

**U.S. NRC**  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
*Protecting People and the Environment*


## 2007 Peach Bottom Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) Exit Meeting

Marsha K. Gamberoni, Director  
James M. Trapp, Team Leader  
Division of Reactor Safety  
NRC Region I

- 6 wk. float  
48 hr. aug.
- Outage = 60hr aug. group
- 16 in 24  
26 in 48  
72 hrs in 7 day float.

indiv.

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## AIT Exit Meeting

### Meeting Purpose

- Inform Exelon of the results of the AIT's review of events involving inattentive security officers
- Provide opportunity for Exelon to respond to AIT results
- Conduct a public question-and-answer session

DZ

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## AIT Exit Meeting

### Meeting Protocol Richard Barkley, PE Technical Communications Asst.

- The NRC will answer questions from the public following the meeting with Exelon
- Please silence all cell phones and pagers
- Please sign up for question-and-answer session

(Feedback Forms)

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


## AIT Exit Meeting

### Meeting Agenda

- Introduction
- Describe AIT Process and Objectives
- Describe AIT Inspection Results
- Provide Opportunity for Exelon to Respond to AIT Results
- Short Break
- Public Question-and-Answer Session

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# AIT Exit Meeting

## Introduction

### NRC

Samuel Collins                      Region I Administrator  
Marsha Gamberoni                Director, Division of Reactor Safety – Region I  
James Trapp                        Team Leader - AIT

### Exelon

Ronald DeGregorio                Sr. Vice President - Mid-Atlantic Operations  
Joseph Grimes                    Site Vice President - Peach Bottom  
~~Michael Massaro                Plant Manager - Peach Bottom~~  
James Meister - VP Ops, Support




# AIT Process

## AIT Objectives

- Conduct timely and systematic inspection related to significant operational events
- Assess health and safety significance of the event
- Collect and analyze facts associated with the event to determine causes and circumstances

*- initial response  
- assessment  
- next steps ?*




## AIT Process

### AIT Process Overview

- Formal investigation process conducted for the purpose of gathering facts and determining findings and conclusions for significant operational events.
- Implemented for significant operational events that pose an actual or potential hazard to public health and safety, property, or the environment
- Inspection teams consist of technical experts from the Regions augmented by specialists from NRC Headquarters

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
### 2007 Peach Bottom Augmented Inspection Team Members

- |                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| * James Trapp   | Team Leader (Region I)                          |
| * Dana Caron    | Assistant Team Leader (Region I)                |
| Brice Bickett   | Senior Project Engineer (Region I)              |
| George Smith    | Physical Security Inspector (Region I)          |
| Joseph Willis   | Security Specialist (NSIR)                      |
| Jeffrey Teator  | Senior Special Agent (Office of Investigations) |
| Mark Mullen     | Senior Special Agent (Office of Investigations) |
| Albert Cabrelli | Special Agent (Office of Investigations)        |

*Common. of PA*

\* involved in 3/07 Amer. reviews

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## AIT Process

### AIT Basis for Peach Bottom

Multiple occasions in which several security officers at Peach Bottom were observed to be inattentive between March and August 2007


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## Event Background

- NRC made aware of videos through WCBS-TV (New York City) reporter on September 10, 2007
- NRC began enhanced oversight of security on September 10, 2007
- NRC viewed videos on September 19, 2007, which showed multiple occurrences of security officers inattentive to duty in the "ready room" of the plant between March and August 2007
- NRC commenced AIT on September 21, 2007

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# Team Objectives

- Independently review the facts surrounding inattentive security officers
- Assess security plan impact
- Identify probable causes
- Assess corrective and compensatory actions
- Review extent of security officers' inattentiveness
- Assess effectiveness of management oversight
- Assess Behavioral Observation Program
- Identify generic aspects of the event



# AIT Results


## Independent Review of Facts

- The NRC interviewed 38 security personnel total from each of the four security teams, including security supervisors, as well as maintenance personnel and Exelon management
- Multiple security officers inattentive on four separate occasions – 10 security officers total (March 12; June 9; June 20; and August 10)
- Security officers identified in videos as inattentive had not exceeded NRC work hour requirements
- Security officers in videos confirmed as inattentive to duty

All on Admin. Lv.  
 10 TMI  
 Tm. #1 on Admin. Lv.  
 None admitted

10 officers  
 4 occasions

• Fixed post rotate ev. 2 hrs./run. fixed post do not rotate / radio cks. in real  
 1 indiv. per hr  
 • Work hr. limits not an issue. / not shift specific  
 • 12 hrs/shift, 8- to-5...



