

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED CHANGES

Proposed Change No. 1

Instrument tube tie rods (ITTRs) are added to the approved contents as non-fuel hardware. All modifications are a result of this proposed change. Editorial and minor text changes are made to the HI-STORM 100 Cask System Certificate of Compliance (CoC) wording as follows:

- Change Amendment Number, Effective Date and Licensing Chief to “TBD”.
- Appendix B, Section 1.0; added the words “instrument tube tie rods (ITTRs),” to the definition of NON-FUEL HARDWARE.
- Appendix B, Table 2.1-1, Section I, Note 1; added the words “with or without ITTRs,” to the note. This change is also made to Note 1 of Section IV and V of Table 2.1-1.
- Appendix B, Table 2.1-1; Page numbers were modified as necessary.
- Appendix B, Table 2.1-8
 - Note 8 was added to the table stating “Non-fuel hardware burnup and cooling times are not applicable to ITTRs since they are installed post-irradiation.”
 - Reference to Note 8 was added in the title of the table.

Additionally, the following changes are made to the HI-STORM FSAR:

- FSAR Section 1.0; added the words “instrument tube tie rods (ITTRs),” to the definition of Non-fuel hardware.
- FSAR Section 2.1, Table 2.1.17, Table 2.1.20 and Table 2.1.24; In the column labeled “Value” in the row labeled “Other Limitations” the text “with or without ITTRs,” is added to the bullet beginning “BPRAs...”
- FSAR Section 2.1, Table 2.1.25
 - Note 8 was added to the table stating “Non-fuel hardware burnup and cooling times are not applicable to ITTRs since they are installed post-irradiation.”
 - Reference to Note 8 was added in the title of the table.
- FSAR Section 5.0, page 5.0-2
 - Deletion of the text “yet removable”
 - Addition of the text “, with the exception of instrument tube tie rods (ITTRs), which may be stored in the assembly along with other types of non-fuel hardware”
- FSAR Section 5.0; add “n” to “patters” to create the correct word “patterns”
- FSAR Section 5.4, page 5.4-11; change the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th sentences of 1st paragraph of subsection 5.4.6 to read:

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“Since each of these devices occupy the same location within an assembly (i.e., the guide tubes), only one of these devices will be present in a given assembly. ITTRs, which are installed after core discharge and do not contain radioactive material, may also be stored in the assembly. BPRAs, TPDs and ITTRs are authorized for unrestricted storage in an MPC.”

- FSAR Section 6.4, page 6.4-16; add:

“An Instrument Tube Tie Rod (ITTR) is inserted into the instrument tube and is permitted for storage with all PWR assemblies. Studies for representative PWR assemblies, including the assembly with the lowest margin (15x15F in the MPC-32), with voided instrument tubes confirm that this condition is equivalent to or bounded by the condition with flooded instrument tubes. An ITTR in the assembly instrument tube is therefore acceptable in all PWR assembly types, and all results and conclusions for PWR fuel assemblies without an ITTR are directly applicable to PWR assemblies with an ITTR.”

Reason for Change

The changes detailed are necessary to provide adequate description and justification that the addition of ITTRs to the approved contents of the HI-STORM CoC are within the bounds of the safety analysis presented in the HI-STORM FSAR.

Justification for Change

Structural

The maximum weight requirement for PWR fuel assemblies, which includes the weight of any non-fuel hardware or damaged fuel container, remains unchanged. All structural calculations are performed with the maximum weight; therefore no further structural calculations are necessary.

Thermal

An ITTR is a long stainless steel rod inserted in the PWR instrument tube located in or near the center of the fuel assembly. The principal effect of the ITTR on the thermal design of the HI-STORM cask is the blockage of the instrument tube flow area for thermosiphon cooling and reduction in the free volume of the MPCs.

The flow blockage is bounded by the HI-STORM thermal analysis because solid (i.e. blocked) guide tubes and instrument tubes are assumed in the flow resistance calculations. The ITTRs under a bounding fuel loading scenario (MPC-32 canister and ITTRs inserted in all storage locations) displace a miniscule volume (0.4 ft³) relative to the free volume of the MPC-32 (226.5 ft³).

Shielding

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ITTRs are installed into spent fuel assemblies post-irradiation. Since these devices do not add to the source term, it is conservative to neglect the steel associated with the ITTR for the shielding analysis

Criticality

The current criticality analysis assumes that the instrument tube of the PWR assembly remains flooded with spent fuel pool water. This water includes credit for soluble boron as necessary for demonstration that the appropriate regulatory requirements for reactivity are met. Studies for representative assemblies with voided instrument tubes confirm that this condition is equivalent to or bounded by the condition with flooded instrument tubes.

Confinement

The MPC meets the appropriate guidance defined in ISG-18 and therefore there is no radioactive leakage from the MPC. The presence of an ITTR in the instrument tubes does not change the justification that there is no credible leakage from the MPC.

Operations

The ITTRs do not change the operation or loading of the MPC.

**CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
FOR SPENT FUEL STORAGE CASKS**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this Certificate of Compliance pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72, "Licensing Requirements for Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste" (10 CFR Part 72). This certificate is issued in accordance with 10 CFR 72.238, certifying that the storage design and contents described below meet the applicable safety standards set forth in 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart L, and on the basis of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) of the cask design. This certificate is conditional upon fulfilling the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, as applicable, and the conditions specified below.

