TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

5N 157B Lookout Place

AUG 31 1989

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of the Application of ) Docket Nos. 50-390
Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-391

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNITS 1 AND 2 - REVISED RESPONSE TO NRC BULLETIN 80-20 CONCERNING FAILURES OF WESTINGHOUSE TYPE W-2 SPRING RETURN TO NEUTRAL CONTROL SWITCHES

Enclosure 1 to this letter contains a revised response to NRC Bulletin 80-20, "Failures of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return to Neutral Control Switches." This response clarifies the June 2, 1982 letter regarding the number of safety-related W-2 switches and includes an additional six switches, which were recently identified during a study covering plant areas other than the main and auxiliary control rooms. Enclosure 2 contains the list of commitments from this submittal, which will be identified in TVA's commitment tracking system.

If there are any questions, please telephone T. W. Horning at (615) 365-3381.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Ralph H. Shell

for Manager, Nuclear Licensing
and Regulatory Affairs

Enclosures
cc: See page 2

JE11
1/1

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

AUG 31 1989

cc (Enclosures):
Ms. S. C. Black, Assistant Director
for Projects
TVA Projects Division
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint, North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Mr. B. A. Wilson, Assistant Director
for Inspection Programs
TVA Projects Division
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

NRC Resident Inspector
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 700
Spring City, Tennessee 37381

ENCLOSURE 1

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNITS 1 AND 2 -
REVISED RESPONSE TO NRC BULLETIN 80-20 CONCERNING FAILURES
OF WESTINGHOUSE TYPE W-2 SPRING RETURN TO NEUTRAL CONTROL SWITCHES

Our previous submittal dated June 2, 1982, was incorrect in stating that there were 67 safety-related switches per unit. It should have indicated there were 102 total switches, of which 67 were required for Unit 1 operation. This figure was based on a preliminary review of switches on Unit 1 and common plant equipment in the main and auxiliary control rooms. These switches have been modified. An additional 6 switches requiring modification were recently identified during a study covering plant areas other than the main control and auxiliary control rooms. Of these switches, 4 are required for operation of Unit 1, and the remaining 2 are required for only operation of Unit 2. Therefore, WBN has a total of 108 safety-related switches that fall within the description of NRC Bulletin 80-20.

The subject switches are located in the following type of circuits or schematics: (1) breaker control, (2) motor-operated valves, (3) solenoid valves, and (4) motor starters. The affected switches were used in the following systems: Volume Control; Safety Injection; Emergency Gas Treatment; Residual Heat Removal; Containment Spray; Auxiliary Feedwater; Essential Raw Cooling Water; Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning; Reactor Coolant; Main Steam; Associated Electrical; and Component Cooling.

For the main and auxiliary control rooms, existing indicating lights associated with the Westinghouse W-2 switch in the typical circuits have been wired to monitor contact continuity in the spring return to neutral position. The lights have been wired in series with the W-2 switch and will be energized when the switch spring returns to the neutral position, indicating contact continuity. Wiring has been accomplished so as to prevent the "sneak path" for current, as discussed in NRC Information Notice 82-01. The 4 additional switches required for Unit 1 operation that were identified as requiring modifications will be modified in the same manner as those in the main and auxiliary control rooms. The 2 additional switches that were required for Unit 2 operation that were identified as requiring modification will be modified in the same manner as those in the main and auxiliary control rooms were modified.

TVA will complete the above-mentioned modifications for Units 1 and 2 before fuel loading of the respective unit.

ENCLOSURE 2

The following is the list of commitments intended by this letter:

1. The 4 additional switches required for Unit 1 operation that were identified as requiring modifications will be modified in the same manner as those in the main and auxiliary control rooms were modified.

2. The 2 additional switches that were required for Unit 2 operation that were identified as requiring modification will be modified in the same manner as those in the main and auxiliary control rooms were modified.