TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

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JUL 13 1989

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

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In the Matter of the Application of Tennessee Valley Authority

)) Docket No. 50-390

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNIT 1 - CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP) PLAN MATRICES

In our meeting on January 18 and 19, 1989, NRC requested a comprehensive listing of open conditions adverse to quality (CAQs), employee concerns, etc., that would be resolved by each CAP. NRC also requested a listing of previously docketed commitments that were changed by the CAPs. Enclosure 1 provides the source document matrices and commitment revision matrices for each of the 18 CAPs.

The source document matrices list the CAQs, employee concerns, 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports, violation responses, and vertical slice review (VSR) discrepancy reports (DRs) that will be resolved completely or partially through implementation of each CAP. This listing was developed to provide as complete a listing as reasonably possible of the individual problem reports being addressed by or related to each CAP. In some cases the listed documents will not be completely resolved by the CAP implementations since each CAQ, DR, etc., may involve corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence outside the scope of the CAP. It should be noted that TVA's corrective action program, employee concern program, VSR, and 10 CFR 50.55(e) process require each CAQ, employee concern, DR, or 10 CFR 50.55(e) report to be individually closed out and documented regardless of coverage by CAP implementation.

Each source document matrix was developed during March and April 1989 from information in the WBN Tracking and Reporting of Open Items (TROI) listing and from an assessment of the VSR DRs that were judged to be covered by the scope of each CAP. Therefore, the matrices reflect information as of April 1989. These matrices were developed to facilitate the NRC review process and will not be revised or maintained current. TROI will be used to obtain current status of the individual problem reports.

The matrices should not be viewed by NRC as a commitment list since, as stated above, each matrix includes documents that will only be partially resolved by the CAP, is a snapshot in time, and is based upon the best judgment at the time for inclusion. Additionally, a large number of the problem reports included in the matrices are not significant conditions, and therefore do not require reporting under 10 CFR 50.55(e).

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JUL 13 1989

The commitment revision matrices identify the previously docketed commitments that are being changed as a result of each of the CAPs. This listing of commitment changes is also intended to facilitate the NRC review process. The previously docketed commitments will be revised through resubmittal of the 10 CFR 50.55(e) response, violation response, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) amendment, etc.

Enclosure 2 provides the commitment made in this submittal.

If there are any questions concerning the content of the enclosed matrices, please contact D. E. McCloud, WBN Site Licensing, at (615) 365-8650.

Very truly yours, -

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Manager, Nuclear Likensing and Regulatory Affairs

Sec.

Enclosures

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SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

1. Silicone Rubber Insulated Cables

> "During high-potential testing of silicone rubber cable at SQN to resolve the cable support in vertical conduit issue, SQN had several cable failures. Analysis of these cable failures indicated that the failures were not the result of inadequate cable support but possibly caused by "impact-induced damage." Silicone rubber cables manufactured by AIW appeared to be more susceptible to "impact-induced damage" than cable from Rockbestos and Anaconda. AIW silicone rubber insulated cables were removed from 10 CFR 50.49 circuits at SON. SON then performed simulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA) tests at Wyle Laboratories on aged cables with reduced insulation thickness to simulate an impact condition. The results were acceptable and provided a limited qualified life of 10 years. To qualify the cable for its full 40-year life, TVA and the NRC agreed to additional testing of Anaconda and Rockbestos cables. These tests will be conducted using previously installed WBN cables. AIW silicone rubber insulated cables have not been used and will not be used in Class 1E circuits at WBN."

CAQR WBP 870902

The CAP describes the corrective action implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.1.

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

Technical Evaluation

Report No. C-5506-649

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

2. Cable Jamming

"NRC issued a Technical Evaluation Report (TER) (Reference 1) on January 30, 1987. The TER identified the potential for undetected cable damage since TVA-WBN installation documents did not address the cable-jam ratio. Jam ratio is D/d, d is the cable outside diameter and D is the conduit inside diameter. Where three single conductors with a jam ratio of 2.8 to 3.1 are pulled into a conduit, the cables may align in a flat configuration with resultant jamming."



Cable Support in Vertical Conduit

"In the NRC-issued TER for WBN, a concern was expressed that cables in long, vertical conduits were inadequately supported and that "... random failures due to cutting of the insulation and conductor creep may occur during normal service condition, especially silicone rubber cables." Technical Evaluation Report No. C-5506-649

NCR W-262-P 10 CFR 50.55(e) for NCR W-262-P The CAP describes the corrective action implementation program. Reference to section 4.1.2.

The CAP describes the corrective action implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.3.

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

4. Cable Support in Vertical Tray

"This issue has two parts:

The first part of this issue is the mechanism to transfer vertical cable loads, both self weight and seismic, to the tray support system."

"The second part of this deals with TVA's current constructions specification requirement that cables in vertical trays be supported in accordance with the National Electrical Code (NEC) Article 300-19 (Reference 2) to prevent long-term cable damage. The installation specification states that this support may be provided by tie wraps. TVA currently has no basis to verify that cable ties can provide adequate support."

5. Cable Proximity to Hot Pipes

> "NRC Information Notice 86-49, highlighted the potential for cable damage resulting from close proximity to hot pipes."

CAQR WBP 880564 NRC UNRS 390/88-05-03 DR-7 The first part of this issue will be addressed by the cable tray and cable tray support CAP.