Certificate No.	Effective Date	Expiration Date	Docket No.	Amendment No.	Amendment Effective Date	Package Identification No.
1014	05/31/00	06/01/20	72-1014	5TBD	TBD	USA/72-1014

Issued To: (Name/Address)

Holtec International
Holtec Center
555 Lincoln Drive West
Marlton, NJ 08053

Safety Analysis Report Title

Holtec International
Final Safety Analysis Report for the
HI-STORM 100 Cask System

CONDITIONS

This certificate is conditioned upon fulfilling the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, as applicable, the attached Appendix A (Technical Specifications) and Appendix B (Approved Contents and Design Features), and the conditions specified below:

1. CASK

a. Model No.: HI-STORM 100 Cask System

The HI-STORM 100 Cask System (the cask) consists of the following components: (1) interchangeable multi-purpose canisters (MPCs), which contain the fuel; (2) a storage overpack (HI-STORM), which contains the MPC during storage; and (3) a transfer cask (HI-TRAC), which contains the MPC during loading, unloading and transfer operations. The cask stores up to 32 pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel assemblies or 68 boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel assemblies.

b. Description

The HI-STORM 100 Cask System is certified as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Safety Evaluation Report (SER) accompanying the Certificate of Compliance. The cask comprises three discrete components: the MPC, the HI-TRAC transfer cask, and the HI-STORM storage overpack.

The MPC is the confinement system for the stored fuel. It is a welded, cylindrical canister with a honeycombed fuel basket, a baseplate, a lid, a closure ring, and the canister shell. All MPC components that may come into contact with spent fuel pool water or the ambient environment are made entirely of stainless steel except for the neutron absorbers, aluminum seals on vent and drain port caps, and aluminum heat conduction elements (AHCEs), which are installed in some early-vintage MPCs. The canister shell, baseplate, lid, vent and drain port cover plates, and closure ring are the main confinement boundary components. All confinement boundary components are made entirely of stainless steel. The honeycombed basket, which is equipped with neutron absorbers, provides criticality control.

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1. b. Description (continued)

There are eight types of MPCs: the MPC-24, MPC-24E, MPC-24EF, MPC-32, MPC-32F, MPC-68, MPC-68F, and MPC-68FF. The number suffix indicates the maximum number of fuel assemblies permitted to be loaded in the MPC. All eight MPC models have the same external diameter.

The HI-TRAC transfer cask provides shielding and structural protection of the MPC during loading, unloading, and movement of the MPC from the spent fuel pool to the storage overpack. The transfer cask is a multi-walled (carbon steel/lead/carbon steel) cylindrical vessel with a neutron shield jacket attached to the exterior. Two sizes of HI-TRAC transfer casks are available: the 125 ton-HI-TRAC and the 100 ton HI-TRAC. The weight designation is the maximum weight of a loaded transfer cask during any loading, unloading or transfer operation. Both transfer cask sizes have identical cavity diameters. The 125 ton HI-TRAC transfer cask has thicker shielding and larger outer dimensions than the 100 ton HI-TRAC transfer cask.

The HI-STORM 100 or 100S storage overpack provides shielding and structural protection of the MPC during storage. The HI-STORM 100S is a variation of the HI-STORM 100 overpack design that includes a modified lid which incorporates the air outlet ducts into the lid, allowing the overpack body to be shortened. The overpack is a heavy-walled steel and concrete, cylindrical vessel. Its side wall consists of plain (un-reinforced) concrete that is enclosed between inner and outer carbon steel shells. The overpack has four air inlets at the bottom and four air outlets at the top to allow air to circulate naturally through the cavity to cool the MPC inside. The inner shell has supports attached to its interior surface to guide the MPC during insertion and removal, provide a medium to absorb impact loads, and allow cooling air to circulate through the overpack. A loaded MPC is stored within the HI-STORM 100 or 100S storage overpack in a vertical orientation. The HI-STORM 100A and 100SA are variants of the HI-STORM 100 family outfitted with an extended baseplate and gussets to enable the overpack to be anchored to the concrete storage pad in high seismic applications.

2. OPERATING PROCEDURES

Written operating procedures shall be prepared for cask handling, loading, movement, surveillance, and maintenance. The user's site-specific written operating procedures shall be consistent with the technical basis described in Chapter 8 of the FSAR.

3. ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

Written cask acceptance tests and maintenance program shall be prepared consistent with the technical basis described in Chapter 9 of the FSAR.

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4. QUALITY ASSURANCE

Activities in the areas of design, purchase, fabrication, assembly, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, modification of structures, systems and components, and decommissioning that are important to safety shall be conducted in accordance with a Commission-approved quality assurance program which satisfies the applicable requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart G, and which is established, maintained, and executed with regard to the cask system.

5. HEAVY LOADS REQUIREMENTS

Each lift of an MPC, a HI-TRAC transfer cask, or any HI-STORM overpack must be made in accordance to the existing heavy loads requirements and procedures of the licensed facility at which the lift is made. A plant-specific regulatory review (under 10 CFR 50.59 or 10 CFR 72.48, if applicable) is required to show operational compliance with existing plant specific heavy loads requirements. Lifting operations outside of structures governed by 10 CFR Part 50 must be in accordance with Section 5.5 of Appendix A and/or Sections 3.4.6 and Section 3.5 of Appendix B to this certificate, as applicable.

6. APPROVED CONTENTS

Contents of the HI-STORM 100 Cask System must meet the fuel specifications given in Appendix B to this certificate.

