ACRST-3424 Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Safety Research Program Subcommittee

Docket Number: (n/a)

Process Using ADAMS Template ACRS/ACNW-005 SUNSI Review Complete معرف مع

Location:

Rockville, Maryland

Date:

Tuesday, February 5, 2008

Work Order No.:

NRC-1999

Pages 1-210

ORIGINAL

NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC. Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433



Roy

DISCLAIMER


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

February 5, 2008

The contents of this transcript of the proceeding of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, taken on February 5, 2008, as reported herein, is a record of the discussions recorded at the meeting held on the above date.

This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected and edited and it may contain inaccuracies.

	1
1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
3	+ + + +
4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARD
5	. (ACRS)
6	+ + + + +
7	SAFETY RESEARCH PROGRAM SUBCOMMITTEE
8	+ + + +
9	TUESDAY,
10	FEBRUARY 5, 2008
11	.+ + + +
12	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
13	+ + + + +
14	
15	The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear
16	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room
17	T2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Dana A.
18	Powers, Chairman, presiding.
19	
20	COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
21	DANA A. POWERS, Chairman
22	MARIO V. BONACA, Member
23	J. SAM ARMIJO, Member
24	SAID ABDEL-KHALIK, Member
25	DENNIS C. BLEY, Member
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com



1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 OPENING REMARKS/OBJECTIVES: 3 Dana Powers	 . 4 . 5 . 16 . 47 . 60 . 84
3 Dana Powers	. 5 . 16 . 47 . 60
 4 <u>SAFETY RESEARCH PROGRAM</u>: 5 Ashok Thadani	. 5 . 16 . 47 . 60
5 Ashok Thadani	. 16 . 47 . 60
6 REPRESENTATIVE REMARKS FROM INTERNATIONAL 7 NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMUNITIES: 8 Jacques Repussard	. 16 . 47 . 60
7 <u>NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMUNITIES</u> : 8 Jacques Repussard	. 47 . 60
8 Jacques Repussard	. 47 . 60
	. 47 . 60
	. 60
9 QUESTIONS/DISCUSSION: \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots	
10 Christer Viktorrsen	. 84
11 Carlo Vitanza	
12 <u>QUESTIONS/DISCUSSION</u> :	103
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealr	rgross.com

	4
1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	9:38 a.m.
3	CHAIR POWERS: Let's come into session
4	here. This is a meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on
5	Safety Research Program. I'm Dana Powers. I'll be
6	chairing the meeting. The ACRS Members that are in
7	attendance include Said Abdel-Khalik, Sam Armijo,
8	Dennis Bley, Mario Bonaca. We also have Ashok
9	Thadani, who will be leading us through much of the
10	meeting today.
11	The purpose of the meeting is to discuss
12	the scope of long-term research that the Agency needs
13	to consider. As I have indicated to some of you, we
14	are at the cusp of a flowering of use of nuclear
15	energy in this country and perhaps in the world. And
16	we need to think seriously about the issues of how do
17	we direct our reactor safety research. And we're
18	looking for guidance from our distinguished visitors
19	in that area.
20	The Subcommittee will gather information,
21	analyze relevant issues and facts and formulate
22	proposed positions and actions, as appropriate, for
23	deliberation by the Full Committee. Dr. Hossein
24	Nourbaksh is the designated federal official for the
25	meeting.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 A transcript of the meeting is being kept 2 and will be made available, as stated in the Federal 3 Register notice. It is requested the speakers first 4 identify themselves, use one of the microphones and 5 speak with sufficient clarity and volume, so that they 6 can be readily heard. 7 We have received no written comments or 8 requests for time to make oral statements from the 9 public regarding today's meeting. 10 What I propose we do is now turn to Ashok 11 Thadani, who will lay out some of the background on 12 this meeting and provide some guidance as we go 13 through the discussions. Before I do that, I should 14 ask are there any opening statements that Members 15 would care to make? Seeing none, Ashok, could you 16 start us off on this? 17 MR. THADANI: Thank you very much, Dana. 18 Good morning. First, let me thank all of you for 19 agreeing to participate in this discussion. It's, 20 obviously, a very important subject matter. The 21 Commission has asked the Advisory Committee for their 22 recommendations in terms of areas where this Agency 23 should conduct some long-term research. 24 As one part of seeking views from others, there was a meeting held on December 18th where there 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 were various members of the industry represented by 2 the Nuclear Energy Institute, Department of Energy, 3 NRC staff who provided their views on what they thought was important in terms of long-term research. 4 5 We also had Dr. John Ahearne participating 6 in that panel. You may know that John Ahearne was the 7 previous chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8 and has been very active in terms of long-term 9 thinking, all aspects of nuclear power. And he 10 provided some very interesting insights. One that I 11 thought was important he pointed out was he said 12 remember the Agency's credibility is very, verv 13 critical and you must keep in mind public -- and 14 public includes some skeptics and you have to make 15 sure that you have good sound basis for your decision 16 making. 17 Sometimes we get so caught up in our 18 discussions, we tend to forget that part. 19 CHAIR POWERS: I'm delighted that you --20 because that certainly was the point --21 MR. THADANI: Yes. CHAIR POWERS: -- that drove home to me 22 23 was his emphasis that as we move to more complicated advanced reactors using a great deal of technical 24 sophistication, we still have to demonstrate to the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

public that we have adequate technical sophistication 1 And not only protect 2 to protect their interests. 3 their interests, but persuade them that we're 4 protecting their interests. And that's how you 5 MR. THADANI: Yes. 6 develop trust, also. 7 That's right. CHAIR POWERS: So this was -- besides he 8 MR. THADANI: 9 identified several areas of research, but I think this was probably the key statement that we should keep in 10 11 mind. And today, obviously, we are particularly appreciative of your participating in this discussion, 12 13 as everything is pretty much global now. Nuclear safety is and should be a global consideration. 14 And I think we can really benefit from your thinking in 15 terms of areas you think that are important for long-16 term consideration. 17 We had also invited India. As you all 18 19 know, India has a very strong research program. They 20 are not able to attend today, but they sent us a brief overview of their long-term research program. 21 And I am assuming that everyone has copies of what we 22 23 received from India. Hossein, do all the people have copies? 24 25 Make sure. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 And if you have any comments on what they 2 are suggesting, feel free and this afternoon we will have an opportunity for that. Thank you. So what we 3 4 are going to do is I will go through, as Dennis said, a brief background in terms of objectives 5 and assumptions that the Committee is considering for this 6 7 study. And after my brief overview, we will then go through your presentations and I would certainly 8 9 recommend presentations on the on the order of half an hour to 45 minutes to be consistent with the schedule. 10 11 And then in the afternoon, we will have 12 more of an opportunity for discussion on what I would 13 propose is to pick a specific topic and to have sort 14 of comment discussion and see where we end up. 15 With that, let's see, can I have the first chart, please? 16 17 MR. NOURBAKSH: Oh, do you want your 18 presentation? 19 MR. THADANI: Yes, the objectives. 20 MR. NOURBAKSH: I can do that. 21 MR. THADANI: That would be helpful. 22 MR. NOURBAKSH: Okay. MR. THADANI: Do I need to sit there? 23 24 MR. NOURBAKSH: I can go ahead and --25 MR. THADANI: Anyway, I'm happy to do it. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

9 1 Well, let me just go ahead and read to you the 2 objectives and the reasons. 3 Should а portion of NRC research 4 activities be devoted to the development of the 5 technical infrastructure that may be needed in 10 to 6 20 year time frame and to the development of user 7 That basically is because the friendly tools? 8 computing technology has advanced so much that you can 9 do wonders nowadays with the -- at your desk. 10 So the two parts in this particular 11 objective are, first is, infrastructure, which is technical expertise, having good analysis tools and 12 13 having access to some facilities to keep up with the 14advances, if you will. And the second part is more in 15 terms of efficiency and effectiveness of conducting 16 business, regulatory business, if you will.

17 In order to be timely, some of the 18 decisions may have to be made in let's say 10 years 19 from now, but if it takes a decade or so to develop 20 infrastructure, one has to start now. So the thinking 21 has to be done in a manner that the results are 22 available in a timely way for decision making process. 23 And of course, taking advantage of the 24 best science and technology in terms of having the 25 right tools. And Dana touched on this earlier, in

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

making maximum use of realistic assessment, realistic 1 because if one can understand what realism is, then 2 one can perhaps have a better definition of what 3 4 margins, in fact, are there and how to maintain those So understanding what realism is, often 5 margins. times requires more information and not less. 6 7 The second objective is what is it? If you agree with the first part, this is sort of a 8 9 subset, if you will, then what should be the focus of the Agency research or in terms of what we're talking 10 global considerations of long-term 11 today, about research? And some issues are should that research be 12 focused on light water reactors? 13 A decade from now, we would expect quite 14 15 a number of plants operating with passive safety 16 We have very limited database for passive systems. So what is it that one should be 17 safety systems. 18 considering, if anything, to be able to address 19 potential long-term needs with plants which employ 20 passive systems? One shouldn't be surprised to see, once 21 these plants start to operate, some things happening, 22 23 which would require a good understanding of why. Then the next part is to do with non-light water reactors, 24 25 such as gas-cooled reactors or metal-cooled reactors. NEAL R. GROSS

> COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

Is there a need to develop technical infrastructure 1 for these designs? And if so, are there some areas 2 3 that deserve earlier attention than perhaps other? 4 Another aspect is, and I sort of briefly mentioned it, there are lots and lots of advances in 5 technology. The ability to predict failures is much 6 7 better than it used to be, both for, for example, pipes and cables and things of that sort. Technology 8 9 has really, really advanced quite a bit to be able to predict the performance of hardware systems. 10 11 Now, to what extent these advanced technologies may be applied to existing plants and 12 13 future plants not necessarily clear, but is 14 nevertheless, you employ these technologies. You are also likely to see some potential new failure modes 15 and that would be the area that the safety authority 16 would have to understand. Are there some areas here 17 18 that the regulatory authority should be considering? 19 Those are the key objectives. 20 And I'm going to what are some of the assumptions that have been made, that have not been 21 made, that are on the table, because we will come back 22 23 and seek your views on them. in the U.S. 24 Ι Certainly, and expect 25 worldwide, the nuclear power is going to grow and **NEAL R. GROSS**

> COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

could be considerably more plants operating, one would expect in the next decade or so. Again, it's also clear, based at least on what we are seeing here in the U.S., that light water reactor technology will be dominant over the next decade, several decades.

6 On the other hand, there is considerable 7 interest to try and move forward on non-light water reactor technologies. And the Agency may have to be--8 may have to make certain decisions over the next 9 decade or two in non-light water reactor technologies 10 11 in terms of safety requirements and so on and so 12 So there may be some need in this are to forth. consider some focused initiatives. 13

14 The next assumption is that it's pretty 15 certain that the industry is going to continue to look for greater economies in operation and they will 16 17 continue to look at all the existing margins and try and increase productivity with the, you know, minimum 18 19 costs, so to speak. So one would expect many 20 submittals from the industry that would likely utilize even more sophisticated analytical capability to 21 22 perhaps reduce some of the existing margins.

This would then post challenges for the regulatory authorities as well to be able to pass judgement on the appropriateness of those reductions

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

and margins.

1

And Assumption No. 3 is why we are all 2 3 here today. It's absolutely a global issue. Nuclear 4 safety is a global matter. Plants operating are of 5 pretty much similar designs. And collective focus on important safety matters, obviously, is important. 6 7 This is even critical, more critical, because as the 8 demand work load increases, it's not clear, certainly the NRC, that the growth in staff will be 9 at 10 commensurate with the growth in nuclear power and the 11 challenges of the staff we will be facing. So that's 12 yet another reason to go for efficiency effectiveness 13 as well as global cooperation. 14

Assumption No. 4, we lost.

15 CHAIR POWERS: While we are discovering 16 Assumption No. 4, I think we need to maybe just 17 elaborate a little bit on this international aspect of reactor safety and the issue of productivity, because 18 19 I think that's the one it's going to pinch as we see 20 support in vendor functions become international, can 21 we, in fact, inspect them the way we have in the past? 22 And at what point do we come along and say well, they 23 get inspected in India.

> MR. THADANI: Um-hum.

CHAIR POWERS: By an Indian authority, at

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

24

25

www.nealrgross.com

	14
1	what point do you say well, they probably did a good
2	enough job?
3	MR. THADANI: Yeah.
4	CHAIR POWERS: I mean, that's the issue
5	that we have to come to grips with, because it's not
6	clear that you can do the same as we have done in the
7	past.
8	MR. THADANI: Yeah. This is actually,
9	that's a very critical issue and this is one of the
10	elements of the Multinational Design Evaluation
11	Program, also. And there has always been this
12	question if research is conducted in French, and even
13	assume that certain U.S. was not involved and that
14	information is available, why should U.S. then repeat,
15	conduct similar type of research?
16	So increased cooperation globally, more
17	confidence in work done other places and willingness
18	to accept the results is certainly in my own view,
19	is this is going to become more and more almost a
20	normal way of doing business down the road. And
21	that's one of the objectives at the Multinational
22	Design Evaluation Program also, Phase 1, certainly
23	France is participating in that, as is Finland and the
24	U.S.
25	And under Phase 2, there are 10 countries
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

,

involved right now. And but we will see where it ends 1 2 up, but that's certainly the intention of the program. 3 Going to the fourth assumption, this is 4 driven largely by what we see here at the NRC. And it 5 may well be applicable to some other countries, and I suspect it is not applicable to some countries. 6 For 7 example, I'm not sure this is applicable to countries 8 like India and France and so on. 9 look here, at the But when we 10 demographics, it's clear that the experience-base is 11 significantly reduced and reducing at some rate as we 12 As Dana talked about, the nuclear go forward. 13 renaissance taking place, there's also demand for 14 whatever knowledge is out there all across, not just 15 the regulatory side, but the industry. 16 it appears, certainly, that the So 17 available capability may be reduced down the road, which I guess in a way sort of adds to what Dana said 18 19 earlier. The importance of having tools available to 20 staff are more effective and efficient regulatory 21 These are the basic assumptions. But the reviews. 22 objectives, these are the basic assumptions for this 23 study. 24 We are certainly very interested in your 25 views and suggestions for areas you think are

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	16
1	appropriate, not just for NRC, but in a more global
2	sense to be undertaken and then maybe perhaps in some
3	sort of cooperative fashion.
4	With that, I will stop. Obviously, these
5	are the questions that we are interested in hearing
6	from you about. Unless you have questions for me, I
7	would recommend we get started and Jacques Repussard
8	from IRSN. Jacques, if you will begin?
9	MR. REPUSSARD: Okay. My name is Jacques
10	Repussard. I'm the Director General of IRSN, the
11	French Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear
12	Safety. Before going on going to the presentation
13	as such, maybe not everybody here in this room is not
14	familiar with the French Nuclear Safety Organization,
15	so just a few words.
16	The IRSN is a public body, which the
17	mission of which is to provide independent research
18	and expertise in support to public policies in nuclear
19	safety, security and radiation protection. This
20	affects the whole theme of user ionizing radiation,
21	whether for electronuclear power, whether for military
22	purposes, means the nuclear ships and the weapons, and
23	also the medical, another various industrial use.
24	So any time you use radioactive or
25	ionizing radiation sources, you would find a mission
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

.

of the IRSN to support public policies and the safety authority. So the IRSN has no regulatory power. We are a scientific body in an advisory role and, obviously, research.

The way our legal system is organized is that the operators are responsible for the safety of their installation and nuclear reactors, for example. Obviously, they need a license to operate. And this is given by the government or delegated organizations, as likely the ASN, which is the Nuclear Safety Authority, which is a similar body in its role to NRC as a regulating authority reporting to the parliament.

13 There is also, since 2006, a formal role 14 to be played by stakeholders which are organized 15 around each nuclear site. We have a committee for 16 information and these people in there, which represent the stakeholders, local and national stakeholders, 17 18 have the right to ask questions, have the right to 19 access all documentation from the authority from the 20 operators.

And as IRSN, we are providing services to these various people. Basically, when an operator provides a safety file to create a new reactor or to make some amendments or modifications, they submit that safety file to the authority and the authority

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

www.nealrgross.com

	18
1	asks us for a critical review. This critical review
2	is then goes to a body equivalent to the ACRS, but
3	it is also questioned by the at the local level, if
4	it's a local decision. And finally, the decision is
5	made.
6	The IRSN is 1,700 people strong with about
7	1,000 scientists, engineers, about 400 million Euro
8	dollar budget and, of course, we are very much
9	involved in international affairs, because, as Ashok
10	said, nuclear safety is a global issue now.
11	So to go on with the presentation, this is
12	the summary of what I would like to tell you. Also,
13	on behalf of Michel Schwarz, who helped me prepare
14	this presentation with many a lot of inputs from
15	the various departments in our organization.
16	First, to go back to the key factors and
17	the main assumptions. As seen from our French window,
18	second time second element, what do we see as
19	for ourselves long-term reactor safety research
20	objectives and priorities covering these various four
21	key items?
22	This is important for us, not only because
23	you are asking us these questions, but the government,
24	as you know, in France we have started to merge in the
25	next phase of nuclear industry. And the government
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

.

has reaffirmed the strategic importance. I recall the 1 words of the minister of safety research. This was in 2 a committee meeting. 3 The government was minister 4 presence in last November and they emphasized the research minister and the minister for environment 5 6 emphasized the strategic importance of safety, nuclear 7 safety research, and asked us to elaborate a long-term 8 research plan to be proposed to our board by next 9 summer.

10 So this is timely, because you asked these 11 questions. These are issues which I have yet to see 12 that these issues are also on the agenda here in 13 And finally, of course, some reflects Washington. about the economy of the system, because you can't do 14 15 research without resources, human and infrastructures, 16 and without money.

17 So key factors and assumptions, four electronuclear policy 18 points. National and 19 technology, societal and environmental evolutions, 20 progress of science, which affects what can be done or 21 not done in terms of nuclear research, and, of course, 22 also, the economical aspects. So these are the key 23 assumptions for France covering between 10 and 20 24 years, depending on the items.

First, like here, we anticipate that

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

25

www.nealrgross.com

within the next 20 years we will still have pressure water reactors mainly, utilities. We will, obviously, maintain the close -- fully closed fuel cycle. There are no intentions to modify the economy of the fuel--of the closed cycle.

6 We don't anticipate that there will be any 7 new nuclear sites. But existing sites can absorb new 8 -- more reactors. And it is a possibility that there 9 will be more than one utility operating the nuclear reactors. We also anticipate that the industry will 10 11 ask for operation beyond 40 years. As you know, the French system is different to the U.S. system and we 12 have, by law, a safety review every 10 years. At the 13 14 end of the 10 year period, the operator has to submit a safety file, which looks after all the modifications 15 and justifications for the continued operation for the 16 next 10 years, if they so want. 17

And obviously, the cost of maintaining old 18 19 reactors will become one day not economical, but it's 20 not a nuclear safety authority choice. It's the 21 operator who asks or not. And, of course, it's demand made not -- if you don't spend enough money on 22 23 refurbishment and on elevation of -- so one day it 24 would become not economical, but we expect that it's 25 possible that before -- behind 40 -- beyond 40 years

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

is a possibility.

1

2 We also anticipate that we will be facing 3 multinational designs, that means with existing or new 4 reactors, elements coming from modifications. UINC 5 coming from other parts of the world, so the reactors 6 become more compositive, which would make things 7 Increased sophistication of methods harder for us. 8 and tools to support licensing requests. We already 9 see the beginning of this for fuel safety, for 10 example.

11 The industry wants to use margins and to 12 demonstrate the feasibility. They propose very 13 sophisticated mathematical methods and modeling 14systems which then we have to assess. We also think 15 that there will be around the year 2020 to 2025 a fast 16 sodium reactor, as a demonstration plant, industry 17 sized, but the demonstration plant. And by then, 18 will probably Generation IV processes, we be 19 considering licensing process of a fleet of such 20 reactors.

But the only decision taken by the French government is to actually ask for the sodium class reactor demonstrator. But there is also going on gascooled class reactors. Obviously, an ITER reactor is in France, so we will be involved in the assessment of

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

the nuclear safety files, which pose specific problems.

With respect to the environmental and 3 societal issues, well, these are general aspects, 4 climate change, we already see things happening, so we 5 6 have to -- when you think a reactor will be operating 7 50, 60, 70 years, you can't miss these issues. Security is a growing issue. We also believe that the 8 9 grid in Europe may resemble in the future that of the U.S., which is not as good as the one we have, we 10 11 enjoy in France, and this may have impact on the 12 nuclear safety.

From the public, we note already a growing pressure on low dose exposure health issues. This is a growing issue you may be aware of. An inquiry study which has been published in Germany late last year about the emergence or at least the epidemiological study which points to an increased levels of leukemia, child leukemia near nuclear sites.

We do not believe that this study actually demonstrates the link, but such studies are being published and this raises concern and we are facing these sorts in France, so we -- and today, the point is that we don't understand it.

25

1

2

At really low dose, we have a radiation

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1 protection doctrine with the non -- with the linear 2 risk dose-effect relationship, but we don't know for 3 sure that this is the right scientific -- that this is 4 appropriate. So the public suspects this, so there is 5 some -- from the other side, the industry pressure to 6 increase the domain of operation within the existing 7 fleet of reactors. That means reducing margins and 8 all that to increase the burner introduction of new 9 fuel designs, which can also use the existing design 10 margins.

11 A power rating which can be increased, so 12 they without changing anything else. say, And 13 finally, an element which is affecting us, because we 14 are emerged in the world, the development of nuclear energy in emerging countries, which do not have the 15 16 scientific background, the equivalence of NRC or IRSN or authorities and these people have a right to 17 18 nuclear energy, but there is an onus to sell them not 19 only the technology, but also the safety. And this 20 has to be taken into account somehow, because it's the 21 same people doing the work.

22 Scientific progress, while these are 23 things you know, obviously, I will be quick. Computer 24 science, I shall mention that there is a tremendous 25 progress in computer resource and also the computer

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	24
1	science and mathematics. So that opens new vistas of
2	things which could be done in modeling from a
3	practical and a technological point of view.
4	We see in the near future a generalization
5	of digital I&C including in existing plants, as they
6	will be modernized for useful safety functions. And
7	this poses a specific assessment issue.
8	Advanced materials, we see this in fuel
9	elements, for piping, a better understanding of
10	interactions between radiation and living material.
11	Again, I go back to low dose pressure from another
12	point of view. Existing resources in biology may help
13	us to understand what we couldn't understand so far.
14	So it opens new potential for research.
15	And finally, social sciences are also
16	progressing and we believe that we should make the
17	most of that in order to be able to improve our
18	methods and tools to assess human-related aspects of
19	safety, which by the way has been pinpointed as one of
20	the main causes of past severe accidents, so it is
21	certainly an issue which will not disappear.
22	Reactor safety research economy, while we
23	see a trend already, which would certainly not stop
24	off the industry to use on everybody, in fact, in
25	society using the approach of cost/benefit. You know,
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

one that is scarce everywhere and so it was doing 1 2 something. Secondly, something which is not 3 so 4 politic are our trade is the fact that when there is 5 a vast -- when there are no accidents, nobody wants to So that's life. That's 6 pay the insurance. Okay. 7 Short-term humans tend to be short-term humankind. 8 people. So we have to live with that and take that 9 into account at least. I go back to the human resource part in 10 safety organizations. You mentioned people retiring. 11 12 We don't have such a problem, because the ever dredge 13 of fear is only 36, so we don't have the problem. But 14 what we see is that companies like Areva, ADF and maybe other companies in U.S., because they want to 15 16 launch new generation of equipment and change and 17 replace existing reactors, etcetera, there is a huge 18 demand on all also export technology. Export company 19 like Areva recruits worldwide, about 4,000 people per 20 year, and the continue -- they intend to continue to 21 do so. 22 And, of course, they need trained people. 23 So where do they find trained people? In places like So this is a big challenge for us. 24 And IRSN. 25 therefore, we need to attract people. We can't NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	26
1	compete with them in terms of salary, because if they
2	want to up the salary, well, we can't follow,
3	obviously, as much as we would like to. So we believe
4	that R&D is leeway to keep the good people.
5	And the last point is, obviously, the
6	globalization of nuclear industry will induce/increase
7	multinational cooperation on regulatory issues, as
8	well as in research. We believe this trend will
9	continue, including because it's a way to save money
10	on some resources if we share work, well, it's cheaper
11	for the taxpayer.
12	So now, to go to the research long-term
13	objective imperatives. We see four key objectives for
14	safety research. The first one, well, it echoes what
15	Ashok said, we believe that if we don't have research,
16	it will be difficult to maintain over time an
17	independent capability of assessment. Independent
18	assessment capability needs reference expertise. You
19	need good excellent people and you need state of the
20	art techniques and data. And if you don't keep up
21	with progress, you lose the experts, because they go
22	and work where things go at that time and you don't
23	have the tools and, therefore, you are becoming a
24	bureaucracy and not a science organization.
25	You can always do assessment on the basis

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

of a bureaucratic questionnaire of things, but it's 1 2 just not there, what makes people trust what happens. 3 And we have the example of the genetically modified 4 organisms in France. In France we, in this area, 5 don't have independent research. That means all the 6 research is actually mainly funded by the industry and 7 there has been growing doubts in the French public 8 about the absence of risks linked to the use of 9 modified genetic organisms and the result has been the 10 passing of a legislation which actually puts 11 interrupts the sale and the use of genetically 12 modified organisms in France.

When you look at what happened, it's the lack of independent research which has closed in the absence of trustable answer to the risk issue. And the government had no choice but to say okay, well, we're stuck, which is probably not a good solution, but this is a result of absence of funding of independent research. So it's a key issue.

The second point while we need, also nuclear accidents cannot be excluded with outside consequences under nuclear safety conventions and the legislation, such that the government is responsible for the protection of citizens and also the -- some of the economy consequences that would happen. So we

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 have a duty to maintain at all times state of the art 2 knowledge and operation expertise to deal with 3 potential consequences.

4 And there also, technology moves ahead and 5 we have new potentials which we did not have 20 years 6 ago and it's a duty to actually take benefit from 7 progress of science. You know that will improve our 8 tools and methods, you know, that will deal with 9 If we didn't do that and if potential accidents. there was an accident, we would be, I think, in big 10 11 trouble as an institution.

12 The third point, we need also to make sure 13 that industry itself takes the best of science for the 14 progress of safety and not only the progress of 15 productivity. And to do that, we have hidden concrete 16 examples in our institute. The fact that we lift the 17 corner of some research and publish results, we would 18 force the industry to say well, we can't ignore that. 19 We have to go along with it. And this is, therefore, 20 an incentive, if you like, and public safety research 21 can be a strong incentive and push industry to make 22 the options, you know, either to improve safety, 23 environmental protection and health.

And finally, research is also a way to allow the regulatory policy to not think short-term,

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

which it tends to naturally, because of that's life, 1 2 but by -- research programs may point to the future of You were mentioning Generation IV 3 the policy. reactors, we believe in the IRSN that it is not too 4 5 late -- too early, sorry, to start thinking of what should be safety included in Generation IV reactors. 6 7 If we can't do it now, we would be faced with already fairly solid designs and options would 8 9 have been maybe bypassed and it's too late. And because the industry itself really can't redo it, we 10 11 slide by. So it's today. 12 remind you that when the EPR was Ι 13 starting to be designed in the 19 -- end of the 1980s, beginning of the '90s, in parallel, the French and 14 15 German governments asked the industry to design a new 16 generation of power water reactors, but they asked the IRSN under its German counterpart, TRS, to draw for 17 18 the government, both governments, what could be the 19 scope of safety improvements. This was done in 20 parallel, not in succession. 21 And are missing that today in we 22 Generation IV. I see no movement by the international 23 safety community to say wait a minute, this industry will design things, but what do we want of safety 24 authorities? What do we want a safety objective to be 25

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1	30
1	obtained? And if there is no message, the industry
2	will be okay with that. They will not ignore safety,
3	but it will not be pushed to its limits.
4	Now, more practically, what all this
5	means, so first, there are some cross-cutting issues,
6	which can be affecting pressurized water reactors, but
7	which can also be applied to other type of reactors.
8	Computational methods, we need to be up to date. The
9	industry will use these things, new models, new
10	uncertainties, methods, so we need to be in the
11	practical knowledge of this. Which means we don't
12	take part in the development of such tools. We can't
13	really we are just users. We have to actually be
14	involved in the development in certain fields, you
15	know, to master these techniques fully.
16	The second point, we believe that
17	probabilistic risk assessment is a very useful tool,
18	as long as it's high quality. So therefore, we intend
19	to continue leadership work in the IRSN in order to
20	drive industry to have good PRA tools. Because if
21	there is no drive from the public for such, we know
22	from experience that the industry would not push PRA
23	tools to its limits.
24	The European Commissioners just asked us
25	to coordinate a five year program for European PRA
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

with the industry and other safety authorities or regulatory bodies. This program has started this year and maybe that would be some exchange of information with the NRC about this.

5 In particular, we need to take into 6 account aging, because there are many components which are not included today where we don't know their 7 behavior and this -- obviously, if you do a PRA, 8 9 you've got to do it fully and not only on the things you know. That's the point. So we have things with 10 11 earthquakes which maybe we need to improve, the fire, flooding, etcetera, etcetera. 12

I mentioned earlier research on human 13 factor. We believe that we can and we should over the 14 15 next few years develop or increase our effort in 16 research in this area. For example, we have as an experimental capability, at the moment, we have 17 designed a system which exploits operating experience, 18 19 but instead of looking at the technological point of 20 view that means something failed and what happened, we have a review on how did the people in the control 21 22 room, how did they react to an incident? And we do 23 this systematically.

24That means how long did they take? Did25they hesitate? Did they make mistakes in the clearing

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

of the situation which -- did they understand correctly the messages coming from the control room panels? Did they take the right decision? How long did they take? Did they discuss whether unanimous and this is actually very interesting. And we -- okay. So we can see that we can see trends. We don't know how to interpret them at the moment, but this has led me, in particular, to want to actually have research organized around this.

