

10/11/07

72FR 57975

4

From: "Carol O'Claire" <COClaire@dps.state.oh.us>
To: <nrcprep@nrc.gov>
Date: Fri, Dec 7, 2007 9:48 AM
Subject: 2007 Implementation of the Reactor Oversight Process

Attached are Ohio's comments to the Reactor Oversight Process as a response to the October 4, solicitation of public comments.

The attached responses are from Ohio Department of Health, health physicists who are responsible for assessment of risks and the development of protective actions for Ohio citizens for radioactive material incidents to include nuclear power plant accidents.

Ohio is impacted by several nuclear power plants: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Beaver Valley Power Station, FERMI.

Ohio EMA, Radiological Branch, of which I am the Branch Chief, is responsible for coordination of events that include nuclear power plant accidents. Other responsibilities include training of first responders, providing and maintaining radiological equipment, and notification of nuclear power plant incidents.

Ohio EMA is also the Chair of the Utility Radiological Safety Board (URSB), an oversight entity, of which Ohio Department of Health is a member. Other members include Ohio Environmental Agency, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Ohio Department of Agriculture, and Ohio Department of Commerce.

The URSB reviews the ROP matrix quarterly and also sends Ohio representatives to observe NRC inspections at the Perry, Davis-Besse, and Beaver Valley nuclear power plants.

I have two Ohio EMA comments on the ROP:

The color scheme is difficult to interpret--often times we are made aware of a possible finding that is "greater than green"? What is the definition of "greater than green"?

Also, the matrix as it appears on the NRC web page appears to be two quarters behind--which does not make the information timely. Is this the correct interpretation?

Thank-you for the opportunity to provide comments to the ROP.

CC: <stephen.helmer@odh.ohio.gov>

RECEIVED

2007 DEC 11 PM 3:42

RULES AND DIRECTIVES
BRANCH
URSBPC

E-RFDS-ADH-03

Call = B.FU (RKF)
R. Frahm (RKF)

SUNSE Review Complete
Template=ADH-013

Mail Envelope Properties (47595D41.03C : 23 : 49212)

Subject: 2007 Implementation of the Reactor Oversight Process
Creation Date: Fri, Dec 7, 2007 9:47 AM
From: "Carol O'Claire" <COClaire@dps.state.oh.us>

Created By: COClaire@dps.state.oh.us

Recipients

nrc.gov
 TWGWPO01.HQGWDO01
 NRCREP

odh.ohio.gov
 stephen.helmer CC

Post Office

TWGWPO01.HQGWDO01

Route

nrc.gov
 odh.ohio.gov

Files	Size	Date & Time
MESSAGE	1768	Friday, December 7, 2007 9:47 AM
ROP Questionnaire.doc	31744	
Mime.822	47456	

Options

Expiration Date: None
Priority: Standard
ReplyRequested: No
Return Notification: None

Concealed Subject: No
Security: Standard

Junk Mail Handling Evaluation Results

Message is eligible for Junk Mail handling
 This message was not classified as Junk Mail

Junk Mail settings when this message was delivered

Junk Mail handling disabled by User
 Junk Mail handling disabled by Administrator
 Junk List is not enabled
 Junk Mail using personal address books is not enabled
 Block List is not enabled

USNRC Reactor Oversight Process
2007 Request for Comments

(1) Does the Performance Indicator Program provide useful insights to help ensure plant safety?

Comments: Yes, it appears that performance indicators are based on the cornerstones of operating safety. But it's unclear whether the indicators are "re-set" periodically to reflect changes in observed occurrences and current expectations.

(2) Does appropriate overlap exist between the Performance Indicator Program and the Inspection Program to provide for a comprehensive indication of licensee performance?

Comments: It appears that the PI and Inspection Program results are intended to work together in determining a comprehensive evaluation of licensee performance, but we are not knowledgeable enough to ascertain this information.

(3) Does NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" provide clear guidance regarding Performance Indicators?

Comments: The revised document is guidance for the licensee to help reduce unnecessary reporting burden, provide clearer guidance, and aid the accurate and consistent reporting of PI information. We have not applied the guidance in this manner, therefore, this question is more suited to the licensees.