7. DESIGN FEATURES

Features or characteristics for the site, cask, or ancillary equipment must be in accordance with Appendix B to this certificate.

8. CHANGES TO THE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The holder of this certificate who desires to make changes to the certificate, which includes Appendix A (Technical Specifications) and Appendix B (Approved Contents and Design Features), shall submit an application for amendment of the certificate.

9. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRST SYSTEMS IN PLACE

The air mass flow rate through the cask system will be determined by direct measurements of air velocity in the overpack cooling passages for the first HI-STORM Cask Systems placed into service by any user with a heat load equal to or greater than 20 kW. The velocity will be measured in the annulus formed between the MPC shell and the overpack inner shell. An analysis shall be performed that demonstrates the measurements validate the analytic methods and thermal performance predicted by the licensing-basis thermal models in Chapter 4 of the FSAR.

Each first time user of a HI-STORM 100 Cask System Supplemental Cooling System (SCS) that uses components or a system that is not essentially identical to components or a system that has been previously tested, shall measure and record coolant temperatures for the inlet and outlet of cooling provided to the annulus between the HI-TRAC and MPC and the coolant flow rate. The user shall also record the MPC operating pressure and decay heat. An analysis shall be performed, using this information, that validates the thermal methods described in the FSAR which were used to determine the type and amount of supplemental cooling necessary.

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9. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRST SYSTEMS IN PLACE (continued)

Letter reports summarizing the results of each thermal validation test and SCS validation test and analysis shall be submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 72.4. Cask users may satisfy these requirements by referencing validation test reports submitted to the NRC by other cask users.

10. PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING AND TRAINING EXERCISE

A dry run training exercise of the loading, closure, handling, unloading, and transfer of the HI-STORM 100 Cask System shall be conducted by the licensee prior to the first use of the system to load spent fuel assemblies. The training exercise shall not be conducted with spent fuel in the MPC. The dry run may be performed in an alternate step sequence from the actual procedures, but all steps must be performed. The dry run shall include, but is not limited to the following:

- a. Moving the MPC and the transfer cask into the spent fuel pool.
- b. Preparation of the HI-STORM 100 Cask System for fuel loading.
- c. Selection and verification of specific fuel assemblies to ensure type conformance.
- d. Loading specific assemblies and placing assemblies into the MPC (using a dummy fuel assembly), including appropriate independent verification.
- e. Remote installation of the MPC lid and removal of the MPC and transfer cask from the spent fuel pool.
- f. MPC welding, NDE inspections, pressure testing, draining, moisture removal (by vacuum drying or forced helium dehydration, as applicable), and helium backfilling. . (A mockup may be used for this dry-run exercise.)
- g. Operation of the Supplemental Cooling System, if applicable.
- h. Transfer cask upending/downending on the horizontal transfer trailer or other transfer device, as applicable to the site's cask handling arrangement.
- i. Transfer of the MPC from the transfer cask to the overpack.
- j. Placement of the HI-STORM 100 Cask System at the ISFSI, for aboveground systems only.
- k. HI-STORM 100 Cask System unloading, including flooding MPC cavity, removing MPC lid welds. (A mockup may be used for this dry-run exercise.)

11. When the Supplemental Cooling System is in operation to provide for decay heat removal in accordance with Section 3.1.4 of Appendix A the licensee is exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR 72.236(f).

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12. AUTHORIZATION

The HI-STORM 100 Cask System, which is authorized by this certificate, is hereby approved for general use by holders of 10 CFR Part 50 licenses for nuclear reactors at reactor sites under the general license issued pursuant to 10 CFR 72.210, subject to the conditions specified by 10 CFR 72.212, and the attached Appendix A and Appendix B. The HI-STORM 100 Cask System may be fabricated and used in accordance with any approved amendment to CoC No. 1014 listed in 10 CFR 72.214. Each of the licensed HI-STORM 100 System components (i.e., the MPC, overpack, and transfer cask), if fabricated in accordance with any of the approved CoC Amendments, may be used with one another provided an assessment is performed by the CoC holder that demonstrates design compatibility.

FOR THE U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert Nelson TBD, Chief
Licensing Section
Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Washington, DC 20555

Dated, TBD

- Attachments:
1. Appendix A
2. Appendix B

1.0 Definitions (continued)

FUEL DEBRIS	FUEL DEBRIS is ruptured fuel rods, severed rods, loose fuel pellets, containers or structures that are supporting these loose fuel assembly parts, or fuel assemblies with known or suspected defects which cannot be handled by normal means due to fuel cladding damage.
INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLY	INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLIES are fuel assemblies without known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks and which can be handled by normal means. Fuel assemblies without fuel rods in fuel rod locations shall not be classified as INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLIES unless dummy fuel rods are used to displace an amount of water greater than or equal to that displaced by the fuel rod(s).
LOADING OPERATIONS	LOADING OPERATIONS include all licensed activities on an OVERPACK or TRANSFER CASK while it is being loaded with fuel assemblies. LOADING OPERATIONS begin when the first fuel assembly is placed in the MPC and end when the OVERPACK or TRANSFER CASK is suspended from or secured on the transporter. LOADING OPERATIONS does not include MPC transfer between the TRANSFER CASK and the OVERPACK, which begins when the MPC is lifted off the HI-TRAC bottom lid and ends when the MPC is supported from beneath by the OVERPACK.
MINIMUM ENRICHMENT	MINIMUM ENRICHMENT is the minimum assembly average enrichment. Natural uranium blankets are not considered in determining minimum enrichment.
MULTI-PURPOSE CANISTER (MPC)	MPCs are the sealed spent nuclear fuel canisters which consist of a honeycombed fuel basket contained in a cylindrical canister shell which is welded to a baseplate, lid with welded port cover plates, and closure ring. The MPC provides the confinement boundary for the contained radioactive materials.
NON-FUEL HARDWARE	NON-FUEL HARDWARE is defined as Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs), Thimble Plug Devices (TPDs), Control Rod Assemblies (CRAs), Axial Power Shaping Rods (APSRs), Wet Annular Burnable Absorbers (WABAs), Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs), Control Element Assemblies (CEAs), Neutron Source Assemblies (NSAs), water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, <i>instrument tube tie-rods (ITTRs)</i> , vibration suppressor inserts, and components of these devices such as individual rods.

