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December 21, 2007

EA-07-296

Mr. Charles G. Pardee  
Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President  
Exelon Generation Company, LLC  
4300 Winfield Rd  
Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: NRC AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) FOLLOW-UP REPORT  
05000277/2007405 AND 05000278/2007405; PRELIMINARY GREATER THAN  
GREEN FINDING - PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION

Dear Mr. Pardee:

On November 9, 2007, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an AIT follow-up inspection at your Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3. This inspection was conducted to provide additional assessment and determine the significance of issues identified by an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) in September 2007 regarding security officer inattentiveness. The enclosed inspection report documents the AIT follow-up inspection results, which were discussed at the public exit meeting on December 3, 2007, with Mr. Joseph Grimes and other members of your staff. Following the inspection exit, the NRC responded to questions from those stakeholders in attendance. It should be noted that the findings documented in this report do not represent new or different issues or incidents of inattentiveness other than those identified during the September 2007 AIT inspection.

**EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE**

May be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552)

Exemption number: 5  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission review required before public release.

James Trapp, RI/DRS/PSB1/RA by D. Roberts for/  
Name and organization of person making determination.

Date of determination: 12/20/2007

Attachment C Contains Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information. Upon separation, the cover letter, enclosure, and Attachments A and B are decontrolled.

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The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

As initially described in the NRC Augmented Inspection Team report dated November 5, 2007, the enclosed report documents one finding regarding inattentive security officers and an ineffective behavior observation program that was preliminarily determined to be greater than Green, as determined by the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process (i.e., a finding of at least low to moderate security significance). The Significance Determination Process analysis contains security sensitive information and will not be made publicly available (Attachment C). When notified of this issue by the NRC, compensatory measures were put in place by Exelon that addressed this finding while longer term corrective actions were being implemented. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program" this finding has cross-cutting aspects in the areas of Human Performance and Safety Conscious Work Environment.

As mentioned previously, this inspection was conducted as a follow-up to an earlier AIT inspection that took place from September 21-28, 2007. Following the earlier inspection, the NRC took several actions to ensure that the overall effectiveness of the security program at Peach Bottom was not compromised as a result of the incidents of inattentiveness. These actions included issuing a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) to Exelon to ensure that immediate and long term corrective actions were being implemented at the site. The NRC supplemented its own routine inspection effort by increasing its monitoring while Exelon transitioned to a proprietary security force at Peach Bottom in November 2007. On November 28, 2007, the NRC's Executive Director for Operations approved a Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Deviation Memorandum allowing the NRC Region I staff to increase its inspection and oversight of Peach Bottom beyond that which would normally be prescribed by the ROP. These actions ensured that adequate NRC oversight was provided to address the performance deficiencies described in this report while the NRC's significance determination and enforcement process were being completed. The NRC has made the public aware of these actions by holding public inspection exit meetings and making related documents publicly available in ADAMS.

Before we make a final significance decision regarding this preliminary "greater than Green" finding, we are providing you an opportunity (1) to attend a Regulatory Conference where you can present to the NRC your perspective on the facts and assumptions the NRC used to arrive at the finding and assess its significance, or (2) submit your position on the finding to the NRC in writing. If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held within 30 days of the receipt of this letter and we encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a Regulatory Conference is held, it will be closed for public observation because it involves security sensitive information. If you decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within 30 days of the receipt of this letter. If you decline a Regulatory Conference and choose not to submit a written response, the NRC will proceed with its final significance determination.

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Please contact Mr. James Trapp of my staff at (610) 337- 5186 within 10 business days of the date of your receipt of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination decision. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter and matters involving future enforcement decisions. In addition, please be advised that the characterization of the performance issue described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and Attachments A (Supplemental Information) and B (Event Chronology) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room). However, because of the security-related information contained in Attachment C, and in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, a copy of Attachment C will not be available for public inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390(b)(1)(ii), the NRC is waiving the affidavit requirements for your response, if any. This will ensure that your response will not be made publicly available. If Safeguards Information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

Sincerely,

*/RA/*

Darrell J. Roberts, Deputy Director  
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos: 50-277, 50-278  
License Nos: DPR-44, DPR-56

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000277/2007405 and 05000278/2007405  
w/Attachments

Attachments:

- (A) Supplemental Information
- (B) Event Chronology

Non-Public Attachment:

- (C) Physical Protection Significance Determination Process Review Results (Official Use Only - Security Related Information)

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C. Pardee

Please contact Mr. James Trapp of my staff at (610) 337- 5186 within 10 business days of the date of your receipt of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination decision. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter and matters involving future enforcement decisions. In addition, please be advised that the characterization of the performance issue described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review.

