

U.S. NRC


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Protecting People and the Environment

80

2007 Peach Bottom Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) Congressional Brief

Marsha K. Gamberoni, Director
James M. Trapp, Team Leader
Division of Reactor Safety
NRC Region I






AIT Process

AIT Objectives

- Conduct timely and systematic inspection related to significant operational events
- Assess health and safety significance of the event
- Collect and analyze facts associated with the event to determine causes and circumstances





AIT Process

AIT Process Overview

- Formal investigation process conducted for the purpose of gathering facts and determining findings and conclusions for significant operational events
- Implemented for significant operational events that pose an actual or potential hazard to public health and safety, property, or the environment
- Inspection teams consist of technical experts from the Regions augmented by specialists from NRC Headquarters






AIT Process

AIT Basis for Peach Bottom

Multiple occasions in which several security officers at Peach Bottom were observed to be inattentive between March and August 2007





Event Background


- NRC made aware of videos through WCBS-TV (New York City) reporter on September 10, 2007
- NRC began enhanced oversight of security on September 10, 2007
- NRC viewed videos on September 19, 2007, which showed multiple occurrences of security officers inattentive to duty in the “ready room” of the plant between March and August 2007
- NRC commenced AIT on September 21, 2007





Team Objectives

- Independently review the facts surrounding inattentive security officers
- Assess security plan impact
- Identify probable causes
- Assess corrective and compensatory actions
- Review extent of security officers' inattentiveness
- Assess effectiveness of management oversight
- Assess Behavioral Observation Program
- Identify generic aspects of the event






AIT Results

Extent of Security Officers' Inattentiveness

- All security officers were interviewed at least once by either NRC or Exelon
- Based on videos and interviews conducted, all security officers identified as inattentive were working on Security Team No. 1

o No S.O. Provided statements of Sleeping S.O. on other Teams.
& NAMES






AIT Results

Security Plan Impact

- Security at Peach Bottom was not significantly degraded as a result of this event
- Security at the plant provided high assurance that the health and safety of the public was adequately protected at all times
- Inattentive security officers did have an adverse impact on elements of the defense-in-depth security strategy

- SPECTRA LINK PHONES*
- (1) S.O. HAD RADIOS, & ~~PEACH BOTTOM~~ ~~IN R~~ R.
 - (2) S.O. HAVE RESPONSE FUNCTION NOT SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION.
 - (3) ONE S.O. ALWAYS AWAKE - RADIO CHECKS EVERY 30 MIN (HIGH ACT) 15 MIN (LOW ACT)
 - (4) TIME LINES DO NOT REQUIRE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
 - (5)






AIT Results

Probable Causes

- Adverse behavior developed on Security Team No.1
- Ready room not accessible for adequate supervisory oversight - *o CABINET BUCKLED WINDOW + DOOR LOCK*
- Management failed to effectively communicate and reinforce station attentiveness expectations - *o SECURITY OFFICERS FAILED TO SEE*
o NOT CLEARLY ATTACHED TO EVENTS / SIGNIFICANCE
o RETURN TO S/P.
- Security supervisors failed to address concerns involving inattentive security officers
- Management failed to address poor environmental conditions in the ready room - *o DIMMY LIT* *o NOISY.*
o HOT
o SMALL ROOM
- Management failed to provide adequate attentiveness stimuli - *Books, Newspapers, Former Security Procedures.*
Company Provided
Computers, radios, NONE AVAILABLE.






AIT Results

Compensatory and Corrective Actions

- Prompt compensatory and corrective actions implemented by Exelon were appropriate
 - Briefed All SD and FFB
 - Random Checks By Sr. Site management & Security Site management.
 - 24 HR oversight By TWC Corporate night + TWC Security night 10 hrs/day + 10 hrs night.
 - TWC Supervisor assigned 24/7 to RR.
 - Proc Rev. to require 30 min / 15 min Radio checks.
 - RADIO CHECKS RANDOM
- Enhanced oversight by Exelon and Wackenhut continues
 - * ALL S.O & SUPERVISORS ON TEAM #1 ARE ON ADMIN LEAVE.
- Corrective actions prior to September 2007 were ineffective for addressing unacceptable security officer behavior






AIT Results

Management and Supervisory Oversight

- Ineffective security supervisory oversight had a direct adverse impact on this event
- Security supervisor discouraged the bringing forward of safety concerns

- Barrier broken.

- No formal procedure for backshift oversight visits..






AIT Results

Behavioral Observation Program

- Multiple opportunities existed for security officers to report inattentive behavior
- Security organization was not effective in enforcing the Behavioral Observation Program






AIT Results

Generic Communications

- Exelon has shared lessons learned with the Exelon fleet and the industry — ISSUED NER TO FLEET
- NRC has issued a security advisory to the industry on inattentive security officer behavior





AIT Conclusions

- Security officers were inattentive on multiple occasions
- The level of security was not significantly degraded as a result of inattentive security officers
- Supervisors failed to correct inattentive behavior
- Peach Bottom's prompt corrective actions were appropriate





NRC Actions

- Issued a letter to Exelon on October 4, 2007, regarding inattentiveness concerns
- Issue an AIT inspection report
- Perform an AIT follow-up inspection
- Consider enforcement actions following completion of NRC review

