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Dale E. James
Manager, Licensing - ANO

2CAN050801

May 8, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Licensee Event Report 50-368/2008-001-00
Arkansas Nuclear One – Unit 2
Docket No. 50-368
License No. NFP-6

Dear Sir or Madam:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), enclosed is the subject report concerning operation prohibited by Technical Specifications.

Commitments contained in this submittal are documented in the attachment.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dale E. James", written over a light gray grid background.

DEJ/rs
Enclosure

cc: Elmo Collins
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011-4125

NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Arkansas Nuclear One
P.O. Box 310
London, AR 72847

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
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LEREvents@inpo.org

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Arkansas Nuclear One – Unit 2	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000368	3. PAGE 1 of 3
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4. TITLE Containment Isolation Valve Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications as a Result of Personnel Error During Planning and Construction of Scaffolding

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
3	13	2008	2008	- 001 -	00	5	8	2008	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE 1	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: <i>(Check all that apply)</i>									
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A					
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)							

10. POWER LEVEL 100	
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12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER	
NAME Dale E. James	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 479-858-4619

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED				15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)*

On March 18, 2008, with the plant shutdown in Mode 5, the outside containment isolation valve for the chill water system did not fully close during “as-found” stroke time testing. Investigation by Operations personnel revealed that a scaffold pole was interfering with the close stroke of the valve, resulting in it remaining approximately 30 to 40 percent open. The scaffold was constructed on March 13, 2008, while the plant was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. Since the plant was shutdown for Refueling Outage 2R19 on March 16, 2008, the valve was inoperable for a period of time longer than allowed by the Technical Specifications. The obstruction was removed, and the valve was successfully stroke tested. The cause of this event was human error in that the walkdown conducted before the scaffold was installed did not identify the subject valve as a work site interference issue. Due to the unique design of the valve associated with this event, it was determined to be an isolated occurrence. However, a “lessons learned” discussion will be conducted with the Operations staff of both ANO units regarding this event to stress the importance of walkdowns with scaffolding personnel in identifying all potential interference issues.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER (2)	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Arkansas Nuclear One – Unit 2	05000368	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 of 3
		2008	- 001	- 00	

17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

A. Plant Status

At the time this condition occurred, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit-2 (ANO-2) was in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power. At the time this condition was discovered, the plant was shutdown in Mode 5 for Refueling Outage 2R19.

B. Event Description

On March 18, 2008, with the plant shutdown in Mode 5, the outside containment isolation valve [ISV] for the chill water system [KM] did not fully close during “as-found” stroke time testing. Investigation by Operations personnel revealed that a scaffold pole was interfering with the close stroke of the valve, resulting in it remaining approximately 30 to 40 percent open. The obstruction was removed and the valve was successfully stroke tested.

C. Root Cause

The cause of this event was human error in that the walkdown conducted by Operations personnel and the scaffold crew before the scaffold was installed did not identify the subject valve as a work site interference issue. This was, for the most part, due to the unique valve design. The valve has a large air cylinder on the top with four rods and springs connecting it to the valve body. Between the cylinder and the rods/springs, there is a flat plate that moves when the valve operates. When the valve is open, the plate rests against the bottom of the air cylinder and appears to be an integral part of the cylinder, which does not move during valve operation. The plate also extends approximately 1 to 2 inches beyond the edge of the cylinder. When the scaffold was installed, special care was taken to ensure that the scaffold was not close enough to the springs and rods to interfere with valve operation (approximately 1 1/2 inches). However, the crew did not recognize that the subject plate was a movable part of the valve assembly. Due to the unique design of the valve associated with this event, it was determined to be an isolated occurrence.

D. Corrective Actions

The obstruction was removed and the valve was successfully stroke tested.

Even though this event was an isolated occurrence, a “lessons learned” discussion will be conducted with the Operations staff of both ANO units regarding this event to stress the importance of walkdowns with scaffolding personnel in identifying all potential interference issues.

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17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

E. Safety Significance

Considering that this condition existed for a short period of time and the fact that the redundant containment isolation valve remained operable during this time, the significance of this event is considered to be minimal.

F. Basis for Reportability

ANO-2 Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 requires that each containment isolation valve be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. If unable to restore an inoperable containment isolation valve to operable status or isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours, the specification requires that the plant be taken to Hot Standby within the following 6 hours and to Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours.

The scaffold was constructed on March 13, 2008, while the plant was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. The plant was shutdown for Refueling Outage 2R19 on March 16, 2008, and entered Mode 5 at 1503 on that date, at which time containment integrity was no longer required. Since the subject containment isolation valve was inoperable for a period of time longer than allowed by the Technical Specifications, this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by Technical Specifications.

G. Additional Information

There have been no previous similar events reported by ANO.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

Attachment

2CAN050801

List of Regulatory Commitments

List of Regulatory Commitments

The following table identifies those actions committed to by Entergy in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENT	TYPE (Check One)		SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE (If Required)
	ONE TIME ACTION	CONTINUING COMPLIANCE	
Conduct a lessons learned discussion with the Operations staff of both ANO units regarding this event to stress the importance of walkdowns with scaffolding personnel in identifying all potential interference issues.	X		6/30/2008