10 The next point is similar. We have the 11 so good experience. We hired a very good not specialist in this area, but after three years they 12 left, because they become even more specialized in the 13 14 industry. These people are there, so they just went. 15 Not necessarily to the nuclear industry, by the way, but so the only way to keep people is to have a lab 16 17 doing research, then you can keep people. So that's 18 what we want to do over the next few years.

And of course, fuel issues are central to nuclear safety and, therefore, we will in the longterm continue to work in these, which these are heavy and an expensive research program, but the government at this meeting, which I mentioned the end of November, has confirmed that we -- the reactor should be operating for the next 20 to 30 years for safety

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1 research. So that was a very good signal and we also have the decision by main utility, EDF, to actually 2 3 invest in this reactor showing that they believe that fuel safety research by IRSN was central to nuclear 4 operation in France, a strategic aspect. 5 6 Off-site consequences. I mentioned that IRSN 7 of responsibility of and the safety the 8 authorities. So we have started, two years, to develop a new generation of decision making tools, 9 10 which would be -- which would take into account the latest available technologies, links with the weather, 11 meteorological data live, you know, to have real time 12 13 tools, short distance, medium distance, long distance, it will be whole set of tools also linking with the 14 15 radiological consequences with the agriculture and the 16 uptake of radionuclides, so it would be a set of 17 tools.

Not integrated tools like the German did 18 19 in the 1980s, but a set of coordinated tools. So that 20 is not just a black box. We can use if an item is 21 exposed, we can use various parts of it depending on 22 what the question is at the particular time during the 23 crisis. So we have made a market of that and the utility EDF has also taken an interest and will 24 25 probably want to buy some of our tools, which means

NEAL R. GROSS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433

they must be up to date, because it's a lot of money for them and they made the review, international review and they have decided to do this. So maybe we could show you what the NRC will one -- one day what we are doing and we have already made the beginning of markets working.

7 low dose effects Research on on 8 environmental. We have -- we believe that in between 9 there are three ways to do this. One is epidemiology, 10 which has limitations when you look -- when you go 11 through very low doses. The other one is fundamental 12 radiobiology, where you can study the direction 13 between cell and the radiation. You can derive 14 knowledge about personal sensitivity to radiation and 15 that. But the link between the two is the missing 16 element.

And we have with our own program, we believe that we have -- but it's very expensive. We need to understand functional effects of a particular internal contamination, chronic contamination. I remind you that some of the waste is released by reactors, carbon 14 and others.

In waste policies there is also some potential releases and we need to understand these things and we need animal testing, which we have

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

www.nealrgross.com

35 1 started, but it's extremely expensive. And we are 2 trying to push this in Brussels for our European 3 approach that could actually take care of this middle element, which nobody has ever done, which, in our 4 5 view, explains why we don't progress. 6 Passive safety features. Okay. This is 7 for us a long time, because so far we don't have any 8 plans to have an AP1000 in France, but you never know. 9 And also, IRSN being an independent body, we also work 10 for other authorities. For example, Bulgarian 11 government has asked us to review the safety of the new BVR1000 reactor, so we need to be aware of, I 12 13 believe, in a body like IRSN, which pretends to be a reference study, on an international level, and it is 14 15 possible that we may need to be involved. Maybe not 16 as a main actor, but at least to participate to the 17 investigation of the realism of passive safety 18 features in large power reactors. So not for 19 immediate time, but maybe later.

Criticality cannot be abandoned. We in France together with CA are very significant databases for data for criticality. We see new materials coming and we need to maintain the research, so that we are-again, we can be good in assessment, because there are changes and sometimes you just can't make the

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1 assumption that it is -- you are changing material, but you make the assumption that nothing has changed 2 3 in terms of criticality. It's not always true. 4 And if you don't have good experts, again, the bureaucratic approach will prevail and we may miss 5 6 And finally, knowledge management. things. Okay. 7 It's not research, but can be some on the side of research. We believe that by developing international 8 9 centers of excellence is a good way also to facilitate 10 knowledge management and transfer by maintaining 11 people and also by transferring people, that knowledge 12 from the older generation to the newer. 13 Now, specific issues for pressurized water reactors. Obviously, we have aging. The industry has 14 15 a lot of data on a lot of compliments, but not all. And we are concerned about some internal structures, 16 concrete, electronics, cables and we believe that if 17 we don't initiate some research, the industry will 18 19 make some assumptions, which we will not be able to 20 verify very easily until something happens and we 21 don't want that to happen. 22 And similarly, default initiations in 23 piping and in steel structures. I think we may also participate in the improvement of tools which are 24 25 available to predict such events. I think there is

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

also scope using the potentiality of а new technologies, in particular, computers, computer know to facilitate rate time science. You inspections, access to databases, I mean, we could use a lot of existing features, if you like, in the economic world and apply them to nuclear safety. That's very applied research, but it is research. It's creation of tools of today, therefore, it's research.

10 Obviously, severe accident. We will -- we 11 had the big -- a very large debate in France about severe accidents, which has been concluded. 12 The result is that the PHEBUS reactor will be closed, but 13 14 we will -- the government is asking us to maintain 15 research on severe accidents and we will probably look to use for our further research a new reactor, which 16 17 the CA is building right now, which will be available 18 in 2014. I will come back to that in a moment.

Now, with sodium and gas-cooled fast reactors, first, there have been a lot of experience in the world and in France, in particular, on the sodium fast reactors, which have been deployed in france. We had benefits for a short time.

And the problem is that most of the people who knew these things are now retiring. So we need to

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

www.nealrgross.com

reappropriate past efforts of our R&D. There is no point in redoing what has already been done. There are codes which exist that very few people know how to use them properly these days. So we need to spend time in refurbishing all this knowledge, review the accident codes and fire propagation codes with sodium.

We had a lot of experience, a lot of knowledge and we're still using that today to help the Chinese, for example, but it's very few people and it's fragile.

11 Another idea is to actually from this type 12 of reappropriation to -- rather then having specific 13 codes to try and have as close as possible wide 14 ranging codes, which would apply to several types of 15 We are trying to do that, in particular reactors. We're trying to see if we could have an 16 with GRS. overall code strategy. That means a long-term code 17 18 strategy, rather than have teams developing codes here 19 and there and see can we interface them or not and 20 just to have a put down code strategy.

We are not sure we can do this, but we are investigating at the moment the feasibility of having the strategic approach code development. It is linked to the progress of computers and, therefore, the reduction, the probable reduction of the amount of

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

	39
1	physical testing that there will be.
2	Okay. This is a trend, but to know that
3	this trend is successful, you need to have a big a
4	very good overview of what you can do or not do in
5	terms of codes. Codes are not just the in the
6	future, they will not just be the consequence of
7	testing. They will be the key point in testing
8	will be the concept, rather the annex to the codes.
9	And for this to work, we need to have a
10	clear strategy and understand whether it's going to
11	work or not, because you're talking about slots of 10
12	years time. The developer may the code is 10
13	years. And if it trails at the end, well, then it is
14	lost.
15	Complimentary research for code
16	development. Okay. It's similar. Skip that one.
17	Research on material and fuel under high neutron flux
18	and high temperature. This, of course, is
19	technological issues linked to the potential future
20	reactors. And this kind of research would help us
21	design the safety requirements, because, otherwise,
22	it's only theoretical. Obviously, sodium reactors,
23	they one of the issues with the super annex was the
24	difficulty of having of inspecting structures,
25	etcetera. And this was one of the gray areas. And we
	NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

need to overcome this difficulty, if we want to propose new reactors of sodium code in the future.

Now, the last item with respect to ITER, there will be accidental -- accident scenarios in the large scale fusion reactor. So what about codes? Can we derive codes from existing codes? We need to look into these issues. Independent, obviously, the ITER team will look at that, but we need to also have our look into that.

And in particular, we have identified some 10 phenomena, which you see here on this list, which 11 could be the base of accident, which could be 12 13 significant accident, maybe not with outside consequences, although, there would be maybe dust in 14 15 the radioactive testers, etcetera. So you're not talking about a large scale, but you could have 16 significant accident, in particular, for the staff. 17

So we need to understand these things. 18 19 And the issue here is access to some information which 20 is linked to military research. So it's not so 21 obvious and this is point we're trying а to investigate and where probably we will need the 22 international collaborations. 23

24 So the last part of this presentation 25 about the resources which are needed. So as I said

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

	41
1	before, we believe that human resources are a key
2	issue and to attract highest level people, we need to
3	develop multinational networks operating around large
4	data, that means research facilities, in other words.
5	If you don't a facility like PHEBUS has
6	been the core to play the sound network which actually
7	is the 95 percent or 99 percent of the capacity in
8	Europe and even beyond to on severe accidents. But
9	it was PHEBUS which if we had PHEBUS, this wouldn't
10	have happened. So we need to keep that in mind.
11	The second point is that we have found by
12	observing our or I have found as a director by
13	observing various things in the institute that those
14	who did well or better than the others, they will do
15	well for us. But those who did better than others,
16	was those were there was a close mix between R&D
17	and operational safety assistance.
18	We have the two types of organizations.
19	We have teams doing safety assessment for the
20	authority, teams doing research and some of them are
21	mixed. And those do very well. The others sort of
22	diverge a little bit. That means the research is
23	doing research and asking them in terms of what they
24	will do next, that's not a good solution. So close
25	mix. And mobility, young people, they don't want to
	NEAL R. GROSS

NEAL R. GRUSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	42
1	spend 40 years in the same place. So if we don't
2	provide for mobility, they will do it themselves.
3	Maybe not in the optimal way as our own scientists, so
4	we need to think about these things.
5	Capitalization of knowledge, obviously, is
6	a key point, because these reactors lasting 60, 70
7	years, it's three generation of people, so we need to
8	organize ourselves in such a way to be efficient.
9	And, of course, the second point after human factors
10	altogether with human factors is infrastructures.
11	First, we this is a strong point for
12	us, we believe, and this we have made it clear to the
13	government without any reactions that reactor safety
14	research infrastructures are key to the long-term
15	pertinence of regulatory action and to the continued
16	high level competency of experts. This has been very
17	strongly reaffirmed. And the other consequence,
18	obviously, the IRSN is, okay, medium developed size,
19	safety research body, but we can't do everything with
20	what we have, so we this is the bottom line.
21	We look for international cooperation,
22	because there are many fields of research and we don't
23	want to be or we can't be heading everything. We need
24	to be involved in most significant aspects, but we
25	can't lead everything. But there are a few areas
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

where we can have a leadership role, because we have 1 We have experience and we have past 2 facilities. 3 results of high level. Fuel behavior in reactivity accidents, 4 5 this is linked to the CABRI reactor, which is being refurbished and from 2011, hopefully, we will be able 6 7 to conduct for the next 20 or 30 years research 8 programs and testing. 2010. 9 MR. SCHWARZ: 2010, okay. Whole core 10 MR. REPUSSARD: severe accidents, I mentioned before. The new Jules 11 Horowitz reactor of COR, which will be a mixed use 12 13 reactor producing pharmaceuticals, material testing But it will have the potential to also do 14 reactor. 15 safety research. And we are considering at the moment 16 putting some of the financial resources, which we use to fund the PHEBUS Program, into this reactor. 17 And 18 the point is we will not do that alone. So we would like to have the international 19 20 community considering severe accident, let's say, 21 nuclear safety research, consider what this new reactor -- you know, there was a PHEBUS International 22 23 Group which said okay, we need fees to start PHEBUS, because there is -- there are needs for research, but 24 25 not yet, in the future. And we don't know exactly NEAL R. GROSS

> COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 what research. But, please, don't close it. Now, we can't maintain it, because it's 2 3 far too expensive and it's an old reactor or a relatively old reactor. But this new reactor will 4 5 have some performance which could be useful and they should be investigated and we should consider whether 6 7 safety programs could be invested in this reactor from an international point of view. 8 9 Fire propagation, we have a large scale 10 test platform, which the NRC is now going to be a 11 partner in that, and we believe that there is a long-12 term future in fires. It would always be -- remain a risk, a key risk for nuclear installations, not only 13 14 reactors, and criticality cases, not on the same --15 but we also intend to maintain experimental capacity 16 and criticality for maintaining of knowledge and also 17 evaluation of new materials that will be proposed from 18 now and then by the industry. 19 A11 this needs to be put against 20 background of international cooperation. And finally, funding. While first, my 21 pledge to the French government is that they should 22 23 maybe maintain enough public resources in order to 24 safety remains industry ensure that reactor 25 independent. This is, of course, a key point. We --**NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1	45
1	such at the moment that we want to maintain it this
2	way.
3	Secondly, we want to think multinational
4	in a systematic, even more systematic than before.
5	And for us the way The Halden Project is managed is a
6	good approach. And we would like to take that
7	experience into account in addition of future research
8	programs.
9	The third point is a key point. We also
10	are convinced that multinational research and
11	development is in the long run the best, the fastest
12	track to a good regulatory harmonization. And you
13	talked about MDEP. Phase 2 will run into difficulties
14	because of different codes, different knowledge,
15	different science having been produced. And the
16	science is not different by definition. It's
17	different because it has been done separately.
18	This will cause obstacles which will be
19	extremely difficult to overcome through a
20	harmonization process. And if we did research
21	together, then it would be harmonized from the start.
22	Okay. So we are talking about 20 years,
23	but this is the your issue. You are asking the
24	question what should be done with a 20 year
25	perspective, well, one of the answers is multinational
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	46
1	R&D would eliminate by and large the absence of
2	capacity to have multinational design.
3	And as such, the industry should
4	facilitate that by investing. Industry has a natural
5	tendency not to spend money on long-term research, but
6	they are wrong in this particular case, because it's
7	in their own interest. If we have a global nuclear
8	industry, we should have a global safety research.
9	And the global safety regime as the IAEA. But you
10	can't do that without research or it could be fragile.
11	And how to do it? Well, NEA is a platform
12	which has proven it's worth for establishing a good
13	R&D program with the CSNI Committee. This should be
14	continued and even enlarged probably. And one of the
15	points is that all nuclear countries, even new nuclear
16	countries, should in some way be able to function
17	good. And I'll tell you they are in kind by sending
18	researchers, training their people through such
19	programs or funding, local funding at least.
20	And the point is not all countries have a
21	vocation to be member of ICD, but through the IAEA,

22 there could be arrangements that these countries have 23 Atoms for Peace Program. They should have access to the information, because that's the logic of worldwide 24 25 safety. So how to do that? Well, we have the actors

(202) 234-4433

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

www.nealrgross.com

	47
1	here. Maybe we can discuss it. And the key countries
2	like the U.S. or France or China, for example, this
3	should be addressed quite clearly.
4	Okay. Maybe I've been a little bit long,
.5	but thank you for your patience.
6	CHAIR POWERS: Absolutely, most useful and
7	keen insight. Several points that I want explore
8	further, but I think we have opportunity for
9	discussion afterwards.
10	MR. THADANI: Yes, we do. We do. In
11	fact, I think
12	CHAIR POWERS: One point.
13	MR. THADANI: If you want to pick up on
14	one or two topics, I recommend
15	CHAIR POWERS: There was just one I wanted
16	to add to. The point here is on international
17	cooperative research, one of the items that we see
18	that bring is peer review.
19	MR. THADANI: Is?
20	CHAIR POWERS: Peer review.
21	MR. THADANI: Peer review.
22	CHAIR POWERS: We have such a small cadre
23	of say severe accident researchers in this country,
24	they don't get adequate peer review. But by going to
25	NEA, IAEA, but especially at the PHEBUS Programs and
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

	48
1	now in the SARNET Program, they get peer review. And
2	in some respects, I think, you were hitting on that
3	when you made the point about harmonization there. So
4	it's just a different set of words.
5	But I see that as perhaps a bigger value
6	than even the experiments done in PHEBUS itself have
7	been just the peer review. Because otherwise, they
8	don't get it.
9	MR. THADANI: Yeah.
10	CHAIR POWERS: The cadre of severe
11	accident researchers is so small that people can look
12	and they can say well, this is plausible, but there
13	are no real adequate peer reviewers, unless we work
14	cooperatively in international numbers.
15	MR. THADANI: Yes. In fact, CSNI, and I
16	completely agree with you, has several working groups
17	and subgroups with expertise in selected areas and
18	they provide a good platform as a starting point.
19	CHAIR POWERS: It's just absolutely
20	crucial that we do that.
21	MR. THADANI: Yeah.
22	CHAIR POWERS: And quite frankly, one of
23	the challenges we're going to have is as the Asian
24	countries become more and more involved in the nuclear
25	enterprise, it's the peer review there and the
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

1 interaction there is going to have to be strengthened. I think you pointed out that some countries don't 2 3 belong to all these agencies. Somehow, we're going to 4 have to get them involved. And so I appreciated your 5 points. 6 And there are several others that I would like to go through. I mean, I think you have given us 7 8 a good starting point for our discussions. 9 MR. THADANI: Yeah. 10 MEMBER BONACA: Well, the issue of 11 globalization or, you know, international experience, 12 I would like to explore in part. I mean, I think the 13 challenge we have in the U.S. right now is that we are trying everything. I mean, we do license renewal and 14 15 so we have the process ahead almost to some of the 16 research. We have a meeting in two weeks to 17 determine, in fact, what research we should have to 18 support beyond 60 years. 19 CHAIR POWERS: Yeah. 20 MEMBER BONACA: And so the step is very 21 long already. And we have passive system designs. We 22 have two in front of us already right now. We do have 23 -- so the challenge, I think, in the U.S. is that our 24 experience right now or our areas of involvement are so many that, you know, how can we capitalize? For 25 **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	50
1	example, you do have a narrower problem, because of
2	the there is a design that you are focusing on, but
3	you have expressed interest, for example, in aging.
4	Okay. So how do we bring it together in
5	a way that we have shared interest in all these areas?
6	MR. THADANI: You are actively involved
7	in, what is it called, SOARCA, is that correct,
8	looking at perhaps more realistic consequences. But
9	as far as I know, NRC is not fully engaged in terms of
10	health effects from the low doses. And it's a slowly
11	moving science, I'm sure, but nevertheless, it's not
12	clear to me how you make those decisions in absence of
13	real information.
14	I mean, information going back to
15	convincing the public that this makes sense. You can
16	do parametric studies, but I don't know what you do
17	with the results in the end.
18	Okay. Well, thank you very much. Michel,
19	did you want to add anything?
20	MEMBER ARMIJO: Does IRSN do research in
21	water chemistry, both primary and secondary water
22	chemistry, as it relates to material degradation or is
23	it materials are tested under certain kind of
24	chemistry regimes?
25	MR. SCHWARZ: We are making a few
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

	51
1	assertions, corrosion areas, yes, as a primary and
2	secondary surface. But I think that's part of the
3	aging, in fact.
4	MEMBER ARMIJO: The aging?
5	MR. SCHWARZ: Yes. Not only the integrity
6	of structures or mechanical point of view or the force
7	used by neutrons. We see all sorts of corrosions.
8	MR. REPUSSARD: But going back to your
9.	remark, I think it's quite clear that nobody, no
10	organization, no safety organization can cover the
11	whole scope of research, you know, everything. And I
12	think there is a strategic issue to have, to actually
13	share together with those who want to do that. Kind
14	of mapping of what we should be doing as a
15	collectivity and then share and say, okay, you know,
16	some countries have had more experience in these
17	areas.
18	Okay. You are the leading of that and you
19	will lead this and they kind of have shared strategy
20	over the next 20 years. And then, of course, there
21	will be things that happen. There will be incidents,
22	etcetera. But nevertheless, if we had this map, it
23	would be much easier in places like CSNI to do things
24	not totally better, but also to mix them with also a
25	strategic approach.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	52
1	MEMBER BONACA: Yes.
2	MR. REPUSSARD: We say okay, we come to
3	the U.S., you know, you will lead that, but, of
4	course, we share the knowledge. We will lead this and
5	the Chinese will do this and etcetera. This may be a
6	dream, but
7	MEMBER BONACA: But that's why
8	organization, because I think the opportunity is
9	there. The interest that they have shown here are
10	similar with if you do not have license to rule, you
11	rule out the issue of aging in several areas from
12	materials to wiring to etcetera, digital I&C is a
13	challenge we face right now in licensing. So, you
14	know, how do we however, you seem to have an idea
15	already on matrixing and finding areas of common
16	interest.
17	But that may be a challenge and we have to
18	work at it. And maybe we can talk about that later in
19	the day.
20	MR. THADANI: Yes, Carlo?
21	CHAIR POWERS: We have one question.
22	MS. SCHOENFELD: Thanks, Dana. Thank you
23	for your presentation. I'm Isabelle Schoenfeld.
24	CHAIR POWERS: Do you want to step up to
25	the microphone?
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

MS. SCHOENFELD: I'm Isabelle Schoenfeld 1 2 and I work in the Office of Enforcement at NRC. I'm 3 also Chair of the Safety Culture Working Group. And we are interested to learn from other countries and 4 5 international organizations and what they are doing in 6 this area of safety culture. And I refer to your 7 Slide 6, where you mentioned that social sciences 8 offer improved methods to assist human-related aspects 9 of safety. And I wondered if you could provide some 10 11 examples and if there is anything specifically being 12 done relative to safety culture? 13 MR. REPUSSARD: I'll give you an example 14 of what we are trying at the moment is to identify the 15 way that we -- safety culture should co-exist with 16 security culture. We have an increase of security 17 issues and sometimes they are seen as conflicting. 18 They mustn't, because if they -- it's everybody's 19 So how to get these two things together? loss. How 20 to get the, you know, cooperation, because in security 21 you shouldn't spread information. 22 Safety culture you spread the knowledge, 23 so how do you do it? And there are how do you manage 24 that? And we have to talk about that with the people. 25 It is not a research program, as such, but these are, **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 at the moment, one area where we would like to 2 continue to progress by proposing some documents to be 3 discussed with the community of people in France and 4 abroad. 5 This is just one example. I mentioned 6 this program we have with the operating experience. 7 And the --8 MS. SCHOENFELD: Yes. 9 This is also mainly to MR. REPUSSARD: 10 observation of what is safety culture, you know, in 11 reality, in a control room reality. We also could 12 mention about enforcement. How is the behavior of the 13 inspectors, for example, within relationship with the 14 utility people? Is there confidence there? Do people 15 give information or not or is that information 16 retained? There are many fields where we could or 17 should investigate further. 18 So at the moment, we have a very small 19 team and we have made some small studies. And we see 20 that there is a scope to have actually go further into 21 aspect is interaction with science. Another 22 stakeholders. 23 MS. SCHOENFELD: Yes. 24 MR. REPUSSARD: What is -- you know, we 25 have a new law on transparency. Okay. So the **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

utilities have to provide all information they have. 1 2 This could have a negative impact, that means 3 information retention. They don't formalize 4 information, therefore, they don't have to release it. 5 Will this happen or not? So you see, there are-these are sort of pieces where we should take on, 6 7 items which should be now openly investigated. Well, thank you. 8 MS. SCHOENFELD: Yes. 9 We're also looking into the safety-security --MR. REPUSSARD: Yes. 10 MS. SCHOENFELD: -- relationship. Thank 11 12 you. 13 MR. REPUSSARD: Christer? 14 MR. VIKTORRSEN: Yes. Can I -- I will 15 comment on your point on safety culture later on. 16 MS. SCHOENFELD: Yes. MR. VIKTORRSEN: But just to come back to 17 18 this question about cooperation internationally on 19 research. And as you said, Jacques, we -- no one 20 organization can do everything. So we need to, I 21 think, agree on where do we have the strong points, 22 etcetera, and encourage research there and then share 23 the results. And for example, in China, we are -- we 24 were approached recently by the Chinese. 25 As you know, they have a unique program of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

expansion. They have today 11 reactors in operation. And by 2020, they told us that they would have 60, 6-0, reactors in operation, which is unbelievable, but it's a huge challenge anyway.

1

2

3

4

5 And in parallel to this, they are setting 6 up research centers. They would like to have the 7 Agency, the IAEA, co-sponsorship in the centers. And 8 this would, I think, take very well with your idea if 9 And we are also cooperating with the sowe can. 10 called technical safety organizations, with Jacques' 11 organizations and others. And maybe we can find in 12 the future a way to integrate also the Chinese and get 13 them to also share our knowledge and we get knowledge 14 from their side. I think this is an idea we should 15 try to retain.

16 MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: I have a related 17 question. You indicated that the Bulgarian government 18 has asked you to review their BVR1000 design. Is this 19 a one of a kind project or is this viewed as a service 20 that you intend to provide to countries in the future? 21 MR. REPUSSARD: Well, it's growing, but 22 there are -- have been many precedents. The first --23 some of the Chinese existing reactors were assessed by 24 We help the Chinese set up their assessment us. 25 For example, the accident management capability.

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

procedures in China are the French one, which have been we trained them, we transport, we help them establish their own procedures on the basis of our existing French procedures.

5 We have a permanent contract with South 6 African Safety Authority, whereby when they have 7 changes which are not common, let's say when they want 8 to -- recently they wanted to change some valves in 9 the existing reactors and they said they didn't know 10 how to work out the potential safety implications of 11 the new systems, because they weren't exactly the same 12 as the ones before, so they asked us. So we have a 13 permanent contract where they come ask us questions and we will make assessment. 14

15 don't be involved We want to in inspections and, you know, normal routine work of 16 17 nuclear safety, but when there are issues which 18 require reference knowledge, then we do offer such 19 service.

20 So the Bulgarians, we have since -- with 21 our German colleagues after the Chernobyl catastrophe, 22 you know, and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, there 23 was this program, Safety Against Money, that means the 24 West European Commission and European Construction 25 Banks said to the Russians and the Ukrainians,

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

www.nealrgross.com

etcetera, okay, we will fund a grading of safety in your reactors, but safety assessment will be done by Western organizations.

4 So we set up a joint operation, which is 5 a giant operation, it's also German, and this provides б services in most Eastern European countries, Russia, 7 Ukraine and we -- so we do such services, at the 8 moment, funded by the European Commission, European 9 And now, we offer through this quite a good Banks. 10 bit of knowledge of the reactors. And the Bulgarian 11 reactor has -- will have a -- this is typical. This 12 is Russian design, but it will have Areva/Siemens 13 digital I&C.

14 There is noting there, you see, so we see 15 the design is sort of changing and becoming sort of 16 global mixes really. And it's important that there 17 are safety organizations. We don't want to be alone 18 in this and it would be better if there was a 19 community of bodies working together, if you like, 20 with the same shared science at the bottom. And there 21 is a scope for, let's say, reference science in 22 nuclear safety, because there are very tricky issues. 23 And then there is the run-of-the-mill 24 safety, which should be mastered in every country. 25 Every nuclear country should have a nuclear safety

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

authority with inspectors, with people knowledgeable, 1 well-trained, but it's not necessary that everybody 2 qualification, scientific 3 has the top-most qualifications. There would be a concentration in the 4 In 15 years, there would be approximately 5 industry. four main technology providers and there would be 6 three, four, five centers of excellence in nuclear 7 safety worldwide. And the French approach is to be 8 9 one of those. Okay. So if I may make a suggestion? If I may add to what you 10 MR. THADANI: just said, Said, you may know that there is an 11 umbrella agreement between the NRC and the Chinese 12 Safety Authority, whereby they need assistance in many 13 So Westinghouse, areas focusing on safety. for 14 15 example, on AP1000 may have all kinds of agreements The NRC agreement with China provides 16 with China. support and training in certain selected areas of 17 safety. And it's a pretty broad range of areas. 18 19 So I think you would almost expect this from now on with the international community to have 20 some kind of arrangement to be able to support in 21 safety areas, I would expect. 22 23 Okay. All right. Christer? MR. VIKTORRSEN: I have my presentation 24 25 here. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	60
1	MR. THADANI: Oh.
2	MR. VIKTORRSEN: Thank you very much for
3	inviting also the IAEA to this event. First, a few
4	words about myself. I am Christer Viktorrsen, Swedish
5	has worked with the Agency for two years, were
6	previously the elected DG of SKI, the Swedish
7	regulatory body, and as such, I have been involved in
8	international research, mainly through the to the
9	CSNI and the NEA, but also through a number of
10	bilateral agreements that we have, including the NRC
11	and the Japanese and other countries.
12	So the Agency is not really a research
13	organization, but we do come in contact with research.
14	I'm just starting to say that the Agency was
15	established in '57 and, as you know, it is part of the
16	Atoms for Peace Program by President Eisenhower. And
17	we have presently handled in 48 or 49 member states,
18	so there are a number of small states which are not
19	members, but all the major nations are members of the
20	IAEA.
21	We are based in Vienna, have 2,200 staff,
22	the majority works with safeguards, safeguards
23	inspection where we have the nonproliferation treaty
24	as the regulation. The Agency works according to
25	three pillars: Nuclear technology transfer from

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

develop to non-developed countries, we work in the
 area of safety and security, security has been
 emphasized, particularly, during the last 10 years,
 and then on safeguards.

5 And we have mentioned, I think, all these 6 three key words have already been mentioned, the 7 globalization that we clearly see, the nuclear 8 renaissance, we will say a few words about this, and 9 the importance that we introduce safety at the same 10 time as we introduce the technology, particularly, in 11 the new country.

12 That is the message that we convey and the 13 Agency has recently published a small booklet. This came as a result from the many questions by El Baradai 14 when he traveled around the world. And many countries 15 asked him what should we -- how should we start the 16 17 development of the nuclear program? So he wanted to pages to give them. And finally, then we inducted 18 19 three pages, I believe. But we tried to summarize what is essential and then we had the security 20 21 threats.

