



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL

May 6, 2008

MEMORANDUM TO: R. William Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations

FROM: Stephen D. Dingbaum */RA/*
Assistant Inspector General for Audits

SUBJECT: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS: AUDIT OF NRC'S
AUTOMATED ACCESS CONTROL AND ENHANCED
SECURITY SYSTEM (OIG-07-A-10)

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION,
MEMORANDUM DATED MARCH 25, 2008

Attached is the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) analysis and status of recommendations as discussed in the agency's response dated March 25, 2008. Based on this response, Recommendations 8, 10, 13, and 15 are resolved while recommendations 5 and 14 are closed. Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 16, and 17 were previously closed. Please provide an updated status of the resolved recommendations by December 29, 2008.

If you have questions or concerns, please call me at 415-5915 or Beth Serepca at 415-5911.

Attachment: As stated

cc: V. Ordaz, OEDO
J. Arildsen, OEDO
P. Shea, OEDO

Audit Report

Audit of NRC'S Automated Access Control and Enhanced Security System OIG-07-A-10

Status of Recommendations

Recommendation 5: Institute quarterly quality assurance reviews of system data to ensure that system data is accurate with regard to special access areas, terminated employees, and terminated contractors.

Response Dated
March 25, 2008: ADM instituted quarterly quality assurance reviews of system data in August 2007.

OIG Analysis: The proposed corrective action addresses the intent of OIG's recommendation. OIG reviewed documentation provided by ADM indicating that all four regions have conducted the review. This recommendation is closed.

Status: Closed.

Audit Report

Audit of NRC'S Automated Access Control and Enhanced Security System OIG-07-A-10

Status of Recommendations

<u>Recommendation 8:</u>	Write and implement badge access system operating procedures that provides system user guidance and addresses the preceding three recommendations.
Response Dated March 25, 2008:	The badge access system operating procedures were updated to enhance system user guidance as part of the updated manual for both the Personnel Security Branch (PSB) and Facilities Security Branch (FSB) in November 2007. The document is currently under review and will be finalized by August 29, 2008.
OIG Analysis:	The proposed corrective action addresses the intent of OIG's recommendation. This recommendation will be closed when ADM provides OIG with a copy of the operating procedures.
Status:	Resolved.

Audit Report

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Status of Recommendations

Recommendation 10: Replace the current visitor badges with expiring paper badges.

Response Dated
March 25, 2008:

ADM was unsuccessful in utilizing paper badges in the past (sticker-type badges damaged clothing or simply fell off). As part of the consulting services contract for Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, the contractor recommended that temporary date-stamped, clip-on visitor badges could be a feasible alternative to the current permanent visitor badges. The clip-on temporary badges would be date stamped and only be good for one day at a time. The decision on whether to convert to clip-on visitor badges will be made in early Spring 2008.

OIG Analysis:

The proposed corrective action addresses the intent of OIG's recommendation. This recommendation will be closed when ADM provides indication to OIG that a decision concerning clip-on visitor badge has been made.

Status:

Resolved.

Audit Report

Audit of NRC'S Automated Access Control and Enhanced Security System OIG-07-A-10

Status of Recommendations

Recommendation 13: In accordance with NRC requirements for listed systems, develop an ACCESS system security plan and appoint an Information System Security Officer.

Response Dated
March 25, 2008:

As stated in the response to the OIG dated October 29, 2007, several of the security categorization documents were sent back to ADM for updating to newer templates, which caused a delay in the process. Since ACCESS is a listed system and is on a fully enclosed network, the OIS contractor has not given this task a high priority. As a result, the current target is to complete the security categorization documents and provide them to the Computer Security Office (CSO) for approval by June 30, 2008. The Information System Security Officer for ACCESS is officially listed in the security categorization document. Once CSO has approved the security categorization documentation, ADM will move forward with the remainder of the certification and accreditation (C&A) documentation. Since ACCESS is not on the agency priority list for C&A this fiscal year, the C&A package is expected to be provided to CSO for approval by March 31, 2009.

OIG Analysis: The proposed corrective action addresses the intent of OIG's recommendation. This recommendation will be closed when ADM provides OIG with a copy of the approved security plan and the security categorization document listing the appointed ISSO.

Status: Resolved.

Audit Report

Audit of NRC'S Automated Access Control and Enhanced Security System OIG-07-A-10

Status of Recommendations

Recommendation 14: Develop documentation to support the ACCESS interim authority to operate.

Response Dated
March 25, 2008:

The NRC no longer issues an interim to operate (IATO) for systems. The C&A package is expected to be provided to CSO for approval by March 31, 2009.

OIG Analysis:

Since NRC does not issue IATOs, the recommendation is no longer necessary. This recommendation is closed.

Status:

Closed.

Audit Report

Audit of NRC'S Automated Access Control and Enhanced Security System OIG-07-A-10

Status of Recommendations

Recommendation 15: Complete the actions necessary to address the ACCESS weaknesses contained in the penetration test reports.

Response Dated
March 25, 2008:

ACCESS is on a fully closed network environment and does not connect to any other system or the Internet. Due to other high priorities, ADM has determined that it is not cost-effective or imperative that the findings from the penetration tests be corrected with the current, closed network since the system will be upgraded or replaced in the implementation of HSPD-12. Many of the findings were related to weaknesses only if other systems were connecting to the system or if it was connected to the Internet. ADM will work with CSO to ensure that any issues are corrected when the system is upgraded or replaced. The Division of Facilities and Security (DFS) will then determine a schedule to correct those actions impacting the weaknesses if any are still found with the upgraded system.

OIG Analysis: The proposed corrective actions address the intent of OIG's recommendation. This recommendation will be closed when ADM provides OIG with documentation showing that any weaknesses found with the upgraded system are corrected.

Status: Resolved.