This CAP describes the corrective action implementation program for the second part of this issue. Refer to section 4.1.4.

Design Study Request No. DSR-011 NRC IFLP 390/86-12-11 The CAP describes the corrective action implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.5.

PIR WBN EEB 8644

NRC Information IE Notice 86-049



SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

6. Cable Pullbys

"The NRC-issued TER for WBN (Reference 1) concluded that cable damage resulting in cable failure may have occurred due to pullbys which occur when cables are pulled into occupied conduits. The TER stated a concern that "... the moving pull rope and cable could have sawed through the insulation of the stationary cable..." "The potential for circuit failures occurs if the conduit becomes wet from condensation or when exposed to steam."

Technical Evaluation Report No. C-5506-649 The CAP describes the corrective action implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.6.



Cable Bend Radius

"TVA has identified through nonconforming condition reports (NCRs) and Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) reports that the minimum recommended cable bend radius was violated during the installations of some cables."

10 CFR 50.55(e) for NCR 4194 PIR WBN EEB 86107 CAQR WBP 870133 CAQR WBP 870134 CAQR WBP 870136 CAQR WBP 870637

NCR W-290-P

The CAP describes the corrective action implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.7.

NCR 6295

Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report No. I-86-101-SQN

Technical Evaluation Report No. TER-C-5506-649

DR-379, DR-401, DR-402 DR-422, DR-484, DR-550 DR-602, DR-607, DR-598, DR-149

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

8. Cable Splices

"As a result of NRC Information Notice 86-53 TVA's internal review of WBN splicing details and experiences at SQN indicate that the installed splices may not conform with the qualified configuration and materials tested by the vendor (e.g., use of nongualified materials under the splice. improper selection of Raychem tube, inadequate seal length of the tubing)."



NCR 6224 10 CFR 50.55(e) for NCR 6224

10 CFR 50.55(e) for SCR WBN EQP 8501

PIR WBN EEB 8720 CAQR WBP 871109

SCR WBN EQP 8641 SCR WBN MEB 8652 CAQR WBP 870164 CAQR WBP 880676 NCR W-510-P Employee Concern CATD CATD 30403-NPS-01 CATD 24101-WBN-02 CATD 10900-WBN-06

NCR 6584

PIR WBN EEB 8707 SCR WBN EQP 8617

NCR W-353-P 10 CFR 50.55(e) for NCR W-353-P

9. Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure

> "The July 9, 1985 NSRS Report (Reference 3) stated that cable sidewall bearing pressure (SWBP) was not addressed properly during installation. SWBP is the radial force exerted on the insulation of a cable at a bend point when the cable is being pulled."

NCR 6347 NCR 6270 PIR WBN WBP 87139 NRC UNRS 390/86-03-1 CAQR WBP 870135

CATD 10900-NPS-01 CATD 23801-WBN-08

Technical Evaluation Report No. TER-C-5506-649

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

The CAP describes the corrective action implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.8.

The CAP describes the corrective action implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.9.

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

10. Pulling Cable Through 90-Degree Condulet and Flexible Conduit

> "In the TER (Reference 1), concerns were expressed that "...considerable damage is likely to occur if cables are pulled under tension around the inside edge of a 90-degree condulet...," and that flexible conduit severely tears the cable jacket and insulation."

- 11& Computer Cable Routing
- 12. System Software And Data Base is Not Verified
- (A) "Concerns have been expressed and documented in CAQRs, Employee Concerns, and an NRC inspection Report on SQN about the adequacy of the CCRS." Refer to section 4.2 of the CAP.

Technical Evaluation Report No. TER-C-5506-649 The CAP describes the corrective action implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.10

SCR WBN ECB 8601 SCR WBN ECB 8602 (Closed) SCR WBN ECB 8603 (Closed) SCR WBN ECB 8604 (Closed) CAQR WBF 870030 (Closed) CAQR WBT 870152 CAQR WBP 880762 CATD 23900-WBN-02 CATD 23900-WBN-03... ...Closed) CATD 23900-WBN-04 CATD 23900-WBN-05 CATD 23900-WBN-06 CATD 23900-WBN-07 CATD 23801-WBN-01 CATD 23801-WBN-02 SCR WBN EQP 8635 (Closed)

Discrepancy Report (DR) DR-1 DR-3 DR-213 "The Computer Software has been validated and verified in accordance with TVA QA Procedures" Refer to section 4.2 of the CAP.

"To verify the adequacy of the CCRS data base, data from the WBN review of 4,256 EQ cables (10 CFR50.49) and the review of the 339 appendix Rrelated cables will be used." Refer to section 4.2 of the CAP.

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

SCR WBN EQP 8628 and others 10 CFR 50.55(e) SCR WBN EQP 8624 SCR WBN EQP 8625 SCR WBN EQP 8628 SCR WBN EQP 8648

"...Lack of adequate (B) procedures to assure a verified data base and the failure to follow procedures that existed when installations were made. The procedures are related to both the engineering/design process and the use of the CCRS software, and its output as used by NC." Refer to section 4.2.4 of the CAP.

