

RF
From: Marsha Gamberoni
To: Neil Sheehan
Date: 10/08/2007 11:21:24 AM
Subject: Revised statement

Neil

I made a couple of other minor changes. Call me on my cell if you have questions.

Thanks
Marsha

1075

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Subject: Revised statement
Creation Date 10/08/2007 11:21:23 AM
From: Marsha Gamberoni
Created By: MKG@nrc.gov

Recipients

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NAS (Neil Sheehan)

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**STATEMENT FOR PEACH BOTTOM PRESS
BRIEFING
OCTOBER 9, 2007**

Good afternoon and thank you for coming.

We are here this afternoon to provide a brief overview of our findings from an inspection we recently conducted at the Peach Bottom nuclear power plant.

On Sept. 20th, the NRC announced that we were sending an Augmented Inspection Team, also known as an AIT, to Peach Bottom to look into information that security officers at the facility may have been inattentive while on duty.

That occurred after videos surfaced showing several plant guards apparently sleeping when they were supposed to be ready to respond to a security event at the facility.

Our inspection, which involved eight NRC staff with different technical and investigative backgrounds, was concluded on Sept. 28th.

I'd now like to summarize what our inspection found:

- We have confirmed that multiple security guards were inattentive on multiple occasions. The guards involved were stationed in what is known as a plant "ready room," that is, a room where guards are stationed so that they could be called upon if needed.

- We have found that Exelon, the company that operates Peach Bottom, did not do a good enough job of getting across the message that inattentiveness would not, in any way, shape or form, be tolerated. Also, we have

determined that there were missed opportunities by security supervisors and by the plant's Behavioral Observation Program to identify inattentiveness. Further, we believe the company failed to provide sufficient stimuli for the guards.

- We did not find that security was significantly degraded as a result of the guard inattentiveness. Nuclear power plants do not rely on a single guard or set of guards. Rather, security is maintained via a foundation of overlapping and integrated defensive strategies. The guards in question were just one part of the plant's security program. The security program at Peach Bottom provided reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public was adequately protected at all times.

- We have learned that overtime was apparently not a factor in the inattentiveness.

and

- We have found that Exelon has instituted prompt corrective actions in response to the inattentiveness issues identified. These include regular and random checks on guard alertness.

Tonight, at a public meeting set to begin here at 6:30 p.m., we will provide the results of our Augmented Inspection Team review in greater detail. The NRC will be available starting at 5:30 to meet with interested parties. Within 30 days of the meeting, we will issue a report summarizing our findings.

But the NRC has more work to do and we recognize that. Our overall review of the guard inattentiveness issue is ongoing. In line with that, we have sent a letter to Exelon

asking for more information on issues related to inattentiveness. In addition, we are awaiting the company's root cause analysis of the issues. We will be performing a follow-up inspection to review Exelon's root cause analysis, as well as, the implementation of its transition to an in-house security force.

On a related note, we have sent an advisory to the nuclear industry, reminding it of its need to adhere to requirements for effective processes and procedures to be in place, to make certain, individuals performing security duties are ready, at a moment's notice, to carry out those responsibilities.

The bottom line is that the NRC considers it thoroughly inexcusable for a guard to be unprepared to respond to a plant event at any time. In the past, we have issued fines and notices of violations for inattentiveness.

Going forward, we will continue to deliver that message and to take whatever steps necessary to achieve compliance.

With that, we are now ready to take your questions.