(continued)

Table 2.1-1 (page 2 of 2440)
Fuel Assembly Limits

I. MPC MODEL: MPC-24 (continued)

A. Allowable Contents (continued)

d. Decay Heat Per Fuel Storage Location:

i. Array/Classes 14x14D, 14x14E, and 15x15G ≤ 710 Watts

ii All Other Array/Classes As specified in Section 2.4.

e. Fuel Assembly Length: ≤ 176.8 inches (nominal design)

f. Fuel Assembly Width: ≤ 8.54 inches (nominal design)

g. Fuel Assembly Weight: ≤ 1720 lbs (including NON-FUEL HARDWARE) for assemblies that do not require fuel spacers, otherwise ≤ 1680 lbs (including NON-FUEL HARDWARE)

B. Quantity per MPC: Up to 24 fuel assemblies.

C. Deleted.

D. DAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES and FUEL DEBRIS are not authorized for loading into the MPC-24.

E. One NSA is authorized for loading into the MPC-24.

Note 1: Fuel assemblies containing BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, or vibration suppressor inserts, *with or without ITTRs*, may be stored in any fuel storage location. Fuel assemblies containing APSRs or NSAs may only be loaded in fuel storage locations 9, 10, 15, and/or 16. Fuel assemblies containing CRAs, RCCAs, CEAs may only be stored in fuel storage locations 4, 5, 8 - 11, 14 - 17, 20 and/or 21 (see Figure 2.1-1). These requirements are in addition to any other requirements specified for uniform or regionalized fuel loading.

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Fuel Assembly Limits

IV. MPC MODEL: MPC-24E and MPC-24EF (continued)

A. Allowable Contents (continued)

- | | |
|---|---|
| d. Decay Heat Per Fuel Storage Location: | ≤ 710 Watts. |
| i. Array/Classes 14x14D, 14x14E, and 15x15G | As specified in Section 2.4. |
| ii. All Other Array/Classes | |
| e. Fuel Assembly Length | ≤ 176.8 inches (nominal design) |
| f. Fuel Assembly Width | ≤ 8.54 inches (nominal design) |
| g. Fuel Assembly Weight | $\leq 1,720$ lbs (including NON-FUEL HARDWARE and DFC) for assemblies that do not require fuel spacers, otherwise, $\leq 1,680$ lbs (including NON-FUEL HARDWARE and DFC) |

B. Quantity per MPC: Up to four (4) DAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES and/or FUEL DEBRIS in DAMAGED FUEL CONTAINERS, stored in fuel storage locations 3, 6, 19 and/or 22. The remaining fuel storage locations may be filled with PWR INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLIES meeting the applicable specifications.

C. One NSA is permitted for loading.

Note 1: Fuel assemblies containing BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, or vibration suppressor inserts, *with or without ITTRs*, may be stored in any fuel storage location. Fuel assemblies containing APSRs or NSAs may only be loaded in fuel storage locations 9, 10, 15, and/or 16 (see Figure 2.1-2). Fuel assemblies containing CRAs, RCCAs, or CEAs may only be stored in fuel storage locations 4, 5, 8-11, 14-17, 20 and/or 21 (see Figure 2.1-2). These requirements are in addition to any other requirements specified for uniform or regionalized fuel loading.

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Fuel Assembly Limits

V. MPC MODEL: MPC-32 and MPC-32F (cont'd)

A. Allowable Contents (cont'd)

d. Decay Heat Per Fuel
Storage Location:

- | | |
|--|--|
| i. Array/Classes 14x14D,
14x14E, and 15x15G | ≤ 500 Watts. |
| ii. All Other Array/Classes | As specified in Section 2.3. |
| e. Fuel Assembly Length | ≤ 176.8 inches (nominal design) |
| f. Fuel Assembly Width | ≤ 8.54 inches (nominal design) |
| g. Fuel Assembly Weight | $\leq 1,720$ lbs (including NON-FUEL
HARDWARE and DFC) for assemblies
that do not require fuel spacers,
otherwise, $\leq 1,680$ lbs (including NON-
FUEL HARDWARE and DFC) |

B. Quantity per MPC: Up to eight (8) DAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES and/or FUEL DEBRIS in DAMAGED FUEL CONTAINERS, stored in fuel storage locations 1, 4, 5, 10, 23, 28, 29, and/or 32. The remaining fuel storage locations may be filled with PWR INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLIES meeting the applicable specifications.