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Sincerely,  
**/RA/**

Darrell J. Roberts, Deputy Director  
Division of Reactor Safety

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Attachments:  
(A) Supplemental Information  
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(C) Physical Protection Significance Determination Process Review Results (Official Use Only - Security Related Information)

**SUNSI Review Complete:**     dcc     (Reviewer's Initials)

DOCUMENT NAME: C:\FileNet\ML073550590.wpd

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DATE	12/19 /07	12/19 /07	12/13 /07	12/14/07	12/17/07
OFFICE	RI/DRP	RI/DRS	HQ/NSIR	RI/OI	RI/DRS
NAME	Dlew/Via telecon*	JTrapp/JMT	RCorreia/Via e-mail*	EWilson/Via Telecon*	DRoberts/DJR
DATE	12/20/07	12/20/07	12/17/07	12/20 /07	12/21/07

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\* See Previous Concurrence Page

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cc w/encl; w/Att. C:

J. Kovalchick, Acting Site Security Manager  
D. Allard, Director, Dept. Of Environmental Protection, Pennsylvania  
S. Pattison, Maryland Department of Environment  
J. Powers, Director, Office of Homeland Security, Pennsylvania  
A. Lauland, Director, Homeland Security Advisor, Maryland  
N. Lowey, U.S. House of Representatives

cc w/encl; w/o Att. C:

Chief Operating Officer, Exelon Generation Company, LLC  
Site Vice President, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station  
Plant Manager, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station  
Regulatory Assurance Manager - Peach Bottom  
Manager, Financial Control & Co-Owner Affairs  
Vice President, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs  
Senior Vice President, Mid-Atlantic  
Senior Vice President - Operations Support  
Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs  
J. Bradley Fewell, Assistant General Counsel, Exelon Nuclear  
Manager Licensing, PBAPS  
Director, Training  
Correspondence Control Desk  
Public Service Commission of Maryland, Engineering Division  
Board of Supervisors, Peach Bottom Township  
B. Ruth, Council Administrator of Harford County Council  
R. Ayers, Harford County Emergency  
E. Crist, Harford County Emergency  
L. Ploener, Harford County Emergency  
R. Brooks, Cecil County  
Mr. & Mrs. Dennis Hiebert, Peach Bottom Alliance  
TMI - Alert (TMIA)  
J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club  
Mr. & Mrs. Kip Adams  
E. Epstein, TMI Alert  
R. Fletcher, Department of Environment, Radiological Health Program  
R. French, Dir., PA Emergency Management Agency  
K. McGinty, Secretary, PA Dept of Environmental Protection  
R. Janati, Chief, Nuclear Safety Division (DEP)  
B. Mertz, Deputy Director, PA Office of Homeland Security  
Lieutenant T. Shannon, PA State Police

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Distribution w/encl; w/Att. C:

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos: 50-277, 50-278

License Nos: DPR-44, DPR-56

Report No: 05000277/2007405 and 05000278/2007405

Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon)

Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3

Location: Delta, Pennsylvania

Dates: November 5 - 9, 2007

Inspectors: D. Caron, Senior Physical Security Inspector (Team Leader)  
J. Larsen, Senior Physical Security Inspector, Region IV  
B. Bickett, Senior Project Engineer  
J. Willis, Security Specialist, NSIR

Approved by: Darrell J. Roberts, Deputy Director  
Division of Reactor Safety

**~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION~~**

Enclosure

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**SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

IR 05000277/2007-405, 05000278/2007-405; 11/05/2007 - 11/09/2007; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3; Access Authorization and Protective Strategy

The augmented inspection follow-up was conducted by a team consisting of inspectors from the NRC's Region I office, Region IV office, and a security specialist from Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR). One finding with preliminary greater than Green security significance was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

**Cornerstone: Physical Protection**

- TBD. A preliminary greater than Green finding was identified for failure to maintain the minimum number of available responders and failure to maintain an effective behavior observation program (BOP). The licensee implemented immediate compensatory measures and conducted a root cause analysis that resulted in additional corrective actions.