SCR WBN EQP 8628 and others 10 CFR 50.55(e) SCR WBN EQP 8625 SCR WBN EQP 8626 SCR WBN EQP 8628 SCR WBN EQP 8648

CATD 23801-WBN-01 CATD 23801-WBN-02 CATD 10900-NPS-05 CATD 23801-WBN-05 CATD 23801-WBN-10 CATD 23900-WBN-01... ...(Closed) CATD 23900-WBN-04 CATD 23900-WBN-05 CATD 23900-WBN-09 CATD 23900-WBN-10 CATD 23900-WBN-06 CATD 24000-WBN-02 CAOR WBP 870174 SCR WBN ECB 8601 SCR WBN ECB 8604 (Closed) NCR W-283-P (Closed Prior to CAP Development) DR-513 DR-603 DR-654

"A construction hold (H-256) was issued to stop installation of safety-related cables until actions can be taken to prevent future recurrence.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

NE's cable routing procedure has been superseded and replaced with a new procedure that clarifies responsibilities and provides rigorous control of cable design and verification of cable pull data prior to releasing the cable to NC for installation.

The construction hold will be maintained until the NC implementing procedures are revised to properly control the use of NE's revised design output. Once these procedure revisions are complete, the construction hold will be released and safety-related cable installation will be resumed. SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

For long-term recurrence control, the CCRS software and the CCRS data base will be verified and validated. Also, the NE and NC procedures will be revised to control the verified CCRS."

Refer to section 4.2.5 of the CAP for the above resolution discussion

"Finalize results of the EQ and the Appendix R reviews in a report.

Verify and validate the CCRS software.

Verify the CCRS data base

Update CCRS data base as defined in Section 4.2.

Reevaluate Electric calculations, raceway fill, support loading by using the verified CCRS software and data base.

Correct identified hardware problems that are beyond the analytical limits via the CAQ and the reportability process."

Refer to section 6.0 of the CAP for the above resolution discussion.

(C) "Program interfaces include coordination with the WBN Design Baseline and Verification Program (DBVP) CAP, which includes electrical calculations (e.g. voltage drop analysis, cable short circuit, coordination analysis, and cable sizing), EQ program, fire protection-appendix R compliance review, and cable tray and conduit support CAP." Refer to section 5.0 of the CAP.

SCR WBN EQP 8628 and others, 10 CFR 50.55(e)

NCRs WBN EEB 8589, and WBN EEB 8590 CAQRs WBP 870632 and WBP 870694 Cable Tray Overfill SCR WBN ECB 8601 10 CFR 50.55(e) revised Final Report

SCR WBN EQP 8628 SCR WBN ECB 8601

 CATD
 23801-WBN-01

 CATD
 23801-WBN-02

 CATD
 23900-WBN-04

 CATD
 24000-WBN-02

 CATD
 24000-WBN-04

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 24000-WBN-04

 CATD
 23900-WBN-05

 CATD
 23801-WBN-03

CAQR WBP 880510 CAQR WBT 870152 CAQR WBP 870174

DR-213, DR-543, DR-579 R1 DR-437, DR-438, DR-460, DR-461, DR-462, DR-464, DR-472, DR-473, and DR-486 NCR WBN EEB 8589 (Closed) NCR WBN EEB 8590 (Closed)

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR CABLE ISSUES CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

"To verify the Adequacy of the CCRS data base, data from the WBN review of 4,256 EQ cables (10CFR50.49) and the review of the 339 appendix Rrelated cables will be used" (Refer to section 4.2 of the CAP). Therefore, no further review of cables will be performed.

WBN will replace all 10 CFR 50.49 harsh environment cable splices, and some mild environment cable splices will be reworked. In mild environmental areas, cable splices will also be reworked where the environmental conditions exceed the parameters of tape. Refer to paragraph 4.1.8.

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

Review all remaining Class IE cables required for Unit 1 operation which are located in nonharsh environments

Perform Engineering Evaluation for all cables requiring the use of multiple computer records for storing cable data which were installed before April 30, 1987,

TVA will review all class 1E equipment requiring Raychem type N materials to determine which devices are improperly terminated. All improperly terminated slices will be reworked.

COMMITMENT SOURCE

WBN EQP 8628 (10 CFR 50.55[e])

WBN EQP 8628 (10 CFR 50.55[e])

NCR 6208 and 6224 10 CFR 50.55(e) Final Report



SOURCE ISSUE

- Adequate documentation was not maintained for the closure of NCR 5737 Rl. Not all cable tray supports were walked down to compare as-built configurations with issued drawings during response to NCR 5737 Rl.
- 2. ZNB and ZNK (i.e., fittings and offset type fittings, respectively) have not been qualified for various field configurations.



CAQR WBP 870528 (50.55e)

CATD 11103-WBN-08

SOURCE DOCUMENT

NRC violation 390, 391/ 88-01-02 CAQR WBP 880040 (50.55e)



3. Missing bolts or nuts at cable tray fitting locations and the installed configurations of cable trays do not match design drawings NRC violation 390, 391/ 88-01-02 10 CFR 50.55(e) for NCR WBN 6297 as reported by WBRD-50-390/85-51, CAQR WBP 880167 (50.55e)

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Perform overinspection (sample reinspection) of 2700 supports originally inspected under NCR 5737. Perform critical case walkthrough of approximately 1000 supports not walked down under NCR 5737. (CAP section 4.1.5)

Develop a complete design basis addressing cable tray connectors and fittings. Revise design output to be consistent with design basis. Implement a critical case evaluation of existing installations, where necessary perform modification. (CAP sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.4)

Perform an engineering walkthrough of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)

SOURCE	ISSUE
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4. No documentation exists

to qualify cable tie

wraps for horizontal

cable trays mounted on their side. No documentation exists to qualify the instal-

lation of cable tray covers

SOURCE DOCUMENT

CAQR WBP 880418

88-01-02

NRC violation 390, 391/

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Develop a complete

to be consistent with revised design basis. Implement a

Verify condition

does not exist at

(If problem does

exist, the

WBN (basis of CAP).

discrepant conditions

Revise design output

evaluation of existing installations. Where necessary, perform modifi- cations. (CAP section 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.4)

design basis.

critical case

same as 2 above

during a seismic event.
5. Cable trays have not CAQR WBP 870818 been evaluated for differential movement between buildings.



