESSURES[†]

Condition	Pressure (psig)			
	MPC-24	MPC-24E	MPC-32	MPC-68
Without Fuel Rod Rupture	79.8	79.8	79.8	79.8
With 100% Fuel Rod Rupture	158.9	159.3	191.1	126.6

[†] The reported pressures are based on temperatures that exceed the calculated maximum temperatures and are therefore slightly conservative.

Table 11.2.5

SUMMARY OF BOUNDING MPC PEAK TEMPERATURES
DURING A HYPOTHETICAL HI-TRAC FIRE ACCIDENT CONDITION

Location	Initial Steady State Temperature [°F]	Bounding Temperature Rise [°F]	Hottest MPC Cross Section Peak Temperature [°F]
Fuel Cladding	872	26.3	898.3
Basket Periphery	600	26.3	626.3
MPC Shell	455	26.3	481.3

Table 11.2.6

SUMMARY OF INPUTS FOR ADIABATIC CASK HEAT-UP

Minimum Weight of HI-STORM 100 System (lb) (overpack and MPC)	300,000
Lower Heat Capacity of Carbon Steel (BTU/lb/°F)	0.1
Initial Uniform Temperature of Cask (°F)	740 [†]
Bounding Decay Heat (kW)	28.74

[†] The cask is conservatively assumed to be at a uniform temperature equal to the maximum fuel cladding temperature.

Table 11.2.7

MAXIMUM TEMPERATURES CAUSED BY EXTREME ENVIRONMENTAL TEMPERATURES[†] [°F]

Location	Temperature	Accident Temperature Limit
HI-STORM 100		
Fuel Cladding	736 (PWR) 785 (BWR)	1058
MPC Basket	765	950
MPC Shell	396	775
Overpack Air Exit	251	N/A
Overpack Inner Shell	244	350 (overpack concrete)
Overpack Outer Shell	190	350 (overpack concrete)
HI-STORM 100S Version B		
Fuel Cladding	657 (PWR) 718 (BWR)	1058
MPC Basket	698	950
MPC Shell	450	775
Overpack Air Exit	245	N/A
Overpack Inner Shell	291	350 (overpack concrete)
Overpack Outer Shell	185	350 (overpack concrete)

[†] Conservatively bounding temperatures reported include a hypothetical rupture of 10% of the fuel rods.

Table 11.2.8

BOUNDING MPC TEMPERATURES CAUSED BY LOSS OF WATER
FROM THE HI-TRAC WATER JACKET [°F]

Temperature Location	Normal	Calculated Without Water in Water Jacket
Fuel Cladding	872	888
MPC Basket	852	868
MPC Basket Periphery	600	612
MPC Shell	455	466
HI-TRAC Inner Shell	322	342
HI-TRAC Water Jacket Inner Surface	314	334
HI-TRAC Enclosure Shell Outer Surface	224	222
Axial Neutron Shield [†]	258	261

[†] Local maximum section temperature.

Table 11.2.9

SUMMARY OF BLOCKED AIR INLET DUCT EVALUATION RESULTS

	Max. Initial Steady-State Temp. [†] (°F)	Temperature Rise (°F)		Transient Temperature (°F)	
		at 33 hrs	at 72 hrs	at 33 hrs	at 72 hrs
Fuel Cladding	740	101	160	841	900
MPC Shell	351	184	250	535	601
Overpack Inner Shell #1 ^{††}	199	113	174	312	373
Overpack Inner Shell #2 ^{†††}	155	193	286	348	441
Overpack Outer Shell	145	14	40	159	185
Concrete Section Average	172	79	141	251	313

[†] Conservatively bounding temperatures reported includes a hypothetical rupture of 10% of the fuel rods.

^{††} Coincident with location of initial maximum.

^{†††} Coincident with active fuel axial mid-height.