This finding is considered more than minor because it is associated with the Response to Contingency Events and Access Authorization attributes and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide assurance that the licensee's security system uses a defense-in-depth approach and can protect against (1) the design basis threat of radiological sabotage from external and internal threats, and (2) the theft or loss of radiological materials. Specifically, an inadequate BOP led to inattentive responders. With multiple inattentive response team members at one time, the licensee was below minimum numbers of available responders, which increased the potential for degradation in the protective strategy of the site. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process (PPSDP), the team determined that the finding was of greater than very low security significance. The cause of the finding is related to the cross cutting elements of safety conscious work environment (SCWE)(S.1.a) and management/supervisory oversight element (H.4.c) of the human performance cross-cutting area. (Section 3.3)

B. Licensee-Identified Findings

None



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**REPORT DETAILS**

1.0 Inspection Background Information

On September 10, 2007, the NRC was contacted by representatives of WCBS-TV (New York City), stating that videotapes of inattentive security officers (SOs) at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) were in their possession. The NRC verbally informed Exelon management of the information and initiated enhanced oversight of security activities at Peach Bottom that same day. On September 19, 2007, after viewing the videos, the NRC determined an augmented inspection team (AIT) was warranted to gather facts related to these events. On September 21, 2007, an augmented team inspection was initiated. On September 27, 2007, the NRC issued an advisory (SA-07-06) to the nuclear industry regarding inattentive security officers and related fitness for duty and behavior observation issues.

On October 9, 2007, the NRC held a public exit for the AIT inspection. The team identified that immediate corrective actions were adequate, but also identified additional areas for follow-up inspection. On October 19, 2007, the NRC issued a confirmatory action letter (CAL) to ensure immediate compensatory measures were maintained and to document a schedule for planned long term corrective actions. On October 24, 2007, the NRC instituted a weekly status call with Exelon to discuss CAL actions and the status of transitioning from a contract security force to an Exelon force. On November 5, 2007, the AIT inspection report was issued and an AIT follow-up inspection began to review issues identified by the AIT in detail and assess the significance of any performance deficiencies. On November 28, 2007, the NRC's Executive Director of Operations approved a Deviation Memorandum which provided additional NRC inspection and oversight of Peach Bottom security beyond what would normally be prescribed by the reactor oversight process.

Attachment B contains the detailed chronology associated with this issue.

2.0 Augmented Inspection Follow-up Objectives (93800)

This inspection was conducted to provide additional NRC review and significance determination of performance issues identified by the NRC Augmented Inspection Team. The specifics reviewed by the follow-up inspection team and previously documented in the AIT inspection report (IR 05000277/278-2007404) were:

- Root cause analysis and extent of condition (Section 3.1)
- Corrective actions for identified security officer concerns (Section 3.2)
- Security officer inattentiveness and extent of condition (Section 3.3)
- Effectiveness of security management and supervisory oversight (Section 3.3)
- Behavioral Observation Program effectiveness (Section 3.3)

3.0 AIT Follow-up Inspection Team Findings and Observations

3.1 Review of Exelon Root Cause Analysis and Extent of Condition

a. Inspection Scope

The team assessed the adequacy of the licensee's initial evaluation of the issue, the thoroughness of the licensee's root cause analyses, and whether the corrective actions specified were sufficient to prevent recurrence (see Section 3.2). This assessment included a review of the licensee's investigation reports (IR), root cause analyses, completed and scheduled corrective actions, procedures, additional related documents, and interviews with key plant personnel.