 Cable tray support design issues identified at SQN. Verify the potential generic condition evaluation performed for WBN. SCR SQN CEB 8622

7. No documentation can be DR 89 found confirming that designers used accurate weights for cable tray support design to include cable, covers, etc. will be factored into the CAP plan.) Develop a complete design basis. Revise design output to be consistent with revised design basis. Implement a critical case evaluation of existing installations. Where necessary, perform modifi- cations. (CAP section 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.4)

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	SOURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
8.	Cable tray not attached to support.	DR 217	Perform an engineering walk- through of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)
9.	Nuts attaching the tray hold down clip are not fully engaged on bolts.	DR 236 (5A)	Perform an engineering walk- through of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)
10.	Grout is chipped and/or cracked under baseplates	DR 237 (5B)	Perform over- inspection (sample reinspection) of 2700 supports originally inspected under NCR 5737. Perform critical case walkthrough of approximately 1000 supports not walked down under NCR 5737. (CAP section 4.1.5)

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	SOURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
11.	Bolts for hold down clips are loose.	DR 238 (5)	Perform an engineering walk- through of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)
12.	A flex conduit is attached to a cable tray without design approval.	DR 365 (5A)	Same as 1 and 3 above (to address impact on cable trays and adjacent supports).
13.	A flex conduit is attached to a cable tray without design approval.	DR 376 (5Aii)	Same as 12 above.
14.	A flex conduit is installed on a cable tray without design approval.	DR 377 (5C)	Same as 12 above.
15.	A flex conduit is attached to the cable tray without design approval.	DR 378 (5B)	Same as 12 above.
16.	A flex conduit is attached to the cable tray without design approval.	DR 381 (5A)	Same as 12 above.
17.	A flex conduit is attached to the cable tray without design approval.	DR 382 (5B)	Same as 12 above.



SOURCE ISSUE

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SOURCE DOCUMENT

- 18. G-32 anchor bolt spacing requirements are violated.
- DR 437 (5A, 5B)

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Perform overinspection (sample reinspection) of 2700 supports originally inspected under NCR 5737. Perform critical case walkthrough of approximately 1000 supports not walked down under NCR 5737. (CAP section 4.1.5)

Same as 12 above.

Perform an

- 19. Spacer bar connecting tube steel members is missing. An abandoned hole is present in a cable tray hold down clip.
- 20. Cable tray connections are installed such that the bolts do not have thread engagement.

Support is installed in

incorrect location and

has dimensional

discrepancy.

21.

DR 438 (5A, 5C)

DR 446 (5B)

DR 447

engineering walkthrough of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)

Perform overinspection (sample reinspection) of 2700 supports originally inspected under NCR 5737. Perform critical case walkthrough of approximately 1000 supports not walked down under NCR 5737. (CAP section 4.1.5)

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	SOURCE_ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
22.	Nut is missing on splice plate and tray covers and not securely attached to tray.	DR 460 (5B, 5C, 5D)	Perform an engineering walk- through of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)
23.	Nuts are loose and not flush with bolts.	DR 461 (5D, 5E)	Perform an engineering walk- through of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)
24.	Cable tray support clips have been attached through splice plate connections and configuration of fitting is questionable.	DR 462 (5B, 5C)	Perform an engineering walk- through of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)

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	SOURCE_ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
25.	Discrepancies with cable tray connectors and fittings.	DR 464 (5B through 5E)	Develop a complete design basis addressing cable tray connectors and fittings. Revise design output to be consistent with design basis. Implement a critical case evaluation of existing instal- lations, where necessary perform modification. (CAP sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.4)
26.	Cable tray support is not installed per approved details.	DR 472 (5A, 5B, 5D, 5E)	Perform over- inspection (sample reinspection) of 2700 supports originally inspected under NCR 5737. Perform critical case walkthrough of approximately 1000 supports not walked down under NCR 5737. (CAP section 4.1.5)
27.	Baseplate is different size than specified on drawing. One baseplate has chipped grout in one area.	DR 473 (5A, 5B)	Perform over- inspection (sample reinspection) of 2700 supports originally inspected under NCR 5737. Perform critical case walkthrough of approximately 1000 supports not walked down under NCR 5737. (CAP section 4.1.5)

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	SOURCE ISSUE	SOURCE	DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
28.	Common bolts are utilized for cable tray splice plate and support clip. Cable tray cover is attached with wire.	DR 486	(5B, 5C)	Perform an engineering walk- through of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)
29.	Cable tray splice plate has been notched without NE approval.	DR 520	(5B)	Perform an engineering walk- through of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)
30.	Common bolts are used to connect cable tray support clips and splice plate to the cable tray.	DR 524	(5B)	Perform an engineering walk- through of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)

