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1. This measure is the number of new red inspection findings during the fiscal year plus the number of new red performance indicators during the fiscal year. Programmatic issues at multi-unit sites that result in red findings for each individual unit are considered separate conditions for purposes of reporting for this measure. A red performance indicator and a red inspection finding that are due to an issue with the same underlying causes are also considered separate conditions for purposes of reporting for this measure. Red inspection findings are included in the fiscal year in which the final significance determination was made. Red performance indicators are included in the fiscal year in which Reactor Oversight Process external web page was updated to show the red indicator.
2. Significant Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) events have a conditional core damage probability (CCDP) or Δ CCDP of $\geq 1 \times 10^{-3}$. Such events have a 1/1000 (10^{-3}) or greater probability of leading to a reactor accident involving core damage. An identical condition affecting more than one plant is counted as a single ASP event if a single accident initiator would have resulted in a single reactor accident. One event was identified in FY 2002 as having the potential of being a significant precursor. This precursor involved reactor pressure vessel head degradation at Davis-Besse. The detailed ASP Program preliminary analysis of this complex event was completed in September 2004. Based on the screening and engineering evaluation of FY 2002, FY 2003, and FY 2004 events, no other potentially significant precursor were identified. Therefore, the second performance measure was not exceeded for FY 2002, FY 2003, and FY 2004.
3. This measure is the number of plants that have entered the Manual Chapter 0350 process, the multiple/repetitive degraded cornerstone column, or the unacceptable performance column during the fiscal year (i.e., were not in these columns or process the previous fiscal year). Data for this measure is obtained from the NRC external web Action Matrix Summary page, that provides a matrix of the five columns with the plants listed within their applicable column and notes the plants in the Manual Chapter 0350 process. For reporting purposes, plants that are the subject of an approved deviation from the Action Matrix are included in the column or process in which they appear on the web page. The target value is set based on the expected addition of several indicators and a change in the long-term trending methodology (which will no longer be influenced by the earlier data and will be more sensitive to changes in current performance).
4. Considering all indicators qualified for use in reporting.
5. Beginning in FY 2005, this measure is based upon Abnormal Occurrence Criterion 1.A. Prior to FY 2005, the criterion was based upon a higher threshold of significant functional damage to organs or physiological systems. Using the pre-FY 2005 criteria, NRC reported zero events through FY 2004. However, it should be noted that if the FY 2005 performance measure, based upon Abnormal Occurrence Criterion 1.A., had been in place in FY 2003,

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- two materials events would have been reported for that fiscal year.
6. Releases for which a 30-day report requirement under 10 CFR 20.2203(a)(3) is required.
 7. With no event exceeding Abnormal Occurrence Criterion 1.B.1.
 8. “Risk-significant” is defined as any unrecovered lost or abandoned sources that exceed the values listed in “Appendix P to 10 CFR Part 110--High Risk Radioactive Material, Category 2.” Excluded from reporting under this criterion are those events involving sources that are lost or abandoned under the following conditions: (1) sources abandoned in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 39.77(c); (2) recovered sources with sufficient indication that doses in excess of the reporting thresholds specified in AO criterion I.A.1 and I.A.2 did not occur during the time the source was missing; (3) unrecoverable sources lost under such conditions that doses in excess of the reporting thresholds specified in AO criterion I.A.1 and I.A.2 were not known to have occurred; (4) other sources that are lost or abandoned and declared unrecoverable; (5) for which the Agency has made a determination that the risk-significance of the source is low based upon the location (e.g. water depth) or physical characteristics (e.g. half life, housing) of the source and its surroundings; (6) where all reasonable efforts have been made to recover the source; and (7) it has been determined that the source is not recoverable and will not be considered a realistic safety or security risk under this measure.
 9. “Substantiated” means a situation where an indication of loss, theft or unlawful diversion such as: an allegation of diversion, report of lost or stolen material, statistical processing difference, or other indication of loss of material control or accountability cannot be refuted following an investigation; and requires further action on the part of the Agency or other proper authorities.
 10. A formula quantity of special nuclear material is defined in 10 CFR 70.4.
 11. “Radiological sabotage” is defined in 10 CFR 73.2.
 12. Security goal performance measures 2, 3, and 4 together encompass the discontinued performance measure "Number of security events and incidents that exceed the Abnormal Occurrence Criterion I.C 2-4" to provide greater clarity and detail.
 13. A “substantial breakdown” is defined as a red finding in the security inspection program, or any plant or facility determined to have overall unacceptable performance, or in a shutdown condition (inimical to the effective functioning of the nation’s critical infrastructure) as a result of significant performance problems and/or operational events.

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14. "Significant unauthorized disclosure" is defined as a disclosure that harms national security or public health and safety.
15. OIG products are issued OIG reports. For the audit unit, these are audit reports and evaluations. For the investigative unit, these are investigations, Event Inquiries, and special inquiries. Activities are the OIG hotline or proactive investigative reports.
16. Congress left the determination and threshold of what constitutes a most serious challenge to the discretion of the Inspectors General. As a result, OIG applied the following definition: Serious management challenges are mission-critical areas or programs that have a potential for a perennial weakness or vulnerability that, without substantial management attention, would seriously impact agency operations or strategic goals.
17. High impact is the effect of an issued report or activity undertaken that results in: a) confirming risk areas or management challenges that caused the agency to take corrective action, b) real dollar savings or reduced regulatory burden, c) identifying significant wrongdoing by individuals that results in criminal or administrative action, d) clearing an individual wrongly accused, and e) identifying regulatory actions or oversight that may have contributed to the occurrence of a specific event or incident or resulted in a potential adverse impact on public health or safety.
18. During FY 2006, three recommendations involving byproduct materials were not agreed to by the agency. These recommendations have since been resolved and are in the process of being implemented.
19. The agency has extended the time required to complete final action on the deficiencies identified in the audit of the Incident Response Program.
20. During FY 2007, five recommendations involving three separate audit reports on byproduct materials licensing, Probabilistic Risk Assessment and the National Source Tracking System respectively have taken longer for the agency to implement.
21. The agency is taking longer to complete final action on FISMA recommendations.
22. Majority of these audit recommendations deal with FISMA and a specific computer-based security program that will take a lengthy time to complete final actions. For example, the agency will not be able to complete its FISMA related certification and accreditation efforts before 2009.
23. During FY 2007, eleven recommendations involving three separate audit reports on baseline security, Nuclear Security and Incident Response and Integrative Personnel Security System respectively have taken longer for the agency to implement.

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24. Final action on recommendations in the Financial Statements audit took 16 months to complete.
25. The OIG Management and Operational Support staff consists of senior managers, a general counsel, and administrative support personnel. To carry out the function of this program for FY 2009, OIG estimates its costs to be \$1.265 million, which includes salaries and benefits for eight FTE. The associated FTE and salaries and benefits estimate were equally applied between the audits and investigations programs. Contract support and travel estimates were allocated in proportion to each program's fully costed FTE.