The team reviewed the methodology and results of Exelon's root cause analysis as documented in the root cause report (IR 673505), "Security program degradation due to inattentiveness." Additionally, the team reviewed the root cause analysis to determine if Exelon had appropriately identified the extent of condition to ensure that the scope and station-wide applicability of any performance issues were appropriately evaluated.

b. Findings and Observations

The team found the level of detail of the root cause analysis, including its extent of condition review, to be thorough and acceptable with a self-critical review of the station and its management of security. The team concluded that Exelon appropriately identified the root and contributing causes.

The analyses used several formal systematic processes to identify root and contributing causes. Per LS-AA-125-1001, "Root Cause Analysis Manual," Exelon formed a root cause team consisting of a Mid-Atlantic corporate manager as the lead, supported by an Exelon fleet security manager, a PBAPS human performance manager, site regulatory and licensing personnel, and three external consultants. Time line analysis, cause and effect analysis, and barrier analysis methodologies were utilized. The root cause team appropriately evaluated information including past history and industry experience along with interviews of personnel conducted by Exelon's incident investigation team.

3.2 Review of Corrective Actions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspection team reviewed security condition reports, employee concerns program files, station cultural surveys and Exelon's root cause analysis on inattentive security officers to assess whether the PBAPS adequately identified security adverse conditions,

including missed opportunities to identify unacceptable SO behavior, prior to being informed of the videotapes in September 2007.

The team conducted interviews and reviewed corrective actions associated with previous adverse security conditions to determine whether the actions taken by the station properly identified and evaluated causes of the problems. The team reviewed security condition reports for repetitive problems to determine whether previous corrective actions were effective. The team also reviewed the timeliness of the implementation of corrective actions and the effectiveness of corrective actions to preclude recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality.

b. Findings and Observations

The team concluded that, following September 2007, Exelon has implemented or developed appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence that address the principle areas of: 1) Exelon management not providing adequate contractual oversight and leadership; 2) Wackenhut failure to provide adequate management and supervisory oversight; and, 3) security officer inattentiveness and non-compliance with the BOP within the PBAPS security organization.

The team also concluded that Exelon's Corrective Action Program (CAP), prior to September 2007, had not been an effective tool in addressing the adverse conditions and trends which led to SO inattentiveness. The team determined that there were several missed opportunities in the area of security problem identification and resolution prior to the inattentive security officer events being made public in September 2007. The team determined that these opportunities, while not primary causal factors for the inattentive security officer events, indicated an adverse performance trend in the PBAPS security organization. The following were examples of these missed opportunities: 1) the results of two safety culture surveys were not properly evaluated for indications of negative performance trends in the security organization; 2) longstanding environmental issues in the ready room were not properly evaluated and resolved; and, 3) attentiveness aids for security officers were not properly evaluated in the CAP. The team concluded that following September 2007, the corrective actions implemented or planned by Exelon for these CAP shortcomings were appropriate.

Issues involving inadequate corrective actions can be treated as findings in their own right, however, the above stated examples of ineffective corrective actions and CAP shortcomings directly contributed to the inattentive security officers and ineffective BOP performance deficiencies for which a preliminary greater than Green finding is discussed in Section 3.3 of this report. As such, these contributing causes and related performance deficiencies were not treated as separate findings.

3.3 Review of Security Officer Inattentiveness and Behavior Observation Program

a. Inspection Scope

The team conducted interviews and observations of the security organization to determine the overall security program effectiveness and implementation during the time frame of the inattentive security officer events. The team reviewed the Security Plan and evaluated PBAP's ability to implement Security Plan requirements. The team performed walk downs of the site's protective strategy to evaluate the potential effect of degraded security officer response due to inattentiveness. The team also evaluated critical SO defensive position response times, for a variety of potential threats, to evaluate the potential significance of SO inattentiveness on Security Plan effectiveness.

The team reviewed Exelon's and Wackenhut's actions preceding September 2007, to assess the effectiveness of management and supervisory oversight and their engagement with the station security organization. The team evaluated management and supervisory inadequacies that may have contributed to the inattentiveness and BOP performance issues present in the security organization.

The team reviewed implementing procedures for the BOP, the FFD program, and related training. Interviews were conducted to evaluate the level of understanding of these programs by the security officers and supervisors. The team reviewed records related to self reporting fatigue, work hours, deviations from normal work hours, testing for cause, and Employee Assistance Program utilization.

b. Findings and Observations

Introduction: A self-revealing preliminary greater than Green finding was identified for failure to maintain the minimum required number of available responders and the associated failure to maintain an effective behavior observation program.