C. One NSA is permitted for loading.

Note 1: Fuel assemblies containing BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, or vibration suppressor inserts, *with or without ITTRs*, may be stored in any fuel storage location. Fuel assemblies containing NSAs may only be loaded in fuel storage locations 13, 14, 19 and/or 20 (see Figure 2.1-3). Fuel assemblies containing CRAs, RCCAs, CEAs or APSRs may only be loaded in fuel storage locations 7, 8, 12-15, 18-21, 25 and/or 26 (see Figure 2.1-3). These requirements are in addition to any other requirements specified for uniform or regionalized fuel loading.

Table 2.1-8
NON-FUEL HARDWARE COOLING AND AVERAGE BURNUP (Notes 1, 2, and 3, and 8)

Post-irradiation Cooling Time (years)	INSERTS (Note 4) BURNUP (MWD/MTU)	NSA or GUIDE TUBE HARDWARE (Note 5) BURNUP (MWD/MTU)	CONTROL COMPONENT (Note 6) BURNUP (MWD/MTU)	APSR BURNUP (MWD/MTU)
≥ 3	≤ 24,635	NA (Note 7)	NA	NA
≥ 4	≤ 30,000	≤ 20,000	NA	NA
≥ 5	≤ 36,748	≤ 25,000	≤ 630,000	≤ 45,000
≥ 6	≤ 44,102	≤ 30,000	-	≤ 54,500
≥ 7	≤ 52,900	≤ 40,000	-	≤ 68,000
≥ 8	≤ 60,000	≤ 45,000	-	≤ 83,000
≥ 9	-	≤ 50,000	-	≤ 111,000
≥ 10	-	≤ 60,000	-	≤ 180,000
≥ 11	-	≤ 75,000	-	≤ 630,000
≥ 12	-	≤ 90,000	-	-
≥ 13	-	≤ 180,000	-	-
≥ 14	-	≤ 630,000	-	-

- Notes:
1. Burnups for NON-FUEL HARDWARE are to be determined based on the burnup and uranium mass of the fuel assemblies in which the component was inserted during reactor operation.
 2. Linear interpolation between points is permitted, except that NSA or Guide Tube Hardware and APSR burnups > 180,000 MWD/MTU and ≤ 630,000 MWD/MTU must be cooled ≥ 14 years and ≥ 11 years, respectively.
 3. Applicable to uniform loading and regionalized loading.
 4. Includes Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs), Wet Annular Burnable Absorbers (WABAs), and vibration suppressor inserts..
 5. Includes Thimble Plug Devices (TPDs), water displacement guide tube plugs, and orifice rod assemblies.
 6. Includes Control Rod Assemblies (CRAs), Control Element Assemblies (CEAs), and Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs).
 7. NA means not authorized for loading at this cooling time.
 8. *Non-fuel hardware burnup and cooling times are not applicable to ITTRs since they are installed post-irradiation.*

TERMINOLOGY AND NOTATION

Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) means the sealed canister consisting of a honeycombed fuel basket for spent nuclear fuel storage, contained in a cylindrical canister shell (the MPC Enclosure Vessel). There are different MPCs with different fuel basket geometries for storing PWR or BWR fuel, but all MPCs have identical exterior diameters. The MPC is the confinement boundary for storage conditions.

NDT is an acronym for Nil Ductility Transition Temperature, which is defined as the temperature at which the fracture stress in a material with a small flaw is equal to the yield stress in the same material if it had no flaws.

Neutron Absorber Material is a generic term used in this FSAR to indicate any neutron absorber material qualified for use in the HI-STORM 100 System MPCs.

Neutron Shielding means a material used to thermalize and capture neutrons emanating from the radioactive spent nuclear fuel.

Non-Fuel Hardware is defined as Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs), Thimble Plug Devices (TPDs), Control Rod Assemblies (CRAs), Axial Power Shaping Rods (APSRs), Wet Annular Burnable Absorbers (WABAs), Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs), Neutron Source Assemblies (NSAs), water displacement guide tube plugs, instrument tube tie rod (ITTR), orifice rod assemblies, *instrument tube tie-rods (ITTRs)*, vibration suppressor inserts, and components of these devices such as individual rods.

Planar-Average Initial Enrichment is the average of the distributed fuel rod initial enrichments within a given axial plane of the assembly lattice.

Plain Concrete is concrete that is unreinforced and is of density specified in this FSAR.

Post-Core Decay Time (PCDT) is synonymous with cooling time.

PWR is an acronym for pressurized water reactor.

Reactivity is used synonymously with effective neutron multiplication factor or k-effective.

Regionalized Fuel Loading is a term used to describe an optional fuel loading strategy used in lieu of uniform fuel loading wherein the storage locations are ascribed to two distinct regions each with its own maximum allowable specific heat generation rate. Regionalized fuel loading does not apply to the MPC-68F model.

SAR is an acronym for Safety Analysis Report (10CFR71).

Service Life means the duration for which the component is reasonably expected to perform its intended function, if operated and maintained in accordance with the provisions of this FSAR.