SOURCE ISSUE

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SOURCE DOCUMENT

31. Common bolts are used to DR 465 (5B) connect the cable tray support clip and the splice plate to the cable tray.

32. Cable tray appears to DR be overfilled (overloaded).

DR 593 (5B)

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Perform an engineering walkthrough of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4)

Perform an engineering walkthrough of installed cable trays focusing on attributes essential to cable tray qualification. Identify and evaluate critical cases. Where necessary, perform modifications (CAP section 4.1.4) IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR CABLE TRAY SUPPORT CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

- Perform overinspection (sample reinspection) of approximately 2700 supports originally reinspected under NCR 5737. Perform walkthrough of approximately 1000 supports not walked down under NCR 5737. Perform evaluations and document results. Modify supports as required. (See CAP section 4.1.5.)
- 2. Develop an acceptance criteria for fittings and configurations. Perform an engineering walkthrough to identify critical cases. Any installations which cannot be qualified will be modified. (See CAP section 4.1.4.)
- 3. Identify by engineering walkthrough all cable tray/fitting deficiencies such as: missing and loose bolts and loose tray covers. Qualify the tray system by evaluations of critical cases identified. Produce design output consistent with installations. Where necessary perform modifications. (See CAP section 4.1.4.)

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

Perform a 100-percent walkdown on those affected supports not walked down under NCR 5737. Verify documentation exists for those supports previously walked down under NCR 5737.

Same although steps are in slightly different order (violation response refers to CAP).

Same although steps are in slightly different order (violation response refers to CAP).

COMMITMENT SOURCE

CATD 11103-WBN-08

Response to Notice of Violation 390, 391/88-01-02

CAQR880167 (50.55e) Response to Notice of Violation 10 CFR 50.55(e) for NCR WBN 6297 as reported by WBRD-50-390/85-51

SOURCE ISSUE

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SOURCE DOCUMENT

1.	Discrepancies involving	SCR 6463-S
	supports documented	WBRD-50-390/86-14
	without proper change	DR 383, 393, 394,
	documentation, supports	395, 418, 463
	documented to incorrect	DR 466-5a
	typical support types,	DR 414-5a
	and supports with	DR 469-5cii
	miscellaneous	DR 500-5b & c
	installation problems.	DR 516-5c & d
	-	DR 518-5c, f, h, &i
		DR 525-5c
2.	Conduits installed with	SCR 6794-S
	cantilever lengths	DR 495-5b
	in violation with	
	47A056-89 drawing.	

3. Conduits installed with cantilever lengths in violation with 47A056-102 drawing.

SCR 6867-S

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAP, section 4.1.4 -A critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as-installed configurations." A walk-through will review the installed conduit and conduit supports.

CAP, section 4.1.4 -A critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as-installed configurations." A walk-through will review the installed conduit and conduit supports.

CAP, section 4.1.4 -A critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as-installed configurations." A walk-through will review the installed conduit and conduit supports.

SOURCE ISSUE

4. Typical conduit designs found not to envelope worst case design parameters. Some question on design criteria applicability to various conduit configurations.



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SCR WBN CEB 8675 R1
WBRD-50-390/86-14
CATD 22800-WBN-05
DR 313-5c, d, e,
f, i, & j
DR 315-5a, b, d
e, f, g & h
DR 316-5a, c, d
e, f, g, h & i
DR 326-5ai, b, c & d
DR 469-5ci
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DR 500-5a

 Typical drawing 47A056-107 is unclear on support requirements. SCR WBN CEB 8683

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAP, section 4.1.1 - The conduit and conduit support design criteria will be reviewed for technical adequacy. The design criteria will be revised as required to establish a complete and technically adequate design basis. CAP, section 4.1.2 - The existing typical support designs will be reviewed and revised as required to be in compliance with the revised design criteria. CAP, section 4.1.4 - Critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying installed configurations based on revised design output.

CAP, section 4.1.2 -Existing typical support designs will be reviewed and revised as required to be in compliance with the revised design criteria. CAP, section 4.1.4 - Critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying installed configuration based on revised design output.

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

PIR WBN CEB 8708

 Contrary to design criteria some support typical drawings allowed attachment to duct without consideration of duct movement.

CAQR WBF 870033

7. Inconsistencies exist between P2558 series clamp test data used to generate load tables.

 Clamp deflections have not been considered in design calculations. CAQR WBF 870034

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAP, section 4.1.2 -Existing typical support designs will be reviewed and revised as required to be in compliance with the revised design criteria. CAP, section 4.1.4 - Critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying installed configuration based on revised design output.

CAP, section 4.1.2 -Existing typical support designs will be reviewed and revised as required to be in compliance with the revised design criteria. CAP, section 4.1.4 - Critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying installed configuration based on revised design output.

CAP, section 4.1.2 -Existing typical support designs will be reviewed and revised as required to be in compliance with the revised design criteria. CAP, section 4.1.4 - Critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying installed configuration based on revised design output.

SOURCE ISSUE

9. Discrepancies exist between FSAR 3.10.3 and design criteria. Design criteria does not address OBE load conditions.

SOURCE DOCUMENT

CAQR WBF 870087 CATD 22403-WBN-01 DR 313-5a, b & g DR 315-5c

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAP, section 4.1.1 -The existing design criteria will be reviewed for Technical adequacy and agreement with the FSAR and other licensing commitments. The design criteria and FSAR will be revised as required to establish a complete and technically adequate design basis.