## AIT Results

- All in Pur Block
- Radios/phones
- Rdy-Rm - response on rounds . . .
- 1 alert @ all times
- "fire-man" response

### Security Plan Impact

- Security at Peach Bottom was not significantly degraded as a result of this event
- Security at the plant provided high assurance that the health and safety of the public was adequately protected at all times
- Inattentive security officers did have an adverse impact on elements of the defense-in-depth security strategy

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


## AIT Results

### Probable Causes

- Adverse behavior developed on Security Team No. 1
- Ready room not accessible for adequate supervisory oversight
- Management failed to effectively communicate and reinforce station attentiveness expectations
- Security supervisors failed to address concerns involving inattentive security officers
- Management failed to address poor environmental conditions in the ready room
- Management failed to provide adequate attentiveness stimuli

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## AIT Results

### Compensatory and Corrective Actions

- Prompt compensatory and corrective actions implemented by Exelon were appropriate
- Enhanced oversight by Exelon and Wackenhut continues
- Corrective actions prior to September 2007 were ineffective for addressing unacceptable security officer behavior

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


## AIT Results

### Extent of Security Officers' Inattentiveness

- All security officers were interviewed at least once by either NRC or Exelon
- Based on videos and interviews conducted, all individuals identified as inattentive were working on Security Team No. 1

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## AIT Results

### Management and Supervisory Oversight

- Ineffective security supervisory oversight had a direct adverse impact on this event
- Security supervisor discouraged the bringing forward of safety concerns

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


## AIT Results

### Behavioral Observation Program

- Multiple opportunities existed for security officers to report inattentive behavior
- Security organization was not effective in promoting and supporting the Behavioral Observation Program

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## AIT Results

### Generic Communications

- Exelon has shared lessons learned with the Exelon fleet and the industry
- NRC has issued a security advisory to the industry on inattentive security officer behavior

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## AIT Conclusions

- Security officers were inattentive on multiple occasions
- The level of security was not significantly degraded as a result of inattentive security officers
- Supervisors failed to correct inattentive behavior
- Peach Bottom's prompt corrective actions in September 2007 were appropriate

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## NRC Actions

- Issued a letter to Exelon on October 4, 2007, regarding inattentiveness concerns
- Issue an AIT inspection report
- Perform an AIT follow-up inspection
- Consider enforcement actions following completion of NRC review

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


## Exelon Response and Remarks


Par D. - Inattent. is unacceptable & intolerable - others didn't follow/mgt. short-circuiting - actions taken.

Joe G. - Public safety not impacted  
- sig. issue - doesn't meet std. / "fired" wackerhut...

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# END OF THE PRESENTATION



# U.S. NRC

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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## Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region I

### King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

### October 9, 2007

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
T/U presentation and discussion:

- Clarify Roles/ Exelon, Wackenhut ← ≈ 50% sites contractors → next Wackenhut  
67 sites = 30 "
- NRC continuing reviews:
  - AIT closure
  - Root Cause review
  - Add'l reviews/interviews of individuals...
  - Enforcement considerations...
- Discussion by Security Officers:
  - Isolated / Dedicated / concerned / Anxious / many local
- Ops. → Security - Preparedness
- "missed opportunity" by NRC - reopen past concern  
recontact to indiv.

• BREs?

• any Exelon Δ

• Fleet issues!



• Feedback Forms:

• NRC/Exelon role in Q&A: Rich Barkley