Description: On four separate occasions (March 12; June 9; June 20; and August 10, 2007), multiple security officers, who were all members of the security response team, were videotaped while they were inattentive in the security ready room. On March 12, 2007, five officers were inattentive at the same time. The ready room is a location within the protected area boundary where officers are staged for response functions, while not conducting security patrols. The officers in the ready room are required to be readily available to respond and effectively implement their role within the Security Plan's protective strategy.

In addition, the Behavior Observation Program (BOP) was determined to be ineffective. Security officers are required to self-report to supervision when they feel fatigued and when they observe others who are fatigued. Although the security officers in the ready room were in close proximity to each other, only one stated that he reported other security officers being inattentive. Supervisors who had information regarding

inattentive security officers failed to take appropriate action, as required by the BOP. The ineffective implementation of the BOP was directly linked to the events of inattentive officers. An effective BOP could have mitigated the inattentive officer events.

The team's interviews with a number of security force members identified that security officers were discouraged from bringing forward safety concerns to supervision. The security officers stated that they did not raise safety issues, such as these involving inattentive officers, because they were afraid of an adverse consequence. Based upon these interview results, the team concluded that an adverse safety conscious work environment (SCWE) was a contributing cause to the finding.

As discussed in Section 3.2.b above, Exelon and Wackenhut management/supervision failed to properly evaluate attentiveness aids for officers, failed to adequately address environmental issues associated with the ready room, failed to conduct adequate and effective post checks, and failed to ensure effective radio checks were conducted. Some of these issues were raised during previously conducted security officer surveys, but no effective action was taken to address these security-officer-identified concerns. The follow-up team concluded that each of these issues was a contributor to the inattentiveness events.

The team determined that the licensee's failure to maintain the minimum number of response team members and the associated failure to maintain an effective BOP constituted a performance deficiency.

Analysis: This performance deficiency is greater than minor because it is associated with the Physical Protection Cornerstone attributes of Response to Contingency Events and Access Authorization, and affected the cornerstone objective to provide assurance that the licensee's security system and material control and accountability program use a defense-in-depth approach and can protect against (1) the design basis threat of radiological sabotage from external and internal threats, and (2) the theft or loss of radiological materials. Specifically, an inadequate BOP was a direct contributor to the inattentive responders. With multiple inattentive response team members at one time, the minimum numbers of available responders was adversely impacted. This affected the defense-in-depth strategy and increased the potential for degradation in the protective strategy for the site.

The team reviewed IMC 0609, Appendix E, "Baseline Physical Protection Significance Determination Process (PPSDP) for Power Reactors," for security findings. Using the PPSDP, the team determined that the finding was of more than very low security significance (i.e., preliminary greater than Green). The PPSDP takes into consideration the security cornerstone key attributes, various levels of defense-in-depth, and prioritized elements of security programs to determine the significance of findings. The details of the PPSDP analysis contain sensitive security information and will not be made publicly available. The analysis is included as a security sensitive attachment to this report (Attachment C).

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of SCWE (S.1.a) because Exelon and Wackenhut supervision did not encourage the free flow of information related to raising safety concerns. Security supervisors who had information regarding inattentive officers did not respond to employee safety concerns in an open, honest, and non-defensive manner. This finding also has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance (H.4.c) because Exelon did not ensure that supervisory and management oversight of security activities supported nuclear safety. The team concluded that, following notification of the inattentiveness issues by the NRC, Exelon's root cause analysis appropriately identified weaknesses in the station's security management and supervisory oversight and SCWE.

Enforcement: The enforcement aspects of the security officer inattentiveness and ineffective BOP issues are still under NRC review. Upon completion of this review, enforcement action will be considered, consistent with the Enforcement Policy. The safety significance of this finding is preliminarily greater than Green. (FIN 05000277/278, 2007405-01, Failure to Maintain Minimum Available Responders and an Effective BOP.)