Table 2.1.17

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-24

PARAMETER	VALUE
Fuel Type	Uranium oxide, PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class
Cladding Type	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) as specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class
Maximum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	As specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class
Post-irradiation Cooling Time and Average Burnup per Assembly	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1 SS clad: ≥ 8 years and $\leq 40,000$ MWD/MTU
Decay Heat Per Fuel Storage Location	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1 SS clad: ≤ 710 Watts
Non-Fuel Hardware Burnup and Cooling Time	As specified in Table 2.1.25
Fuel Assembly Length	≤ 176.8 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	≤ 8.54 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	$\leq 1,720$ lbs (including non-fuel hardware) for array/classes that do not require fuel spacers, otherwise $\leq 1,680$ lbs (including non-fuel hardware)
Other Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantity is limited to up to 24 PWR intact fuel assemblies. ▪ Damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris are not permitted for storage in MPC-24. ▪ One NSA is permitted in MPC-24. ▪ BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, and/or vibration suppressor inserts, <i>with or without ITTRs</i>, may be stored with fuel assemblies in any fuel cell location. ▪ APSRs may be stored with fuel assemblies in fuel cell locations 9, 10, 15, and/or 16 ▪ CRAs, RCCAs and/or CEAs may be stored with fuel assemblies in fuel cell locations 4, 5, 8 through 11, 14 through 17, 20, and/or 21. ▪ Soluble boron requirements during wet loading and unloading are specified in Table 2.1.14.

Table 2.1.20 (cont'd)

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-24E AND MPC-24EF

PARAMETER	VALUE
Other Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantity is limited to up to 24 PWR intact fuel assemblies or up to four (4) damaged fuel assemblies in DFCs may be stored in fuel storage locations 3, 6, 19, and/or 22. The remaining fuel storage locations may be filled with intact fuel assemblies. ▪ Fuel debris is not authorized for storage in the MPC-24E. ▪ One NSA is permitted in MPC-24E. ▪ BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, and/or vibration suppressor inserts, <i>with or without ITTRs</i>, may be stored with fuel assemblies in any fuel cell location. ▪ APSRs may be stored with fuel assemblies in fuel cell locations 9, 10, 15, and/or 16. ▪ CRAs, RCCAs and/or CEAs may be stored with fuel assemblies in fuel cell locations 4, 5, 8 through 11, 14 through 17, 20, and/or 21. ▪ Soluble boron requirements during wet loading and unloading are specified in Table 2.1.14.

Notes:

1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for storage.

Table 2.1.24 (cont'd)

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-32 AND MPC-32F

PARAMETER	VALUE
<i>Other Limitations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantity is limited to up to 32 PWR intact fuel assemblies and/or up to eight (8) damaged fuel assemblies in DFCs in fuel cell locations 1, 4, 5, 10, 23, 28, 29, and/or 32, with the balance intact fuel assemblies up to a total of 32. ▪ One NSA is permitted for storage in MPC-32. ▪ BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, and/or vibration suppressor inserts, <i>with or without ITTRs</i>, may be stored with fuel assemblies in any fuel cell location. ▪ CRAs, RCCAs, CEAs, NSAs, and/or APSRs may be stored with fuel assemblies in fuel cell locations 7, 8, 12-15, 18-21, 25 and/or 26. ▪ Soluble boron requirements during wet loading and unloading are specified in Table 2.1.16.

NOTES:

1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for storage.
2. The requirements stated in this table, with the exception of fuel assembly length, width, and weight, do not apply to array/class 14x14E, Indian Point Unit 1 fuel. Supplement 2.II provides the limits for array/class 14x14E fuel assemblies to be stored in the MPC-32F.

Table 2.1.25

NON-FUEL HARDWARE BURNUP AND COOLING TIME LIMITS (Notes 1, 2, 3 and 83)

Post-irradiation Cooling Time (yrs)	Inserts (Note 4) Maximum Burnup (MWD/MTU)	NSA or Guide Tube Hardware (Note 5) Maximum Burnup (MWD/MTU)	Control Component (Note 6) Maximum Burnup (MWD/MTU)	APSR Maximum Burnup (MWD/MTU)
≥ 3	≤ 24,635	N/A (Note 7)	N/A	N/A
≥ 4	≤ 30,000	≤ 20,000	N/A	N/A
≥ 5	≤ 36,748	≤ 25,000	≤ 630,000	≤ 45,000
≥ 6	≤ 44,102	≤ 30,000	-	≤ 54,500
≥ 7	≤ 52,900	≤ 40,000	-	≤ 68,000
≥ 8	≤ 60,000	≤ 45,000	-	≤ 83,000
≥ 9	-	≤ 50,000	-	≤ 111,000
≥ 10	-	≤ 60,000	-	≤ 180,000
≥ 11	-	≤ 75,000	-	≤ 630,000
≥ 12	-	≤ 90,000	-	-
≥ 13	-	≤ 180,000	-	-
≥ 14	-	≤ 630,000	-	-

NOTES:

1. Burnups for non-fuel hardware are to be determined based on the burnup and uranium mass of the fuel assemblies in which the component was inserted during reactor operation.
2. Linear interpolation between points is permitted, except that NSA or Guide Tube Hardware and APSR burnups > 180,000 MWD/MTU and ≤ 630,000 MWD/MTU must be cooled ≥ 14 years and ≥ 11 years, respectively.
3. Applicable to uniform loading and regionalized loading.
4. Includes Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs), Wet Annular Burnable Absorbers (WABAs), and vibration suppressor inserts.
5. Includes Thimble Plug Devices (TPDs), water displacement guide tube plugs, and orifice rod assemblies.
6. Includes Control Rod Assemblies (CRAs), Control Element Assemblies (CEAs), and Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs).
7. N/A means not authorized for loading at this cooling time.
8. *Non-fuel hardware burnup and cooling time limits are not applicable to Instrument Tube Tie Rods (ITTRs), since they are installed post-irradiation.*