22 So in blue you see the countries today 23 which operate nuclear power. And in red you have 24 China and India, where nuclear developments really 25 haven't gone on and it is, as I said before, expanding

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

61

1 tremendously. And there should be a color, but it 2 doesn't show on the screen, unfortunately, a lighter color where all the -- where I have marked all the 3 4 countries that have expressed an official interest to the Agency through a letter or through a visit to 5 Vienna where they have requested assistance. 6 7 And we have highlighted a few in the -- on 8 the right hand side. So you see it's a new type of I mean, traditionally, nuclear power is in 9 country. countries with a developed industry or technical 10 infrastructure. But now, it seems that nuclear power 11 will also go into countries with much less developed 12 13 technical infrastructure. So what we said before that we need to 14 assist is obvious, because there will be a need for us 15 in this new global world to help, because, as was 16 said, everyone, every country has a right to develop 17 18 peaceful nuclear power. We have 29 countries today with operating 19 20 nuclear power and the 30th country would probably be 21 Iran, because they are very close to fuel loading and we are still allowed by the UN Security Council to 22 23 assist in safety. So we have expert missions almost all the time in Iran helping the regulatory authority 24 25 and helping the Busher Nuclear Power Plant, which is

NEAL R. GROSS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	63
1	now built or finalized by the Russians.
2	And the Russians have trained the staff of
3	this plant, but the regulatory body has not been
4	trained. So they are not they are now looking for
5	assistance how they can get experience to simulators
6	and experiences from countries or regulators that
7	regulate BVR reactors. So we are trying to organize
8	that type of assistance.
9	I also wanted to highlight this in view of
10	the globalization. We had the Chernobyl accident in
11	'86 and many things have happened since then. And
12	this map, which doesn't come out extremely well, is
13	the work that we has been done in the European
14	Union to map, in a more extensive way, the fall out of
15	cesium-137 in Europe.
16	And at that time, I worked in the Swedish
17	Radiation Protection Institute in '86 and we got more
18	than 1 percent of the core content of cesium-137 on
19	Swedish soil. And this is still a problem and there
20	are still contaminated mushrooms, lake fish, elks,
21	reindeer and other animals that live from organism
22	where the cesium doesn't disappear very quickly.
1	

24 research on off-site consequences of nuclear 25 accidents. And it was -- although it was tragic, it

> **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

was a good boom for the off-site radiologic science to expand. But we can see again in Europe that it is starting to go down, because this is not believed to happen again. And we tried to say that we will never be sure. We need to keep the main thing, our knowledge, to estimate how radioactivity spread in the environment. Where are the sensitive parts? Which soil? Which type of fruits take radioactivity?

9 And many new concepts emerged after this accident: safety culture and safety management and 10 It was clear that this was 11 regulatory independence. not the case in the Soviet Union and safety culture 12 13 was also missing at that time. The question of stakeholder involvement has come to also -- in focus. 14 15 And there were new instruments created internationally. 16

In addition to the conventions, there has 17 been four international conventions, one on early 18 19 notification, which is intended really to avoid that 20 we are not alerted, because we don't want to be 21 surprised once more. Because we sat in this emergency 22 center in Stockholm and we got suddenly measurements 23 from one of the power plants of cesium-137 or iodine, sorry, of iodine-131, and nobody knew from where it 24 25 came.

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

www.nealrgross.com

So one of the reactor stations that submitted these results were almost closed by us. But then more results came from other places, from other power plants and then it was finally thought, but no one admitted it, but the cloud came from the east, somewhere from the east and it took a couple of days before there was confirmation that there was a small accident in Chernobyl.

9 The INSAG was created and also the 10 industry group, WANO. This is also very bad looking. 11 I'm sorry, I will read. So I wanted just to highlight 12 also in the security area, there has been a big 13 evolution.

14 On the top, I'm talking about the main 15 actors. Before, I mean, in the Cold War area, we had 16 nations that were the threats, that were the main It was roughly bi-polar and had 17 actors. we Today we have non-states as actors, 18 superpowers. 19 small groups. We have small states that can be 20 We have global networks. A completely actors. 21 different strategy we have to use to deal with the 22 security issue.

About the threats, we have high density, big bumps, high intensity. There was a lower probability and there was certainly overkill. Today

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

	66
1	we have a lower density in these devices, but we have
2	a higher probability of them being used. And we have
3	more socio-psychological terror.
4	And the motivation is completely
5	different. It was more from we have gone from a
6	geopolitical one or rather predictable and calculable
7	motivations to malicious acts, unpredictable behavior
8	or terrorists.
9	So it's a completely new strategy we need
10	and, in this area also, new conventions have been
11	created. But what is the summary of this is that we
12	are all in the same boat and this boat is very small,
13	but I think there is place for everyone. But we need
14	to cooperate in order not to run into a cliff. And
15	that is really the message of this picture.
16	So going into the Agency. So we have in
17	the safety area, we will only talk about safety and
18	security area. Our main role is to provide
19	international community with high quality standards.
20	And they are grouped in three levels: Fundamentals,
21	requirements and guides. But not and this is said
22	in the statute of the Agency from '57, but this is the
23	main role.
24	The second is to provide for the
25	application of the standards and make sure that they
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

are continuously updated. So we do radio services, training courses and sharing experience, creating networks. And we are also there to support the implementation of conventions. So these are the standards. There is one fundamental now containing 10 basic safety principles.

7 And this was a major effort in order to try to integrate the various professional communities, 8 particularly radiation protection and traditional 9 10 nuclear safety community to agree on threat 10 11 important principles. And one is the role of the operator, which is the prime responsible for safety. 12 13 A second principle is that there is a big role for governments to oversee and regulate nuclear power. 14

15 And as a third principle it's management for safety, which is quite unique that such a 16 principle is now considered among one of the 10 major 17 18 safety principles. It just shows that leadership, the 19 leader is still -- has extremely big responsibility to 20 promote a good safety character in his organization. 21 That is the key message of this principle, etcetera. They 22 Then we have safety requirements. 23 are today 16 in these areas. I don't need to go through them, you know them, but they are on the 24 25 Internet if you want to look at them. And every

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

www.nealrgross.com

1 guide, they are about 100 today becoming downloaded 2 from the Internet. 3 For the application of the service -- of 4 the standards, we do peer reviews. On the regulatory 5 framework and activities, which we call IRRS, and 6 there will be such one in NRC during one of the coming 7 We are this week in Spain doing a fully years. integrated regulatory review service with a team of 8 9 about 20 experts from all over the world. The more traditional services are 10 in 11 operations and OSART is one we do similar also fuel 12 cycle facilities now, because there are standards 13 there. And in safety culture, the last one was done in the Spanish plant where we assessed by interviews, 14 15 observations and documents the safety culture in this plant, which is a very interesting exercise. 16 Research reactors are also done and we 17 18 have done one in Halden, because of the license 19 renewed on the Halden reactor and also in design and 20 engineering. So I approached this topic, this was sort 21 22 of an introduction, using the following methodology. 23 We are every three years asked by the contracting 24 parties to the convention for nuclear safety to give 25 a report on what we see from the Agency as issues and **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 trends in the world going on. And then I have added 2 to that corresponding research needs. 3 And this report we based on all the safety review services we do on the events that are reported 4 5 in the IRRS system and analyzed and other types of б information that is available through all our 7 meetings, etcetera. So there are maybe 10 such issues and trends, which we raise in this year's report, 8 9 which will go to the review meeting in April in 10 Vienna. 11 So the first one is the ambitious nuclear 12 development plans that we see in the world. It is not only new builds, but there is also life extensions and

13 14 the globalization. And it is evident that light water 15 reactor technology is dominant today and will be so 16 for decades ahead. And I say that or we say that 17 because the present fleet is only slightly less, the 18 average age is slightly less than 30 years. And most 19 countries go for extending life beyond 40, which seems 20 so. So one can say that the present fleet of reactors can serve the rest of their life. 21

And also, what we see that the reactors, the few reactors ordered today including in China are sort of evolutionary. Similar types of reactors that we operate today. And in relation to this, one must

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

conclude that the major safety issues are aging and the importance to keep research going that is to try to force the aging effects. And we will always have surprises, but we should try to keep research going on on aging.

And the question of the human resource has 6 been mentioned already. And in relation to life 7 extension, there are, of course, modernization of the 8 facilities 9 countries, there and in many are significant modernization projects of the control 10 room, for example, but also adding additional safety 11 features, even additional trends, safety trends and 12 modernizing the I&C, for example. 13

And so we have the new technology, which coming not -- under new technology is an issue in itself. We also put it in old facilities. And there is an important safety assessment aspect in that.

In the event that we analyze, we can see 18 19 that safety culture is often blamed to be the reason 20 for an event. We have had such one in my country, in Sweden, the Forsmark event. It was considered a 21 safety cultural, the main reason. So when we say 22 23 that, we must also be prepared to work with the safety And it is a difficult concept. It was 24 culture. 25 around essentially after the Chernobyl accident and it

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

www.nealrgross.com

took until 2006 until safety culture was introduced in the international safety standards of the Agency.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Now, there is a characterization of safety culture and there are also to each of the five characteristics attributes developed, which can serve as assessment tools. And those are the ones we are using when we go to South Africa, for example, or Spain or whatever country to assess the safety culture. And we see that the management part is extremely important in such assessment results.

11 And the safety assessment of life extension, modernization is also an issue that comes 12 13 back into events, so we need to, I think, model the plans even better. And the work management, we have 14 15 a large number of contractors entering the nuclear 16 power plants during a short period and it's extremely 17 difficult to introduce safety culture into this huge 18 often having different number of contractors, 19 languages, speaking different languages and the first 20 time in a power plant.

Education and training, as I mentioned, the Chinese are building now a huge system for education and training, which we need to support. And of course, the research facilities aging and closing. And the work done by the Agency -- by the NEA is

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

extremely important in this respect. 1 2 We also see, of course, that new reactor 3 concepts are emerging and we do take part in the 4 generation for risk and safety group and also in the 5 But concerning new reactors, I think, we need MDEP. a significant research activities in many areas and I 6 7 think we have already this. And I'm not going to repeat it. But we will also need support -- I mean, 8 9 various types of fuel cycle facilities supporting these new type of reactors. 10 And we must not forget this. We might 11 need new type of fuel. We see in South Africa they 12 13 have been building the pebble bed reactor and I think the fuel part is extremely complicated and you gain 14 15 that question from them, how can we manage this? And 16 how to take care of this fuel then. And the globalization again, increasing 17 18 the cross-border responsibilities and we have few 19 reactor vendors, etcetera. I mean, not all of this 20 has necessity of the research component, but it is important to keep in mind. 21 22 The really second part is the need of 23 nuclear safety infrastructure and international cooperation. And because of the decline in nuclear 2425 power new build in many countries, not in all parts of NEAL R. GROSS

> COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	73
1	the world, but in many parts, have degraded the
2	nuclear infrastructure. I mean, this is very well-
3	known, education and training, for example, but also
4	research.
5	And infrastructure is also weak in the
6	countries considering nuclear power plants. So we
7	need to be prepared for from countries like the
8	U.S. to support in these activities and to take our
9	responsibilities to make sure that we promote safety.
10	And this could be done through bilateral
11	I think the international organizations have an
12	important role as well as the Technical Safety
13	Organization. And we try to work with them and
14	jointly with NEA to try to see what can be done in
15	order to facilitate the sharing and distribute of
16	tasks.
17	The global nuclear safety regime was
18	mentioned. It is a concept that has been introduced
19	from the Agency and INSAG is supporting this concept.
20	It means, essentially, the whole system of
21	international instruments, such as the conventions,
22	such as the safety standards, such as the, of course,
23	national systems are at the base and the international
24	part support this. And we have all the expert and
25	research networks, which would contribute.
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

And again, I would like to say that it 1 2 needs support from the major nuclear countries in 3 order to keep the worldwide safety strong. We see also a clear trend since maybe 10 years or so that 4 there is more and more reliance on the safety standard 5 6 produced by the Agency. And this gives a huqe responsibility on our side, because we need to make 7 sure that they are of high quality, that they are 8 9 updated continuously to reflect best and good 10 practices from the world.

11 Because I have mentioned China a couple of 12 times and I will do it a third time, they are one of 13 the examples of countries that use the IAEA Safety 14 They are -- plug them into the Standard directly. 15 national regulatory system. So what we manage to put into the safety standards will have some implication 16 in China and in many other countries. This means that 17 we must keep them on a high level. 18

19 There is more and more demand for 20 independent safety reviews and I mentioned we are 21 doing them now on regulatory bodies on operators, but also on design organizations. But we are about and we 22 23 are discussing with the TSO whether we could also have a peer review on research organizations and technical 24 25 research, TSOs. And I hope this will materialize.

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

I think we must recognize the importance of regulatory effectiveness for a successful TSO organization on nuclear power. The question of independence and independent safety assessment capability, for example, is very, very important. Becoming more and more important as the public demands more and more responsibility from the regulatory.

8 So the competence building of regulators 9 is important and I think we need to maintain some form 10 of safety assessment capabilities independent from the 11 industry, but to do that we need strong support from 12 research organizations.

The licensing is one of these challenges 13 for many regulators, particularly, concerning new 14 15 reactors, but also in renewals considering aging 16 The pressure from the industry to reduce effect. safety or to optimize, but one can say reduce in 17 safety margins perhaps. The public participation in 18 19 licensing through international interest is not more 20 a national interest only. The licensing process it is 21 an international interest. And we have the new 22 technology.

23 We have mentioned already the passive 24 system and the lack of experience and data and I think 25 there is a need to have some research facility for

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

this purpose. And at the same time, there is a strong demand from the industry on harmonization of regulatory stability. And that has to in some way be met. And our approach is that concerning the standards, we are trying to maintain the requirements, the standard from the requirements level, rather stable for a number of years, maybe after 10 years before updating, where the guides should be more giving good practices.

10 The operational safety performance, we are 11 in this report to the contracting parties on the 12 safety conventions stressing that the -- we see safe 13 performance from the operating reactors, 440 reactors 14 operating, but we also see recurring events. We 15 suggest that maybe the root cause analysis is not 16 always done in a way that it should be done.

So I believe there is more or there is a 17 need for continued support in this area from the 18 19 research area. And we also see when we look at 20 experience that electrical system operational 21 behavior, maybe it's an area which has been neglected, because we should also have a defense in that sort of 22 23 see-in approach in that way in those areas. And I think the Forsmark event showed that it was not really 24 25 thought true.

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Reactivity control systems are continuing to better operators. We have had many events, particularly, in BVR reactors, but also in some western pressurized water reactors. We have, of course, the brand new issue of seismic events and the event that happened in Japan, which clearly showed

that the seismic hazard was not very well-analyzed.

8 There is now a big work going on supported 9 by the Japanese who tried to create with the help of 10 the Agency and knowledge center for -- to spread, to 11 collect and spread best practices in this area in the 12 world. We are just in the start, but this is 13 supported by other countries as well. The Japanese 14 are in particular interested. And then the new 15 technology I have -- we have already mentioned.

16 the --Let me come to one of the 17 fundamental safety principles. And we stress this 18 also in the report. That nuclear organizations are 19 They are not as any organization, because unique. 20 they contain this particular feature of radiation risk 21 and the waste issue and etcetera. So we need strong 22 leadership recognizing the importance to manage safety 23 strongly and to develop and promote safety culture. And I think there is still more work to do 24

in order to understand better the concept of safety

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

www.nealrgross.com

particularly, 1 the various national culture, in 2 cultures. We may find an agreement in the west, for 3 example, what is strong safety culture. But when we 4 come to countries like Japan, they have other -- for example, one of their strong principles is ownership. 5 6 You can do everything for -- to make sure that your 7 plant survives. It's very strong ownership. And this sometimes conflicts with the --8 9 what we say concerning safety culture, that you need 10 to be open. You need to share, etcetera, within the --11 within an organization. So we have a good discussion 12 with them also on this issue with their operating --13 with their organization, which is now developing also 14 this area of safety culture. And what is the relation between the 15 16 formal management system and strong safety culture? There is certainly a relation, but what is it really? 17 There is need -- more research needed. We mentioned 18 19 already the safety and security culture and I don't 20 need to go into that, because there are conflicting 21 issues, which need to be handled by operator, for example, in the same culture. We can never have two 22 23 different cultures. And how to start the development of safety 24 25 culture in new or weak infrastructures. That is still

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

an area which we do not know exactly how to do. The approach we are having we say that in document like this, in parallel when you introduce nuclear technology, you have to introduce safety culture in the country. But how should this be done really, that is still not evident.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Openness and transparency is a part that 8 has been mentioned also. Public confidence, the 9 openness within organizations to ensure feedback of 10 how things work. And the security issues again. And 11 the technical development and safety which has led to 12 enhancement in safety, but I think plant modifications 13 need continuous attention to this.

When we assess new technology, when we operate power, when we consider long-term operation, etcetera, and we need to better understand safety margins, how to model in human organization factors and to develop management strategies to cope with severe accidents.

I think we agree with Jacques' comment that there is a need to continue some severe accident research. But still there needs to be coping measures, how to deal with uncertainties from the operators. I think we -- one should try to once more draw the lessons, what we have learned, and give good

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

advice to operators.

1

2 Long-term operation and aging management, 3 maybe I don't need to go into this. Sharing our experience and lessons learned have improved, but it 4 5 needs continuous enhancement and the INSAG group is 6 preparing now or finalizing a report on how to enhance international operating experience, because, 7 of course, they also recognize with recurring events that 8 there is not full effectiveness in risk elimination. 9 10 is easy to learn from your It own

mistakes, but mistakes done in a country far away is very difficult to feel ownership with. I think this is human and this is something that we need to also be aware of.

And the human and knowledge resource is 15 16 the key to successful renaissance for sure. You get 17 completely what was said and we need to create 18 stronger safety networks. We cannot -- everyone has, 19 in the past, or almost all nations, tried to be 20 independent. Today it's not possible. And there is 21 strong need for international cooperation in a 22 research.

23 So we are seeing now regional training 24 centers growing. We are establishing one in Argentina 25 to support the Latin American region. We have just

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

signed an agreement with KINS in Korea to support the Asian region with training and nuclear radiation safety. We are discussing with Lithuania after they are closing down Ignalina Power Plant. They have good training centers which would be empty. And we are trying to establish also a regional center there to train future operators and also regulators.

We have also something what is called 8 9 coordinated research projects in the Agency. If you have ever heard, I just wanted to mention it's not 10 11 really a systematic research, but we promote common 12 research between industrial countries and non-13 industrial countries. So there is every two or three years documents sent to every -- all the 148 member 14 15 states which contains ideas from the secretariat and its working groups on proposals for research projects 16 and some are in reactor safety. And I have this 17 18 document with me, if somebody is interested in it.

19 So summary for existing reactors, I think 20 there is a need to keep the basic technical safety 21 This is purely of importance for research alive. 22 safety, but also for knowledge management. But we 23 need to put specific emphasis on some weaknesses from operational experience and, of course, topics related 24 25 to new design and power uprates and life extension.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

And some external phenomena in reactor safety, such as seismic, extreme weather conditions. We have had flooding events. We have had the tsunami and this type of extreme weather conditions. And the security issue and the interface safety-security. And also in the interface safety-security, INSAG is now producing a document on how these two areas should synergetically cooperate in order to support each other.

And on the barriers, I mean, the fuel is 10 11 certainly in need of continued research. Reactor 12 pressure vessel and primary systems for the aging, 13 failure mechanisms. Containment, we saw, at least in my country, several -- we had several examples of 14 15 leakages in the containment. And we do not really have good known destructive testing methods 16 for 17 concrete, particularly, when we have liners and to understand better 18 concrete. And the aging 19 mechanism, but also to have automatic more 20 surveillance of these issues.

And I mentioned some reactor systems, including the great consideration that was mentioned. And then for new reactors, I think, there is this extensive research needed and probably it is difficult to maintain the research in all the sort of concepts

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

	83
1	that, for example, Generation IV is suggesting. I
2	think a country has to decide at some point we are
3	going in this direction and then the research should
4	follow.
5	And I had mentioned, I think, the other
6	one, fire safety also and safety culture and the
7	maintenance of large scale test facilities, of course,
8	and I think the NEA is doing an excellent work in this
9	area. We will probably hear from Carlo Vitanza more
10	that that on this. And I want to stress again,
11	safety culture, safety management needs to get its
12	part of research, including regulatory effectiveness.
13	So this was our contribution. It is based
14	on our experience from the practical work with the
15	countries all over the world. Thank you.
16	MR. THADANI: Thank you, Christer.
17	Questions?
18	CHAIR POWERS: Yes, I think we will kind
19	of hold the questions until our discussion period, but
20	I think this is pretty good for validating and
21	expanding on our assumptions.
22	MR. THADANI: Yeah.
23	CHAIR POWERS: And I am facing a rebellion
24	of my Members if I don't take a break here. And then
25	we'll come back and, Carlo, you can close out the
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

	84
1	formal presentations and then we will break for lunch
2	and then come back for discussions.
3	MR. VITANZA: Okay.
4	MR. THADANI: Take what, 15 minutes?
5	CHAIR POWERS: At five after we will come
6	back.
7	MR. THADANI: Five after. Okay.
8	(Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m. a recess until
9	12:06 p.m.)
10	CHAIR POWERS: Let's come back into
11	session and I'll turn it back to you, Ashok.
12	MR. THADANI: Well, Carlo?
13	MR. VITANZA: Okay. Thank you very much,
14	Mr. Chairman. I would like then to outline the OECD-
15	NEA approach for long-term nuclear safety research.
16	And in doing that, I will give you a brief overview of
17	the OECD-NEA and also the outcome of recent NEA
18	workshop in the role of research in the regulatory
19	context, which, in fact, apprised also the long-term
20	research. And also, I will mention the OECD-NEA
21	International Research Project, which we call it
22	sometime "joint project," which has been referred upon
23	earlier by previous speakers. And also, I will try to
24	summarize with a couple of slides regarding the
25	possible NEA options for long-term safety research.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

:

When I say NEA role or NEA option, the NEA 1 is actually not doing the things by themselves and 2 3 they are promoting activity. And through the working 4 groups, through the CSNI, they try to put together the expertise that is necessary to conduct this work. And 5 6 I will mention that in the presentation. 7 The OECD is 30 member countries and they correspond to 20 percent of the world population, 8 9 about 60 percent of the world's experts and generate 80 percent of nuclear power in the world. 10 So 346 reactors are in the OECD countries. 11 12 The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency has a 13 mission to assist these member countries maintaining and developing through international cooperation, 14 15 scientific, technological and also the legal bases for 16 the safe and economical use of nuclear energy. So this goes together with the work that was discussed 17 before in terms of international cooperation for today 18 19 and future research. 20 It has a small size budget. There is only 21 80 staff members. The budget is 13 million Euros, but 22 actually the one that is involved with the things that 23 we are discussing today may be one-fourth of that. So it's not a big organization. It's very small. 24

And in addition, there are some voluntary

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

25

www.neairgross.com

contribution and projects. I will mention now that this international project we will be referring to, they correspond to about \$50 million per year, that's the overall budget of this project. Of course, some of them are larger than others, but this is what we are talking about. And, of course, this has to be --this money has to be found somewhere and I will try to mention later on how we try to do that.

9 So the NEA also aims to put together the 10 world's best expertise among member countries. And is 11 organized by specialized committees. The committees that are dealing with the safety and regulation are 12 13 the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities, CNRA, 14Committee Safety of Nuclear and the on the 15 Installations, CSNI, and the CSNI is the one that 16 deals with the safety research, primarily.

17 This CSNI works through working group. 18 They are listed there. And the recent things are risk 19 assessment, analysis and management of accidents that 20 these primarily thermal hydraulic and CDR accident 21 work is done there, integrity of components and 22 structures, aging is addressed there, but not only 23 aging, inspections and, for example, seismic is 24 included in that working group.

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

And there is also a group on human and

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

organizational factors. We have heard a lot of that this morning. And then fuel safety and fuel cycle safety. And in addition, as I said, its sponsored joint research project.

1

2

3

4

Within the frame of the CSNI and the CNRA, 5 there was very recently that there is, yes, exactly 6 7 two months ago, a workshop on the rule of research in 8 the regulatory context. And the objective to review 9 the progress made there since the previous forum was And also set forth the high priority 10 held in 2001. safety issues currently and in the near-term for 11 current plants and those for new build. 12

13 Identified the challenges for safety evaluation of advanced reactor designs and those are 14 15 for organizing the long-term research and 16 infrastructure that would be needed. And through the 17 above, provide input to the CSNI regarding strategies for how these things can be addressed in the future 18 19 within the CSNI.

The program is outlined there. Jacques Repussard was co-chair together with Mr. Soda of the Nuclear Safety Commission in Japan and they had the opening. Then there was a session dedicated to the need and the facility utilization. Facility means, we are talking about test facilities, research/test

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

88 1 facilities for operating reactors. 2 There we had, from the U.S., Rosa Yang 3 And then we have two French and one from EPRI. 4 Then there was a session Japanese presentation. 5 dedicated to the new reactors. Again, the countries 6 that are mostly involved with new reactor and new 7 builds were represented and U.S. NRC was present 8 there. 9 Finally, there was the session on the R&D 10 procedures and infrastructure for advanced reactors, 11 that is the longer term. There we had the 12 presentation from Michael Johnson, actually the 13 presentation was intended to be Brian Sheron. Brian 14 couldn't come and Michael had the presentation. In addition, we had presentation from CEA and 15 two 16 presentations from Japan. Then we had summary and 17 recommendation and we tried to come back to what this main summary and recommendations were. 18 19 The main conclusions were that the 20 regulator research institutes and industry should 21 promote stronger research cooperation. These things

regulator research institutes and industry should promote stronger research cooperation. These things are the industry participation, research, not only for today, but also for the longer term is important. The CSNI put attention to that thing and how to conduct cooperative research programs with the industry and

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

89 1 with the regulated cooperating together in the data 2 gathering phase, at least. 3 Especially for expensive data gathering, this is -- this can be done. 4 And can be done by 5 maintaining also transparency, as long as we don't 6 involve into that interpretation and drawing the 7 conclusions, we leave them to the individual parties, 8 but at least in the data gathering phase, it's 9 important that there is this thing. And there is a 10 full set of reasons for that and I will not enter into it. 11 12 And then there are different new and advanced reactor designs. And for water reactor, I 13 14 think we have today some sort of base infrastructure, 15 which if we are able to keep it, it would be useful 16 also for the future. But for new build, new designs, 17 that is non-water reactor designs, we have to do 18 something about it. And we don't know if the current 19 infrastructure can be adapted to that or an extent to 20 which it can be adapted or not. 21 Certainly, some of the test reactors, for 22 example, use the -- for fuel testing can be, to some 23 extent, modified. But we have to address what is 24 needed for the future. 25 It was also said at the meeting, and I'm NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

	90
1	glad it was also mentioned during the previous
2	presentations, that the OECD-NEA projects are a good
3	means for insuring facility infrastructure and for
4	maintaining a competence network in a practical
5	manner. The OECD-NEA joint project approach should
6	also be used for the long-term research.
7	There was again some other reasons for
8	this multinational cooperation, but it was the
9	OECD-NEA was encouraged to play a role and promote
10	this long-term research through efficient project
11	arrangement. This is principles, but then how to do
12	it in practice.
13	Okay. The first step is that's the way
14	the CSNI operates. They set up a task force probably
15	working for one year time or something like that and
16	try to set the priorities for that and then we take it
17	from there. Again, it's the country that decides.
18	It's not the secretariat. It's not us. It's the
19	people that know the matter and know their priorities
20	and bring these priorities on the table.
21	And this task group was proposed by the
22	U.S. NRC by Brian Sheron. And the intention was to
23	set up the long-term strategy and approach to joint
24	efforts for this infrastructure build-up and, in
25	particular, define key safety and risk issues as
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

1 related to specific design concept issues that will 2 require experimental data and also the infrastructure 3 that would be needed for developing the required data, 4 including key infrastructure element, timing and roles 5 for -- and the role of regulator, the support 6 organization and the industry.

7 And so we will start with this thing now 8 and we presume that we be finished in about a year's 9 time. At the same time, we are not -- we have already this project interest, research project interest. 10 Actually, that has been there from before and I will 11 This was to cooperate. It consist of 12 mention it. project in different disciplines and technical area. 13

I mentioned this thing with the project, because I presume that if the NEA will make some contribution, it would be through this type of project arrangement. And I will tell you in a second what this project arrangement is.

19 The motivation and goals of this project 20 is to address safety issues relevant to the nuclear community by means of research shared by 21 many 22 countries. If you will talk to us seven years ago, 23 you will see the first sentence would have been Maintain facilities doesn't maintain facilities. 24 25 stand on its own. You have to maintain facilities

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	92
1	that are able to do meaningful work. And if they are
2	not able to produce meaningful work, that means they
3	are not good enough.
4	MR. THADANI: Amen.
5	MR. VITANZA: And so this is what we had
6	to find out.
7	MR. THADANI: Does that apply to
8	maintaining competence also?
9	CHAIR POWERS: Let's not go there, Ashok.
10	MR. THADANI: All right.
11	MR. VITANZA: That is good you mentioned.
12	Let me go back through something. 35 years when I was
13	young, before this today, this the younger
14	generation and how to attract them and have research,
15	I think, it was Jacques that mentioned that how it is
16	important to have challenging program. I came at the
17	age of 27 years. And the reason for which I stayed
18	there was because there was this dynamic research
19	environment, but also because it was an international
20	environment.
21	It was an exciting human experience at the
22	same time. So this, we have put it together. Of
23	course, you cannot live with that only, but this is a
24	part that we should consider.
25	And then there is enhance technical
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

1 cooperation and consensus-building exchange, 2 That was also mentioned before. internationally. 3 Support the data counts as a third point. Support the 4 continued operation of unique test facility, which are a value for the community. And then help to retain 5 6 the expertise. We just mentioned that. 7 Finally, facilitate these through cost-8 sharing arrangements where many countries contribute to the program funding. But there is no money sent today up front, that's also another important, I will

9 to the program funding. But there is no money sent 10 today up front, that's also another important, I will 11 say, quality. There is no money there that needs to 12 be distributed. The money has to be found on a case-13 by-case basis. And this is a positive thing, because 14 if the project is not attractive enough, people will 15 not put the money on the table.

So the way to operate maybe we shouldn't go into this. I just mentioned that there is no funding available up front. And that's it. So next.