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Table 11.2.10

MPC PRESSURES UNDER A POSTULATED FUEL HEATUP FROM NORMAL TEMPERATURES TO ACCIDENT LIMIT (1058°F)

MPC	Normal Condition		Accident Pressure ²		Design Pressure (From Chapter 2, Table 2.2.3)
	MPC Average Temperature (T _o) [°F]	Absolute Pressure (P _o) [psia] (Table 4.4.14)	Absolute (P) [psia]	Gage [psi]	Gage [psi]
MPC-24	463	81.1	133.4	118.7	200
MPC-24E	467	80.5	131.8	117.1	200
MPC-32	464	80.3	131.9	117.2	200
MPC-68	482	81.8	131.8	117.1	200

² Conservatively assuming the MPC is heated from T_o to a uniform maximum of 1058°F, the final gas pressure is computed by Ideal Gas Law as: $P = P_o (1058 + 460)/(T_o + 460)$.

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Inner Overpack Surface Heated to 300 deg. F by Hot Gases



Outer Overpack Surface Heated by 1475 deg. F Fire Condition
Thermal Radiation and Forced Convection

2-D Axisymmetric HI-STORM Storage Overpack Fire Transient

FIGURE 11.2.1; FIRE TRANSIENT ANSYS MODEL ELEMENT PLOT

FIGURES 11.2.2 THROUGH 11.2.5

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


FIGURE 11.2.6; ALLOWABLE BURIAL UNDER DEBRIS TIME VERSUS DECAY HEAT LOAD

11.3 REFERENCES

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- [11.2.3] IAEA Safety Standards, "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material," International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, (1985).
- [11.2.4] Deleted.
- [11.2.5] ESEERCO Project EP91-29 and EPRI Project 3100-02, "Debris Collection System for Boiling Water Reactor Consolidation Equipment," B&W Fuel Company, (October 1995).
- [11.2.6] Docket Number 72-1008, HI-STAR 100 System FSAR, Holtec Report HI-2012610, latest revision.
- [11.2.7] Docket Number 71-9261, HI-STAR 100 System SAR, Holtec Report HI-951251, latest revision.

SUPPLEMENT 11.I

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11.I-1

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SUPPLEMENT 11.II

OFF-NORMAL AND ACCIDENT EVALUATION FOR HI-STORM 100S-185

11.II.0 INTRODUCTION

This supplement is focused on the off-normal and accident condition evaluations of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System for storage of IP1 fuel. The evaluations described herein parallel those of the HI-STORM 100 System contained in the main body of Chapter 11 of this FSAR. To ensure readability, the sections in this supplement are numbered to be directly analogous to the sections in the main body of the chapter. For example, the fire accident evaluation presented in Supplement Subsection 11.II.2.4 for the HI-STORM 100S-185 is analogous to the evaluation presented in Subsection 11.2.4 of the main body of Chapter 11 for the HI-STORM 100.

11.II.1 OFF-NORMAL EVENTS

A general discussion of off-normal events is presented in Section 11.1 of the main body of Chapter 11. The following off-normal events are discussed in this supplement:

- Off-Normal Pressure
- Off-Normal Environmental Temperature
- Leakage of One MPC Seal Weld
- Partial Blockage of Air Inlets
- Off-Normal Handling of HI-TRAC Transfer Cask
- FHD System Failure

The results of the evaluations presented herein demonstrate that the HI-STORM 100S-185 System can withstand the effects of off-normal events without affecting its ability to perform its intended function, and is in compliance with the applicable acceptance criteria.

11.II.1.1 Off-Normal Pressure

A discussion of this off-normal condition is presented in Subsection 11.1.1 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of, detection of, corrective actions for and radiological impact of this event is presented therein.

Structural

The structural evaluation of the MPC enclosure vessel for off-normal internal pressure conditions is discussed in Section 3.4. The applicable pressure boundary stress limits are confirmed to bound the stresses resulting from the off-normal pressure.

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Thermal

The off-normal event is evaluated for the generic HI-STORM in Section 4.6.1 This evaluation is bounding as the MPC temperatures and pressures in a HI-STORM 100S-185 are bounded by the generic HI-STORM System.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this off-normal event. As discussed in the structural evaluation mentioned above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this off-normal event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the off-normal pressure does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System.