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PWR fuel assemblies may contain burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs), thimble plug devices (TPDs), control rod assemblies (CRAs) or axial power shaping rod assemblies (APSRs), neutron source assemblies (NSAs) or similarly named devices. These non-fuel hardware devices are an integral ~~yet removable~~ part of PWR fuel assemblies and therefore the HI-STORM 100 System has been designed to store PWR fuel assemblies with or without these devices. Since each device occupies the same location within a fuel assembly, a single PWR fuel assembly will not contain multiple devices, *with the exception of instrument tube tie rods (ITTRs), which may be stored in the assembly along with other types of non-fuel hardware.*

In order to offer the user more flexibility in fuel storage, the HI-STORM 100 System offers two different loading patterns in the MPC-24, MPC-24E, MPC-24EF, MPC-32, MPC-32F, MPC-68, and the MPC-68FF. These patterns are uniform and regionalized loading as described in Section 2.0.1 and 2.1.6. Since the different loading patterns have different allowable burnup and cooling times combinations, both loading patterns are discussed in this chapter.

The sections that follow will demonstrate that the design of the HI-STORM 100 dry cask storage system fulfills the following acceptance criteria outlined in the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-1536 [5.2.1]:

Acceptance Criteria

1. The minimum distance from each spent fuel handling and storage facility to the controlled area boundary must be at least 100 meters. The “controlled area” is defined in 10CFR72.3 as the area immediately surrounding an ISFSI or monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facility, for which the licensee exercises authority regarding its use and within which ISFSI operations are performed.
2. The cask vendor must show that, during both normal operations and anticipated occurrences, the radiation shielding features of the proposed dry cask storage system are sufficient to meet the radiation dose requirements in Sections 72.104(a). Specifically, the vendor must demonstrate this capability for a typical array of casks in the most bounding site configuration. For example, the most bounding configuration might be located at the minimum distance (100 meters) to the controlled area boundary, without any shielding from other structures or topography.
3. Dose rates from the cask must be consistent with a well established “as low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA) program for activities in and around the storage site.
4. After a design-basis accident, an individual at the boundary or outside the controlled area shall not receive a dose greater than the limits specified in 10CFR 72.106.

fuel gamma source for the MOX fuel in Table 5.2.22 by the 110 inch active fuel height provides a gamma source per inch of $2.36\text{E}+12$ photons/s. Dividing the total neutron source for the MOX fuel assemblies in Table 5.2.23 by 110 inches provides a neutron source strength per inch of $3.06\text{E}+5$ neutrons/s. These values are both bounded by the BWR design basis fuel gamma source per inch and neutron source per inch values of $1.08\text{E}+13$ photons/s and $9.17\text{E}+5$ neutrons/s for 40,000 MWD/MTU and 5 year cooling. These BWR design basis values were calculated by dividing the total source strengths for 40,000 MWD/MTU and 5 year cooling by the active fuel length of 144 inches. This comparison shows that the MOX fuel source terms are bound by the design basis source terms. Therefore, no explicit analysis of dose rates is provided for MOX fuel.

Since the MOX fuel assemblies are Dresden Unit 1 6x6 assemblies, they can also be considered as damaged fuel. Using the same methodology as described in Section 5.4.2.1, the source term for the MOX fuel is calculated on a per inch basis assuming a post accident rubble height of 80 inches. The resulting gamma and neutron source strengths are $3.25\text{E}+12$ photons/s and $4.21\text{E}+5$ neutrons/s. These values are also bounded by the design basis fuel gamma source per inch and neutron source per inch. Therefore, no explicit analysis of dose rates is provided for MOX fuel in a post accident configuration.

5.4.6 Non-Fuel Hardware

As discussed in Section 5.2.4, non-fuel hardware in the form of BPRAs, TPDs, CRAs, and APSRs are permitted for storage, integral with a PWR fuel assembly, in the HI-STORM 100 System. Since each of *these* devices occupies the same location within an assembly (*i.e., the guide tubes*), only one of *these* devices will be present in a given assembly. *ITTRs, which are installed after core discharge and do not contain radioactive material, may also be stored in the assembly.* BPRAs, ~~and~~ TPDs and ITTRs are authorized for unrestricted storage in an MPC. The CRAs are restricted to the center twelve locations in an MPC while the APSRs are restricted to the center four locations in the MPC-24, MPC-24E, MPC-24EF and the center twelve locations in the MPC-32. The calculation of the source term and a description of the bounding fuel devices was provided in Section 5.2.4. The dose rate due to BPRAs and TPDs being stored in a fuel assembly was explicitly calculated. Table 5.4.15 provides the dose rates at various locations on the surface and one meter from the 100-ton HI-TRAC due to the BPRAs and TPDs for the MPC-24 and MPC-32. These results were added to the totals in the other table to provide the total dose rate with BPRAs. Table 5.4.15 indicates that the dose rates from BPRAs bound the dose rates from TPDs.

As discussed in Section 5.2.4, two different configurations were analyzed for CRAs and three different configurations were analyzed for APSRs. The dose rate due to CRAs and APSRs was explicitly calculated for dose locations around the 100-ton HI-TRAC. Tables 5.4.16 and 5.4.17 provide the results for the different configurations of CRAs and APSRs, respectively, in the MPC-24 and MPC-32. These results indicate the dose rate on the radial surfaces of the overpack due to the storage of these devices is less than the dose rate from BPRAs (except for the surface dose rate at the bottom, where the value for the CRA is comparable to or higher than the value

reduced amount of moderator, while the amount of fissile material is maintained. Thus, the reactivity of the configuration with sealed rods will be lower compared to the configuration with water rods. Any configuration containing sealed rods instead of water rods is therefore bounded by the analysis for the configuration with water rods and no further analysis is required to demonstrate the acceptability. Therefore, for all BWR fuel assemblies analyzed, it is permissible that water rods are replaced by sealed rods filled with a non-fissile material.