CHAIR POWERS: Well, let's point out that there is also a priority issue over us. The project may be very worthwhile today, but if you try to call your funds doing other worthwhile things --

MR. VITANZA: Yes.

24 CHAIR POWERS: -- maybe it has to be -- I 25 mean, don't immediately throw it away before --

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

19

20

21

22

23

	94
1	MR. VITANZA: Yes.
2	CHAIR POWERS: we may have to wait.
3	MR. VITANZA: Yes. Well, concerning this
4	thing, if I may mention, I don't know if I should
5	mention and make another digression, but I will
6	mention that later on when we come to the projects
7	themselves. So this is a typical cost arrangement.
8	It's not the same in all cases, but that's the basis.
9	That's the host country comes in with the technical
10	proposal and puts on the table 50 percent of the cost
11	of the program. And then the other countries, there
12	can be many, 10, 12, 15 or something, they come with
13	the remaining.
14	And the way is cost-shared. They have
15	some general rules for that and we don't need to go
16	into details, but, of course, the largest country
17	contributes normally more than the small country.
18	These are the projects that we have today.
19	And I just wanted to mention that, for example, France
20	is running some of them as a host country, like the
21	SERENA fire safety, there is the steam explosion
22	together with Korea. If you look again in the middle,
23	there is a SETH Program, which is a containment
24	program where they run France running together with
25	Switzerland. The CABRI Program. which is No. 2, is

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

again a French program. There is a Japanese in kind contribution from NSRR, which is becoming important in this phase, in which the CABRI reactor is being refurbished.

5 All these projects are run after the model 6 of the Halden Project. And the model is on -- the way 7 it is administered is very, I would say, straight 8 administrative rules for that, but at the same time, 9 allowing for some flexibility when needed, especially 10 in adopting the program.

11 They address different areas. One thing 12 that I wanted to mention and I'll come back later on 13 is that there is also a U.S. program on severe 14 accident, MCCI. This is run at Argonne National 15 Laboratory. If you want to have another way of how the -- these projects start to look like, it's like 16 17 This is divided. that. It's more or less in 18 technical discipline.

19 Now, I just make a small digression on, 20 for example, the thermal hydraulics facility. The PKL 21 facility is in Germany, PWR. ROSA is their facility It's also a PWR facility. 22 in Japan. These two facilities exist today. They are there today because 23 of this international program, otherwise, they would 24 25 both be shut down. And I think they are doing good

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

work.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

14

And when we are looking for the future of the passive system, for example, and so on and so forth, we have to try to bridge today's reality, in which these programs are not there yet, to the time when these programs will be important and try to do something meaningful today with these facilities, otherwise, we are not there today.

9 Nobody today would say that the Halden 10 reactor is useless. But in the '80s, I can tell you, 11 after TMI, we had very tough problem in convincing 12 many organizations that we should continue with fuel 13 program, at that time. Do you believe it?

MEMBER ARMIJO: I heard it.

And now how we cross the 15 MR. VITANZA: desert is another story and we can tell you -- we can 16 17 talk about that in another occasion, but we did it. And today we have the facility that everybody 18 recognized that is -- should be there. 19 So maybe 20 sometime we have to be a little bit forward looking 21 and be maybe a little bit tolerant if programs are not 22 always giving you 100 percent or giving the best 23 today. They should give something at least. But also 24 here maybe some degree of flexibility should be 25 allowed in determining this and conceivably in the

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

longer term.

1

So now, let me come to the conclusion and 2 3 try to put together some of the possible NEA options for the long-term safety R&D. This is not on the 4 subjects that we looked at. Again the subject would 5 be determined by those who -- by the stakeholders. 6 7 It's not us that do that, but how we can approach it will be -- well, probably through the OECD Project. 8 9 This is a good way to perform experimental research and especially when the cost is high. 10 And this can 11 also be used for the longer term research.

12 How we are to work on a step-by-step 13 basis. The joint project also provides the ground for 14 an efficient regulatory industry TSO cooperation. It is there today in many cases for producing data. 15 At 16 the same time maintain data interpretation 17 independent.

18 Incidentally, we talked to the U.S. NRC 19 partners and they participate in virtually all OECD 20 safety projects today. Given the size of the U.S. 21 program, the U.S. NRC may consider initiative for 22 hosting projects based in this country in the future 23 and we are in contact with U.S. NRC in that project. An NRC proposal was made at the last -- it 24 25 was mentioned before. And the NEA will set up a task

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

group addressing the long-term strategy as it was recommended. For this, the NRC contribution will be very important. Of course, the contribution of France would be very important and contribution of many other countries is important.

Challenges and questions for advanced 6 reactors, while that can be 300 questions, but one can 7 8 be that the reactor design is not always clearly 9 identified. So we cannot arrange over full spectrum 10 of designs. We have probably to narrow it down to 11 some specific things. For example, water reactor or one or two type of gas reactor or one or two types of 12 13 sodium reactor, for example. But again, it would not 14 be absolutely certain.

15 The risk that we also have to consider is 16 the long-term research may be too abstract, just 17 because it's so long-term. I was reassured yesterday 18 when I was talking to our police at the NRC that 19 things are actually coming very soon. Some of these gas reactor designs might need to start the licensing 20 21 process already in a few years. So probably will not be that abstract. It would be probably more concrete 22 23 than one may imagine.

How should the program be organized? And then also where to find the money, because one

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

www.nealrgross.com

important contributor for this thing is -- for this 1 project is that we have to find enough people that are 2 3 interested and are prepared to put the money. And if you are looking at the long-term, we don't know. Ι 4 think again it will be important to have public 5 6 funding, but also industry funding in that. 7 I mean, the industry funding will have --8 will keep this program less exposed to the changing 9 wind of politics and budgeting. You know what I mean? So we have to try to find a way, but again, we have to 10 discuss and try to find an optimal solution. 11 Carlo, just in these 12 MEMBER ARMIJO: 13 various programs, does the Department of Energy participate in any of these OECD research projects or 14 15 is it just the NRC? 16 The NRC is primarily --MR. VITANZA: there was only minor participate of the DOE in the 17 PSB-VVR Project, which you will find here on the left 18 19 side. 20 MEMBER ARMIJO: Um-hum. 21 MR. VITANZA: But that is more -- mostly 22 for historical reason. We have been -- but in Halden, 23 of course, then we have a collaboration of EPRi. 24 MEMBER ARMIJO: Right. that's Yes, 25 That's industry and NRC, but not the industry. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	100
1	Department of Energy.
2	MR. VITANZA: Not DOE, no, no.
3	MEMBER ARMIJO: Yeah.
4	MR. VITANZA: We don't have DOE in it.
5	CHAIR POWERS: Most of these things are
6	most of these programs are devoted to existing water
7	reactors.
8	MR. VITANZA: Correct.
9	MR. THADANI: Sam, we tried very hard to
10	get DOE to participate. We were not successful.
11	Particularly, if you recall, Carlo, in some of these
12	accident issues.
13	MR. VITANZA: Yes, correct. Ah, I forget.
14	Our national laboratory started with the contribution
15	of DOE.
16	MR. THADANI: Yes.
17	MR. VITANZA: And then apparently now it's
18	they withdrew that contribution. I had an example,
19	but I don't know how pertinent that is on maybe some
20	of the things that we need to be addressed in this
21	working group that will come up in the future.
22	We have already addressed the facilities
23	available for light water reactors in a group called
24	SPEAR, SESAR SPEAR in the CSNI. It was support
25	facilities for existing advanced reactor. In reality,
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

it limited -- it was a catalog of existing facilities 1 2 for light water reactor. Now, we have ability to go 3 beyond that and do these exercises. And maybe one other thing that we had talked about is how do the 4 5 existing facilities -- can the existing facility be 6 adapted also for non-water reactor purposes? 7 Which are the ones that are good for that? 8 Which are the ones that would be available presumably for that purpose? Here, I take, for example, the test 9 reactor. There is a spectrum of test reactors. Some 10 of them would be available. Some of them -- they are 11 12 all old, older, that's another consideration that we 13 have to keep in mind. 14 There are also very new ones like, where 15 is it in France, there is a -- in France there is the 16 Jules Horowitz reactor here that will come in the 17 It is not there. It's just a baby at the future. 18 We will see what we are able to do in five or moment. 19 six years time in this reactor. But this is the 20 infrastructure and the question that we had to pose to 21 ourselves how are we going to use these things? 22 There are also some things that are a 23 little bit more -- they are there, but they are not 24 put on international scene so much. And for example, 25 the Japanese high temperature test reactor is a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

facility that has been operating for 10 years, but we 1 2 don't hear very much about it. Maybe we should talk 3 to the Japanese about that. 4 There is the Joyo reactor or the Monju reactor there, they are the only operating, in the 5 OECD, sodium reactors. One is a test facility, the 6 7 one there, the Joyo. The Monju is more a prototype. 8 Phoenix is also there, sorry. 9 So maybe we have to put on the table this infrastructure and try to give some questions on, for 10 example, how big are the patience needed? Will new 11 reactors be needed, if you are talking about test 12 13 Who will pay for this thing, for this reactor? reactor? And also how to get started. Maybe the best 14 15 to start gradually with sub-programs within is existing waste projects. 16 For example, in Halden, there is -- there 17 are projects on digital I&C that can be maybe 18 19 projected into the advanced or maybe fuel testing that 20 can be done in one program just as an add-on to 21 existing program for current reactor or maybe it will be necessary to start from scratch with new project. 22 23 There will be some researchers here with that, because when you're doing -- projecting things in the longer 24 25 terms, it's a bit more risky.

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

Maybe it would be necessary to pool different test reactors in one comprehensive project. Okay. These are the things that maybe we have to discuss in this group and come up with options for maybe the first set of steps, second steps and following steps. Thank you very much.

7 MR. THADANI: Carlo, I know I have a guick 8 What you talked about was how OECD member auestion. 9 countries, you have other research facilities. China 10 has small PBMR, I think, 10 megawatts. India has a 11 passive high full pressure scale facility for passive systems and so on. In this one year effort that you 12 13 are talking about, are you going to limit the 14 resources out there to just OECD countries or beyond?

15 MR. VITANZA: Again, it's not a thing that 16 the NEA has to decide. We are to discuss together with our partners. But I think we would be wise, as 17 18 we have done in the past, when it comes to facilities 19 to see what is on the table worldwide. It would make 20 no sense if there is a good facility in a country that 21 is not an OECD country and that if our partners want 22 to use it, not to do it.

MR. THADANI: Yes.

24 MR. VITANZA: And we should put 25 bureaucracy to come after practicality.

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

	104
1	MR. THADANI: Good.
2	MR. VITANZA: And we have done that in
3	other cases. So pragmatically, I think we should go
4	that way, but it has to be our partners that make the
5	decision.
6	MR. THADANI: Okay. Thanks.
7	MEMBER ARMIJO: In this list of reactors,
8	test reactors, are any of these at risk of being shut
9	down? I know JMTR, the Japanese government decided to
10	refurbish that and upgrade it.
11	MR. VITANZA: JMTR has decided to be
12	upgraded. You know, it depends on the way you look at
13	it. They seem to be all have a reasonable healthy
14	economy today. So partly part of them like the HFR
15	in the Netherlands, they lead with radiochemical and
16	medical applications mostly. They were very good, if
17	you remember in the past, but they went more in that
18	direction for political or maybe for convenience.
19	But I think that they should be available
20	for some period of time. They are all aging, as I
21	said. But the fact that they are aging, doesn't mean
22	that they are in risk of being shut down.
23	MEMBER ARMIJO: Um-hum.
24	MR. VITANZA: ATR, for example, in we
25	know of this facility, but it tends to be very much
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

ļ	105
1	national. And maybe it does open up for some
2	international testing with the Japanese in that part,
3	but we are to have a dialogue with this
4	MEMBER ARMIJO: Well, that's DOE. DOE-
5	controlled.
6	MR. VITANZA: Yes, exactly. But maybe
7	also DOE can make maybe DOE may see the convenience
8	of opening up for the international work. But for
9	them to decide. It's not for us to decide.
10	CHAIR POWERS: You just can't dynamite
11	time on the ATR. I mean, it's just extremely limited
12	timing on it and it has nothing to do with DOE.
13	MR. VITANZA: Right.
14	CHAIR POWERS: Okay.
15	MR. THADANI: This chart is very striking,
16	Sam. I mean, if you had this 15, 20 years ago, North
17	America would have had a huge list, a pretty
18	significant list of facilities. It's really
19	remarkable, I think.
20	CHAIR POWERS: Well, you know, there are
21	all for instance, the Texas A&M reactor is not
22	listed on there.
23	MR. VITANZA: Yes.
24	CHAIR POWERS: There is a couple of zero-
25	power facilities are not listed there.
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

	106
1	MR. VITANZA: Yes, yes.
2	CHAIR POWERS: And I don't fault you for
3	not listing them. I think we have to do our own
4	homework.
5	MR. VITANZA: Yes.
6	MR. THADANI: But, I think, if you look in
7	terms of safety research, you know, both of the Sandia
8	facilities are basically gone and there has been a
9	MR. VITANZA: I should say, Mr. Chairman,
10	that when you look at this here, the one that we are
11	really doing fuel work are OSIRIS, Br-2 is very small
12	amount or a relatively small amount. OSIRIS, Halden
13	and then the rear area of CABRI. So it depends on
14	they are there, but they are not all doing, for
15	example, fuel work.
16	MR. THADANI: I was broadening funds just
17	to test reactors to
18	MR. VITANZA: Right.
19	MR. THADANI: safety research
20	facilities.
21	MR. VITANZA: Right, yes.
22	MR. THADANI: Yeah.
23	CHAIR POWERS: Okay. Well, I think you
24	have given us a lot to discuss. And there is issues
25	connected, not with just reactors, but thermal-
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

	107
1	hydraulic facilities that I think we need to go
2	through because we are making specific recommendations
3	in that area. And a lot of discussion points probably
4	better done over full stomachs than empty ones.
5	So I will take a recess for an hour for
6	lunch and
7	MEMBER ARMIJO: At our great cafeteria.
8	CHAIR POWERS: Well, to utilize the
9	facilities we have, you go to lunch with the
10	facilities we have, not the facilities you want.
11	(Whereupon, the meeting was recessed at
12	12:40 p.m. to reconvene at 1:48 p.m. this same day.)
13	CHAIR POWERS: Let's come back into
14	session. What I wanted to do this afternoon, Ashok,
15	is have you lead us through this. We've just had
16	three, what I think, are just tremendous presentations
17	that sharpen focus on the questions that we have. And
18	now I'd like to help us come to some conclusions that
19	we can represent before the full committee. And I
20	look to you to help us go through that.
21	One of the things I've noticed in all
22	three of the presentations spoke to the issue of
23	international collaboration in research. There was an
24	interesting suggestion of mapping the capabilities of
25	various organizations. As you're aware, we have been
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

advocating the virtues of cooperative international research, pointing to our own severe accident research program as a point example and indicating areas within the NRC research program where greater international collaboration could be most useful and highlighting, in fact, issues of fire protection safety and thermohydraulic safety.

8 And we've also noted the area from of thermohydraulics is undergoing a fair revolution from 9 10 the days of yore when the current generation of plants 11 were developed. And we see the emergence 12 computational fluid dynamics more. And I believe it 13 was Mr. Repussard who crystalized that when he says, gee, the era now is the codes are driving the 14 experiments, not the experiments driving the codes. 15 And as you are aware, this is an issue we saw also in 16 17 the relatively geriatric experimental facilities that 18 we have avail for thermohydraulics. That seems to be 19 an issue that we can focus in on as an example of 20 where we could focus the discussion a little bit, draw 21 some conclusions out of that.

22 So with that, I turn it to you, Ashok, to 23 lead us through.

MR. THADANI: Yes. And if I may just add to what you were saying. My understanding is that

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

108

long-term thinking by the Department of Energy here is mostly focused on doing analysis suite of codes and so on and as I understand very little or very limited experimental --

I think Carlo kind of 5 CHAIR POWERS: raised this point, in fact, in his presentation, the 6 7 dilemma we face in regulatory research for advanced 8 reactors. There is no design. The designers tell us 9 this reactor's very safe; we'll be able to prove to you it's very safe. There's nothing you can look at. 10 11 Dollar resources are short for manpower and dollars, and so you go to your prioritization scheme, and you 12 say let me invest some money in long range and look at 13 this advanced reactor for which there is no design, 14 15 and they kind of laugh you out of the room and say we've got to send our resources to more pressing 16 And then the design gets submitted for 17 issues. certification and the people doing the certification 18 19 say, we're not going to hold up our certification 20 waiting for your research to get done. So you can't -21 - you don't have a long-term research, then you can't it started. You can't get it started until there's a 22 23 Once there's a design, it's too late -design.

24

1

2

3

4

25

CHAIR POWERS: -- in a dilemma here. And,

It's bad luck.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

MR. THADANI:

(202) 234-4433

	110
1	you know, we've encountered this dilemma in the past,
2	and that was the origin of a lot of these
3	international collaborative efforts. We said we can't
4	afford it individually, but maybe we can afford it in
5	sum. This may be another area where we have to think
6	in a collaborative fashion because some of these
7	design issues for instance, the issue of fuel for
8	the gas reactors seems to challenge analytic
9	capabilities even at the CHASE FIRST DATA kinds of
10	levels. And the experimental database that we have
11	available is wholly inadequate to address what will be
12	even the operational environment of fuels, let alone
13	upset conditions.
14	And yet doing these experiments, my
15	goodness, they are extraordinarily expensive
16	experiments because with the gas reactor fuel, you
17	have to do them in pile. There is no good I mean
18	you can't set up a Verdon facility or the Oak Ridge
19	facility and do out of pile experiments and get
20	anything useful out of it.
21	MR. THADANI: Yes. Actually, I was
22	thinking that Carlo might have talked a bit more about
23	sphere report. It ties in with the point I think
24	you're making, Dana, it seems to me. You can talk
25	about two-phase CFD codes a an example if you want.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

But there are a number of likely needs in the thermohydraulics area for example. If you can lay those out and then you say okay, what are the limitations and where are these capabilities, if you will; do they exist.

6 And I think you did -- I think CSNI did a 7 pretty good job of identifying some challenges and gaps in where either the facilities don't exist or the 8 facilities that might be needed are in some danger of 9 being shut down. It would be useful, I think, at some 10 11 point -- obviously, we don't have it today -- but 12 useful to lay out the specific potential needs, tying 13 it to perhaps in a worldwide sense where the capability is or is not. And if there isn't, then 14 15 going to Carlo' point which is there may be some -- if some handful of countries can agree on that, then see 16 17 if there are sponsors in those selected areas.

I would think -- and again, I think 18 19 probably the best organization to be able to Domestic 20 Industry that is, I think, the NEA. The CSNI is 21 probably the best organization. So the support you 22 talked about that you would produce in a year may be 23 something to look to as -- you know, it could spawn. It could actually bring countries together and see --24 25 and I'm hoping that, at some point, the U.S. will have

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	112
1	some integral facility. I look to future passive
2	systems and plants, designs for passive systems, even
3	just focusing on light water. I personally think we
4	should expect some surprises.
5	I think if you don't learn from history,
6	where else can you learn from? I mean we've seen with
7	light water reactors, we learned a bunch of stuff.
8	MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: Ashok, if I may? We
9	listened to we got a lot of information. And from
10	my perspective, I'm trying to organize all this
11	information. The difficulty is sort of a mix of
12	detail and concept. And for me, in order to organize
13	this process, I need a structure. And so the first
14	question in my mind was what is the timeframe that
15	we're looking at and based on everything that we've
16	heard today and in the past, we're looking at
17	essentially a 20-year rolling horizon.
18	MR. THADANI: Okay.
19	MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: And once we have
20	identified that timeframe, the next question that
21	would come in defining this structure is what are the
22	issues that I'm going to look at in the next 20 years.
23	And you don't sort of pull these issues random
24	obviously. So to me, what one should do is start out
25	by dividing the issues into technology-independent
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

1 issues and technology-dependent issues. And there are 2 a lot of technology-independent issues that need to be looked at -- human performance, advanced PRA tools, 3 And, therefore, to come up 4 digital I&C, etcetera. 5 with that list issues under technology-independent issues that likely will become important over the 20-6 7 year rolling horizon. That, you know, you can get a 8 group of people to come up with that list of issues. 9 And then the second category would be the 10 technology-dependent issues. Now here, we have to 11 start bifurcating a little bit. We have to look at 12 LWR-related issues and non-LWR-related issues. LWR-13 related issues including GENERATION III. So you look 14 at advanced methods whether they are thermohydraulics 15 or neurotics, and all this stuff comes into whether 16 you're talking about CFD or talking about uncertainty 17 analyses or aging issues or even passive system. A11 18 of this falls under LWR. And then you have non-LWR. 19 And here, we run into the issue that Dr. Powers was talking about.

20 run into the issue that Dr. Powers was talking about.
21 You have so many concepts on the table right now in
22 different stages, and as far as deciding where you're
23 going to put your money, you don't know really how to
24 prioritize this. But one just needs to go back and
25 ask the question what is the motivation for putting

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 forth these non-LWR concepts. They are -the motivations come from enhanced --2 potentially, 3 enhanced safety and enhanced economics, fuel 4 utilization. And when you look at these three 5 motivations, I'm not sure that enhanced economics amongst all the concepts that I've look at really will 6 7 Enhanced safety, with the new advanced pan out. 8 reactors? Well, I'm not really sure that that's going 9 to pan out either.

But enhanced fuel utilization is certainly 10 going to be a driver and, therefore, as far as, you 11 know, non-LWR options, maybe the focus ought to be on 12 13 breeders. Fusion, I'm afraid we'll have to treat it on a case-by-case basis, on a facility-by-facility 14 15 basis, because our horizon is only 20 years. And that, to me, provides a structure as to how one can 16 organize the entire enterprise. Without that, I think 17 we're jumping all over the place between issues for 18 19 some of these long-term/short-term. It's --

20 MEMBER BONACA: The only thing that 21 concerns me about -- I agree that you have very good 22 points there. The point I was bringing this morning, 23 for us, 10 to 20 years is too late. We are being 24 pressed to review these concepts now or, you know, in 25 the immediate future. So we're not talking about

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

	115
1	long-term research now. I mean if you look at, you
2	know, we have in front of us these passive systems,
3	the ESBWR, AP1000. We're looking at them. We have no
4	integral facilities with which they've ran experiments
5	of some type. We've heard the results and the vendors
6	are in a position where they can say, yes, we will do
7	them almost as a false verification because they don't
8	want to invest the money now. So what do we do? Are
9	we going to sponsor research in the short term, in a
10	year or two. We don't even have test facilities yet
11	out there that we can say they're adequate to do
12	MEMBER ARMIJO: The burden's on the
13	designers or promoters of the technology to bring the
14	data that's adequate
15	MEMBER BONACA: I agree.
16	MEMBER ARMIJO: to the Committee and if
17	they don't, they just don't get they don't get
18	their certification, and particularly if it's just a -
19	- for example, the gas reactor in the United States,
20	the promoter is or developer-funder is Department
21	of Energy plus some commercial organizations. Well,
22	they have to bring us the data to anser the questions
23	
24	MEMBER BONACA: Well, look at the AP1000.
25	As they certified, okay, and yet so much is left to
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

the ITAACs that will come at a later time when they have a contract and finally they can build a facility and then they will test it as a first time. So I'm not discouraging at all the fact that we need to have, in fact, an international effort in the long term. I'm just feeling challenged by the timetable we've set in front of us, 10 to 20 years. But that, for us, is too late for some of the decisions we have to make now.

10 REPUSSARD: MR. May I come in the 11 conversation? You're looking at your structured 12 approach. There is another division you could make is 13 between talking about new designs. Those new designs 14 where the safety community believes that existing 15 tools can be adapted. Okav? Yes, but obviously 16 things which could be used. There are models which 17 could be probably altered in which case, okay, it's 18 not the same scale. And there are other designs --19 Chairman Dana Powers mentioned one of them -- where 20 we, on the contrary, believe that the existing 21 knowledge is not adequate.

And that poses a great difficulty and I think it should be made -- it's a matter for national decision, because to go into design for which we know nothing, where we have not only to build the

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

www.nealrgross.com

technology but also to invent the safety signs that go with it. It's a huge effort also for the -- on the taxpayer, etcetera, and that could be discriminating against designs for which everything has to be invented and for -- and which do not -- maybe do not -- well, that's not for us to decide -- but which do not have an edge, an advantage which is so obvious that this effort should be made.

So it's not just a question of technology. 9 10 Development is also a question of safetv tool 11 development, and in those areas where models, test platforms, all our knowledge cannot be applied, we 12 believe that there are good reasons to think that they 13 14 cannot be translated to these new designs. That 15 should be an alarm signal to the government that says, 16 this is an unmapped area. Okay, we can go to it but then there should be a massive investment by the 17 public in the same way as it was done in the 70's when 18 19 PWRs were invented. There was many amount of public money to create those bodies as the NRC, the NUREGS. 20 I mean that was not funded by the applicants. 21 That was funded by the public, by the taxpayer basically. 22 23 And now, of course, this investment has some time limitations, it can be adapted. The results 24 25 -- you know, what we know can be adapted too some

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

www.nealrgross.com

certain level. And if there could be a report, maybe international report on what are the main -- the key limits of this knowledge we have. Then anything outside, okay, it's not forbidden place but it should be earmarked as needing a totally different type of economic framework to deal with it. That could be guidance to believe in your country to say, okay, watch out, because there not only do you have to develop the technology, but you also have to develop a total new frame for safety, and that's not cheap.

11 MR. THADANI: To go back to Sam's point, 12 think you sort have to ask yourself a Τ verv 13 fundamental question, and then that has to be tied in, I think, with what Said was saying: What's the role 14 15 responsibility of safety authority? and 16 Fundamentally, what do you really expect from them? And as John Ahearne told us in fairly certain terms 17 18 about responsibilities, one of them is to have 19 confidence in the regulator's ability to make sound safety decisions. What does it take? 20

If you can first -- and if it takes having independent analytical tools or data from wherever it's coming -- nevertheless, in a transparent manner, something that people have truly agreed to. If you can first say, yes, this is really what I think

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

5 critical have But it's to some understanding what does it really take for the safety 6 authority to make those kinds of decisions. You know, 7 this is -- you know, we keep coming back to this do we 8 have the expertise; do we have the people who really 9 understand the technology; do we have the tools they 10 11 can use to study and whether it's design bases or beyond design base conditions and things of that sort. 12 I would think that that would be the driver. 13

We talked a lot about sever accidents. 14 Ι 15 didn't want to inject them but I will now. You know, 16 there are bypass scenarios. We didn't talk about steam generator tubes and what sort of technology 17 advances there might be in that area. 18 Interfaces 19 between high pressure and low pressure systems -maybe these designs should not have such low pressure 20 21 design pressure for residual heat removal system. I'm into some bit of a detail, but the high level is are 22 23 there some areas which have potential for large Probability is fairly low. 24 consequences? Do we understand? Are there things of that sort? 25 I would

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

www.nealrgross.com

think that those would be kinds of things that the safety authority has to think about, because it may be the designer doesn't pay as much attention to those things.

1

2

3

4

5 If you can come to some understanding of 6 expectations from safety authority and that context 7 three categories, if you will, what stands out within 8 those categories? I think it would be helpful if you 9 sort of put it in that structure that you talked 10 about.

11 MEMBER BLEY: You just hit on a piece of 12 the structure that meshes up with what Jacques was 13 saying that I think is really important. In the GEN IV International Effort, in the first step, tried to 14 15 do that, and that's identify where there are technical knowledge gaps to couple them with what you said, 16 17 Ashok, and how important could these be to safety, to vulnerability to terrorists, whatever the issue is, 18 19 but put them in context. You know, there are places where we don't know a lot but it won't hurt us, and 20 there are other places where it's really important. 21 22 Jacques said something this morning that kind of --23 MR. THADANI: Jacques said that, yes. MEMBER BLEY: -- that really struck me was 24 25 having this level of technical expertise is important

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

in the confidence your communities and your larger communities. And if you don't push forward, you find bureaucratic solutions to all these. And that's a place we get caught in sometimes. It looks like kind of it's okay, but it really won't stand up because of

the knowledge gaps with --

7 Dana's point, I think, is MR. THADANI: 8 absolutely a critical point because I happen to also 9 believe what he said, that practically what happens is if you keep saying that, you know, we're probably not 10 11 going to have this challenge in the next several years, you keep putting it off and then suddenly the 12 challenge shows up and you have to make a decision, 13 14 and let's be honest, every agency will make a decision 15 because that's generally the way the system works. 16 And so we're almost -- sometimes we almost are setting ourselves up to maybe not make as good decisions as 17 18 perhaps we should. This is, you know, which having 19 been part of some of the challenges over the last 20 decade, I can tell you that that was a real issue all 21 through.

22 MR. VIKTORRSEN: I think, to compare the 23 situation when the reactors were developed, the 24 present ones, and the situation where we are today, I 25 think there is some fundamental differences, and it's,

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

www.nealrgross.com

to me, the safety community is almost always lagging 1 2 sort of behind the industrial development. This is maybe an understatement but this is the case. And in 3 4 previous time, this was less serious because nuclear 5 energy development was part of a national strategy. 6 It was supported strongly by the governments and we built universities. We built research institutes who 7 8 worked together with industry, and we had very 9 responsible vendors.

10 Today this is a business, much more a business than it was previously. So I believe that at 11 12 some point, we need to, as was suggested, we need to 13 write down where the limitations of knowledge exist 14 and also say, in connection with what we say is the 15 knowledge we have and these are the limitations, and 16 if you want to go further outside this sphere of 17 knowledge, we'd advance the signs, you have also to 18 demonstrate that they are safe. I mean you have to 19 demonstrate not only with advanced models but also 20 with test facilities, and until you have done that, 21 the sort of present type of reactors can't be 22 licensed.

