

EDO Principal Correspondence Control

FROM: DUE: 04/23/08

EDO CONTROL: G20080204
DOC DT: 03/24/08
FINAL REPLY:

William E. Smith
Stanley, North Carolina

TO:

Luis A. Reyes, EDO

FOR SIGNATURE OF :

** GRN **

CRC NO:

Dyer, NRR

DESC:

ROUTING:

2.206 - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
(EDATS: OEDO-2008-0250)

Reyes
Virgilio
Mallett
Ash
Ordaz
Cyr/Burns
McCree, RII
Cyr, OGC
Jones, OGC
Mensah, NRR

DATE: 03/24/08

ASSIGNED TO:

CONTACT:

NRR

Dyer

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

Template: EDO-001

E-IDS: EDO-01

EDATS

Electronic Document and Action Tracking System

EDATS Number: OEDO-2008-0250

Source: OEDO

General Information

Assigned To: NRR

OEDO Due Date: 4/23/2008 5:00 PM

Other Assignees:

SECY Due Date: NONE

Subject: 2.206 - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Description:

CC Routing: Region II

ADAMS Accession Numbers - Incoming: NONE

Response/Package: NONE

Other Information

Cross Reference Number: G20080204

Staff Initiated: NO

Related Task:

Recurring Item: NO

File Routing: EDATS

Agency Lesson Learned: NO

Roadmap Item: NO

Process Information

Action Type: 2.206 Review

Priority: Medium

Signature Level: NRR

Sensitivity: None

Urgency: NO

OEDO Concurrence: NO

OCM Concurrence: NO

OCA Concurrence: NO

Special Instructions:

Document Information

Originator Name: William E. Smith

Date of Incoming: 3/24/2008

Originating Organization: Citizens

Document Received by OEDO Date: 3/24/2008

Addressee: Luis A. Reyes, EDO

Date Response Requested by Originator: NONE

Incoming Task Received: E-mail

To: Executive Director for Operations

Attention: Mr. Luis Reyes

Date: March 24, 2008

Subject: REQUEST THAT MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION NOT START UP
DUE TO A POTENTIAL MELT DOWN (REF 10 CFR 2.206)

I have a concern, which I believe indicates the potential for a major nuclear accident at both the Duke Power Company's McGuire Nuclear Station Unit One and Unit Two. I am of the opinion that there is a distinct possibility for a major nuclear accident resulting from a sudden and massive number of tube ruptures in the u-bend section of any of the "A" feed water heaters on both units. This massive tube rupture would be possible due to being aided by the present stresses currently being imparted to the tubes by broken top support plates, which have broken loose and migrated upward into the u-bend area of the tube bundle.

The broken top support plates are now seized to the tubes so tightly that it takes a thermal cycle to move them even tighter and farther into the u-bends by initiating a sort of walking/moving action. The stresses being applied to the tubes have continued to increase over the past 14 plus years due to the broken top support plates and if allowed to continue will result in a possible massive number of tube ruptures. When this happens, I believe the flow of feed water will be massive enough to allow a quick and complete flooding of the feed water heater shell and cause a very quick and large amount of water to fill the bleed steam line and be inducted into the main turbine. When this happens, an unbelievable amount of damage will occur and most likely the turbine will destruct and cause extensive damage to the control room and thereby resulting in the possibility of having two uncontrollable reactors, which would have simultaneous meltdowns.

I know that my concerns are very real and most likely will present one or more un-reviewed safety questions, which must be addressed 100% by competent personnel to ensure the continued safe operation of both of the station's reactors. I have become more concerned now about this issue than when I first contacted Duke Power Company on March 7, 2008, because it appears to me that they are going to depend entirely on their internal staff to provide justification for the continued operation of the units without considering any additional input from outside the company.

I realized that I cannot and will not attempt to tell Duke Power how to operate their plants, but I did offer some strong suggestions on items I felt should absolutely be included in their inspections and evaluation of the problem. It remains to be seen but I feel at this time that the possibility that a detailed enough inspection and evaluation may not be sufficient to justify continued operation of both Unit One and Unit Two at McGuire Nuclear Station.

EDO --G20080204

Request McGuire Nuclear Station Not Start Up Due to a Potential Meltdown (Ref. 10 CFR 2.206)

Personally I would feel very uncomfortable if Unit Two is put back into service without a final evaluation which includes a detailed visual inspections of all three "A" feed water heaters' broken top support plates in the u-bend area were all of the tubes are seized by the broken top support plates.

I believe that a final evaluation should include detailed accurate measurements that have been taken to locate the exact position of each broken top support plate in relation to the distance from the top of the tube sheet to the top of the broken support plates. This should provide valuable detailed information to allow a comparison between all three feed water heaters on Unit Two and also allow for comparison of the same identical damage to all three feed water heaters on Unit One.

I believe that a final evaluation should include 100% ECT results obtained during this recent outage for each of the three "A" feed water heaters. I also believe that the final evaluation should include a comparison between the recent new ECT readings and any old ECT readings obtained within the past 14 or so years. The comparison could possibly reveal additional damage that may have occurred during this time span. I realize that to perform this type of inspection would involve removing of all three "A" feed water heater shells, construction of suitable accurate base to use which will ensure accurate position readings are taken within a possible tolerance of +/- .005 of an inch, and trying to obtain very small visual inspection equipment which would allow a good visual inspection on the underside of the broken top support plates and deep into the bundle and any place where the tubes are seized.

I have no idea of what Duke Power's evaluation will reveal, but if some things are not included, which reflect the past design inadequacies and past improper operation of one of the least significant systems on the secondary side of a nuclear power plant, then it raises additional safety questions on how a nuclear station can continue to operate with a sort of "old cookie cutter" type design mentality in relation to the secondary systems.

I also believe that if a detailed enough evaluation was performed then it should include any information that proves no one in Nuclear Production Engineering or Design Engineering had any previous knowledge that the improper operation of the feed water heaters' vent systems could possibly lead to the erosion of the internal piping. If any of the engineering staff is found to have had prior knowledge of this situation, then it needs to be determined why this information was not transmitted to the proper responsible station personnel so that proper action could be taken to prevent this problem from occurring.

I have attempted to list some of the details that come to mind after being away from the problem for 14 or better years and hope that I have provided you with sufficient information to ensure that a very detailed evaluation and inspection of the affected equipment has been or will be performed. The final results of the evaluation and inspection must ensure that the potential catastrophic failure of currently damaged secondary equipment shall not in any way affect the safe operation and/or safe shutdown of either of the station's Unit One or Unit Two reactors.

Request McGuire Nuclear Station Not Start Up Due to a Potential Meltdown (Ref. 10 CFR 2.206)

Since Duke Power has elected to not provide me with any updates on the progress they are making on their inspections and do not seem to want any additional input on my part, this leads me to feel that they have already decided to restart Unit Two around the time of my next meeting with them, which is scheduled for April 3, 2008 and is only about two weeks from now.

In conclusion, I feel strongly that the potential does exist for a possible uncontrolled meltdown of both McGuire Nuclear Station's Unit One and Unit Two reactors! No matter how small any evaluation may show the potential to be, any potential is too large and must be dealt with and corrected to ensure the safety of the public which is now the overriding factor to consider is the continued operation of both reactors.

My name, address and phone numbers are listed below, so please feel free to call me at any time day or night and I will be more than glad to provide any additional input that I can, which may be helpful in aiding you to resolve this now overriding safety issue.

Thank You,

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