(4) Can the Performance Indicator Program effectively identify declining performance based on risk-informed, objective, and predictable indicators?

Comments: Yes; this program provides for the ability to track and observe trends, but again we don't know if the values are "normalized" to reflect long term observations or current concerns.

(5) Does the Inspection Program adequately cover areas important to safety, and is it effective in identifying and ensuring the prompt correction of any performance deficiencies?

Comments: yes, the few inspections we have been able to observe have been very comprehensive and detailed and have resulted in attention given to areas of concern which does lead to correction of performance deficiencies.

6) Is the information contained in inspection reports relevant, useful, and written in plain English?

Comments: Yes

(7) Does the Significance Determination Process result in an objective and understandable regulatory response to performance issues?

Comments: Yes, it is useful tool to determine a plant's status in specific oversight areas quickly.

(8) Does the NRC take appropriate actions to address performance issues for those plants with identified performance deficiencies?

Comments: Yes

9) Is the information contained in assessment reports relevant, useful, and written in plain English?

Comments: Yes

10) Are the ROP oversight activities predictable (i.e., controlled by the process) and reasonably objective (i.e., based on supported facts, rather than relying on subjective judgment)?

Comments: Yes, the inspection procedures we have reviewed provide consistency and objectivity.

(11) Is the ROP risk-informed, in that the NRC's actions are appropriately graduated on the basis of increased significance?

Comments: Yes, in the inspections we have observed this has been the case.

(12) Is the ROP understandable and are the processes, procedures and products clear and written in plain English?

Comments: Yes

13) Does the ROP provide adequate assurance, when combined with other NRC regulatory processes, that plants are being operated and maintained safely?

Comments: Yes, the ROP provides a substantial framework for ensuring that safety remains a primary focus for the licensees.

(14) Is the ROP effective, efficient, realistic, and timely?

Comments: Not enough experience to comment.

(15) Does the ROP ensure openness in the regulatory process?

Comments: It promotes openness, but we are not sure that it ensures openness. For example: asking for public comments at a public meeting can be very intimidating for members of the public. While the NRC would appreciate all comments it cannot ensure that anyone will comment.

(16) Has the public been afforded adequate opportunity to participate in the ROP and to provide inputs and comments?

Comments: Not enough experience to comment.

(17) Has the NRC has been responsive to public inputs and comments on the ROP?

Comments: Not enough experience to comment.

(18) Has the NRC implemented the ROP as defined by program documents?

Comments: In as far as completing inspections in a diligent manner, our experience in this area is positive.

(19) Does the ROP result in unintended consequences?

Comments: Not enough experience to comment.

(20a) Do the ROP inspection and assessment safety culture enhancements help to focus licensee and NRC attention on performance issues associated with aspects of safety culture?

Comments: Not enough experience to comment.

(20b) Do the baseline Identification and Resolution of Problems inspection procedure (71152) and the special inspection procedures (93800 and 93812 respectively) provide an appropriate level of guidance on safety culture aspects and on the consideration of causal factors related to safety culture?

Comments: Not enough experience to comment.

(20c) Do the supplemental inspection procedures (Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area (95001), Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area (95002)) respectively provide an appropriate level of guidance to evaluate whether safety culture components have been adequately considered as part of the licensee's root cause, extent of condition, and extent of cause evaluations and to independently determine if safety culture components caused or significantly contributed to the risk significant performance issues?

Comments: Not enough experience to comment.

(20d) Does the procedure for a Supplemental Inspection for Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs, or One Red Input (95003) provide an appropriate level of guidance to independently assess the licensee's safety culture and evaluate the licensee's assessment of their safety culture?

Comments:

(20e) Do the ROP inspection reports clearly describe inspection finding cross-cutting aspects?

Comments: Yes, in our experience, the ROP inspection reports ensure linkage between observations and events from multiple areas of concern, looking for causes in one area that impacted results in other areas.

(20f) Do the Operating Reactor Assessment Program (0305) cross-cutting components and cross-cutting aspects provide an adequate coverage of the cross-cutting areas?

Comments: Not enough experience to comment.

(21) Please provide any additional information or comments related to the Reactor Oversight Process.

Comments: None at this time.