I mean at some point, I think the governments or international community or whatever needs to make this point, because we are seeing now

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

Can I go back to what Said 6 MR. VITANZA: 7 said before and the structure, the separation between or the difference between light water reactor and non-8 water reactor systems. For water reactor systems, I 9 10 have the feeling that we still have -- and I'm look at 11 that in the perspective of facilities now -- I think 12 that we have a reasonable set of facility available both for severe accidents and thermohydraulics. 13

14 But I'm surprised when I hear the urgency 15 that Mario was mentioning before about, for example, 16 addressing these passive systems and for different 17 route and at the same time, the sort of modest input that we receive sometimes for the utilization of these 18 facilities. Why are -- if there is such an urgent 19 20 thing, and these facilities can address many of these 21 passive safety issues and they can maybe, in cases, 22 modify -- I think there is, at some point, also, a 23 disconnect between the existence and the availability of the facility and the input that they are receiving 24 or the lack of input that they are receiving, because 25

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

www.nealrgross.com

(202) 234-4433

[124
1	when I hear that the Japanese are shutting down or
2	there has been a risk of shutting down their ROSA
3	facility which is the unique in the world, at full
4	pressure, the only one left on the PWR side.
5	And at the same time, for these things.
6	Then I think we have to fill up this as a matter of
7	urgency. There is a gap there that we have to fill up
8	and maybe this Committee can help filling up these
9	gaps. Then there is the issue on the longer term for
10	advanced reactors, and of course, that has to be
11	addressed in a different way because there are things
12	that we don't know.
13	But for the things at least that we know
14	that are a challenge and for which there are
15	facilities, I think we should come with some input.
16	We have a very hard time trying to convince people to
17	participate in severe accident programs. And I keep
18	hearing that this is still an issue that needs
19	attention. So at some point in time, we have to fill
20	up that gap.
21	MR. THADANI: You are being too practical.
22	MR. REPUSSARD: hy has the NRC certified
23	the AP1000 if you are not sure that the passive
24	systems are totally safe?
25	MR. THADANI: No, no. Let me make sure
Y	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

I'm happy to respond to that because I made the 1 2 statement that I made, and I see, technically, as 3 confident in terms of the operation of -- adequacy of 4 the design of AP1000. And that conclusion was arrived 5 at because of two factors. One, the experimental and analytical studies by Westinghouse. Two, experimental 6 7 studies did and analytical by the NRC. NRC 8 analyses, did independent independent some 9 did experiments in cooperation with experiments, 10 Westinghouse and others, so there is a whole range of, I think, a really pretty good technical base. 11 Nevertheless, all these studies are based 12 on a set of assumptions and you have reasonable 13 14 assurance that these plants will behave nicely. 15 Having reasonable assurance and being prepared for 16 some unanticipated things is, in my mind, to me, 17 that's good regulatory approach, that you should now 18 say it's a very good design but when we go into 19 things may come out of operational operation, 20 experience, and they did for light water reactors in operation today. And the question is -- and I will 21 use the TMI accident, BMW designs -- we had a 22 23 difficult time saying we really understood small breaks in those designs, and we didn't have any way to 24 25 do any experiments, so we had to go and rush and

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	126
1	develop some capability to be able to understand small
2	breaks in those designs. And I
3	MEMBER BONACA: So that's the issue is
4	how far do you have to go.
5	MR. THADANI: Yes.
6	MEMBER BONACA: And the desire is the one
7	that you would want to address all the issues. Now I
8	think there is a number of commitments in the ITAAC
9	program. The ITAAC is the final inspection tests,
10	etcetera, that should close a number of open issues
11	there or questions that we have. I don't disagree
12	with that. Are we satisfied that that's that's the
13	whole spectrum and are we satisfied that for the ESBWR
14	we have all the information that we need? I don't
15	know yet. We're reviewing it now. Okay, what if we
16	suddenly stumble on an issue for which you need some
17	testing, do they have a test facility that can be used
18	to do that? I don't know. This is where it would be
19	a real shame if ROSA Facility is shut down, because
20	that provides that capability for passive.
21	MR. VITANZA: Or the PKL's, you know, it
22	depends whether the experiment needs to be done at
23	full pressure or not. But anyway, the new program on
24	the PKL facility in Germany and in the ROSA, they are
25	addressing passive cooling issues. And I hope that
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

	127
1	they will receive the right support and the right team
2	from the participants on the detail to help to run
3	these experiments.
4	MEMBER ARMIJO: Is GEH in the ROSA
5	project?
6	MR. VITANZA: Is whom?
7	MEMBER ARMIJO: The General Electric-
8	Hitachi consortium that's building the ESBWR, are they
9	going to run some ESBWR tests at
10	MR. VITANZA: In the ROSA project, from
11	the Japanese side, there is Mitsubishi for the moment.
12	Whether TECO will join in the future is a possibility
13	and TECO maybe we'll bring in also this but it is
14	a PWR facility, so.
15	CHAIR POWERS: I mean, let me raise an
16	issue somewhat aligned to this question of
17	experimental facilities but really kind of I keep
18	coming back to this the codes are driving the
19	experiments, not the other way around now, because I
20	think it's true. One of the issues that one of our
21	who couldn't be here raised is his thesis was
22	computational fluid dynamics was going to become more
23	involved in the regulatory process, the justification
24	of reducing margins.
25	And he said he insisted that commercial
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

1 CFD codes were not validated to the levels that we ordinarily expect reactor safety codes to be validated 2 And he had a half a dozen examples of things 3 at. they've done to encourage convergence in those 4 commercial codes without naming them. And he said 5 6 that's not the way to go for the regulatory agency. 7 So the designers will use those commercial codes when 8 they design things. The regulatory agency needs to 9 use something independent and different from that, and it needs to be something build to the regulatory 10 11 standards.

And unfortunately, developing a CFD code 12 is not something you undertake for \$1.95 and three 13 guys or one guy or a part-time guy. And he said, now 14 15 we, as an international community, ought to develop a CFD code for doing reactor accident analysis, ought to 16 be an international undertaking. And coupled with 17 that, we ought to have experimental facilities for 18 19 validating CFD kinds of code.

20 experimental What we have some - -21 facilities that purport to having been designed for validating CFD codes. I point to THAI on your list 22 23 and I think there are a couple of others there. But 24 now this issue of should we engage in an international 25 development of a reactor safety CFD code comes up, and

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

I tie to that the idea of a center of excellence where 1 2 that might be done in a modern electronic network 3 I mean that, in fact, si how the commercial sense. CFD codes are developed. There are lots of little 4 home operator that are all connected together and 5 whatnot, but with a requirement that it be validated 6 to this standards that's common in reactor safety. 7 I mean is that -- I bring it up because it 8 9 seems like a very tangible point issue that everybody faces that might be an area of focus and I toss that 10 11 out. It's interesting that you 12 MR. VITANZA: mention that there has been in one of the -- in the 13 working group that I was mentioning before and the 14 CSNI and the one dealing with accident management was 15 this use of CFD for nuclear safety. And it has 16 addressed basically three different items. One is 17 18 guidelines for the user because there are a lot of 19 user effect involved in it. The second was on a validation matrix for single-phase, and the third one 20 was two-phase problems. And the test scale now to a 21 22 point where there is a web-based sort of system where CFD operators can be addressing that. 23 But of course, this is a modest effort and 24 25 they can -- should be perhaps scaled up. And again, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

it depends on the international community for formulating a perspective of whether that can be done at a higher level.

4 MR. THADANI: Yes, Dana, I think what 5 saying is that there actually was a Carlo is conference also on this particular topic. But if I 6 7 remember correctly, and I may not, there were a set of 8 recommendations about what things one needs to do to 9 move to having a validated, I think, two-phase CFD It might well be really a good case 10 capability. addressing the issues of having independent validated 11 code and also at the same time having, you know, a 12 center of excellence. But if I remember correctly, 13 the problem you had was the same. To go forward, you 14 15 got to have countries willing to participate and provide resources. And to the best of my knowledge, 16 it is still kind of --17

MR. VITANZA: The CFD has enough support and -- but of course, those who have these fluent or whatever code are not so many, and those who are able to use it, so there's a limited participation for the moment.

MR. THADANI: That's what I thought.
MR. VITANZA: But it is a trend to go more
and more in that direction, especially for containment

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

	131
1	issues or for some primary thermohydraulic issues.
2	Where it's not used, for example, is on fuel for gas
3	reactors. There could be, for example, very
4	fascinating potentials. Still, that is an area where
5	people maybe should be looking.
6	MR. SCHWARTZ: There are some actions that
7	you will be unable to and solve some development of
8	CFD codes by the new regime actions which is supported
9	by the Commission. But you find the industry or some
10	safety organization and just say go forth.
11	MR. VITANZA: I think from the U.S., in
12	this exercise that I was mentioning, there was Mojave
13	was
14	MR. THADANI: Mojave, yes, I think was
15	MR. VITANZA: co-sponsored by the NRC?
16	MR. THADANI: Yes, but I think if I
17	remember, NRC didn't participate in the second part.
18	MR. VITANZA: Not directly. That's
19	correct.
20	MR. SCHWARTZ: But the question is what
21	kind of experiments do you need to validate these
22	codes, because I think you have to have analytical
23	tests as well as integral tests, because you need to
24	have a multi-scale approach and very, very far
25	measurements.
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

CHAIR POWERS: Yes. I mean the very high precision measurements goes without saying almost, because if you're doing a high precision calculation -- and that's why one thinks in terms of a center of excellence, because a major tour is just developing the experimental capability to do it. I mean that is an undertaking in itself, you're staying aware of what developments occur there.

9 The flip side of centers of excellence is 10 ossification, that is they tend to get established and 11 And they become increasingly they never go away. 12 irrelevant and demand resources without yielding a 13 I mean there's a certain advantage to the product. competitive approach to research in that new ideas or 14 15 relevant ideas come forward in competition а 16 framework, but it does limit you on this kind of high 17 precision sort of stuff that takes a huge amount of investment of time. Instrumentation tends not to be 18 19 so terribly expensive as far as the hardware, but it's 20 horribly expensive as far as the manpower.

21 MR. VITANZA: And in Switzerland, for 22 example, there is a PANDA facility that was, in the 23 past, used for thermohydraulic studies on BWR, on 24 HBWR. Now it has been converted into more containment 25 type of studies and it has been developed with good

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

instrumentation.

1

In France, there is a facility also for 2 doing -- operated by CEA, also for doing specialized 3 4 studies just for CFD containment studies. And they 5 are recommended in this SFEAR report that Ashok was just mentioning before. So there is some effort being 6 7 In the primary systems, there is some work in done. 8 the context of ROSA where they have instrumented with 9 very different instrumentation in some areas in order to be able, for the CFD, to reproduce those areas of 10 interest. So there is some effort. 11

But again, we have to bring the input together so that this effort is correctly focused and correctly addressed. Again, I see sometimes a mismatch between the interest that is seen, the opportunity of having it there and there is something in between the two missing.

18 CHAIR POWERS: Well, let me ask you this 19 question: suppose one set up a facility in the 20 institution says, here, we can do CFD calculate -- we 21 can do experiments that will be use -- everybody 22 agrees that these experiments will be useful for 23 validating the CFD code and after five years, what 24 happens to that facility?

MR. VITANZA: Well, we are to take one

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

25

1 step at a time and we are to -- I think if a facility 2 is good to produce good data, people will not abandon 3 And I think it's important also to mix together it. 4 the industry and the public organization. The reason 5 for that is that, in my experience at least, the б industry tends to be more stable in terms of their 7 drive and their funding and their interest. Of 8 course, the are oscillation also there. Public money 9 can be exposed to winds that are changing and then all 10 of a sudden, something that was priority one becomes 11 priority five. That is less likely to happen with the 12 industry. That's why it's good to have this merging 13 of industry and regulator in terms of the data 14 generation. 15 But what will happen with any facility in 16 five years is difficult to -- nobody can guarantee 17 anything except that this facility has to be lively 18 enough to generate continuous interest. That's the 19 prerequisite. 20 MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: But, you know,

21 validating large-scale codes, you know, like CFD 22 codes, does not necessarily require large-scale 23 experiments. Okay? And therefore, to think from the 24 very beginning that we need these very, very expensive 25 experiments that have to have a life of their own

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

ĺ	135
1	after five years or whatever is not necessarily the
2	right focus, because if you design small-scale, clever
3	experiments, you can get 95% of the work done with
4	these very small, disposable, dispensable experiments
5	
6	MR. VITANZA: But that would make
7	MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: and then the rest
8	of it.
9	MR. VITANZA: But that will make the ROSA
10	facility redundant and there's a natural selection if
11	that happens. Nobody wants to keep an expensive
12	facility if you can do an experiment with less money.
13	CHAIR POWERS: Well, just to pursue that
14	a little bit I concede your thesis that you can get
15	95%. Ninety-five percent is that good enough? Or
16	do we have to get 5%, and do we have a situation that
17	we often do that the last 5% takes 50% of the effort?
18	MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: That may very well
19	be the case but, you know, to think from the very
20	beginning that all you need is large-scale experiments
21	that have to sustain themselves for a long period of
22	time is maybe fallacious. Oftentimes, you can get the
23	majority of the work done if you just think hard
24	enough and are clever enough to design appropriate
25	small-scale experiments that answer specific questions
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 BHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1 that you can toss out afterwards. You don't have to worry about long-term use or reuse of these small-2 3 scale experiments. 4 CHAIR POWERS: Said, we've got a member 5 who says, gee, the thermohydraulic facility at Oregon 6 State is no good because it's not full height. The 7 facility in Europe is not good because it's not full 8 height. We've got a draft recommendation that says 9 the commercial CFD codes are no good because they're 10 not validated. I mean are you contesting that? 11 MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: Well, I don't know. 12 I always have subscribed to the philosophy that the scale of an experiment is directly proportional to the 13 14 level of ignorance, and therefore, if you don't 15 understand the problem, you'll just build a full scale 16 experiment and test and get an identical set of data. 17 But if you think long and hard, you may be able to come up with, you know, small-scale experiments that 18 answer some of the critical questions. That does not 19 20 preclude the need for large-scale experiments. Ι 21 think --22 MR. THADANI: Yes, because, you know, if 23 there are scale issues that cannot be resolved, by 24 gosh you will need large-scale experiments. 25 MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: I think -- I don't **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

think anyone -- certainly, I don't think -- most 1 2 people would not argue with that logic, but you got to 3 go through that thinking up front. And if you're 4 convinced up front that you do need some large 5 experimental facility -- I can tell you for AP600, NRC staff and the ACRS, I doubt, would have supported 6 7 certification of that design without ROSA. CHAIR POWERS: You had to have the ROSA. 8 9 I think you had to have it MR. THADANI: 10 and so it's -- intellectually, I agree with what 11 you're saying of course, but I'm saying you should also up front in your thinking not exclude -- and you 12 said it, you said it. 13 14 MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: I agree. MR. THADANI: And for ESBWR, for example, 15 16 the staff apparently is going forward without large-17 scale --18 CHAIR POWERS: Well, it's hard to 19 anticipate what they'll do. Let me turn to another 20 object, and I'm simply using these as examples. One 21 of the areas we've not spoken of is the safety of the 22 reprocessing system, fuel reprocessing. And another 23 one is the safety strains or threats posed by climatic I'm not a big supporter of global warming, 24 change. but I am a great believer in trends in the climate 25 NEAL R. GROSS

> COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

that threaten our reactors. Are these areas that have not gotten the attention that they deserve in the past and do deserve attention in as we move into the 20year timeframe?

1

2

3

4

5 Certainly, I'm familiar with reprocessing of fuel within the weapons complex where we've had our 6 moments. We've blown up a couple of facilities pretty 7 good, and we are -- there are issues. The most famous 8 one is called "red oil" where we have no understanding 9 10 of the phenomena whatsoever. They may actually 11 understand it in France. There's some very good 12 research going on in France in the area. But we've proceeded ahead with operating facilities despite not 13 having an understanding. That's probably doable in a 14 15 security framework. Can we do that in a commercial framework or do we need to move into reprocessing 16 17 safety?

MR. VITANZA: That would be a yes. It was mentioned before if you are going more and more in the direction of better fuel utilization and especially liquid metal-type of structures; of course, that will be an essential step that one has to look more and more into these facilities.

24 CHAIR POWERS: Is it inevitable that we go 25 to reprocessing? I think it is.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

139 1 MEMBER ARMIJO: I think it is. I think 2 so. 3 MR. THADANI: I would even -- I don't know 4 if you remember -- John Ahearne said that yes, NRC 5 should get ahead of reprocessing, regeneration, 6 recycle. Ι certainly that mean was his 7 recommendation, but the NRC will have to face those 8 issues. 9 MR. VITANZA: It is more difficult maybe 10 to imagine how we research -- activity can be put 11 together there, but it is certainly something that 12 people should look into. 13 CHAIR POWERS: And I know for certain the history of "red oil" research has been almost classic 14 15 that one trains a researcher so that he kind of 16 understands the problem, and just about the time that 17 he begins to actually make progress, they cut it off 18 because they come up with a new administrative safety 19 limit. 20 MR. VITANZA: Right. 21 CHAIR POWERS: It's almost impossible to 22 sustain your research in those areas. It is very 23 difficult. 24 MR. VITANZA: But concerning that point, 25 maybe there is also a related thing on the enrichment **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

and the 5% limitation. I don't know if this is the 1 2 right time to bring it up, but there are some people 3 that are thinking, some countries, at least one, that 4 is thinking that maybe the 5% limit doesn't need to 5 stay there forever and ideas to get around it with some burnable poison mixing of more than 5%s, traces 6 7 of burnable poison. I don't know if that can also be 8 a subject of interest for the longer term. 9 MR. THADANI: The U.S. industry, I know, 10 has a strategic plan. In that strategic plan, they 11 talk about their long-term intention is to go to 85 gigawatt-days per metric ton by way of burn up and 12 13 enrichment in excess of 55, so --14 MEMBER ARMIJO: There's а big 15 infrastructure cost. 16 MR. THADANI: Yes. 17 MEMBER ARMIJO: Huge --18 MR. THADANI: So that's --19 MEMBER ARMIJO: -- historic burden. Ι 20 mean it's everything from transportation to conversion 21 to everything --22 MR. THADANI: High cost. 23 It's very costly. MEMBER ARMIJO: 24 MEMBER BONACA: It's the need for your 25 cost. Cost goes up **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	141
1	MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes.
2	MR. VITANZA: Even if you add burnable
3	poison into the uranium? Of course, that will be
4	after the conversion. But if you do after the
5	conversion
6	MEMBER ARMIJO: There may be simpler,
7	other ways to get there, you know, without going above
8	5%, other kinds of fuels, higher density fuels,
9	carbides, nitrates.
10	MR. VITANZA: Yes, nitrates.
11	MEMBER ARMIJO: But I haven't seen anybody
12	really working on that. That's the sort of think that
13	the industry or DOE or somebody would have to really
14	be promoting and have an economic justification before
15	NRC would start fooling around with it, I would think.
16	CHAIR POWERS: Well, we've already been
17	panting getting cross sections to for enrichments
18	beyond 5% up to 10%. And certainly
19	MEMBER ARMIJO: I don't see anything wrong
20	with getting that kind of basic information, but until
21	somebody makes some fuel and starts getting it into
22	test reactors and things like that, it's going to
23	MR. VITANZA: I put it on the table
24	because
25	MEMBER ARMIJO: Sure.
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

in that direction. They're talking about 7% with some traces of burnable poison which I don't remember exactly what it is.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

MEMBER ARMIJO: But their refuel factory would have to go through an awful lot of work if -- to work with it, unless you built a special purpose facility just to make that level of enrichment, rods of that type and then put them in bundles.

11 MR. THADANI: And may I follow-up on this thought -- still, centers of excellence. If you look 12 13 ahead 10 to 20 years and say we would need this expertise and it's crucial -- I mean they have to be 14 15 really crucial safety areas -- do we have to build it or are we at risk of maybe losing it? Or do you have 16 some thoughts on what those crucial areas might be, a 17 18 handful presumably where one better do some solid 19 thinking now and see if some centers of excellence 20 exist or should be developed. And again, I think all 21 of us have been scientists. It very likely would have international collaboration 22 to be in some _ _ 23 collaborative way.

Do you see some critical safety areas where one should be paying attention now so that 10 to

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

www.nealrgross.com

(202) 234-4433

ļ	143
1	20 years form now, you can say, yes, you have that
2	access with that type of capability? And refuel keeps
3	coming up, clearly.
4	MR. REPUSSARD: Fuel is safety criteria
5	because the industry would want to innovate.
6	MR. THADANI: Yes.
7	MR. REPUSSARD: And the current system
. 8	where each country in fact, if you look at the past
9	20 years, the criteria have been diverging. Initially
10	the NRC has had the initial historically, and
11	they're able to us those because everybody else will
12	see them out, and so we use them. But little-by-
13	little, as knowledge was acquired, as different
14	interpretations, different regulations, and today,
15	it's when you look at the I was shown a map on
16	one slide of the different criteria which exist in the
17	world today it's not communicatable to the public.
18	But it is safe here. It's not safe there.
19	And we are trying to get together with the
20	TCRs and NRC as a beginning to try and converge again,
21	which would also induce the joint research. If we
22	have a joint goal, it's easier to have a joint
23	research, because I think on these critical areas,
24	there should be more than just NEA projects which may
25	happen or may not happen for some time and stop. I
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

think facing a global nuclear industry, there should be, on these critical areas, almost a treaty between the safety agencies -- okay, we are going to work together a long time.

And it is quite good what you said about 5 proportionality between ignorance and the scale of the 6 7 This was applied to nuclear weapons. experiments. And the point I was making, in fact, earlier -- you 8 9 could decline it the other way around. That means 10 GENERATION IV designs for which we have no knowledge; therefore, we have ignorance, we'll call start at the 11 beginning; that is to have large-scale experiments 12 which will be very extremely expensive. 13

And that should be stated. That's part of 14 15 the learning curve that you start with very expensive 16 stuff because you have the need to understand. If you have a thousand equations with we don't know anything 17 about it, then the only thing is to make a scale one 18 19 model. That is true. And that will be applicable to 20 maybe some exotic designs which then should be -- that should be added to the bill and say, okay, when you do 21 the economic viability of such projects, that should 22 23 be included what the safety agencies together would need to investigate. 24

25

1

2

3

4

And the other way around, when we have

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

learned and gradually we need less -- this was what 1 2 happened to PHEBUS for example. We say okay, we need less because we can do a lot of -- we can do source 3 4 term which is an analytical test. And people said, 5 well, okay, from time-to-time, you need to have a concluding global test to see. That's an intermittent 6 7 stage and I think we should be careful when we -- for 8 example, with the ROSA LOOP, before you kill the last one, I think, you know, you can reduce down scale 9 10 here. You have five, four, three. Then when you have 11 one last one to say okay, we know enough forever and -12 - secure -- that's a risk. 13 CHAIR POWERS: The other trend -- we may have a major philosophical evolution here that we 14 15 start with big tests; we go to small tests; then once 16 you implement, you start cutting margins finer and 17 finer so you have to go back to big tests, so you need 18 all the competing effects. So you may have a major 19 innovation in experimental philosophy. 20 Regarding GENERATION IV, MR. SCHWARTZ: 21 it may distinguish between high-temperature gas-cooled reactors and certain liquid metal-cooled reactors, 22 23 because most liquid metal-cooled first reactors, we

24 are not starting from scratch. We have already wrote 25 the codes and we have just forgotten them. We have to

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	146
1	use them again. But this is maybe not the case for,
2	I'm sure, high temperature and gas-cooled reactors.
3	We have just new materials.
4	MR. VITANZA: Certain materials, yes.
5	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: New graphite.
6	MR. SCHWARTZ: And the other point is that
7	
8	MR. REPUSSARD: And with thermohydraulics,
9	I mean it always amazes me is that the finite capacity
10	of gas is not great in general.
11	MR. SCHWARTZ: And the other point is we
12	cannot wait for the industry to give us the data that
13	we need because we have to build the competence to
14	that level, independent review of what we are going to
15	propose. This is a difficult
16	MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: If I may go back to
17	the issue of centers of excellence, are you sort of
18	thinking in terms of sort of area-specific, like a
19	thermohydraulic center of excellence or a neutronic
20	center of excellence or a materials center of
21	excellence? Is that what is being proposed? Or is
22	this sort of a you know, oftentimes, the big
23	problems are the interface between different
24	disciplines and, therefore, to sort of think in terms
25	of a narrowly defined center of excellence may not
	NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1 really advance the state of knowledge very much in terms of resolving critical issues that would be of 2 3 importance. 4 MR. SCHWARTZ: We have the experience of 5 the network of excellence, which is not a center of 6 excellence but a network of excellence, around severe 7 accident research. And in fact, we are organizing in 8 such a way that we -- how can I say -- we optimize our 9 resources and so as a network, we are sharing those 10 different tasks and capitalizing on the knowledge in 11 one-twos. This is, I think, a very federated way of 12 working. 13 MR. REPUSSARD: But it's not one discipline? 14 15 MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes. 16 MR. REPUSSARD: It's what? 17 It's multidisciplinary MR. SCHWARTZ: 18 around -- yes. 19 MR. REPUSSARD: I think that the networks 20 should be around safety issues, not about disciplines. 21 MR. VIKTORRSEN: So one area that probably 22 may need more research is site-related issues. Ι 23 think the Japanese are particularly learning that 24 lesson given the Kashiwasaki. And I think we have to 25 do this better in order to avoid surprises like this, **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

148 like they have had and with a risk of shutting down permanently seven reactors on one site. And then to consideration take into also extreme weather conditions which are more extreme than in some of the design-basis accident considerations that we start to see. I think this is an area -- I don't know -many of you or us are considering new sites but we might need to reassess existing sites. And in many new countries, we have to establish new sites. And we saw clearly that the IAEA safety guides on siting were not enough, so we are now going to revise them and issue new, much more strict safety guides -- may have implications for all of us. CHAIR POWERS: We have been reassessing now four of our sites, because they're seeking to

16 install new reactors. One of the problems that we ran 17 18 into, we said, okay, what are the extremes of weather 19 that you can have at this site. And people came back and said, well, we looked back 100 years and sure 20 enough, this is the coldest weather we've ever had and 21 this is the warmest weather we've ever had in this 22 The question came back, well, if that's --23 time. It's factual evidence and 24 that's all very true. 25 whatnot.

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

But is there a reason to think what 1 2 happened in the last 100 years is what's going to happen in the next 100 years. And that's about the 3 4 time period you have to think about for these, because 5 you approve the site for 20 years, and then you put a reactor on it that lasts for 60. 6 Well, that's 80 years right there, so it's almost 100 years. And what 7 we found is that all of these were done on the --8 9 nearly all of them were on the eastern coast of the United States where we have weather records of 10 11 reasonable reliability going back to the 1700's. And in that record, you could indeed see that there were 12 cycles in the extremes of weather. 13 But it became almost an imponderable to 14 15 address within the reactor safety community because we don't have models that are predictive in that sense. 16 So we didn't -- I mean we ended up throwing up our 17 18 hands and saying, okay, we're going to take the 100-19 year historical record and we're going to pay 20 attention to it. Now we know very well we won't pay 21 attention to it, because we're not going to see it. I mean it's going to be all a very gradual sort of 22 23 thing. But you can see those kinds of problems 24 come up in the -- I mean this -- and all of that was 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

done within a context of not worrying about global 1 2 warming, anything like that. That was simply looking 3 at the factual evidence that indeed, there are cycles 4 and there are a couple of them and when they're in 5 phase, things get very bad and we happen to be 6 entering in, on the east coast of the United States, 7 into a phase where the two cycles are in phase. And 8 so we expect horrible hurricanes and things like that. 9 In the area of tsunamis, we've just finished a study 10 because the Cape Verde Islands periodically collapse 11 off and create tsunamis. They're not the kind in 12 Indonesia. They're a different kind of tsunami. And 13 then we discovered, sure enough, the Caribbean does 14 the same sort of thing. I mean these are all very 15 difficult things whereas on these sites --That's common to waste 16 MR. VIKTORRSEN: 17 siting or waste a reactor for whatever facility, so I 18 think we need to keep this in the research area. That 19 is my connection. 20 CHAIR POWERS: Yes. Our -- we are 21 enjoying a reasonable challenge people have frequently 22 mentioned in the presentations on the area of seismic 23 And I think we'll learn a lot from the research. Japanese experience in this recent reactor. Most of 24 25 the people that talked to me about it are very

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

And we're going through a change in our 5 regulatory approach toward seismic effects, because we 6 7 -- our seismic hazard has gone up by roughly -estimated seismic hazard on the east coast of the 8 9 United States has gone up by roughly a factor of five 10 or six based on earthquake frequencies, so we're going But having a PRA that 11 through that challenge. encompasses that seismic effect at the level of risk 12 13 it imposes is a challenge that we haven't really 14 overcome yet, because there are a lot of little very 15 technically detailed things -- what do high frequency 16 parts of the spectrum do to you and things that that.

17 But the general concept of a network of 18 expertise seems very attractive to me as opposed to a 19 center, an actual physical center, though I don't see how you get out of center concept when you talk about 20 21 experiments. I'm thinking not just in 22 thermohydraulics but for instance, non-destructive 23 examinations. And for instance, mention was made of non-destructive examination of containment leakages, 24 one I've not thought of but you're right. We don't 25

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

www.nealrgross.com

	152
1	have any capabilities there. And yet it'sI mean
2	for the ESBWR, that's a major issue right now is that
3	we get enough leakage that you threaten the control
4	room, and we don't have any capability there.
5	MR. VIKTORRSEN: There is research going
6	on in some of the European countries, at least on
7	this. But I think more needs to be done, because this
8	might be a trap to a whole fleet if they start to
9	degrade.
10	CHAIR POWERS: We actually know they are.
11	Well, I mean we have
12	MEMBER ARMIJO: Some of them almost
13	dissolved.
14	MR. PECKENPAUGH: I mean we are in our
15	main steam isolation valves, we've not required
16	anybody to test them for 10 years, and it's kind of
17	find to test when you know that they won't pass the
18	test. But we also know that the man-rems involved in
19	fixing them is it's a burden. It's a major burden
20	and so now what do you do with that piece of
21	information.
22	MR. VIKTORRSEN: And the PWR too, we had
23	holes like this in the liners, corroded. And this
24	took I mean it was a major effort to repair them.
25	And this may also exist in other places without
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

testing.