#### 4.0 Meetings

##### Exit Meeting Summary

On December 3, 2007, the inspection team presented the inspection results at a public exit meeting to Mr. Joseph Grimes and other members of the PBAPS staff. Exelon acknowledged the team's findings.

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**ATTACHMENT**

**SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION**

**KEY POINTS OF CONTACT**

Licensee Personnel

J. Grimes	Site Vice President
P. Cowan	Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
D. Deboer	Security Manager
S. Craig	Security Operations Supervisor
J. Mallon	Licensing Manager

**LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED**

Opened

05000277/278-2007405-01	FIN	Failure to maintain minimum number of responders and an effective BOP (Section 3.3)
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**LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

Procedures

LS-AA-125, "Corrective Action Program Procedure," Revision 11  
SY-AA-1016, "Watchstanding Practices," Revision 0  
SY-AA-1016, "Watchstanding Practices," Revision 4  
SY-AA-1020, "Supervisor Post Checks and Post Orders," Revision 0  
SY-AA-1020, "Supervisor Post Checks and Post Orders," Revision 1  
SY-AA-102, "Exelon's Nuclear Fitness-For-Duty Program," Revision 11  
SY-AA-101-130, "Security Responsibilities for Station Personnel," Revision 8  
SY-AA-101-130, "Security Responsibilities for Station Personnel," Revision 9  
SY-PB-101-124-1001, "Security Control Center Operations," Revision 3  
SY-AA-101-126, "Duties and Responsibilities of the Station Security Organization,"  
Revision 5  
SY-AA-103-513, "Behavioral Observation Program," Revision 6  
SY-AA-150-1001, Security Training and Qualification Manual, Revision 3

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Miscellaneous

NER NC-07-034, "Inattentive Security Officer Investigation Fleet Actions," September 24, 2007  
NER NC-06-010, "Increased Field Observation and Coaching of the Site Security Force,"  
Revision 2  
SA-07-06, "NRC Security Advisory - Security officers inattentive to duty," September 27, 2007  
Nuclear Oversight Quarterly Reports, 2005 - 2007  
NOSA-PEA-06-02, Security Plan, FFD, and Personnel Access Data System, February 1, 2006  
NOSA-PEA-07-03, Security Plan, FFD, and Personnel Access Data System, January 21, 2007  
Exelon General Employee Training, FFD Module, Revision 4  
Exelon's Security Transition Plan, September 24, 2007  
Card Reader Transaction History 3/11-12/07 - 6/09/07 - 6/20-21/07 - 8/10/07  
Vital Area Patrol Forms Fox 2/3/5/6/7  
Drill/Exercise Reports 2006 (4<sup>th</sup> Qtr) - (2007 1<sup>st</sup> Qtr-3rd Qtr) (All Teams)  
Weekly Work Hour Averages from March 4, 2007 through October 28, 2007

**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

ADAMS	Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System
AIT	Augmented Inspection Team
BOP	Behavioral Observation Program
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	Condition Report
FFD	Fitness For Duty
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IP	Inspection Procedure
NER	Nuclear Event Report
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSIR	Nuclear Security and Incident Response
PARS	Publicly Available Records
PBAPS	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
PPSDP	Physical Protection Significance Determination Process
SCWE	Safety Conscious Work Environment
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SO	Security Officer
WNS	Wackenhut Nuclear Services