CAP, section 4.1.2 existing typicals will be reviewed and revised as required to be in compliance with the revised criteria. CAP, section 4.1.4 - Critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying installed configuration based on revised design output.

CAP, section 4.1.4 -A critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as installed configurations." A walk-through will review the installed conduit and conduit support focusing on those attributes essential to conduit and conduit support qualification.



10. Slot head screws were used in electrical hanger clips instead of ASTM A 307 bolts. CAQR WBP 870367

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

11. Contrary to the requirements inspections have not been performed on concrete expansion anchors used on typical supports 47A056-101 and 114. CAQR WBP 870407 CATD 80209-WBN-05

12. Conduits have not been evaluated for differential seismic movement between buildings. CAQR WBP 870818

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAP, section 4.1.4 -The critical case evaluation includes having Nuclear Construction or Nuclear Quality Assurance obtain information that cannot be obtained by engineering personnel during the walk-through.

CAP, section 4.1.1 -The existing design criteria will be reviewed and revised as required for technical adequacy and agreement with the FSAR and other licensing commitments. CAP, section 4.1.2 - Existing typicals will be reviewed and revised as required to be in compliance with the revised criteria. CAP, section 4.1.4 -Critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying installed configuration based on revised design output.

13. Conduits, 0-4MC-292-635A, 1-3 PM-292-7215-E and 1-2 PM-292-7353-A have been installed without an axial restraint on axial runs longer than 30 ft. CAQR WBP 871061 WBRD-50-390/86-14 CAP Section 4.1.4 - A critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as installed configurations." A walk-through will review the installed conduit and conduit supports focusing on those attributes essential to conduit and conduit supports qualifications.

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

CAQR WBP 871145

14. Several issues affecting the design of conduits and conduit supports were not considered (i.e., thermal due to post accident, mill tolerance on conduit wts, conduit qualified and insulation weights unconservative).

15.

16.

by NE.

Conduits, 1-PLC-1918B, 1VC 1247B, and 1VC 2584A were installed with unsupported spans exceeding the allowed spans per typical drawing 47A056-1D.

B-Line system clamps

and channel have been

used without evaluation

NCR W-333-P WBRD-50-390/86-14

NCR W-387-P

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAP, section 4.1.1 - The existing design criteria will be reviewed and revised as required for technical adequacy and agreement with the FSAR and other licensing commitments. CAP, section 4.1.2 -Existing typicals will be reviewed and revised as required to be in compliance with the revised criteria. CAP, section 4.1.4 -Critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying installed configuration based on revised design output.

CAP, section 4.1.4 - A critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as installed configurations." A walk-through will review the installed conduit and conduit supports focusing on those attributes essential to conduit and conduit supports qualifications.

CAP, section 4.1.4 - A critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as installed configurations." A walk-through will review the installed conduit and conduit supports focusing on those attributes essential to conduit and conduit supports qualifications.

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

17. Conduits installed with condulets on the free end in violation with the intent of typical drawing 47A056-102. NCR W-389-P WBRD-50-390/86-14

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAP, section 4.1.4 - A critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as installed configurations." A walk-through will review the installed conduit and conduit supports focusing on those attributes essential to conduit and conduit supports qualifications.

CAP, section 4.1.4 - A critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as installed configurations." A walk-through will review the installed conduit and conduit supports focusing on those attributes essential to conduit and conduit supports qualifications.

CAP, section 4.1.1 - The existing design criteria will be reviewed and revised as required for technical adequacy and and agreement with FSAR and other licensing commitments. CAP, section 4.1.2 -Existing typicals will be reviewed and revised as required to be in compliance with the revised design criteria CAP, section 4.1.4 - Acritical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as-installed configurations." A walk-through will review the installed conduit and conduit supports.

18. Insulation or other attachments may have been installed after conduit supports had been finalized. NCR W-403-P CATD 10400-WBN-03



19. Conduits 1-FCV-61-97-B and 1-FCV-61-122-B installed in violation with typical drawings 47 A056-89 and -102. NE failed to provide requirements for supporting oversized bodies. NCR-W-420-P

SOURCE ISSUE

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SOURCE DOCUMENT

20. Discrepancies NCR-W-539-P involving supports DR 416-5a documented without proper change documenttation, supports documented to incorrect typical support and support with miscellaneousinstallation problems.

21.	Conduit supports	WBP 880573
	installed without	DR 414-5b
	clamp spring nuts	DR 436-5d
	in the proper	DR 466-5b
	position.	DR 496-5c
		DR 518-5g



22. Flexible conduit attached with unapproved supports.

WBP 880670 DR 365-5a DR 376-5aii DR 377-5c DR 378-5b DR 381-5a DR 382-5b

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAP, section 4.1.4 - Acritical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as-installed configurations." A walk-through will review the installed conduit and conduit supports.

CAP, section 4.1.4 - Acritical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as-installed configurations." A walkthrough will review the installed conduit and conduit supports focusing on those attributes essential to conduit and conduit supports qualification.

CAP, section 4.1.2 -Existing typical support designs will be reviewed and revised as required to be in compliance with the revised design criteria. CAP, section 4.1.4 - Critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying installed configuration based on revised design output.