1

2 MR. REPUSSARD: There are many areas where there's not so much a need for research but there is 3 4 a need to maintain high level expertise. And 5 unfortunately, you don't -- you can't do it unless you do a little bit of research. Otherwise, the experts 6 7 just get away. And if you -- we'll use your ecology 8 for example. Okay, we are -- in Europe now, there are 9 very few countries, France one of them, but when you look at the capability in Europe -- in fact, why do I, 10 11 because in the States, it's the same. It's becoming less than critical. 12

13 And if anything comes up, there is a risk that we can't deal with the issue, because we just 14 15 don't have anyone who knows about these things. And that is also a responsibility for the -- a collective 16 responsibility to try and maintain some level of 17 18 expertise, because there's always some issues on a 19 daily basis. And there could be problems which we 20 would need -- you can't exclude an accident or a waste 21 spillage or whatever. And if you don't have people 22 who understand, then you're in big trouble.

And so I think there could be -- you know, there are areas where regulatory safety needs its own research to be able top criticize the industry to

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1 address, okay, we -- these are key -- what you call 2 the key issues where you probably need to concentrate 3 because it's so expensive that you -- okay, this is a But there are other areas where you need 4 sharing. 5 people who understand seismology. You need then in 6 We need them in other countries. But you Japan. don't really -- I wouldn't call that research, because 7 8 it's not separate research from those needed by 9 chemical industries or to build schools or hospitals, 10 it's basically the same.

11 So what you need is -- in the IRSN, for 12 example, we have a laboratory with quite a few good 13 people, but we've been pressurized to close it and 14 says why do you need this in the IRSN. I mean you can ask anybody to do it. And I said, yes, but this is a 15 16 key issue and I keep a small lab, but they spend half 17 of their time working for other projects for us. You know, when there is a seismic activity, the French ---18 19 I don't know, in the Caribbean, okay, we have problems 20 there because not all the public buildings have been 21 built without taking care of -- so we have a grant, so 22 we contribute to that. So that keeps my expertise 23 going because they work on other things, but I know 24 they're there if I need the, people who still know 25 about nuclear facilities and seismicity.

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

And I think these networks, not concentrated, but it's a way maintain such knowledge by having exchange. But I wouldn't call it research really. It's not really. It's a totally different configuration but is still something we need that has a productivity.

7 MR. VIKTORRSEN: But radio-oncology is 8 research. For example, when the Chernobyl happened 9 and we had to answer in the morning, we had 5 10 kilobecquerel of iodine or 10 kilobecquerel of iodine 11 on the vascular meter. Can we allow the cows to go 12 Fortunately, we had people from the -- who had out? done research because of the fallout from the Russian 13 14 bomb tests, so they could answer. But they were, I 15 think, less than five in Sweden. And they were all 16 more than 60 and today there are not anymore there. 17 But fortunately, Chernobyl helped us to build a new 18 generation, but they are also phasing out.

But it is on paper now and ICRP has published this, and so we have quite dose conversion factors. But you need also expertise to be able to elaborate them and to understand them.

CHAIR POWERS: We turn now to the question of digital electronic systems, because it's one that we've been specifically asked to address. And what is

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

1 it that we need to know about these systems from a 2 regulatory point of view, and do we need a network or 3 a center of expertise on digital electronic systems? 4 MR. SCHWARTZ: Maybe not only for nuclear 5 or community but you can open that to lots of 6 industry.

7 MR. REPUSSARD: I think there is one 8 question that I would love very much to announce, 9 because there's no doubt that digital I&C will, for 10 safety functions, will give it up. That's -- and 11 there's no reason to be against it in principle. And one of the questions I'm asking my people but I can't 12 answer is, is it reasonable to allow the nuclear 13 industry to use commercial -- that means standard 14 15 digital, which have many functions which only a subset 16 will be used in a particular -- or do we spend more? Because if you do that, of course, it's more expensive 17 18 but it's a lot more reassuring. But do we have 19 arguments to criticize the use of very cheap, off-the-20 software which can do anything you want shelf 21 including safety. But then they have so many other 22 functions built in for commercial purposes that it's 23 totally impossible to even begin using those tests. And that is a tough question and at the 24

24 And that is a tough question and at the 25 moment, I have no strong arguments to say to our

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

```
www.nealrgross.com
```

	157
1	French authorities that you must not allow commercial
2	and that there would be an uproar in one place and the
3	other, but there maybe a good case for that. Maybe
4	this is it's a simple question, not an easy answer.
5	And as Michel says, it's not specific to it's
6	aeronautics. I mean we have an Arian rocket fall out
7	of the sky because of that, because the software went
8	to pick up the wrong information which normally had no
9	role at all, but the fact is it was there and somehow
10	it happened, and it deviated the rocket. One chance
11	in one million.
12	CHAIR POWERS: Well, one chance in a
13	million is the kind of levels of probability we're
14	working in.
15	MEMBER BLEY: But I suspect we don't know
16	that it was once chance in one million. You know, we
17	that's the problem with these. We don't know what
18	the we don't have good models, especially if
19	they're complicated.
20	MR. REPUSSARD: After it happened, they
21	knew they found out eventually through a very
22	complex inquiry that the chance was I mean the
23	probability of that particular logical circuit being
24	active at that particular moment.
25	MEMBER BLEY: Good point, yes, but the
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

	158
1	problem with that is is that a member of a class or is
2	that a specific thing?
3	MR. REPUSSARD: It's not a member.
4	MEMBER BONACA: You know, the probability
5	of one bridge hand is extremely low but the
6	probability of a bridge hand with a certain number of
7	points is pretty high, and you need a model that can
8	deal with that. We don't have good models just yet.
9	We don't even have good explanations of all the
10	different kinds of failure modes and how they might
11	get actuated. It seems like this is an area that
12	might be a nice one
13	MR. THADANI: Dennis, we tried to model
14	we tried to estimate likelihood of TMI after TMI
15	happened.
16	MEMBER BLEY: Yes, sure.
17	MR. THADANI: Okay, we traced the whole
18	sequence of events including all the failures for you
19	know that exact one because we knew. It came up like
20	one in a billion or something like that.
21	MEMBER BLEY: The chance that the plant is
22	out there working today is exactly in the state it's
23	in is extremely low.
24	MR. THADANI: Right. Well, if you ask me
25	something simple like small break and failure of a
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	159
1	high pressure injection system, I come up with a
2	different estimate.
3	MEMBER BLEY: Much higher, of course.
4	MR. THADANI: Yes, and so more credible
5	that you can have an accident like that. So I think
6	it's very you know, you can make these estimates,
7	but if you go to a very detailed level, more often
8	than not, you'll estimate fairly low likelihood of
9	things happening.
10	MEMBER BLEY: And that's not very helpful
11	to you.
12	MR. THADANI: No, that's
13	MEMBER BONACA: In fact, it gives you
14	false comfort.
15	MR. THADANI: For decision making, that's
16	false, yes.
17	CHAIR POWERS: The general question you
18	said it exactly correct is we know it's inevitable
19	we will have digital safety systems in nuclear power
20	plants. Are those digital safety systems going to be
21	COF systems, commercial off-the-shelf systems or not?
22	Right now we say not, because you have to follow an
23	IPEEE standard which it can't do. But is that unfair,
24	overly conservative? Probably. What's the
25	alternative? We don't know. And we have before us a
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

1 proposal coming from a relatively high level that says let's set up a center of excellence on this. And I'm 2 3 sitting here saying, you know, is this one that we support, or should we support a network of excellence 4 5 in this area, or should we go it alone? I mean that's 6 the question I'm wrestling with right now. 7 MR. THADANI: You have a very practical issue of where, for example, not digitalizing the 8 9 context of the hardware but the software aspects -- is there international agreement on what is adequate 10 11 software system for safety criticals functions such as 12 protection system or certain actuation systems? As 13 you probably know, an earlier design certified by the NRC, there was a requirement that you have to have a 14 15 hard-wired limited backup capability. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes. 16 17 MR. THADANI: Is that going to continue on for the next 20 years the same philosophy, or is there 18 19 some international agreement? As you said, systems 20 may be built in different countries and applied 21 elsewhere. 2.2 MEMBER BONACA: Well, typically, you have 23 a hard backup system or you do have circumstances that action 24 give credit for operator or operator 25 intervention. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	161
1	MR. THADANI: Right.
2	MEMBER BONACA: And that's a concern to me
3	for new designs where, in some cases, you're asking
4	the operator to step back from the console to do
5	nothing. So, you know, the solution we have had in
6	the past, which was essentially giving credit for
7	operator intervention on feedback systems, now is
8	going to disappear. I mean because simply you step
9	back and you cannot intervene and maybe the plant is
10	not going in the right direction. So that's a
11	concern. I mean, you know? But the backup system, I
12	believe, still now is a solution, right, when the NRC
13	has?
14	MR. THADANI: It's currently being debated
15	still.
16	MEMBER BONACA: Being debated?
17	MR. THADANI: But I guess my point in
18	this, bringing it up, was on Dana's issue are you
19	really looking in the long-term for some consistency
20	in safety requirements? And let's take digital
21	systems, both hardware and software. Well, what are
22	those requirements? If you're going to allow off-the-
23	shelf, NRC's not going to allow, and you're going to
24	have the same question why is it okay in one
25	country and not okay in another country. So you're
	NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

back to is this -- are we -- are there issues like digital I&C where you really do want to achieve some semblance of international agreement? Agreement may be too strong a term to use.

5 I do believe that's a MEMBER BONACA: 6 great candidate for a center of excellence at the 7 international level, because, I mean, particularly, I 8 think there is a lot to learn from people who have 9 worried about common cause more than we have done in 10 the U.S. Like, you know, the Germans used to design 11 plants assuming single failure but also common cause 12 failure in a systematic way. I don't know how effective but they did. And I'm sure that that was --13 a central issue was the, you know, I&C. So there is 14 15 probably information out there that can be leveraged. 16 And I think it's an area of common interest. I mean 17 every regulatory body that I know is concerned about 18 this. This is happening and is being pushed by the 19 licensees and we're not ready.

20 MR. VITANZA: I would just like to mention 21 that in this context, of course, it would be very 22 appropriate to build up a center of excellence. There 23 is already a center of excellence, to some extent at 24 least if you want to go in this way, at Halden in that 25 Halden has devoted a lot of work in the history. But

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

of course, then here are some specific items and doing research. Then if you want to bring it together, all this research and maybe do additional complementary work, that, of course, can be done in whatever alternative context. But there is already at least some important work that has been done in one international sphere.

8 MR. REPUSSARD: But for me, it's clearly 9 an area where we need to -- as I said, we have 10 difficulty to maintain expertise, experts. You don't have expertise without experts. And the only viable 11 solution for me would be a network of expertise. Of 12 course, that will include some research programs, but 13 14 we have to be careful not to institute, in our eyes, 15 research too much in any of our areas.

16 need committed people who But we understand and top people, and the only way to give 17 offer them something feed is to them 18 to an 19 international network and also some research issues 20 who could, on that scenario, where we could say, okay, what are the five questions we ask for in research. 21 And also, will you please work together because we 22 23 want only one answer to each of the questions. And it's not so expensive, it's just manpower plus some 24 25 experimentation.

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

www.nealrgross.com

MR. VITANZA: One thing is to perform 1 2 research. Another thing is also to bring the results together and make sense out of it and possibility a 3 4 consensus out of that. We see that in many areas. For example, in the RIA, there are good data that have 5 been produced for the fuel, and I think we are in the 6 7 position where at least we can come together with some 8 consensus, at least on a provisional basis. So one 9 thing is to perform the research. Another thing is to 10 bring things together. That can be a very good thing to be done in these sort of networks. 11 MR. VIKTORRSEN: Yes, I also believe that 12 13 this item is more a question for a network than as a real center of excellence, because this knowledge is 14 15 spread in so many areas --16 MR. VITANZA: And it's not only nuclear. 17 MR. VIKTORRSEN: -- and it's not -- no, 18 it's not only nuclear, exactly. So we have just to 19 draw the question about specific application in the 20 And I think many elements of the nuclear area. necessary knowledge exists, and I agree with Carlo. 21 22 We have to try to put it together. And in that sense, 23 a network is probably the best thing. MEMBER BONACA: The thing that troubles me 24 25 about these issues is that we've been presented by the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

1 industry with examples, the sophisticated hardware-2 software out there -- I remember we went to Germany a 3 few years ago, and we went to Siemens -- they 4 presented us a system that was very elaborate -- so 5 from one end, we get very supportive statements and presentation by the industry, and then we have the 6 7 examples being brought by the NRC. I remember they 8 gave us examples of failures. That's a horror story over a 10-year period -- I mean of events that were 9 caused by failures in programming or really the 10 combination of hardware-software interaction that took 11 12 So it's a difficult issue because although place. 13 there are many applications, etcetera, you know, I always hear two stories and they diverge. You know, 14 15 the proponents are coming in and telling me I don't have to worry about it. And then the events are 16 17 telling me I should worry about it. The licensing 18 MR. VIKTORRSEN: is 19 particularly difficult for a computerized system. How 20 -- I mean a mechanical system, you can go through in a sort of a normal engineering way, but in a computer, 21 22 you have to go deep into the programming. It needs to be done, really, in the development stage rather than 23 when a product is there. 24

25

MR. VITANZA: And we've heard recently --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

166

cars, they're building such little quantities that you don't have a lot of repetitiveness of the same faults, so suddenly you have fault and, you know, the car is simply stopping on the highway.

8 MEMBER BLEY: That's a different order of 9 problem, though, and I think that's -- some of our problem in this area, you know, a tremendous use in 10 the process industries where, on a normal basis, they 11 run very well. You get 95, 99%, you're doing very 12 13 well. You're producing more product, because they're controlling things better. But these funny cases 14 15 where you go out of the range that's been tested and 16 some bit of data gets dropped in a register where it 17 isn't normally, and that's used somewhere else, and 18 funny things happen.

And we don't -- you know, we're looking at those funny things, the rare events that can cause us big troubles. And that's not where the focus, at least that I've seen, that's not where the focus has been in the industry. So we're trying to -- you know, so I'm not sure that broad experience, how helpful that is to us.

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1	167
1	MR. VITANZA: Anyway, when you're thinking
2	about long-term research, there is a risk, in some
3	areas, of going in the wrong direction. But if you
4	focus on digital I&C for example, there is very little
5	chance that you're making a wrong choice.
6	MEMBER BLEY: That's true.
7	MR. VITANZA: The world is going in that
8	direction and so it's certainly a very sound avenue to
9	take. Another one would be on an new related area
10	like, for example, wireless communication. One would
11	imagine that with cable agin they would be making new
12	penetration and so on, maybe the industry should
13	consider that. Also, the possibility of reducing the
14	human error with adequate support system, computerized
15	support system, or maybe even support for inspections
16	like that all these sort of, say, support elements
17	that help that the human in performing his work. I
18	think it has to go in that direction, and they are
19	transversal. They are not related to one particular
20	system or another, and the risk of making a mistake
21	there is lower than in other area. By mistake, I mean
22	of going in the wrong direction.
23	CHAIR POWERS: I wonder if we're making
24	mistakes since we're pretty much not looking at
25	wireless communication now.
	NEAL R. GROSS

NEAL R. GRUSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

www.nealrgross.com

(202) 234-4433

MR. REPUSSARD: I suppose the point of having networks of expertise in our areas is that I believe very strongly that the nuclear safety community, regulatory-oriented, we look at questions a different way from the industry. If we don't have the different questions, then we shouldn't do it. We should just let the industry do it and we look at it. But if we have a different approach to the

9 question because we have a different task to them, 10 then it's worth us investigating with our own It doesn't mean that we don't work with 11 approach. them but it's a safety driven network, not an industry 12 13 -- not a technology development driven network, 14 because we can send -- we have some of our people --15 they participate in industry doing that work because 16 that's the way to learn things. That's fine.

But there are areas where we believe that our motion causes us to know things and to have our own doctrine, and the point of this meeting today, I think, is how can we -- because we -- there are, I'm sure, many areas where we share this, although it has never been explicit. And as we don't have infinite resources, how can we pool together?

But the question is how to map --, I mean you have yet on your mind in which the theory of

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

www.nealrgross.com

1 mapping what are the areas where we need to do reactor 2 system research for regulatory purposes. Where are the areas where we need high-level expertise to be 3 4 able to assess and define the policy and rules and then apply them? If we could map these things, which 5 has never been done really in CSNI because CSNI has 6 7 been about to map things where researchers are. Maybe 8 if we put this together, it would be cheaper. That's 9 not at all the same process. The top down -- say, 10 okay, these are all the problems which are important, 11 which one are long-term, which one is really research, which one is just a matter of having no independent 12 knowledge and where do we get that from? 13 If we -- three or four countries -- I 14 15 mean, France would certainly be willing. I know that 16 the U.S., Japan and maybe a country like India also, because all these people have been there. 17 I was in 18 Bombay not long ago and they're asking the same 19 questions, because they want to develop a fleet of reactors and say, okay, we have to get -- how can we 20 solve all these issues. 21 22 MEMBER BLEY: Logic. MR. REPUSSARD: So we would be willing to 23 go together with the NRC in a mapping exercise with 24 25 no, you know, no commitments, just to map things, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.neairgross.com

	170
1	seriously, do it properly.
2	CHAIR POWERS: Said has been a thorn in my
3	side saying this is exactly what we need to do is
4	maybe articulate a little bit what you're
5	MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: Well, just thinking
6	about the structure in a logical way. You don't need
7	to get lost in the details from the very beginning.
8	I think you need a framework to start out with and
9	then the issues will be almost self-identifying when
10	you get to that stage.
11	MEMBER BLEY: That's a nice structure. I
12	mean you've got technical issues; you've got
13	applications, reactor designs, whatever, parts of the
14	fuel cycle; you've got the knowledge gaps that fit
15	within those; and you've got the relevance of those
16	things. And that almost gives you a natural way to
17	structure where you ought to be focused first, second.
18	MR. THADANI: And how is I'm a little
19	unclear about this. I completely agree with you and
20	I think sometimes it's better if you have a handful of
21	countries trying to do that. But did I misunderstand
22	you Carlo? I thought that's what you were saying
23	yes, and I was going to try to do over the next year?
24	Isn't that I mean that's I think that's what I
25	heard.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

	171
1	MR. VITANZA: Looking, however, more in
2	the frame of facilities and strategy for the
3	utilization. I think the exercise that is being done
4	here seems to me a little bit more general content.
5	MR. THADANI: Okay. So you do want to
6	limit to facilities?
7	MR. VITANZA: If you want to do an
8	exercise in one year, probably we have to cut some
9	parts and presumably, we focus
10	CHAIR POWERS: It seems to me if you could
11	do an example, that that is extremely useful to, say,
12	okay, here's what you need to do in the grand scheme
13	of things, but here's an example. I mean that would
14	be very helpful.
15	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. I think so,
16	yes.
17	CHAIR POWERS: Can train it so you can get
18	it done in a year and we can look and see what it
19	looks like.
20	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, okay.
21	CHAIR POWERS: One of the issues that we
22	have, especially with the advanced reactor concepts,
23	is people from the political realms say why should the
24	regulatory body do any research at all; all you have
25	to do is review what the licensee provides, and if he
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

doesn't provide enough, tell him to go back and provide some more.

And what we have learned is that the 3 4 applicant can make a cost-benefit tradeoff and his 5 cost-benefit tradeoff is whether to provide the other data or go complain to the political body that the 6 7 regulatory authority is being too tough on him and 8 that they should chastise him for being so tough. And 9 oftentimes, that turns out to be the cheaper route, to 10 complain about the regulatory authority. And so I was 11 then intrigued by the comment that pretty much 12 universally across the spectrum says that we need to have an independent regulatory examination of these 13 things that's demonstrably independent. 14

And I -- you know, I'm willing to believe. 15 16 It's not clear to me how I persuade my political cousins that this is essential and yet it's -- I mean 17 every single one of -- I bet you I could find the word 18 19 independent in every one of these presentations here 20 someplace. And I know I can find it every one of the 21 presentations, even those from EPRI and the NEI that 22 were at our last meetings -- had this call for an 23 independent regulatory authority that has independent 24 knowledge and that we're continually running into 25 this, especially for the advanced reactors because

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

we're starting somewhat from scratch. The political bodies say, you guys don't need to do research, just have the licensees do -- get you whatever you need.

1

2

3

19

MEMBER BLEY: The think I hadn't really 4 5 thought of earlier dealing with that issue came up this morning, and that's to maintain that independent 6 7 capability, you need this excellence of experts. And 8 the only way to do that is to be out in front on the 9 research to get the right people and that sort of Putting together the case that explains why 10 thing. that has to be so, although it seems self-evident, is 11 not an easy one I think. 12

13 CHAIR POWERS: We've -- I mean in our 14 looking at the research, we've identified areas where 15 having expertise is a tour, because the universities 16 aren't producing the -- there aren't consultants I can 17 go to because all those consultants have been hired by 18 the industry --

20 CHAIR POWERS: and retired or died, and 21 we've done that. I've been very intrigued by this 22 concept that, which I happen to have personal 23 experience, it's true, that by providing a research 24 forum, you can attract people into a field. And the 25 digital electronic field is one of those that we can

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Or have retired.

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

5 MR. REPUSSARD: Sorry. I think we had exactly the same questions when we came up to that 6 7 committee at the end of the year. I mean I've been 8 meeting my -- okay, you know, the bosses are five 9 ministers in the government -- defense, research, industry, environment and health and several of them 10 11 have exactly the same questions, so we commit to this committee. But we came out quite well, and I think we 12 13 -- it was a big effort. But we tried to show them --14 you know, it was very concrete; say, okay, these are 15 the questions. Now who is going to answer these 16 questions if we don't do it? Nobody because the industry is not doing it that way, universities, 17 18 nobody else has this knowledge or could have this 19 knowledge. So if it's not done, it's not going to --20 if we don't do it, nobody will do it.

And there is some neutralize, and do you know what is the cost of an accident, a facility accident. So we came out with a status quo, with a slightly improved budget. That's something because the pressure has gone off to say, okay, yes, they made

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

	175
1	the public statement that safety is strategic for a
2	country which relies massively on nuclear. But for
3	politicians to say that was it took them a little -
4	-
5	MEMBER ARMIJO: Took some courage which
6	there's not a lot of in politicians.
7	MR. REPUSSARD: Yes, but we put real
8	questions on the table. We showed them; said, look,
9	these are concrete but it's not just a question of
10	there are generic arguments by the public's
11	confidence, etcetera, but we also say, okay, if this
12	severe a severe accident can occur, and this
13	and we need radio-oncology because if there is a leak
14	somewhere, what do we do. We can't afford to ruin the
15	whole society because of lack of a few people.
16	MR. VIKTORRSEN: And independent
17	assessments of a regulatory body doesn't mean that we
18	redo what the industry has done.
19	MR. REPUSSARD: No. It's a different
20	MR. VIKTORRSEN: I think this is extremely
21	important also to point out to the politicians that
22	we are doing something different. We are in some
23	very sensitive areas, we have developed our own tools
24	and we use them and to see what the results were. And
25	then we are using research to be able to ask the right
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

1 questions. There are several arguments, because if we 2 try to say or if they believe that we are redoing what 3 the industry has done, that, of course, it doesn't 4 work. 5 CHAIR POWERS: That doesn't work. What 6 I'd like to do now is just take a 15 minute break. 7 When we come back, I'd like to touch a little more on 8 the safety cultural aspects of things and given 9 factors aspects of things, because those look like 10 generic issues that are transcended in time as long as 11 -- well, up until we get this no operator reactor in 12 Galino or whatever. 13 MEMBER BLEY: Then the I&C issues will be really --14 15 CHAIR POWERS: So let's come back in 15 16 minutes. 17 (Whereupon, off the record at 3:34 p.m. 18 and back on the record at 3:53 p.m.) 19 CHAIR POWERS: We are ready to come back 20 into session. The plan, Ashok, is to complete at 5:00 21 o'clock? 22 MR. THADANI: Yes. 23 CHAIR POWERS: So I'll turn it back to 24 you. 25 MR. THADANI: I have a question and it's **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

not necessarily a pure research-type question but 1 2 nevertheless, it goes along with a lot of the For future designs, I think 3 discussion we've had. 4 there has been a lot of discussion that parts will be built different places, questions will be asked about 5 safety in one country versus another country of a 6 7 design. Does it make sense to have some effort to try and establish some high-level safety requirements that 8 9 different countries can agree to? I'm talking about above, higher than the safety standards, for example, 10 11 your safety standards.

Of the standards would, 12 course, 13 presumably, play a very important role depending on the technology that one is talking about. And Said 14 15 had said earlier about maybe -- I don't know that he 16 used the word technology-neutral, but an you establish some high-level safety principles that could really 17 form the basis for whatever is done in more detail, if 18 19 you will, so at least countries can say, yes -- I'll 20 give you a specific example -- core damage frequency, 21 is it appropriate to say that internationally people have agreed that the mean -- that means you have 22 23 considered uncertainties -- the mean value of core damage frequency will be 10 to the minus x or less, 24 25 whatever that x is. I'm talking about in those terms

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

that such high levels. Under MDEP Phase II, the initial information provided indicated that there are differences and different countries use different safety limits, if you will.

5 Do you think it makes sense for these, 6 particularly, the non-LWR designs, to have some 7 international agreement on some high-level principles? 8 Because if the answer is yes, then it is not a simple 9 process. It will be a long-term effort. It won't be 10 something you can do like in a year or two years. It 11 will be a multi-year effort to be able to do that. Is 12 that something worth considering?

13 MR. REPUSSARD: I can make a remark. Ι 14 have the example of the EPR as mentioned earlier. 15 This was the approach that was taken. That means that 16 the French and German government decided that there 17 should be a new Franco-German technology. But at the 18 same time, there was a political decision to choose 19 some common safety, not principles, objectives, safety 20 objectives. In other words, from GENERATION II, what 21 would be the safety improvements that they were 22 jointly expected to design. We knew it would be a PWR 23 but we -- the design wasn't there. There was just no 24 design for it apart from the fact that it was a 25 pressure water reactor.

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

www.nealrgross.com

ļ	179
1	And there were things such as quite
2	simple things well, I should say weren't simple
3	precise. Let's say, for example, we want to exclude,
4	de facto, large-break LOCA. Okay? We want to have no
5	limit the off-site consequences by avoiding the
6	China Syndrome. Okay, so there are a number of other
7	things like that which were kind of a safety charter.
8	We say, okay, we are here with GENERATION II. We want
9	to be here. These are the set of safety requirements
10	or objectives. And then the designers went around and
11	said, okay, how can we solve this issue; how can we
12	reach this level. And they did it. Well, then we are
13	still currently reviewing because some the French
14	EPR is not exactly the same as the Finnish EPR, so we
15	are still discussing the design details with and we
16	don't have but that's okay.
17	Now if you look at GENERATION IV, could
18	there be an international agreement to say, okay, we
19	want no off-site consequences. Do whatever design you
20	want, but we want absolute proof that there will be no
21	accident with off-site consequences. Is that a
22	challenge that can be handled or not? That's just one
23	example.
24	MEMBER BONACA: So you have defined
25	objectives more in terms of certain specific outcomes
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 BHODE ISLAND AVE. N.W.