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**EVENT CHRONOLOGY**

- 2004 - PBAPS security power block “ready room” established to support Security Plan implementation and provide increased defense-in-depth for NRC Force on Force exercises.
- April 16, 2006 - NRC Force-on-Force exercise conducted (No findings).
- January 2007 - Wackenhut Corporation issues improvement plan for Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) improvement actions for its security forces at all sites.
- February 2007 - Security Officer (SO) responsible for video recordings has first observation of inattentive SOs in the power block ready room but did not record the observations.
- March 2, 2007 - SY-AA-1016, Revision 4, implemented to add ‘attentiveness tools’ based on attentiveness issue experienced at an Exelon plant.
- March 12, 2007 - Five SOs inattentive to duty in the ready room captured by a SO’s personal cell phone. All five SOs are on Security Team No. 1.
- March 27, 2007 - NRC receives concerns involving Peach Bottom SOs that are inattentive to duty at PBAPS.
- April 2007 – SO shows videotapes of inattentive SOs to a maintenance technician at a little league ball game. Maintenance technician tells the SO to inform his security supervisor. The following day the maintenance technician informs his supervisor who responds that the SO’s concern should be brought up to the security supervisor.
- April 2007 – Wackenhut Corporate investigation reveals two separate SO unacceptable behavior issues received through Wackenhut Safe-2-Say program. In the course of this investigation, it was determined by Wackenhut that multiple SOs on Team No. 2 were initially untruthful to investigators and tried to hide and cover-up the events. Several officers were disciplined for their lack of candor and not reporting a safety concern.
- April 18, 2007 - Plant review committee rejects \$150K expense of further renovations to “ready room.” PBAPS senior management notified of decision to not fund improvements.
- April 30, 2007 - NRC provided Exelon management with written referral for concerns associated with Peach Bottom SOs that were inattentive to duty.

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- May 30, 2007 - NRC received Exelon's response stating the three referred concerns associated with inattentive SO behavior were not substantiated. Exelon conducted interviews that did not substantiate the issue. Exelon referenced enhancements in their response that included radio check improvements and procedure changes to implement fixed post checks twice a shift. Exelon also referenced 15 minute stand-ups on back shifts and randomly on day shift.
- June 9, 2007 - Three SOs inattentive on-duty in the "ready room" captured by a SO's personal video device (ARCOS camera).
- Mid June 2007 - SO informs a field supervisor of inattentive guards on duty that were videotaped. Field supervisor told lead supervisor of this information including names of guards who were inattentive to duty on video.
- Late June 2007 - Security shift supervisor and lead supervisor of Team No. 1 inform SO to stop bringing video devices into the plant's protected area.
- July 19, 2007 - Security force transitions to new "ready room" that is considered larger and a more moderate temperature.
- June 20, 2007 - One SO inattentive on duty in the "ready room" captured by a SO's personal cell phone.
- August 10, 2007 - Three SOs inattentive on duty in the "ready room" captured by a personal cell phone.
- August 22, 2007 - NRC reviews Exelon response that did not substantiate inattentive SOs. NRC considers Exelon response acceptable after follow-up questions.
- August 28, 2007 - Exelon Corporate nuclear safety review board identified Wackenhut performance as an area for improvement fleet-wide.
- September 10, 2007 - NRC received and verbally referred concerns to Exelon based on WCBS-TV (New York) telephone call with information about videos that shows inattentive SOs on shift at Peach Bottom. NRC resident inspectors begin enhanced security inspections by performing increased number of observations at various security posts during both normal and backshift hours.
- September 10, 2007 - Exelon forms an Issues Management Team based on NRC information passed verbally. Exelon briefed PBAPS security force regarding heightened awareness, fatigue, and responsibilities to report inattentiveness.
- September 11, 2007 - Exelon briefed their fleet security regarding heightened awareness, fatigue, and responsibilities to report inattentiveness.

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- September 15 - 20, 2007 - Exelon corporate security interviews approximately 95 percent on-site members of Wackenhut organization at Peach Bottom.
- September 17, 2007 – SO responsible for videotaping inattentiveness has unescorted access suspended because of trustworthiness concerns and procedure violations.
- September 17, 2007 - Maintenance technician acknowledged after a site communication on inattentiveness that he had knowledge of a SO who taped inattentive SOs on duty and showed him the videos.
- September 17, 2007 - Exelon is contacted by WCBS-TV.
- September 18, 2007 - NRC received and verbally referred inattentive SO concerns that were received based upon telephone conversation that specified “ready room” as area of concern for inattentive SOs.
- September 18, 2007 - Letter from President – Wackenhut Nuclear Services (WNS), to WNS security force emphasizing fitness for duty and fatigue standards.
- September 18, 2007 – Exelon makes decision for outside legal counsel to take over investigation in response to allegations. Exelon issues first press release at 11:00 am.
- September 19, 2007 – NRC views WCBS-TV videotapes and initiates AIT charter. NRC verbally refers to Exelon additional information to be considered in their investigation.
- September 19, 2007 – Exelon management and Wackenhut establish enhanced security oversight at PBAPS. Additional Wackenhut supervision brought in providing 24-hour oversight and observation.
- September 20, 2007 - Exelon implements 24-hour on-site security supervision in the “ready room.” Additionally, on-site Wackenhut supervision providing enhanced oversight and observation.
- September 20, 2007 – NRC informs Exelon that an AIT will be dispatched to Peach Bottom the following morning to begin inspection on the security events surrounding inattentive SOs. NRC issues press release announcing the augmented inspection at PBAPS for inattentive SO concerns.
- September 21, 2007 - WCBS-TV supplies Exelon with videos for viewing. Exelon confirms that videos contain Peach Bottom SOs in the “ready room.”