11.II.1.2 Off-Normal Environmental Temperatures

A discussion of this off-normal condition is presented in Subsection 11.1.2 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of, detection of, corrective actions for and radiological impact of this event is presented therein.

Structural

The effect on the MPC for the upper off-normal thermal conditions (i.e., 100°F) is an increase in the internal pressure. The resultant pressure is below the off-normal design pressure (Table 2.2.1).

Thermal

The effect of off-normal ambient temperature on HI-STORM temperatures and pressures is evaluated in Section 4.II.6.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this off-normal event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this off-normal event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the specified off-normal environmental temperatures do not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System.

11.II.1.3 Leakage of One MPC Seal Weld

A discussion of this off-normal condition is presented in Subsection 11.1.3 of the main body of Chapter 11. The discussion presented therein is applicable in its entirety to an MPC in a HI-STORM 100S-185.

11.II.1.4 Partial Blockage of Air Inlets

A discussion of this off-normal condition is presented in Subsection 11.1.4 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of, detection of, corrective actions for and radiological impact of this event is presented therein.

Structural

There are no structural consequences as a result of this off-normal event.

Thermal

Partial air inlets blockage is evaluated in Section 4.II.6.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this off-normal event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this off-normal event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this off-normal event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the specified off-normal partial blockage of air inlet ducts event does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System.

11.II.1.5 Off-Normal Handling of HI-TRAC

A discussion of this off-normal condition is presented in Subsection 11.1.5 of the main body of Chapter 11. This off-normal condition does not apply to the HI-TRAC 100D Version IP1, which does not have lower pocket trunnions.

11.II.1.6 Failure of FHD System

A discussion of this off-normal condition is presented in Subsection 11.1.6 of the main body of Chapter 11. The discussion presented therein is also applicable to the IP1 cask system.

11.II.2 ACCIDENT EVENTS

A general discussion of accident events is presented in Section 11.1 of the main body of Chapter 11. The following accident events are discussed in this supplement section:

- HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Handling Accident
- HI-STORM 100S-185 Overpack Handling Accident
- Tip-Over
- Fire Accident
- Partial Blockage of MPC Basket Vent Holes
- Tornado
- Flood
- Earthquake
- 100% Fuel Rod Rupture
- Confinement Boundary Leakage
- Explosion
- Lightning
- 100% Blockage of Air Inlets

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Burial Under Debris
Extreme Environmental Temperature

The results of the evaluations performed herein demonstrate that the HI-STORM 100S-185 System can withstand the effects of all credible and hypothetical accident conditions and natural phenomena without affecting safety function, and is in compliance with the applicable acceptance criteria.

11.II.2.1 HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Handling Accident

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.1 of the main body of Chapter 11. The HI-TRAC 100D Version IP1 shall be transported and handled only in the vertical orientation using a device designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 and having redundant drop protection features unless a site specific analysis has been performed to determine a vertical lift height limit. Horizontal lifting of a loaded HI-TRAC 100D Version IP1 is not permitted. Therefore, a drop of the loaded HI-TRAC 100D Version IP1 is not analyzed in this FSAR.

11.II.2.2 HI-STORM Overpack Handling Accident

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.2 of the main body of Chapter 11. The discussion presented therein applies to the HI-STORM 100S-185 System, except that the height of the loaded overpack above the ground shall be limited to below the vertical handling height limit determined in Supplement 3.II.

11.II.2.3 Tip-Over

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.3 of the main body of Chapter 11. The discussion presented therein applies to the HI-STORM 100S-185 System, except that the tip-over analysis of the HI-STORM 100S-185 overpack is provided in Supplement 3.II, Section 3.II.4.

11.II.2.4 Fire Accident

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.4 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of and corrective actions for this event is presented therein.

Structural

There are no structural consequences as a result of the fire accident condition.