Sec. 6



SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

WBP 880687

23. Conduit supports installed in violation of typical drawing 47A056-55.

WBP 880767

24. Conduit insulation weights used in the design criteria are unconservative.

25. Conduit supports installed in violation of typical drawings. WBP 880200

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAP, section 4.1.4 - A critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as-installed configurations." A walkthrough will review the the installed conduit and conduit supports focusing on those attributes essential to conduit and conduit supports qualification.

CAP, section 4.1.1 - The conduit and conduit support design criteria will be reviewed for technical adequacy. The design criteria will be revised as required to establish a complete and technically adequate design basis. CAP, section 4.1.2 – The existing typical support designs will be reviewed and revised as required to be in compliance with the revised design criteria. CAP, section 4.1.4 - Critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying installed configurations based on revised design output.

CAP, section 4.1.4 - A critical case evaluation will be performed qualifying "as-installed configurations." A walk-through will review the the installed conduit and conduit supports focusing on those attributes essential to conduit and conduit supports qualification.

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	SOURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
26.	Miscellaneous isolated conduit and conduit support problems.		These specific problems will be resolved by implementation of CAQ corrective action. The
	-JB support not installed per drawing	WBP 880741	programmatic issues associated with these types of problems will be
	-Conduit has overspan violation and G-32 violation	WBP 880283	resolved under the CAP, section 4.1.4 (critical case evaluation). Loose hardware will be
	-Two conduit supports have rod removed	WBP 870474	corrected as indicated in part III section 1.0 of Volume IV of the Nuclear
	-Conduit has overspan violation	WBP 870590	Performance Plan.
	-Conduit has loose fitting and overspan	WBP 870527	
27.	CAQs with partial coverage in CAP		The structural adequacy of the conduits and conduit supports involved
T	-DNE output drawings do not address the seismic mounting requirements for conduits mounted in the Refueling Water Storage Tank area.	WBP 871298	in this CAQR is within the scope of this CAP critical case evaluation (Section 4.4). The condition initiating the CAOR is not within the

scope of the CAP.

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR CONDUIT AND CONDUIT SUPPORT CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

Implement a critical case evaluation. (Walkthrough and review installed conduit and conduit supports required for unit 1 operation. Evaluate critical cases and implement modifications as required.)

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

In lieu of a walkdown as specified in the sixth interim report dated September 30, 1987, TVA is developing a sample program covering all installed conduit and conduit supports required for unit 1 operation.

COMMITMENT SOURCE

Letter to NRC (5/18/88) Reassessment of Commitment Schedules.

10 CFR 50.55(e) WBRD-50-390/86-14

SOURCE ISSUE

 FSAR not current with respect to plant design

 Design input information insufficient SOURCE DOCUMENT*

Violation 390/86-18-06 Violation 390/87-20-01 Violation 390/87-05-01 CAOR WBT 870165 WBP 870772 WBP 880787 NCR W-314-P NCR W-385-P OE Audit 86-18-01 INPO DC 5.1 Employee Concern 10200-WBN-09 DR 45 DR 46 DR 70 DR 84 DR 120 DR 170 DR 189 DR 191 DR 206 DR 215 DR 257 DR 293 DR 297 DR 303 DR 461 DR 621 CAQR WBP 870443 WBP 890163 WBF 890178901 WBP 870715 WBP 870760 WBP 871206 WBP 871212 WBP 890162 WBP 870759 WBP 870348 Employee Concern 20106-WBN-01 20103-WBN-01 30711-WBN-01 DR 85 DR 597 DR 617 SCR WBN MEB 8632

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

The licensing verification area of DBVP identifies design commitments from the FSAR and verifies them to their upper tier controlling documents. If discrepancies are identified, open item reports are generated to track the discrepancy to resolution. This program creates a baseline with which to compare any future FSAR changes. (Reference: CAP, section 4.1)

The design basis area of DBVP identifies design basis commitments and requirements and incorporates them into a Design Basis Document made up of System Descriptions and Design Criteria. (Reference: CAP, section 4.2)

*Some source documents contain both conditions covered under the DBVP program and other concerns.

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

3. Missing, incomplete and out-of-date design calculations

a. General calculations

b. Civil calculations

DR 650 DR 651 DR 652 Employee Concern 20106-WBN-01, formerly 201.6(A) 20501-WBN-02 CAQR WBO 890035 CAQR WBP 880786** OE Audit 87-12-02 OE Audit 87-12-04 Employee Concern 21506-WBN-01, formerly 215.6(A) DR 36 DR 38 DR 51 DR 54 DR 56 DR 104 DR 105 DR 186 DR 187 DR 210 DR 244 DR 245 DR 254 DR 258 DR 263 DR 266 DR 268 DR 292 DR 299 DR 300 SCR WBN EEB 8630 **WBN EEB 8631 WBN EEB 8538 WBN EEB 8539** WBN EEB 8571** CAQR WBE 870775724 WBP 871085

