

**TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

500C Chestnut Street Tower II

MAY 29 1979

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USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II LETTER  
RII:WPA 50-391/79-04 - INSPECTION REPORT - REVISED RESPONSE TO  
INFRACTION

The subject letter dated March 20, 1979, cited TVA with one infraction  
in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201. A response to that infraction was  
submitted on April 2, 1979.

In response to C. E. Murphy's letter to H. G. Parris dated April 12, 1979,  
we submitted additional information on April 30, 1979.

As agreed in subsequent telephone conversations with C. E. Murphy and  
documented by his letter to H. G. Parris dated May 11, 1979, enclosed  
is our revised response to that infraction.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch  
with D. L. Lambert at FTS 854-2581.

Very truly yours,



J. E. Gilleland  
Assistant Manager of Power

Enclosure

cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE  
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2  
REVISED RESPONSE TO INFRACTION 391/79-04-01

Infraction

As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and as implemented by Watts Bar Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 17.1A.5, "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings. . .and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings." Westinghouse Procedure 2463A68G01, "Reactor Internals Assembly" Paragraph 2.12 required in part to "attach a calibrated sensor between the crane hook and the internals. . ." for reactor internals installation into the reactor vessel. Paragraph 2.13.1 further required to "monitor load sensor so that descent can be stopped for any significant unloading occurrences."

Contrary to the above, the lower reactor internals were lowered into the reactor vessel without a calibrated sensor and load was not monitored during descent.

Response

Westinghouse Procedure 2463A68G01 does state that a load sensor be installed between the crane hook and internals lifting rig. The sensor supplied by Westinghouse was inoperable and had been sent offsite. The load cell on the polar crane was inoperable. Therefore, in order not to delay the work, more employees were stationed at various positions around the RPV than required by Westinghouse procedure to monitor the descent and stop the activity if any binding or resistance was encountered. The original intent of the load cell is to detect any change in load while operating under water when visibility is reduced. For this particular installation, the vessel was not filled with water. TVA considers this an acceptable deviation from the procedure under these particular circumstances, and it was also considered acceptable by the Westinghouse Pensacola Quality Assurance representatives and by a staff member of the Westinghouse site manager's office. The organizations represented are responsible for the procedure and for site work affecting the Westinghouse-supplied equipment. The deviation was noted in the Assembly Status Sheet, and the lower reactor internals were installed satisfactorily.

The only factor that Westinghouse and TVA consider to be of concern is that the Westinghouse Pensacola design engineer did not formally approve the procedural change before the installation of the core barrel assembly. This item has been discussed within Westinghouse, and Westinghouse Design Engineering agrees with the actions taken under the circumstance. However, Westinghouse Pensacola Quality Assurance representatives have been instructed to not allow future deviations from the assembly specifications without documented prior approvals from Westinghouse Design and Quality Assurance Engineering.

Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

1. The load sensor on the unit 2 polar crane has been repaired and placed in service.
2. TVA site employees responsible for major lifts involving placement of the reactor internals in or out of the reactor vessel have been instructed to ensure that this load sensor is operable before starting the lift.
3. The importance of our quality assurance commitment to follow procedures has been emphasized to TVA site employees.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved

We are now in full compliance.