Thermal

Supplement 4.II, Section 4.II.6 evaluates fire accidents for the HI-STORM 100S-185 System. As justified therein, the evaluation of fires on a generic HI-STORM System presented in Section 11.2 bound the effects on the HI-STORM 100S-185 System.

Shielding

With respect to concrete damage from a fire to the HI-STORM 100S-185 System, NUREG-1536 (4.0,V,5.b) states: "the loss of a small amount of shielding material is not expected to cause a storage system to exceed the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 72.106 and, therefore, need not be estimated or evaluated in the SAR."

For the HI-TRAC 100D Version IP1, the assumed loss of all the water in the water jacket results in an increase in the radiation dose rates at locations adjacent to the water jacket. The shielding evaluation presented in Supplement 5.II demonstrates that the requirements of 10CFR72.106 are not exceeded.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this accident event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this accident event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is a very localized reduction in shielding and no effect on the confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this accident event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the fire accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System.

For the HI-TRAC 100D Version IP1, there is no degradation in confinement capabilities of the MPC, as discussed above. There are increases in the local dose rates adjacent to the water jacket. Dose rates at 1 meter from the water jacket, after the water is lost, are presented in Supplement 5.II and it is concluded that dose rates at the 100 meter controlled boundary for the HI-TRAC 100D Version IP1 are bounded by the HI-TRAC 100. Immediately after the fire accident a radiological inspection of the HI-TRAC will be performed and temporary shielding shall be installed to limit the exposure to the public.

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11.II.2.5 Partial Blockage of MPC Basket Vent Holes

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.5 of the main body of Chapter 11. The discussion presented therein applies to an MPC-32-IP1 in a HI-STORM 100S-185.

11.II.2.6 Tornado

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.6 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of and corrective actions for this event is presented therein.

Structural

Analyses presented in Supplement 3.II, Section 3.II.4 show that the impact of tornado and tornado borne missiles on the HI-STORM 100S-185 System does not result in tip-over or a direct missile strike on the MPC.

Thermal

There are no thermal consequences as a result of the tornado.

Shielding

A tornado missile may cause localized damage to the HI-STORM 100S 185 Overpack. As the overpack is heavily shielded, the overall damage consequences (site boundary doses) are insignificant.

A tornado missile may penetrate the HI-TRAC100D Version IP water jacket shell causing the loss of the neutron shielding (water) which results in an increase in dose rates adjacent to the water jacket. The shielding evaluation presented in Supplement 5.II demonstrates that the requirements of 10CFR72.106 are not exceeded.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this accident event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this accident event.

Radiation Protection

There is no degradation in confinement capabilities of the MPC, since the tornado missiles do not impact the MPC, as discussed above. A tornado missile may cause localized damage in the HI-STORM 100S 185 overpack. However, the damage will have a negligible effect on the site

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boundary dose. Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the tornado accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System.

A tornado missile may penetrate the HI-TRAC 100D Version IP1 water jacket shell causing the loss of the neutron shielding (water). There are increases in the local dose rates adjacent to the water jacket. Dose rates at 1 meter from the water jacket, after the water is lost, are presented in Supplement 5.II and it is concluded that dose rates at the 100 meter controlled boundary for the HI-TRAC 100D Version IP1 are bounded by the HI-TRAC 100. Immediately after the tornado missile accident a radiological inspection of the HI-TRAC shall be performed and temporary shielding shall be installed to limit exposure.

11.II.2.7 Flood

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.7 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of this event is presented therein.

Structural

The structural evaluation of the MPC for the accident condition external pressure (Table 2.2.1) is presented in Section 3.4 and the resulting stresses from this event are shown to be well within the allowable values.

Thermal

The thermal consequences of flood are bounded by the all inlet ducts blocked accident.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this accident event. The floodwater provides additional shielding which reduces radiation dose.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this accident event. The criticality analysis is unaffected because under the flooding condition water does not enter the MPC cavity and therefore the reactivity would be less than the loading condition in the spent fuel pool, which is presented in Section 6.1.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this accident event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this accident event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the flood accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System.