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

H

www.nealrgross.com

	180
1	
2	MR. REPUSSARD: Functional objectives.
3	MEMBER BONACA: that purely a
4	numerical?
5	MR. REPUSSARD: Yes, because of
6	probabilities.
7	MR. VIKTORRSEN: I mean to put a number
8	like ten to the minus five or ten to the minus six, we
9	don't have an agreed tool, internationally, to verify
10	this.
11	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's right.
12	MR. VIKTORRSEN: So it's sort of useless.
13	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Right.
14	MR. VIKTORRSEN: So to me, it's much
15	better to put more in the terms that Jacques mentions
16	or to at least say that we have to have several
17	barriers in between the core and the environment and
18	leave possible that would be, of course, an
19	extremely important improvement if we can say there
20	will be no off-site consequences. But how do we prove
21	this? Is this again as long as we have efficient
22	process and residual heat in the core, we will have
23	always the challenge to contain it and to cool I for
24	a certain time. And you need probably human beings
25	there to make sure that this is the case.
	NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	181
1	So I wonder if it's possible to develop
2	numerical principles. I think it's better to try
3	but I think the effort is commendable. I think we
4	should, in this case, we should be a little bit better
5	off than we have been before from the safety community
6	when we develop the new reactors, GENERATION IV, for
7	example, and put some very challenging goals to the
8	industry. And in what frame it will be done? I don't
9	know, because the safety standards and the
10	requirements are already on a rather high level. And
11	I also, difficult it is to see that we develop
12	completely a different process than the safety
13	standards, because we want them to apply for all
14	countries building nuclear power plants, not for a
15	few.
16	I think we should try to discuss them in
17	the terms of safety standards or safety requirements.
18	It could start in a small group and then be enlarged.
19	I mean a process, it's always possible discuss how to
20	do it, but some effort is needed. That's for sure.
21	MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: But don't you think
22	that in the early days, that people had the same sort
23	of functional goals that you're talking about?
24	MR. VIKTORRSEN: I am sure.
25	MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: And it's only after
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

	182
1	we learn that we sort of discover the fallibility of
2	whatever design people came up with albeit their
3	ultimate goal was no off-site releases, etcetera?
4	MR. VIKTORRSEN: I am sure you are right.
5	MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: So if that is the
6	case, you know, we may have the same kind of history
7	repeating itself if we go along a new path where our
8	initial condition is pretty much the same as the
9	original initial condition for the current reactors.
10	So I think the likelihood of repeating history would
11	be relatively high if we go on a completely new path,
12	new technology where we don't know quite as much. But
13	I think if we follow if we have just evolutions of
14	the current technology, then I'm sure we can meet
15	these functional objectives.
16	MEMBER BONACA: And that's really where
17	the PRA will be valuable, which is although we cannot
18	compare plant A to plant B of different design built
19	in different countries it would not be the approach
20	but you can you know, I still have comfort
21	looking at a Westinghouse plant analyzed with current
22	technology. And then the same technology applied to
23	AP1000 and I see that core damage frequency is
24	significantly reduced, I mean, because I'm using the
25	same technology. It gives you at least it gives me

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	183
1	an assessment that based on the same technology, PRA,
2	I have improved results.
3	Now granted I've covered only what I know.
4	But that's true of anything in life. I mean
5.	MR. THADANI: Right. No, I want to
6	clarify, because I didn't mean to say that that's it,
7	that's your high-level safety principle and you can go
8	forward. No. I certainly said that I picked a
9	controversial example deliberately. But that doesn't
10	mean that you will not consider concepts of defense in
11	depth, multiple barriers, all kinds of good, sound
12	considerations including a lot of the stuff that's
13	I know in the U.S. general design criteria for
14	example.
15	But where I was headed with this issue was
16	U.S. NRC has taken a crack at it as to what the future
17	should look like in terms of safety requirements.
18	It's not Commission hasn't approved it. It's work-
19	in-progress and the Committee, I know, has written
20	letters saying you should continue to work for the
21	next several years on this. Where I was headed was do
22	you think there's even some and then Christer said
23	that he thought there would be value in going forward
24	is it something I mean beyond I'm now sure,
25	Chuck, your views; or Carlo, your views; or Michel.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

	184
1	Where do you see this?
2	MEMBER ARMIJO: How does this fit in with
3	the safety research program? This is safety policy,
4	I think, that you're talking about
5	MR. THADANI: No
6	MEMBER ARMIJO: or safety goals for new
7	advanced reactors. But I don't see how that's
8	CHAIR POWERS: Well, where it fits in is
9	explicitly in what we say about technology-neutral
10	frameworks and things like that.
11	MR. THADANI: Yes, framework.
12	CHAIR POWERS: Right now we'd say pretty
13	much what Ashok says is that I think we grant that the
14	current product is disappointing. I think that's the
15	word we use.
16	MR. THADANI: I think that's what you
17	said.
18	CHAIR POWERS: Or you said non-functional
19	or something like that, not useful. And attendant to
20	that is this letter that we've written in which there
21	are more added comments than there are comments, but
22	they were born of a lack of top-down thinking was
23	one of the approaches; another one is lack of
24	practicality. I mean there are a lot of things
25	associated with so that's how it relates to the
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	185
1	research program is what we do here to get to a
2	regulatory system that allows for substantial
3	deviations from the current design. That doesn't mean
4	we abandoned light water reactors, but it allows for
5	more adventuresome activity.
6	And that's one of the overall, that's
7	one of the issues that we have to address is if the
8	regulatory system is so constrained that it inhibits
9	innovation and design, then that's not a good
10	regulatory system. And certainly we've had it
11	telegraphed to us that one of the reasons that the
12	industry is not bringing forth higher technology is
13	that they fear the delay in the regulatory review.
14	And that's very distressing to us.
15	MR. VITANZA: Dana, I think this is still
16	policy more than research, or at least in
17	CHAIR POWERS: We get close to the edge
18	here.
19	MR. THADANI: You still have to go to
20	Commission ultimately to get their approval, because
21	policy decisions have to be made by the Commission.
22	But you don't just come up with policy statements.
23	You got to do a lot of work before you can get to the
24	point of developing sound policy. And in this case,
25	research has been working on technology-neutral
	NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1 framework for, I don't know, six-seven years, and they 2 still, presumably, need to continue to work on that. And I'm stepping back and I'm saying, if 3 4 NRC research is working on something like that, 5 listening to the conversation we've had all day long about global aspects, is it really efficient for NRC 6 7 to be working on issues like that alone, or does it 8 make more sense to see if there's some international 9 That's the issue. It's research, interest. presumably, is going to continue to work for the next 10 11 several years on something like that. CHAIR POWERS: Yes, well, the -- I mean I 12 13 think it goes beyond that issue -- is that research 14 has worked on that issue some time and though some are 15 enthusiastic about the product, some are not. 16 MR. THADANI: Yes. But the question is do 17 CHAIR POWERS: 18 people have a better approach and are they wrestling 19 the issue. And I think the -- just look in the B 20 graphs -- the answer is unequivocally yes. But how do we approach it, and --21 MR. THADANI: I think to their credit, as 22 23 of the work they've done, they have result а identified seven policy issues that clearly require 24 25 Commission consideration, but this -- I'm sort of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	187
1	thinking liquid metal reactors there's so much more
2	knowledge within France.
3	CHAIR POWERS: We have a lot of knowledge
4	in the U.S. We just threw it away.
5	MEMBER ARMIJO: We have a lot
6	CHAIR POWERS: A few years later, you
7	threw yours away.
8	MR. THADANI: Yes, they still have it.
9	MR. VIKTORRSEN: I think the key point is
10	to we have to drive down the probability of
11	accidents.
12	CHAIR POWERS: Yes.
13	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes.
14	MR. VIKTORRSEN: I think, to me, that is
15	the key, because if we maintain a probability of
16	accidents of 10 to the minus four, it's far too high
17	if we are to continue to utilize the reactor, because
18	then we will have new accidents quite soon,
19	mathematically. So we have to drive it down to at
20	least a couple of magnitudes lower. And if you can
21	suggest a reactor which with some good proof can show
22	that, then it should be pursued I believe.
23	If your metal reactor is such a reactor,
24	I don't know. If you think that it can easily go down
25	and it's capital investment is of a reasonable size,
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	188
1	I think then it would be perhaps wise to start
2	supporting this. But if it's questionable, I think
3	the evolutionary approach would be more attractive to
4	me
5	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well, sure.
6	MR. VIKTORRSEN: because we know so
7	much today about the operation and safety of LWRs, so
8	why not continue to develop slowly and better.
9	MEMBER ARMIJO: Revolutionary reactors
10	always look great, wonderful until you start working
11	on them and then you start finding problems and you
12	add costs and
13	MEMBER BONACA: And, you know, I was
14	pointing out before one bullet you have on your
15	presentation on licensing if factory nuclear
16	records tend to encourage a reduction of public
17	spending on safety research because there is this
18	comfort that, you know, we know everything about it,
19	I agree. It's very important to communicate to our
20	politicians that if you do not go away from
21	evolutionary reactors, not light water reactors,
22	you're opening Pandora's box. This statement is not
23	acceptable anymore because probably you have to go
24	back to spending that we had for light water reactors.
25	MR. VIKTORRSEN: Yes.
	NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1	189
1	MR. VITANZA: I understand that in the
2	U.S. NRC, there will be there are already or maybe
3	there will be soon some application for gas reactor,
4	at least one design, and I also understand one, I
5	think it's a Toshiba liquid-soluble reactor so I
6	don't know how realistic that is, but this is what I
7	hear. And so how are we going to cope also with these
8	systems if they're coming on the table and for which
9	the knowledge is not there?
10	MEMBER BONACA: Well, I think that
11	MEMBER ARMIJO: You've done it before,
12	licensed gas reactors and where there's no knowledge,
13	you'll do defense in-depth with other requirements.
14	You might put a containment on a gas reactor, you
15	know, if they approve your fuel so hot.
16	MEMBER BONACA: Okay, got it.
17	MEMBER ARMIJO: You know, there's a lot of
18	things you can do, but I don't that's our highest
19	priority. Our highest priority is the remaining light
20	water reactor issues, the existing ones, the materials
21	degradation, or emerging new phenomena that we haven't
22	seen due to aging and all the issues with the new
23	light water reactors, the passive systems and the new
24	designs, digital I&C, passive safety, severe accidents
25	for these kind of things. Then we get to GENERATION

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

•

	190
1	IV and fast reactors and
2	MEMBER BONACA: I think for that one, I
3	mean isn't there and is the question from Congress
4	to know what it takes?
5	MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes. And somebody's going
6	to tell them. But they're going to tell them and
7	MEMBER BONACA: There is an expectation to
8	
9	MEMBER ARMIJO: This year.
10	MEMBER BONACA: This year?
11	MEMBER ARMIJO: That's right.
12	MR. THADANI: There is a Commission
13	meeting coming up on this month, in two weeks, on
14	February 20th. The topic of that meeting is advanced
15	reactors and that is these are non-light water
16	reactors except I should correct that it
17	includes designs like IRIS, and so and they're
18	unique, very unique designs. There is some sense out
19	there that there may well be some applications coming
20	in between 2010 and 2013 to the NRC. A question
21	that's been raised has been, okay, well, how can we be
22	ready as an agency if that were to be the case. 2010,
23	2013 may well be 2013, 2015, 2016, but nevertheless,
24	it is not 20 years away. We're talking about maybe
25	within a decade or so based on the discussions that

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

are going on.

2	And the Commission will have to then make
3	some decisions on how to partition resources, if you
4	will. Obviously, light water reactors are going to be
5	around for another century or 50, 60, 70 years you
6	would think, so they have to get the substantial
7	fraction of the resources. But the question that
8	they'll have to deal with is how much to invest in our
9	light water reactors. And I think this meeting may
10	will shed some light on really how serious the
11	industry is. You know, it's we've heard before
12	MEMBER ARMIJO: The investment will be the
13	U.S. Congress? The industry isn't going to invest
14	much.
15	MR. THADANI: Well, yes, we know that and
16	
17	MEMBER ARMIJO: The U.S. Congress changes
18	its mind readily, so I just won't hold my breath. But
19	the Commission has an obligation to give their
20	assessment this year.
21	MR. VIKTORRSEN: That would be the
22	opportunity also to highlight these points we have had
23	here of the need for real strong safety case they
24	are going forward. Put all the burden on the NRC.
25	MR. THADANI: I mean, we can't have it all
	NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 234-4433WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701www.nealrgross.com

1 ways. We can't say we need good infrastructure; this 2 is what good infrastructure is, but we cannot put any 3 resources; this is a long-term effort. And when the time comes, what's the agency really going to do. 4 So 5 the point, in my mind, is you let the appointed 6 officials make decisions on priorities and timing, you 7 let the technical people tell the Commission if we 8 have to do these things, here's what would be needed. And ultimately, policy decisions would have to come 9 10 from the Commission, at least in this country. 11 MR. REPUSSARD: But in an interim period, 12 there is something, surely, which is not unreasonable 13 to do, is to spend some resources, not too much but 14 just to salvage and not let die completely the 15 knowledge on false breeders, because from an --16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, yes. 17 MR. REPUSSARD: ---18 policy point of view, fast breeders are something 19 purely unavoidable in the long term, and there is a 20 lot of knowledge just in the past 30 years. 21 And to let it die completely is a 22 guarantee that we'll have to start from scratch in 20 23 years time in another generic. There will be nobody 24 left. All the codes will have been running on 25 computers which nobody will know how to use anymore **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

We have the perspective of for prototype -5 - okay, it's been a political decision, we don't. 6 There's no design at the moment, there's -- but we 7 8 have stopped -- we have decided inside the RSN to 9 allocate some resources to salvage and to try and think, okay, what is transferrable. For example, when 10 11 we continue to develop codes on light water reactors, we add this other question -- okay, don't forget the 12 other -- the sodium reactors; could this code be 13 This is a question we ask. And if it can 14 adapted. 15 be, please -- it's like when you make a building, you need -- in some countries in the Middle East, you need 16 the iron for the next floor up, you know, so that, 17 well, if somebody wants to build another floor, it's 18 19 ready. 20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's already there, 21 right. 22 It's not such a bad MR. REPUSSARD: 23 concept. MR. SCHWARTZ: Even if we don't have a 24 25 firm design, we can start to work with a small group NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

www.nealrgross.com

some generic issues like the accidents 1 or on 2 propagation of -- so less severe accidents. And that 3 would be sufficient to start --4 MR. REPUSSARD: I mean it's not very 5 expensive. 6 MR. SCHWARTZ: -- the process. 7 Well, that's the first MEMBER ARMIJO: 8 step in doing any research is accumulating the past learning about 9 information, reviewing it, it, digesting it and then start to formulate your research 10 11 plan. 12 MR. REPUSSARD: I mean we've had also the 13 participation --14 MEMBER ARMIJO: It's not very expensive. 15 MR. REPUSSARD: -- the debate about safety 16 objectives for a new generation will come up and some 17 input will be expected from our community. And if you 18 don't have specialty, still be talking only in the 19 very general and not very useful terms. You won't be 20 focused. 21 CHAIR POWERS: Should we be -- are we 22 arriving at a consensus that this should be a 23 recommendation? I would think -- my sense 24 MR. THADANI: 25 says, listening to all and the discussions that we've **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	195
1	had, that some sort of state of knowledge report on
2	these selected non-light water reactor designs
3	we'll include gas, I think
4	MEMBER ARMIJO: Gas and
5	MR. THADANI: is essential in the near
6	term, and the results of that state of knowledge
7	assessment, if you will, would or should then play a
8	big role, as Sam was saying, in defining if you have
9	to go further, where do you go; what are those
10	selected areas where you want to move on. But I would
11	say the only other dimension that it should be done in
12	an international context.
13	MEMBER ARMIJO: That would make it more
14	effective.
15	MR. THADANI: Yes, for liquid metal
16	reactors, France has a whole bunch of good so does
17	Japan, too. Yes.
18	CHAIR POWERS: What I'm wondering is if we
19	should draft up a recommendation that says, okay, with
20	respect to gas reactors, NRC has gone through a
21	phenomena
22	MR. THADANI: I did.
23	CHAIR POWERS: identification and
24	ranking exercise
25	MR. THADANI: Yes yes.
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

.

	196
1	CHAIR POWERS: and presumably done a
2	very good job on that?
3	MR. THADANI: Yes, I think so.
4	CHAIR POWERS: And it's now is the time to
5	take that as one input to a more international
6	examination of what needs to be done and how it needs
7	to be done on these issues. I mean it's an input into
8	a discussion rather than anything definitive. But I
9	can see us drafting that. And that the NRC then
10	encourage the same or a similar group to go through a
11	similar exercise with respect to the knowledge that
12	exists on liquid metal-cooled reactors and arrive at
13	a discussion of here are the major issues that need to
14	be resolved sometime with the understanding that maybe
15	it doesn't need to be done tomorrow, but it needs to
16	be done before we get into a certification process.
17	Because once we're into an actual
18	certification process, the people doing the
19	certification simply are not going to wait for
20	research results.
21	MR. THADANI: But I would certainly be
22	careful not to delay that process, starting that
23	process because of the concern that you lose
24	CHAIR POWERS: Yes, it seems to me that we
25	have a pretty good driving force right now. I mean
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.neairgross.com

	197
1	tomorrow we're going to sit down and review some
2	things, and that looks like that's a pretty good input
3	on gas-cooled reactors.
4	MR. THADANI: Yes.
5	CHAIR POWERS: I mean it is an input
6	certainly. It may not be a definitive input, but it's
7	an input. And maybe it's a springboard to create a
8	similar set of inputs for the gas reactors and get the
9	process started with that.
10	MR. VITANZA: The sodium
11	CHAIR POWERS: Yes. I mean sodium
12	maybe it's lined up. I'm not sure what you're doing
13	there
14	MEMBER ARMIJO: LMR.
15	CHAIR POWERS: I mean it seems to me if we
16	I mean we have this section of our report where we
17	equivocate right now but that's not the consensus I'm
18	getting here. I'm getting a there's more of an
19	imperative that's move forward. And certainly, from
20	our own licensing authorities, they said, we're not
21	going to wait for you. I mean they're very clear
22	about that. They're not going to wait for research to
23	do their certification. They're driven by other kinds
24	of concerns, and we've already said that you don't
25	need to have the research to do the certification.

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

	198
1	You just clap another lay of defense in-depth on top
2	of things or something like that.
3	MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes, until you can prove,
4	you don't do it, don't need it.
5	CHAIR POWERS: Okay. That's a useful
6	I mean that's
7	MEMBER ARMIJO: That doesn't have to be a
8	big effort. It can be a pretty mall
9	CHAIR POWERS: No, no, no. Then it's
10	a few people just to become your experts.
11	MEMBER ARMIJO: Well, that's why we're
12	already here.
13	CHAIR POWERS: When you I mean when it
14	gets expensive is when you say, okay, here are the
15	things that we need to do, let's do a couple of them.
16	Then it then the costs start to go up and you can
17	make that decision when you think you have the
18	resources to do it. But right now, you need to have
19	the options in front of you. That seems like a very
20	useful, tangible result coming from this.
21	MR. REPUSSARD: It's true. If there is
22	some international thinking of these issues, it makes
23	it a lot easier afterwards to say, okay, you have a
24	set of more operational developments to do. If this
25	is a result of joined more or less informal work, it's
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	199
1	a lot easier to say, okay, you can basically we'll
2	do this, I'm sure, because we have a global industry
3	in front of us and we ought to think global as a
4	response. Because I always think that, you know,
5	safety's okay when you have a balance between the
6	industry and the safety regulatory people. And if the
7	industry is global, well we'd better get our act
8	together as well, because otherwise there is much more
9	chance of unbalance.
10	CHAIR POWERS: I think I have arrived at
11	the time to see if there are other comments that need
12	to be made, so Mr. Bonaca?
13	MEMBER BONACA: No, I think it was a very
14	interesting debate on the issues. I like the
15	organization that Said is proposing technical
16	non-technical-independent issues that we can focus on
17	and then the technical-dependent, the separation of
18	light water reactors technology from the rest. But I
19	think we pretty much covered the ground I would like
20	to see covered, so I have no further comments.
21	CHAIR POWERS: Mr. Armijo?
22	MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes, I agree with Mario's
23	comments. I think it's been a very good meeting. I
24	appreciate your coming here and talking to us. And I
25	think this idea, particularly on the advanced
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

••

safety issues and then working with equivalent small groups internationally to compare the questions we ask the concerns we have with the rest of the world and see if we've really covered the waterfront of safety issues. I think that's very good.

8 I think there still is -- I guess I'm a 9 light water reactor person -- and I still think 10 there's work to be done in emerging or even existing 11 light water reactor current designs and materials 12 degradation being my principal concern. But I think 13 the advanced reactors, we talked more about them, but I think where the real issues that we have to remember 14 15 is on operating reactors and the new ones that are 16 being proposed, the ESBWR, EPR. These reactors are 17 going to need a lot of research. And we've already 18 covered it's whether it's digital I&C or passive 19 system safety issues. We have to identify what we 20 have to do pretty quick. It may be too late.

CHAIR POWERS: Said?

22 MEMBER ABDEL-KHALIK: I really have 23 nothing to add except to thank our guests for a really 24 stimulating discussion. Thank you very much.

CHAIR POWERS: Dennis?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

21

```
www.nealrgross.com
```

MEMBER BLEY: Yes, the presentations', the discussions' done. If I could have guessed where I'd like to see it, it's pretty much where it's gone. I'd like to sneak one little particular question in if I may. Jacques, in the beginning of your talk, you went through a lot of particular potential problems in the future.

And one you mentioned I've been very 8 9 interested in, because I've seen some real problems in the railroad industry, and we've all seen some in the 10 11 drug industries lately, this issue of multinational equipment, equipment coming from suppliers in all 12 13 parts of the world. It seems like there's a lot of problems there. Is there any aspect that you thought 14 15 about of research that could help deal with that or is it just an administrative control issue? 16

MR. REPUSSARD: Well, it's both I think. 17 The risk is that it is both, and I think I put it in 18 19 the -- as part of our environment as a kind of warning bell for our expert to say if you don't think that you 20 see one design as a -- or just one single thing which 21 fits nicely together, because somebody else, another 22 23 somewhere else will change something, then will we be able to analyze the differences. So it's more of a 24 25 kind of a mental framework than a specific research

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

I	202
1	program. And Michel, if you want to comment
2	MR. SCHWARTZ: For fuel, for instance,
3	because in France, we are used to only one kind fuel
4	from Areva, but now we have fuels coming from
5	Westinghouse and so on. And so we have to make
6	reserves which is already the case for the CABRI
7	program, using other types of fuel for instance. Or
8	we may find other examples like that where we have
9	simply to extend, in fact, the field of our research.
10	MR. REPUSSARD: It's the for me, it's
11	also an incentive to move even more to generic
12	thinking rather than or functional requirements rather
13	than specific technology-related solutions, you know,
14	expertise, because then if something changes, then you
15	are lost if you don't have a frame which is
16	functional. So it's for I don't see any strictly
17	speaking related research program. It's just part of
18	the environment which is going to be different from
19	what we have known in the past, at least in France.
20	MEMBER BLEY: I don't have any good
21	thoughts on that. I'm just worried about
21	CHAIR POWERS: I think there are some real
23	mechanical issues associated with the regulatory
23	
24	system that come up. I mean, in the past, we've intensively reviewed suppliers. Well, that becomes a
20	
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

good deal less feasible as your supply network becomes non-national and more disburse. And it really impacts on how you interpret Appendix B and the Quality Assurance requirements, and so I think we're going to have rethink those. But I think we rethink those in a regulatory framework and less in a research

MEMBER BLEY: That's probably right. Ι 8 9 guess the things I've seen in the railroad industry that they've had real troubles with, are they certify 10 a supplier in some countries and the Far East and 11 right; 12 think everything is set up thev have represented it was a go there regularly. 13 And all of a sudden, they'll start having significant problems 14 15 with certain pieces of equipment, and they'll find that, in violation of all the agreements, the party 16 they certified is getting them from one or two steps 17 18 further away and they're not meeting any of the 19 expected requirements.

20 MEMBER ARMIJO: That's a safety culture 21 issue.

CHAIR POWERS: That's what I call more disperse supplier network and it's one that we've got to wrestle with. And that's why these debates on Appendix B versus ISO-9000 systems become much more

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

framework and --

1 interesting. Ashok, do you have any thoughts --2 Yes, a question on this MR. THADANI: 3 point. Under MDEP, there is actually a working group. 4 MDEP is the Multinational Design Evaluation Program. 5 There is a working group on codes and standards, and 6 that includes not just the regulators from several 7 countries but also includes the standards 8 organizations from the international community. This 9 is just the point Jacques was making that people are still trying to come to grips with how would you deal 10 11 with that. 12 it going to be ASME standards or Is 13 something else, ISO-9000? How do you deal with it. 14 And in fact, again, it's probably going to be a multi-15 year effort, but at least I think they deserve a lot of credit. They've actually started working in an 16 17 international way. There's a group. France is a 18 member of that group also. So I think people at least 19 are trying to move towards and see how would we come 20 to this --Well, that would -- you 21 MEMBER ARMIJO: 22 know, the industry has been dealing with that --23 MR. THADANI: Yes. 24 MEMBER ARMIJO: -- for 40 years, and, I 25 mean, procurement, everything from vessels in one NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 www.nealrgross.com

	205
1	country and assembly in another and fuel components
2	and meeting the safety requirements of different
3	countries. I mean I think the industry's the
4	regulatory bodies could make the industry's job
5	easier, you know, but that's not likely to happen.
6	MR. THADANI: No, no.
7	MEMBER ARMIJO: But, you know, the
8	industry really is meeting all these various
9	requirements and has sorted things out for materials
10	specifications, unique requirements in Finland and
11	Spain and Japan and it's been around for a long time.
12	MR. THADANI: Not to get the details of
13	there are some interesting issues of ISO-9000, for
14	example, where the NRC was and what happened.
15	But two things first, I want to thank
16	you very much. I thought, and speaking for myself, I
17	learned a great deal from your thoughts on long-term
18	research. You've got lots of truly outstanding ideas
19	there and issues that you think would need attention.
20	And I know that I think that would be very helpful
21	to the Committee in its deliberations, both in the
22	near term and in the long term, because there's a
23	continuing expectation that the ACRS will provide
24	recommendations to the Commission. It's not just
25	this is not the last stage. There'll be continuing

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

www.nealrgross.com

: 	206
1	needs for that. So it's been very, very helpful.
2	Second, I want to thank you for your
3	heroic effort. I know you flew to the U.S. from
4	Europe yesterday and you're flying back this evening,
5	and that's quite an undertaking. And I just think at
6	least we're very, very fortunate that you were able to
7	take the time and take, really, the trouble to come
8	and talk to the subcommittee. I certainly want to
9	thank you very much for that.
10	MR. REPUSSARD: Thanks to the carbon print
11	of the ACRS.
12	MR. VIKTORRSEN: Are we allowed to add
13	something?
14	CHAIR POWERS: Absolutely.
15	MR. VÌKTORRSEN: Okay. So one area which
16	I believe that there also should be continued research
17	in is in safety culture. We know that safety culture
18	can be an extremely powerful barrier if it's there, if
19	the workforce have the same strong feeling about the
20	importance of safety. If it's not there, we have a
21	weak safety system.
22	And this is not only in relation to
23	operating at your facilities. We have been approached
24	by PBMR, for example, to assess their safety culture
25	under the design phase. We are seeing, in Finland,
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com
I	

problems they are having to manage all the construction, all the projects, all the consultants they have or all the people working on the projects. There are contractors, subcontractors, subsubcontractors, etcetera.

6 And how can we promote -- probably through 7 effective leadership -- but how can promote a strong safety culture in all these phases? Because we know 8 9 how important it can build in quality. I mean part of the problem within our containments today is lack of 10 11 quality or in construction. There is a need for more research on how to promote better culture in 12 13 organizations.

So this is one suggestion that we can make also. And there are methods by the way. There are methods now to assess safety culture. I know IMPO is working with this and we are working with this with other organizations, etcetera. It's not yet maybe mature. It's just in the beginning.

CHAIR POWERS: We devoted some time, as a Committee, looking for quantitative metrics for safety culture. And we're surprised to discover yes, there are metrics that do correlate with safety. We've not been able to make the next step in saying okay, can we institutionalize these or make use of them. Safety

> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

> > 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

1

2

3

4

culture is still a disperse concept for us and because 1 2 we can't -- we don't want to trace into the area of 3 managing facilities. And though I think we have 4 succeeded in putting it in as part of the inspection 5 process, but as far as quantifying it and eventually putting it into the PRA, that's a challenge that 6 7 remains for the future for us. We'll say more on than 8 human reliability aspect. 9 If there are other people who want to make 10 closing comments, I'll give you an opportunity here. 11 (No response.) CHAIR POWERS: In that regard, I'll echo 12 13 the thanks for the presentations. I could not have asked for more. They were superb. They were right on 14 15 target. They helped us a lot, so much so that I think 16 we'll have to prepare something in documented form, at least for the ACRS, if not the Commission itself on 17 this meeting. They need to be aware of it. 18 19 I come away with a reinforced sense that 20 opportunities for international there are 21 collaboration that we're not exploiting adequately right now and that we should begin to exploit those. 22 23 Two that look to me as ripe for exploitation include fire and human reliability analyses. I would like to 24

> COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

explore further the thermohydraulic as an area for

NEAL R. GROSS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

25

www.nealrgross.com

collaboration.

1

I'm especially intrigued about virtual 2 3 though collaborations, Ι recognize virtual 4 collaborations develop only after you've done some 5 physical collaborations. But it looks like that's 6 something that we can exploit a lot more effectively. 7 I'm going to be intrigued to see how this top-down 8 strategy develops, and I've asked Said to take that on 9 as an area of focus to work with NEA in that area, and 10 as that develops, to see if that's a productive 11 avenue. 12 With that, I can say this has been an 13 extremely productive session for us. And like I said, 14 I think we'll have to prepare something in writing for 15 this. 16 MEMBER BONACA: That so much, so that I 17 propose that we meet in Paris now. 18 (Laughter.) 19 CHAIR POWERS: I will point out to you 20 that you do have a meeting in Paris in October. 21 MEMBER BONACA: Yes, and this would be 22 good opportunity for you to --23 MR. REPUSSARD: Anyway, you're always 24 welcome to Paris. 25 Well, you haven't been CHAIR POWERS: **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	210
1	around me much then, or you wouldn't say that.
2	CHAIR POWERS: It's opportunity.
3	CHAIR POWERS: With that, I'll close this
4	meeting and thank you very much.
5	(Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the foregoing
6	meeting was concluded.)
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Advisory Committee on

n/a

Reactor Safeguards

Docket Number:

Location: Rockville, MD


were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

Charles Morrison Official Reporter Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

(202) 234-4433

Agence pour l'énergie nucléaire Nuclear Energy Agency



OECD-NEA approach for long term nuclear safety research

Carlo Vitanza Deputy head, NEA Nuclear Safety Division

CVit ACRS February 2008




Agence pour l'énergie nucléaire. Nuclear Energy Agency



Content

- Brief overview of OECD-NEA
- Outcome of a recent NEA Workshop on the
- "Role of Research in a Regulatory Context"
- OECD-NEA international research projects (joint projects)
- Possible NEA options for long term safety research


Agence pour l'énergie nucléaire Nuclear Energy Agency



Brief overview of OECD-NEA

CVit ACRS February 2008





What is the OECD ?

- 30 Member countries
- < 20% World's population</p>
- > 3/5 world's exports
- produce > 2/3 goods & services
- generates > 4/5 nuclear
 power in world.
- 346 reactors units in 17
 OECD countries. 10 more units under construction.





