TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
500C Chestnut Street Tower II

APR 30 1979

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
79 MAY 2 A9:24

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II LETTER RII:WPA 50-391/79-04 - INSPECTION REPORT - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON INFRACTION

The subject letter dated March 9, 1979, cited TVA with one infraction. A response to that infraction was submitted on April 2, 1979. Inspector W. Ang of your staff requested additional information in a telephone conversation on April 10, 1979. This telephone conversation was documented by C. E. Murphy's letter to H. G. Parris dated April 12, 1979.

Enclosed is a letter from the Westinghouse Electric Corporation dated April 27, 1979, which provides the information requested by Mr. Ang. The statement in the enclosed letter concerning the Westinghouse site manager's evaluation refers to a member of the site manager's staff acting on his behalf. The site manager was in full agreement with the decision of his staff.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with M. R. Wisenburg at FTS 854-2581.

Very truly yours,

L. M. Mills
for J. E. Gilleland
Assistant Manager of Power

Enclosure
cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

ON INFRACTION 50-391/79-04-01

Westinghouse Electric Corporation

Water Reactor Divisions

P.O. Box 355
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230

Mr. John F. Cox
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
400 Commerce Avenue, W 9D207
Knoxville, TN 37902

April 27, 1979

TVA Contract No. 71C62-54714

WAT-D-3667

S.O. WAT/WBT-1000

Ref: Notice of Violation
391/79-04-01

Dear Mr. Cox:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT
UNIT NUMBER 2

Watts Bar Unit II Reactor Internals Assembly

We have had our Westinghouse Pensacola Division (authors and responsible Division for reactor internals assembly procedures, design, manufacture, etc.) review in detail the facts surrounding the alleged Notice of Violation on the assembly of Watts Bar Unit II internals assembly. Our findings are as follows:

The subject assembly specification operation requires the monitoring of the load sensor during the installation of core barrel assembly so that the descent can be stopped for any significant unloading occurrences. Normally, two load sensors are available at the plant site, one which is connected to the lift rig and another which is an integral part of the polar crane; however, on February 1, 1979, neither of the load-sensors were operational. Since the purpose of the load sensor is to detect any significant unloading occurrence, the Westinghouse Pensacola Quality Assurance representative sent to Watts Bar to direct and monitor internals assembly, and the W Site Manager evaluated the situation and made the decision to install the core barrel assembly. The W Pensacola Q.A. Representative is a member of one of the two organizations with direct responsibility for the reactor internals assembly procedure and the Westinghouse Site Manager has direct responsibility for all site operations affecting Westinghouse supplied equipment. The following items were considered by these two individuals prior to making the decision:

* The normal leveling (Operation No. 10) and centering (Operation No. 11) will be performed prior to installation of the core barrel assembly. NOTE: This creates an alignment of the core barrel assembly to the vessel such that no interference should occur.

* The lifting rig rates with the guide studs prior to the passing of any critical interface areas. NOTE: The use of guide studs should always prevent interference between the core barrel assembly and the vessel.

*, Additional personnel would be used for verification of clearances as the core barrel assembly is being lowered.

The above precautions were taken and the core barrel assembly was installed without incident. This deviation from the assembly specification was noted on the W Pensacola Assembly Status Sheet by the W Pensacola QA Site representative.

The only area of concern that I see is that W Pensacola Design Engineering did not formally approve the procedural change prior to the installation of the core barrel assembly. This item has been discussed and Design Engineering agrees with the actions taken under the circumstance. However, W Pensacola QA representatives have been instructed to not allow future deviations from the assembly specifications without documented prior approvals from W Pensacola Design and QA Engineering.

Very truly yours,

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION

E. A. Moostrek/for

M. A. Siano, Manager
Tennessee Valley Authority
Projects

/rcc

J. F. Cox, 1L

cc: D. R. Patterson, 3L
R. E. Lyman, 1L
F. E. Rolston, 1L
C. E. Brewer, 1L
L. M. Mills, 1L