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- September 21, 2007 – NRC commences AIT and arrives on site for inattentive SO events.
- September 21, 2007 - Letter from Exelon to NRC Regional Administrator highlighting Exelon's efforts to immediately address SO inattentiveness concerns and current fact-finding investigative efforts.
- September 21, 2007 – Nine SOs inattentive to duty placed on administrative hold pending outcome of investigation.
- September 22, 2007 - NRC Region I security inspectors supplement resident staff in conducting backshift inspection and observation of the security posts and compensatory measures throughout the weekend until full AIT arrives on-site.
- September 24, 2007 - Exelon initiates termination of Wackenhut security contract at Peach Bottom.
- September 24, 2007 – Exelon issues NER NC-07-034 to fleet for mandatory fleet actions in light of inattentive SO issues at Peach Bottom.
- September 25, 2007 – Exelon places remainder of Security Team No. 1 on administrative hold pending outcome of investigation.
- September 25, 2007 - Exelon issues an Operations Experience item regarding Security Officers Inattentive to Duty on the NEI security web site
- September 26, 2007 - Exelon announces transition of security force from Wackenhut to a proprietary guard force (Exelon).
- September 27, 2007 - Exelon enhances compensatory measures for BREs.
- September 27, 2007 - NRC issues advisory SA-07-06 regarding Security Officers Inattentive to Duty.
- September 28, 2007 - AIT completes on-site portion of inspection.
- October 4, 2007 - NRC issues letter to Exelon requesting the actions taken or planned to assure the following: (1) security officers remain attentive at all times while on duty in all required locations at the facility; (2) security officers are both willing and able to recognize instances of inattentiveness and promptly take all appropriate actions; (3) supervisors and personnel take the necessary actions to encourage officers and all plant staff to bring forward any concerns, including indications of inattentiveness, and promptly address such concerns when raised; and (4) inattentiveness does not extend to other departments or contractors at Peach Bottom. The NRC also requested that Exelon address why this issue was apparently not self-identified.

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- October 4, 2007 - Letter from Exelon to NRC Regional Administrator describing preliminary results of investigation, additional interim actions taken, and actions planned for the near term.
- October 9, 2007 - NRC conducted a public exit for the AIT inspection. A public question and answer session was held following the exit meeting.
- October 19, 2007 - NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL - ML072920283) to ensure continued security plan effectiveness.
- October 24, 2007 - NRC instituted a weekly status call with Exelon concerning CAL actions and the status of transitioning from a contract security force to an Exelon force.
- November 1, 2007 - Peach Bottom transitioned to an Exelon security force. NRC enhanced monitoring included observation of the transition, attendance at shift turnover meetings, and interviews with selected officers.
- November 2, 2007 - Exelon responded to NRC October 4, 2007, inattentiveness letter on the docket (ML073180128).
- November 5, 2007 - AIT inspection report issued (ML073090061).
- November 5 - 9, 2007 - NRC AIT follow-up inspection conducted to assess Exelon's root cause analysis, corrective actions, and significance of performance deficiencies.
- November 28, 2007 - NRC's Executive Director of Operations approved a Deviation Memo which provided additional inspection and oversight of security activities at Peach Bottom (ML 073320344).
- December 3, 2007 - NRC conducted a public exit for the AIT follow-up inspection with one potentially greater than green finding and two cross-cutting aspects. A public question and answer session was held following the exit meeting.

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