The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)

"The mission of the NEA is to assist its Member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for the safe, environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

- Small size and budget: (80 staff members; budget of 13 million euros, + voluntary contributions and projects)
- Tries to pool world's best nuclear expertise among member countries
- > Organised by specialised committees. The committees dealing with safety and regulations are:
 - Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA)
 - Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI)

The CSNI deals with safety research



CSNI Working Group Activities

- Risk assessment
- Analysis and management of accidents
- Integrity of components and structures
 - Metal components
 - Ageing of concrete structures
 - Seismic behaviour of components and structures

RCH PROJECTS

- Human and organisational factors
- Fuel safety
- Fuel cycle safety



Brief overview of the NEA Workshop on the Role of Research in a Regulatory Context

Paris, 5 December 2007





Objectives

- Review the progress made since the 2001 Forum on the same subject
- Set forth the high priority safety issues currently and in the near-term for operating plants and new reactor construction
- Identify challenges for the safety evaluations of advanced reactor designs, and for organising the long term research & infrastructure that will be needed
- Through the above, provide input to the CSNI regarding strategies for new research programmes and support facilities



Programme

Opening:

Scene Setting - Changes and CSNI/CNRA achievements since 2001

L. ECHÁVARRI, NEA DG

J. REPUSSARD, IRSN, FRANCE K. SODA, NSC, JAPAN

Session 1:

Research needs and facility utilisation for operating reactors

M.P. COMETS, ASN, FRANCE R. YANG, EPRI, UNITED STATES K. ABE, JNES, JAPAN J.C. MICAELLI, IRSN, FRANCE

Session 2: Research and facility needs for new reactors (G-III, G-III+)

L. REIMAN, STUK, FINLAND J.P. HUTIN, EDF, FRANCE J.J. HA, KAERI, KOREA W. BORCHARDT, US NRC, U SA

Session 3: R&D and facility infrastructure for advanced (G-IV) reactors

J.L. CARBONNIER, CEA, FRANCE Y. SHIMAKAWA, MFBR, JAPAN Y. SAGAYAMA, JAEA, JAPAN M. JOHNSON, US NRC, USA

Closure:

Summary and Recommendations

J. REPUSSARD, IRSN, FRANCE

K. SODA, NSC, JAPAN






RRRC-2 Main Conclusions

- Regulators research institutions and industry should promote stronger research co-operation (in data gathering, maintaining independence in the data interpretation).
- There are different new and advanced reactor designs, many non-water reactor concepts. New infrastructure will be needed to assess safety for these systems

The OECD-NEA joint projects are a good means for ensuring facility infrastructure and for maintaining a competence network in a practical manner. The OECD-NEA joint project approach should also be used for the long term research





RRRC-2 Main Conclusions

- 11. Multinational co-operation enables to save money and increases credibility; considering its experience, OECD-NEA should play a major role to promote and support such co-operation through efficient project arrangements
- A Task Group should be set up to address NEA (CSNI) long term strategy and approach to joint efforts for infrastructure build-up, aiming at defining
 - a) Key safety and risk issues as related to specific design concepts
 - b) Issues that will require experimental data
 - c) Infrastructure needed for developing the required data, including key infrastructure elements, timing and roles for regulator, TSO and industry



OECD-NEA Experience with International Research Projects in Nuclear Safety





OECD-NEA Safety Research Projects

Motivation and goals

- Address safety issues relevant for the nuclear community by means of research shared by many countries
- Enhance technical exchange, co-operation and consensus-building internationally
- Support the continued operation of unique test facilities which are of value to the OECD/NEA nuclear community
- Help to retain OECD/NEA technical expertise and infrastructure in strategic fields of nuclear energy
- Facilitate the above through cost-sharing arrangements where many countries contribute to programme funding





OECD-NEA Safety Research Projects


Way to operate

- Overall priorities are set in CSNI ad-hoc reports on "Nuclear Safety Research in OECD Countries".
 Catalogue of relevant facilities in CSNI SFEAR report
- Projects focus on experimental programmes carried out at unique test facilities, based on host country initiative
- There is no funding available upfront, money has to be found on a case by case basis; hence
- Project progammes must interest and attract as many prospective participants as possible
- The OECD-NEA has long term experience with these type of arrangements. Experience is generally good



OECD-NEA Safety Research Projects

Typical cost sharing





OECD-NEA Safety Research Projects


•	HALDEN	Fuel and Materials, I&C, Human Factors
	CABRI	Fuel in RIA transients
٩	SCIP	Fuel integrity
•	Paks-2	Fuel integrity, with IAEA
	MCCI	Severe Accident (ex-vessel)
٩	ROSA	System TH
٩	PKL-2	PWR Boron dilution
\$	SETH	Containment (CFD)
٩	PSB-VVER	T-H for VVER 1000
•	THAI	Containment behaviour
٩	BIP	Containment behaviour
	SERENA	Steam Explosion
\$	PRISME	Fire safety
٠	SCAP	Ageing
٩	Databases	1. FIRE 2. ICDE 3. OPDE 4


Norway Ongoing France (Japan) Ongoing Sweden Ongoing Hungary Completed USA Ongoing Japan Ongoing Germany Ongoing Switzerl/France Ongoing Russia Ongoing Germany Initiated Canada Initiated Korea/France Initiated France Ongoing Japan Ongoing Ongoing 4. COMPSIS





OECD-NEA Safety Research Projects







Possible NEA options for long term safety R&D

- Countries agree that the OECD Joint Projects are a good way to perform experimental research, especially when cost is high. The Joint Project approach can also be used for long term research
- Joint Projects also provide the ground for an efficient regulator-industry-TSO cooperation for producing data (but maintaining data interpretation independent)
- Incidentally: NRC participates in virtually all OECD safety projects. Given the size of its program, the USNRC may consider initiatives for <u>hosting projects</u> in the future.



Possible NEA options for long term safety R&D

Based on a NRC proposal, the NEA will set up a task group addressing the long term strategy and approach to joint efforts for infrastructure build-up in and safety research for advanced reactors. For this, the NRC contribution will be very important

Challenges and questions for advanced reactors

- Reactor designs not always clearly identified
- Long term research may be too abstract
- How should programmes be organised?
- Where to find the money?
- Role of industry? Regulators? TSOs?



Possible NEA options for long term safety R&D

- Example:
 - To what extent will the existing fleet of test reactors be usable in the long term, e.g. for water, gas, liquid metal:


Fuel studies


Materials studies

Coolant-Fuel interaction studies


- Are big adaptations needed? Will new reactors be needed? When? Who will pay for it?
- How to get started: Start with sub-programmes within existing OECD Projects? Initiate new projects? Pool different test reactors in one comprehensive project?

Nuclear Energy Agen Main test reactors - Europe BR-2 Belgium □ LVR-15 Czech Republic □ OSIRIS (JHR), France □ HFR, The Netherlands □ Halden, Norway Cabri - North America ATR, USA □ NRU, Canada - Asia □ Hanaro, Republic of Korea □ JMTR, Japan □ NSRR, Japan **CVit ACRS February 2008**





What about HTTR, Joyo, Monju?







International Atomic Energy Agency

Long Term Research Needs

Considerations by the IAEA


Christer Viktorsson Section Head Nuclear Installations Safety Division

Content

- The IAEA role
- The Safety and Security pillar
- Issues and Trends in Nuclear Safety and Related Research Needs
- Summary of Research Needs

Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

- "Atoms for Peace"
 Established in 4057
- Established in 1957
- 148 Member States
- 2,200 staff
- Three Pillars:




- Nuclear Technology
- Safety and Security
- Safeguards

Changing World and Challenges to the International Nuclear Community

- Globalization
- Nuclear "Renaissance" and Safety
- Security threat

Rising Expectations for Nuclear Developments



Algeria Bangladesh Belarus Chile Egypt Indonesia Iran Jordan Malaysia Morocco Nigeria Poland Saudi Arabia Thailand **Tunisia** Turkey Uruguay

Considering NP

Changing World and Challenges to the International Nuclear Community

Important developments since Chernobyl An accident anywhere is an accident everywhere



- -Safety Culture and Safety Management -Regulatory
 - Independence
- -Severe Accident management
- -Stakeholder involvement
- Creation of WANO, INSAG
- New Conventions

Global Security Evolution

Cold War - Post Cold War - Post 9/11

Nation-states
Bi-polar
Superpowers
Main Actors
Non-States
Small states
Global network

Threats

- High density, high intensity
- Lower Probability
- Physical overkill

• Low density, low intensity

- Higher probability
- Socio psychological terror

- Geopolitical
- Predictable
- Calculable


- Motives
- Malicious
- Unpredictable
- Incalculable

Changing World and Challenges to the International Nuclear

Community (continued-2)


- Globally Shared Perceptions
 - All in the same boat now

- Prevent another watershed event at all cost
- Act together through international cooperation and coordination



IAEA Nuclear Safety Activities

- Establishment and Revision of Nuclear Safety Standards
 Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides
- Safety Standards Application and Feedback
 - Advisory and Review Services
 - Training Courses and Workshops
 - Sharing Experience and Knowledge through Networking



Support for Implementation of Conventions and Codes of Conduct



Safety Fundamentals

Safety Requirements

Safety Guides

STRUCTURE OF THE STANDARDS

Safety Fundamentals

Thematic standards

Legal and governmental infrastructure

Emergency preparedness and response

Management systems

Assessment and verification

Site evaluation

Radiation protection

Radioactive waste management

Decommissioning

Remediation of contaminated areas

Transport of radioactive material

General safety (cross-cutting themes)

Safety of nuclear facilities

Radiation protection and safety of radiation sources

Safe management of radioactive waste

Safe transport of radioactive material

Facilities specific standards

Nuclear power plants: design

Nuclear power plants: operation

Research reactors

Fuel cycle facilities

Radiation related facilities and activities

Waste treatment and disposal facilities

IAEA Safety Review Services

Regulatory Framework and Activities

IRRS – Integrated Regulatory Review Service

Operational Safety

- OSART Operational Safety Review Team
- SEDO Safety Evaluation of Fuel Cycle Facilities During Operation

SCART – Safety Culture Assessment Review Team


Research Reactors

INSARR – Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors

Engineering and Technical Safety

DESAR – Design/Engineering/Assessment Safety Review Services

- Ref. IAEA Safety Services, Assistance Requests and IRS
- Ambitious Nuclear Development Plans (life extensions and new builds) and Globalization of the Nuclear Community
 - * LWR technology dominant today and decades ahead
 - Present fleet only served for some 30 years (half of its in a life time?)
 - Reactors built, or ordered today are evolutionary
 - Major safety issues
 - Ageing of facilities and people
 - Maintenance and modernization of facilities
 - New technology (in old facilities)
 - Safety culture and management of safety
 - Safety Assessment and Work Management (large nb of
 - ^e Education & training (new people, new technologies)
 - Research facilities ageing and closure



New Reactor concepts emerging

- Require research into materials, fuel, core physics, operation, accident management, inspection and maintenance, safety systems, ...
- Support of fuel cycle facilities
- Globalization
 - increasing cross-border responsibilities, few reactor vendors

- Need for Nuclear Safety Infrastructure and International Cooperation
 - Nuclear infrastructure has "degraded" in many countries
 - Nuclear infrastructure weak in countries considering nuclear power plants
 - Infrastructure building important, incl educational and research institutions
 - International cooperation important
 - TSO organisations important

- Global Nuclear Safety Regime is getting more support
 - Conventions, safety standards, national structures, expert networks
 - Support from major nuclear countries essential for strong worldwide safety
 - IAEA safety standards utilized more or less directly in many countries, e.g. China
 - Demand for independent safety peer reviews increases
 - The quality of the GNSR essential
- Regulatory Effectiveness and Legal Framework a key to successful utilization
 - Independence, competence and capabilities of regulator. Independent safety assessment capability
 - Licensing (new reactors, renewals) today different from licensing during 80's (safety margins, public participation, international interest, new technology)
 - Review of advanced designs, including passive systems (lack of experience, data)
 - Demand for harmonization and regulatory stability

Operational Safety Performance

- Safe performance, but recurring events happen
 - Root cause analysis
- Safety issues
 - Electrical systems behaviour, reactivity control systems
 - Natural hazards (seismic events, flooding, ..)
 - New technology (digital I&C, ..)

Strong Leadership, Management for Safety and Safety Culture

- Understanding and assessment of safety culture
- The relationship between management systems and strong safety culture
- Safety and security culture
- The development of strong safety culture in weak infrastructures
- Management of change

Issues and Trends in Nuclear Safety

- Openness and Transparency on the part of operators and regulators
 - Public confidence, ensuring feedback
 - Security issues, balance openness and confidentiality
 - Provide the Technical Developments in Safety Analysis led to enhancements of safety/plant modifications need continuous attention
 - Assessment of new technologies, upgrades of power and long term operation, modifications
 - Better understanding of risks and safety margins
 - Human and organisational factors
 - Management strategies to cope with uncertainties in severe accidents

Long Term Operation require good ageing management

- Safety assessment for structures and components, qualification of equipment
- Integrity of RPV, ageing of cables, integrity and leakage of containments
- Development of plant ageing management programmes

International Atomic Energy Agency 🖗 🕻

Issues and Trends in Nuclear Safety

- Sharing of Experience and Lessons Learned have improved, but needs continuous enhancement
 - Effectiveness of risks elimination
 - Difficult to learn from others experience
- Human and Knowledge Resources a key to successful "renaissance"
 - Part of infrastructure building
 - Knowledge management and creation of safety networks
- International Cooperation for Research & Development, Education and Training
 - Regional training centers
 - National Centres supported by IAEA
 - Closer links between TSOs
 - Joint research more and more important (NEA)

International Atomic Energy Agency

Coordinated Research Projects

. . .

· · · · ·

, * .

.

International Atomic Energy Agency 🖁

Safety

- Existing reactors
 - Need to keep basic technical safety research alive (reactor physics, thermo-hydraulics, structural mechanics, human and organisational factors, ...). Of importance for safety, but also for knowledge management.
 - Specific emphasis is needed on
 - Weaknesses seen from operation experience
 - Topics related to new designs
 - Power up-rates and life extension
 - External phenomena influencing reactor safety (natural and human)
 - Seismic issues
 - Extreme weather conditions (flooding, tsunami, ..)
 - Security issues, interface safety-security

International Atomic Energy Agency

Safety

- Barriers and safety margins confirmation
 - Fuel (burn-up, use of mixed fuel, ..)
 - RPV and primary systems (material ageing, failure mechanisms, ..)
 - Containment (integrity, leakage, NDT-methods, ..)
- Reactor systems
 - Reliability of digital systems
 - I&C (CCF, licensing, ..)
 - Electrical systems (ageing of cables, barrier considerations, ..)
 - Reliability of safety systems (grid considerations, diesel generators, ..

International Atomic Energy Agency 🖁

Safety

New reactors

- Require research into materials, fuel, core physics, operation, accident management, inspection and maintenance, safety systems, ...
- Support of fuel cycle facilities

Safety Assessment

 Plant modelling, root cause analysis, new material, handling of uncertainties, reliability of passive systems, restart of plants after severe events, "simplified methods" for safety analysis

Verification and tests

- NDT of metals and concrete
- Fire safety
- Severe accident and accident management (I-chemistry)
- Simulators for severe accidents

International Atomic Energy Agency

Safety

- Maintenance of large scale test facilities
- Safety culture and management
 - Understanding and assessment of safety culture
 - The relationship between management systems and strong safety culture
 - Safety and security culture
 - Safety culture involving contractors (Modernisation and maintenance)

Regulatory effectiveness

- Licensing (new reactors, renewals), safety margins, public participation, international interest, new technology
- Review of new and advanced designs, including passive systems (lack of experience, data)





REACTOR SAFETY

LONG TERM RESEARCH IN FRANCE


IRSN VIEWPOINT

Jacques REPUSSARD Director General

Michel SCHWARZ Director

IRSN: the French TSO

Mission: to provide independent research and expertise in support to public policies in nuclear safety and security, & radiation protection



- a wide field of competence allowing a broad vision of safety, security and radiation protection issues
- risk assessment capability at the heart of IRSN's R&D and operational support missions

IRSN

- a strong international involvement
- 1700 people, 280 M€ budget

Summary

> Key determining factors and main assumptions

Long term reactor safety research objectives and priorities

- Cross-cutting issues
- PWR specific issues
- > GEN IV specific issues (Sodium/Gaz fast reactors)
- > ITER: Fusion reactor specific issues
- Economy of reactor safety research
 - Human resources
 - > Experimental infrastructure
 - > Funding



Key determining factors and main assumptions

>Electronuclear national policy and technology

> Societal and environmental evolutions

> Generic progress of science

Reactor safety research economy

Electronuclear policy and technology (next 10 / 20 years)

- > Mainly GEN II and GEN III PWR nuclear plants
- Closed fuel cycle
- > No new nuclear sites, but more than one nuclear utility
- > Requests to operate some PWR reactors beyond 40 years
- > Multinational designs (fuel assemblies, I&C, ...)
- Increased sophistication of methods and tools to support licensing requests
- I SFR demonstration plant; licensing of large SFR Plants and GFR prototype considered
- > 1 Fusion large scale reactor (ITER)

Environmental and Societal evolutions

- Climate change to be considered (heat waves, flooding, strong winds)
- > Security always a key issue
- > Grid reliability may lessen
- Pressure from the public on low dose exposure health issues and on environmental risks
- Pressure from industry to increase licensed domain of operation ; trend to reduce margins (increased burn-up, new fuel design, increased power rating, ...)
- Development of nuclear energy in "emerging" countries without necessarily appropriate competence. Need for technical and scientific support resources.



Generic progress of science pertinent for reactor safety research

> Computer sciences and mathematics progress fast

- unprecedented modelling sophistication, available to industry for safety case demonstration, and to reactor safety research labs
- > generalisation of digital I&C for reactor safety functions
- > Advanced materials are used in reactor technology: fuel elements, piping,...
- Better understanding of interactions between radiation and living material may lead to a review of radpro system and possible new requirements for future reactor systems
- Social sciences offer improved methods to assess human related aspects of safety (main cause of past severe accidents)



Reactor safety research economy

- Increased use of cost/benefit approach to evaluate relevance of proposed research projects. Industry more reluctant to fund longer term safety research projects.
- Lasting satisfactory nuclear safety records tend to encourage a reduction of public spending on safety research.
- Large demand of high level human resources by nuclear industry, thereby increasing training needs and making it more difficult in the next decade to hire specialists and keep high level of competence in IRSN. R&D activities are key to attract and train the best people.
- Progressive globalisation of nuclear industry induces increased multinational cooperation on regulatory issues, and in safety research.



Long term reactor safety research objectives and priorities Key objectives

- To maintain over time an independent assessment capability, based on the excellence of experts, and on state of the art techniques and data.
- > To maintain at all times the state of the art knowledge and operational expertise necessary to deal efficiently with major nuclear accident consequences.
- > To contribute in key areas to cutting edge R&D in order to drive industry towards making the best use of scientific and technological progress for improving safety, environmental protection and health.
- To allow regulatory policy to anticipate the evolution of safety, security and radpro related risks.

ACRS - Feb 5th, 2008

Page 9/20



Long term reactor safety research objectives and priorities

10 Cross-cutting issues

Note: will be applied first to PWR technology

1. Advanced computational methods:

Development of more sophisticated and more accurate coupled modelisation tools, based on multi-scale approach, in the following domains:

material physics and mechanics (fuel, piping, ...)
material-hydraulics

neutronics

Development of advanced methods to assess uncertainties.



Cross-cutting issues (cont.)

- 2. Development of PRA tools and methods for more systematic use. Extension of PRA to assess effects of aging, earthquake, fire, flooding and other severe climate events, grid reliability.
- 3. Development of research on human factor.
- 4. Development of research on reliability of Digital Instrumentation and Control. Note that hiring of specialists in this domain is difficult. Not specific to nuclear safety.
- 5. Research on fuel behaviour in reactor and fuel cycle for new fuel designs and burn-ups (reactivity accident and fuel transportation, intermediate storage, reprocessing accidents).

Cross-cutting issues (cont.)

- 6. Offsite consequences
 - Development of decision making tools for mid-term and long term post-accident management
 - Research on low dose effects on man and environment
- 7. Develop an economic approach of the cost of nuclear safety (safety research vs. accident cost estimate including offsite consequences).
- 8. Research on efficiency of passive safety features.
- 9. Keeping research on criticality at a "reasonable" level to maintain competence.
- 10. Consideration on how to manage knowledge. Development of centres of excellence.

PWR specific issues

- 1. Aging
 - Research on aging of PWR plant components (internal structures, concrete structures, electronics, cables)
 - Development of tools on default initiation and propagation to anticipate problems
- 2. Development of in-situ real-time inspection and monitoring techniques.
- 3. Keeping research on severe accidents and Source Term at a "reasonable" level to maintain competence (core meltdown accident considered in GEN III design!).

S(G)FR specific issues

1. Reappropriation of past R&D on SFRs

- > Whole core accident codes as SAS4A, SIMMER and associated qualification experiments (Cabri, ...)
- Local accident codes and associated qualification tests (Scarabée, ...)
- Fire propagation code and associated qualification tests (Esmeralda)
- 2. Develop advanced codes common, when needed and as far as possible, to LWRs and S (G)FRs, and capitalize in them all past R&D results.



S(G) FR specific issues (cont.)

- 3. Performing complementary research in support to code development and qualification, and to (re)develop competence (research on fuel behaviour under accidental conditions).
- 4. Research on material and fuel behaviour under high neutron flux and high temperature.
- 5. Research on inspection and monitoring under sodium environment.



Fusion reactor specific issues

1. Development of codes for simulation of accidental scenarios (possible on basis of LWR codes)

- 2. Research on the following phenomena :
 - > resuspension of dust (graphite, beryllium, tungsten),
 - risk of hydrogen/dust explosion,
 - > behaviour of tritium,
 - behaviour of plasma in accidents (particular need to acquire competences in this new field ...)

> Need to enter international collaborations ...



Economy of reactor safety research

Human resources

> To attract high level scientists and maintain reference experts in a very competitive environment, it appears necessary on a long term basis to:

 develop multinational Networks of Excellence operating around large data acquisition and code development programmes,
 mix R&D and operational safety assessment activities,
 provide for mobility, including internationally.

Capitalisation of knowledge and nuclear safety harmonisation can foster manpower savings in a lasting constrained resources environment.

IRSN

Economy of reactor safety research Experimental infrastructures

<u>Reactor safety research infrastructures are key to the long term</u> <u>pertinence of regulatory action, and to the continued high level</u> <u>competency of experts</u>

IRSN intends to run experimental programmes to validate reactor safety codes for LWRs and future reactors as well in the following main areas:

- fuel behaviour in reactivity accidents: in particular in the CABRI research reactor (to address safety criteria issues and test new fuel designs),
- whole core severe accidents (including source term issues): replace PHEBUS by specific safety programmes in the reactor Jules Horowitz (2014) (to address non-anticipated LWR safety issues, and safety issues in future reactors)
- *fire propagation* (Cadarache large scale platforms)

criticallity (« appareillage B ») for code development validation with respect to new materials

IRSN looks to cooperating with partners in all R&D areas where significant experimental facilities are needed.

Page 18/20



Economy of reactor safety research

Funding

- Enough public resources to ensure that regulatory reactor safety research remains industry independent.
- Think systematically multinational to operate costefficiently large experimental facilities. The Halden Project can be considered as a reference management model.
- Multinational R&D is in the long run the fast track to regulatory harmonisation. As such, it should deserve some industry investment.
- NEA provides an exceptional platform for establishing such R&D programmes, under the scope of CSNI. All nuclear countries should, one way or another, be able to contribute to reactor safety research programmes and to access to relevant knowledge through IAEA.

Thank you for your attention

~

.

IRSN

ACRS – Feb 5th, 2008

Page 20/20

Long-term research activities in India

1. High Temperature reactor (HTR) research

High temperature heat removal technology including heat pipes Experiments and code development for high temperature reactor core heat removal systems under various normal and postulated accident conditions

Corrosion studies with molten lead/molten salt based coolant

Experiments to estimate corrosion behavior of structural materials at different temperatures and under various flow conditions coolant

Integrity of high temperature reactor fuel under normal, transient and accident conditions

Experiments and code development to study behavior of TRISO coated particle fuel and fuel elements under various reactor-operating conditions

Design rules for brittle materials

Development of design rules for ceramic materials like graphite, which are extensively used in high temperature reactor. Validation of design rules with extensive test programs.

Safety studies related to HTR

Experiments and code development to carry out safety studies under various postulated initiating events

Structural material compatibility studies for HTR

Experiments to study behavior of in-contact structural materials subjected to high temperatures

Seismic design of HTR components

Investigate the seismic response of high temperature reactor core by carrying out detailed modeling and validating it with experiments on a shake table

Developments of components and instruments for HTR applications

Experiments for development and testing of components like high temperature heat exchangers, Fuelling/de-fuelling systems, special pumps, reactor control and shutdown systems, decay heat removal systems, neutronic instruments, high temperature instruments and control systems for use in high temperature and corrosive coolant environment

2. Advanced heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) research

Computer codes

Develop and validate neutronic/Thermal-hydraulic/severe accident codes for AHWR, passive system reliability assessment methodology development

シュー 出議会

Natural circulation in advanced reactor concepts

Experimental and analytical studies, Steady-sate, transient and start-up behavior, melt coolability, core concrete interaction, steam explosion, fission product behavior, in-vessel and ex-vessel phenomena during severe accidents etc.

Uncertainty analysis of best estimate computer codes

Error estimation in code prediction by comparison between code and test data, Methodology for uncertainty analysis

Dry out and post-dry out studies

Experiments and code development for dry out and post dry out phenomena in rod clusters

Nuclear hydrogen generation

Experiments and code development for hydrogen production processes, Integration schemes with nuclear reactors

Containment thermal hydraulics safety evaluation

Blow-down phases, aerosol behavior, hydrogen issues and uncertainty assessment, internal and external events related to impact, hydrogen and fire loads.

3. Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) research

Computer codes

Develop and validate neutronic/Thermal-hydraulic/severe accident codes for FBR considering the transient behavior of the fuel melt propagation from fuel to single subassembly and then to whole core, molten fuel coolant interaction, melt fuel debris relocation on the core catcher based on experimental test data available from various publications.

Material research

Development of advanced structural materials for the clad and wrappers to achieve high burn up; numerical simulation of fuel and structural materials under high irradiation conditions and generation of material data for out of core components for long life (> 60 years). Evaluation of design of metallic fuels, development of constitutive models for binary and tertiary alloys, development of oxide dispersion strengthened (ODS) ferritic steels for clad, design safety limits for fuel, clad and coolant.

Safety system performance assessment

Confirmation of passive safety features of fuel behavior, post accident heat removal, shutdown systems and decay heat removal systems, adopting advanced digital C&I control systems.

Seismic research

Establishing robust seismic design: rationalization of site seismic parameters, design criteria, analysis methods and seismic qualification tests. Elimination of OBE from the design and reduction of seismic loads through adopting state-of-the-art base isolation system.

R&D towards improving Economy

Optimization of plant layout giving due consideration for safety and maintenance, optimization of number of heat transport loops and components, homogenization of structural materials, development of high temperature design rules and establishment of thermal hydraulic design criteria such as thermal striping, thermal stratification, thermal ratcheting, sodium free level fluctuations, flow induced vibrations, steam generator flow instabilities etc.

R&D towards achieving enhanced safety

Numerical simulation of sodium fire and sodium water reactions, sodium aerosols behavior, developing sensors for efficient sodium detection system, demonstration of leak before break justification, gas entrainment in sodium pools, mitigation of consequences of core disruptive accidents (CDA), post accident heat removal and establishment of severe accident management guidelines.

3

R&D for fast reactor fuel cycle management

Development of robust fast reactor fuel cycle, design for longer plant life, simplification of waste management and minimization for the repository space and lower exposure potential, robust fabrication technologies.

. Safety research

Nano fluid applications to water-cooled reactors Fundamental experiments on nanofluids applications

Annular fuel development

Development of annular fuel for advanced reactors, Optimization of design parameters

Molten lead/molten salt based coolant chemistry monitoring and control

Experiments to establish methodology for monitoring and control of coolant chemistry under various temperature regimes

Ageing research

Flow assisted corrosion, low temperature (about 300 degree C) sensitization and low temperature embrittlement of stainless steel, environment assisted fatigue, Fatigue and fracture behavior of bi-metallic joints (SS with Low Alloy Steel), thermal fatigue and aging of C&I cables.

Seismic research

Pushover analysis and testing, fatigue-ratchetting behavior of piping components and seismic re-evaluation of existing structures

Probabilistic safety analysis

Probabilistic safety analysis applications for operation and maintenance of NPPs, probabilistic fracture mechanics

Containment structural and thermal hydraulic safety evaluation

Experimental and analytical simulation for severe accidents

Uncertainty analysis for severe accidents



ACRS Subcommittee on Safety Research Program

Rockville, MD February 5, 2008

Ashok Thadani ACRS Consultant



OBJECTIVES

- Should a portion of safety research activities be devoted to the development of the technical infrastructure that may be needed in the 10 to 20 year time frame and to the development of user friendly tools (taking advantage of the computing power) to support more effective and efficient line organizations' regulatory work?
 - Timely
 - based on sound technology and science
 - make maximum use of realistic assessments consistent with the state-of-the-art and the available data



OBJECTIVES (Continued)

- What should be the scope of long-term research that a regulatory authority should consider ?
 - What Should the research focus be on LWRs?
 - How long might it take to develop a technical infrastructure to support sound safety decisions on non-LWRs (e.g., Gas-Cooled Reactors, GNEP, GEN-IV) ? What non-LWR research should be undertaken?
 - Advances in technology (e.g., new materials, sensors, computing power) make it possible to further enhance safety (and improve economics). What areas may deserve long term research?



- Use of nuclear power in the USA (and perhaps worldwide) will grow over the next 20 years
 - light water technology will be dominant
 - reactors using non-LWR technology may be a small part of workload of most regulatory authorities but may well require long term research to develop safety requirements and support future licensing decisions



- Utilities will continue to seek to utilize the current margin that exists between operations and regulatory limits
 - Submittals will become more technically sophisticated and complicated. Analysis tools, used by regulatory authorities, would need to assure appropriate limits and margins are maintained



- Nuclear power will become an ever more international field leading to greater collaboration in research
- Staffing at many regulatory authorities may not grow at a rate commensurate with the growth of nuclear power



 The average experience of regulatory staff will decrease over the next decade

- matter of demographics
- exacerbated perhaps by the competition for manpower within the nuclear community



DISCUSSION

- Do you agree with the objectives?
 - Should there be other objectives?
- Do you agree with the assumptions?
 - Should other or different assumptions be made?

8