Flood Accident Corrective Action

The HI-STORM 100S 185 System is unaffected by flood. Upon recession of floodwaters, exposed surfaces may need debris and adherent foreign matter removal.

11.II.2.8 Earthquake

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.8 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of and corrective actions for this event is presented therein.

Structural

An evaluation presented in Supplement 3.II, Section 3.II.4 shows that the HI-STORM 100S-185 does not tip over. It continues to render its intended function during and after the earthquake and the overpack is unaffected by the event.

Thermal

There is no effect on the thermal performance of the system as a result of this accident event.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this accident event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this accident event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this accident event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this accident event.

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Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the earthquake does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System.

11.II.2.9 100% Fuel Rod Rupture

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.9 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of and corrective actions for this event is presented therein.

Structural

The MPC accident pressure is below the design pressure of the MPC (Table 2.2.1).

Thermal

The 100% fuel rods rupture accident pressure is evaluated in Supplement II, Section 4.II.4.4. The MPC accident pressure is below the vessel design pressure (Table 2.2.1).

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this accident event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this accident event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this accident event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this accident event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the non-mechanistic 100% fuel rod rupture accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System.

11.II.2.10 Confinement Boundary Leakage

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.10 of the main body of Chapter 11. The discussion presented therein also applies to the MPC-32-IP1.

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11.II.2.11 Explosion

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.11 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of and corrective actions for this event is presented therein.

Structural

The structural evaluations for the MPC accident condition external pressure and overpack pressure differential are presented in Section 3.4 and demonstrate that all stresses are within allowable limits.

Thermal

There is no effect on the thermal performance of the system as a result of this accident event.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this accident event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this accident event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this accident event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain well within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this accident event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the explosion accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System.

11.II.2.12 Lightning

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.12 of the main body of Chapter 11. The discussion presented therein also applies to the HI-STORM 100S-185.

11.II.2.13 100% Blockage of Air Inlets

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.13 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of and corrective actions for this event is presented therein.

Structural

There are no structural consequences as a result of this accident event.

Thermal

The 100% air inlets blockage accident is evaluated in Supplement II, Section 4.II.6.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this accident event, since the concrete temperatures do not exceed the accident temperature limit.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this accident event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this accident event.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this accident event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the 100% blockage of air inlets accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System, if the blockage is removed in the specified time period.

11.II.2.14 Burial Under Debris

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.14 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of and corrective actions for this event is presented therein.

Structural

The structural evaluation of the MPC enclosure vessel for accident internal pressure conditions bounds the pressure calculated herein. Therefore, the resulting stresses from this event are well within the allowable values, as demonstrated in Section 3.4.

Thermal

The burial under debris accident is evaluated in Supplement II, Section 4.II.6.

Shielding

There is no adverse effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this accident event.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this accident event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this accident event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this accident event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the burial under debris accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System, if the debris is removed within the specified time period.

11.II.2.15 Extreme Environmental Temperature

A discussion of this accident condition is presented in Subsection 11.2.15 of the main body of Chapter 11. A description of the cause of and corrective actions for this event is presented therein.

Structural

The structural evaluation of the MPC enclosure vessel for accident condition internal pressure bounds the pressure resulting from this event. Therefore, the resulting stresses from this event are

bounded by the design-basis internal pressure and are well within the allowable values, as discussed in Section 3.4.

Thermal

The extreme ambient temperature accident is evaluated in Supplement 4.II, Section 4.II.6.

Shielding

There is no effect on the shielding performance of the system as a result of this accident event, since the concrete temperature does not exceed the short-term temperature limit specified in Table 2.2.3.

Criticality

There is no effect on the criticality control features of the system as a result of this accident event.

Confinement

There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of this accident event. As discussed in the structural evaluation above, all stresses remain within allowable values, assuring confinement boundary integrity.

Radiation Protection

Since there is no degradation in shielding or confinement capabilities as discussed above, there is no effect on occupational or public exposures as a result of this accident event.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the extreme environment temperature accident does not affect the safe operation of the HI-STORM 100S-185 System.