

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
500C Chestnut Street Tower II

APR 2 1979

09 APR 4 10:00

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II LETTER
RII:WPA 50-391/79-04 - INSPECTION REPORT - RESPONSE TO INFRACTION

The subject letter dated March 20, 1979, cited TVA with one infraction.
Enclosed is our response to the infraction.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch
with M. R. Wisenburg at FTS 854-2581.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Gilleland

J. E. Gilleland
Assistant Manager of Power

Enclosure

cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2
RESPONSE TO INFRACTION 391/79-04-01

Infraction

As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and as implemented by Watts Bar FSAR Section 17.1A.5, "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings. . .and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings." Westinghouse Procedure 2463A68G01, "Reactor Internals Assembly" Paragraph 2.12 required in part to "attach a calibrated sensor between the crane hook and the internals. . ." for reactor internals installation into the reactor vessel. Paragraph 2.13.1 further required to "monitor load sensor so that descent can be stopped for any significant unloading occurrences."

Contrary to the above, the lower reactor internals were lowered into the reactor vessel without a calibrated sensor and load was not monitored during descent.

Response

Westinghouse Procedure 2463A68G01 does state that a load sensor be installed between the crane hook and internals lifting rig. The sensor supplied by Westinghouse was inoperable and had been sent offsite. The load cell on the polar crane was inoperable. Therefore, in order not to delay the work, more personnel were stationed at various positions around the RPV than required by Westinghouse Procedure to monitor the descent and stop the activity if any binding or resistance was encountered. The original intent of the load cell is to detect any change in load while operating under water when visibility is reduced. For this particular installation, the vessel was not filled with water. TVA considers this an acceptable deviation from the procedure, and it was also considered acceptable by the Westinghouse Reliability Engineer from Pensacola who was directing the work. This engineer is the appropriate technical expert on the procedure, and he approved this deviation for this particular case only. He noted this deviation on the signoff of this step on his documentation sheet. The activity was accomplished without difficulties, and results achieved met all requirements.

In view of the above, TVA does not agree that the events described constitute an infraction.