6.4.8 Non-fuel Hardware in PWR Fuel Assemblies

Non-fuel hardware such as Thimble Plugs (TPs), Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs), Control Rod Assemblies (CRAs), Axial Power Shaping Rods (APSRs) and similar devices are permitted for storage with all PWR fuel types. Non-fuel hardware is inserted in the guide tubes of the assemblies. For pure water, the reactivity of any PWR assembly with inserts is bounded by (i.e. lower than) the reactivity of the same assembly without the insert. This is due to the fact that the insert reduces the amount of moderator in the assembly, while the amount of fissile material remains unchanged. This conclusion is supported by the calculation listed in Table 6.2.4, which shows a significant reduction in reactivity as a result of voided guide tubes, i.e. the removal of the water from the guide tubes.

With the presence of soluble boron in the water, non-fuel hardware not only displaces water, but also the neutron absorber in the water. It is therefore possible that the insertion results in an increase of reactivity, specifically for higher soluble boron concentrations. As a bounding approach for the presence of non-fuel hardware, analyses were performed with empty (voided) guide tubes, i.e. any absorption of the hardware is neglected. If assemblies contain an instrument tube, this tube remains filled with borated water. Table 6.4.6 shows results for the variation in water density for cases with filled and voided guide tubes. These results show that the optimum moderator density depends on the soluble boron concentration, and on whether the guide tubes are filled or assumed empty. For the MPC-24 with 400 ppm and the MPC-32 with 1900 ppm, voiding the guide tubes results in a reduction of reactivity. All calculations for the MPC-24 and MPC-24E are therefore performed with water in the guide tubes. For the MPC-32 with 2600 ppm, the reactivity for voided guide tubes slightly exceeds the reactivity for filled guide tubes. However, this effect is not consistent across all assembly classes. Table 6.4.10, Table 6.4.11 and Table 6.4.14 show results with filled and voided guide tubes for all assembly classes in the MPC-32 at 4.1 wt% ^{235}U and 5.0 wt% ^{235}U . Some classes show an increase, other classes show a decrease as a result of voiding the guide tubes. Therefore, for the results presented in the Section 6.1, Table 6.1.5, Table 6.1.6 and Table 6.1.12, the maximum value for each class is chosen for each enrichment level.

An Instrument Tube Tie Rod (ITTR) is inserted into the instrument tube and is permitted for storage with all PWR assemblies. Studies for representative PWR assemblies, including the assembly with the lowest margin (15x15F in the MPC-32), with voided instrument tubes confirm

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that this condition is equivalent to or bounded by the condition with flooded instrument tubes. An ITTR in the assembly instrument tube is therefore acceptable in all PWR assembly types, and all results and conclusions for PWR fuel assemblies without an ITTR are directly applicable to PWR assemblies with an ITTR.

In summary, from a criticality safety perspective, non-fuel hardware inserted into PWR assemblies are acceptable for all allowable PWR types, and, depending on the assembly class, can increase the safety margin.

6.4.9 Neutron Sources in Fuel Assemblies

Fuel assemblies containing start-up neutron sources are permitted for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System. The reactivity of a fuel assembly is not affected by the presence of a neutron source (other than by the presence of the material of the source, which is discussed later). This is true because in a system with a k_{eff} less than 1.0, any given neutron population at any time, regardless of its origin or size, will decrease over time. Therefore, a neutron source of any strength will not increase reactivity, but only the neutron flux in a system, and no additional criticality analyses are required. Sources are inserted as rods into fuel assemblies, i.e. they replace either a fuel rod or water rod (moderator). Therefore, the insertion of the material of the source into a fuel assembly will not lead to an increase of reactivity either.

6.4.10 Applicability of HI-STAR Analyses to HI-STORM 100 System

Calculations previously supplied to the NRC in applications for the HI-STAR 100 System (Docket Numbers 71-9261 and 72-1008) are directly applicable to the HI-STORM storage and HI-TRAC transfer casks. The MPC designs are identical. The cask systems differ only in the overpack shield material. The limiting condition for the HI-STORM 100 System is the fully flooded HI-TRAC transfer cask. As demonstrated by the comparative calculations presented in Tables 6.1.1 through 6.1.8, the shield material in the overpack (steel and lead for HI-TRAC, steel for HI-STAR) has a negligible impact on the eigenvalue of the cask systems. As a result, this analysis for the 125-ton HI-TRAC transfer cask is applicable to the 100-ton HI-TRAC transfer cask. In all cases, for the reference fuel assemblies, the maximum k_{eff} values are in good agreement and are conservatively less than the limiting k_{eff} value (0.95).

6.4.11 Fixed Neutron Absorber Material

The MPCs in the HI-STORM 100 System can be manufactured with one of two possible neutron absorber materials: Boral or Metamic. Both materials are made of aluminum and B_4C powder. Boral has an inner core consisting of B_4C and aluminum between two outer layers consisting of aluminum only. This configuration is explicitly modeled in the criticality evaluation and shown in Figures 6.3.1 through 6.3.3 for each basket. Metamic is a single layer material with a slightly

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