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

The calculations program will generate, revise or review calculations, as appropriate, in order to assure the existence and retrievability of safety-related calculations that are technically adequate and consistent with the plant design. The program will also establish a process for statusing essential calculations that will maintain them current with plant design changes. (Reference: CAP, section 4.3)

c. Electrical calculations

**Generic Concern CAQ

WBP 870274

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

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CAQR	WBE	, 880	505
	WBE	880	754
INPO	DC	5–3	
DR 13			
DR 20			
DR 73			
DR 75			
DR 76			
DR 77			
DR 81			
DR 14	n		
DD 16	6		
DR 10	3		
DR 22	່. ວ		
DR 25	5		
DK 25	0		
DR 26	9		
DR 27	3		
DR 39	7		
DR 62	9		
PIR W	BN	EEB	8659
М	BN	EEB	8662
W	BN	WBP	87131
W	BN	WBP	87179
W	BN	WBP	87180
Ŵ	BN	WBP	8732
W	BN	WBP	8733
W	BN	EEB	8539
W	BN	EEB	8571
Emplo	vee	e Con	cern
109	00-	-NPS-	-04
205	01-	-WBN-	-02
205	01-	-NPS-	-04
200	01_	WRN_	.01
227	01-	WRN_	.02
237	02-	WRN_	.03
237	02-	WRN_	0.0
237	02-	-WDN-	04
237	02-	-WDN-	05
302	02-		.01
302	02-		02
302	02-	-MRW-	.03
INPO	DC DC	1-1	
INPO	DC	3–1	
PIR W	RN	WBP	8674
PIR W	BN	WBP	88014
PIR W	BN	WBP	88020
PIR W	BN	MEB8	701

d.	Mechanical
	calculations

PIR WBN MEB 8702

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

0400 UDD 07100744
CAQR WBP 8/133/**
WBP 8/0442
WBP 890102
WBP 890173
OE Audit 87-12-02
OE Audit 87-12-04
Employee Concern
20501-WBN-01,
formerly 205.1(A)
DR 41
DR 45
DR 46
DR 62
DR 64
DR 85
DR 93
DR 132
DR 142
DR 185
DR 201
DR 208
DR 231
DR 232
DR 233
DR 272
DR 302
DR 314
DR 322
DR 324
DR 332
DR 570
DR 579
DR 595
DR 594 DP 505
DR 596
DR 604
DR 621
DR 622
SCR WBN EOP 8621
CAOR WBE 870775724
WBF 880062
WBF 870099
WBP 870284
WRP 871052
WBP 871053
WRD 880787
UDI 000/07

e. Nuclear calculations

**Generic Concern CAQ
IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR DESIGN BASELINE VERIFICATION PROGRAM CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

INPO DC 1.1 DC 3.1 Employee Concern 20501-WBN-02 DR 203

- 4. Lack of adequate design change control process
- Employee Concerns 20406-WBN-02 20601-WBN-02 20601-WBN-03 DR 634
- 5. Drawings do not match plant configuration

Employee Concerns 20601-WBN-01 30713-WBN-02 SCR 6297-S DR 291 An improved change control process is being developed. (Reference: CAP, section 4.4)

The improved change control process will utilize a one drawing system. Design changes will be more effectively documented by posting against and incorporating into (when appropriate) the single drawing. (Reference: CAP, section 4.4)

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR DESIGN BASELINE VERIFICATION PROGRAM CAP

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1.1

CAP COMMITMENT

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

COMMITMENT SOURCE

N/A

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N/A

N/A

SOURCE ISSUE

- Flexible conduit installation deficiencies "Significant Condition Reports (SCR), a Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR), and maintenance requests have identified problems associated with the installation of flexible conduit at WBN. The identified problems are listed below:
 - Inadequate length to account for seismic/ thermal movement.
 - Lack of compliance with the minimum bend radius requirements
 - ° Loose fittings"

Reference section 4.1.1

2. Separation Between Redundant Divisions of CLass 1E Raceways "CAQs and an employee concern have identified isolated cases of redundant enclosed raceways with less than the minimum required 1-inch separation."

Reference section 4.1.2.1

SOURCE DOCUMENT

SCR 6529 R1 SCR W-577-PS RO CAQR WBP 870226 DR 361, DR 364, DR 376, DR 382, DR 419, DR 425, DR 450, DR 599, DR 524, NRC Report number 390/85-57-05

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

The CAP describes the implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.1.

CAQR WBP 870435 CATD 24200-WBN-04 NCR W-31-P

NCR WBN 6606 NCR WBP 6507 The CAP describes the implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.2.1.

<u>Source Issue</u>

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3. Internal Panel Separation Between Redundant Divisions of Class 1E Cables "A CAQ and an employee concern have identified that inside the main control room panel non-Class 1E cables were routed with one train of cables and subsequently routed with the redundant train of cables. Also, inside the auxiliary instrument room panels, several conditions have been identified where redundant cables have not been separated by a barrier or 6-inches of free air space."

Reference section 4.1.2.2

Source Document

CAQI	R WBP	870927		
CAQI	R WBP	880483		
CAQ	R WBP	880725		
CATI	D 2420	00-		
WBN-01				
	.,			
DR	014			
DR 2	298			

Resolution of Issue

The CAP describes the implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.2.2.

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Source Issue

4. Coil-to-Contact and Contact-to-Contact Isolation Between Class 1E and Non-Class 1E Circuits

> "A CAQ has identified that contact-to-contact isolation between Class 1E and non-Class 1E wiring was not specified in design input documents as an acceptable means of isolation and that no analysis has been performed to demonstrate the acceptability of this isolation method. In addition, the corrective action to this CAQ stated that Class 1E relays used as isolators should be reviewed to determine whether they have been qualified by the vendor for their as-designed coil-to-contact and contact-to-contact applications."

Reference section 4.1.2.3.

Source Document

PIR WBN WBP 87120 RO

Resolution of Issue

The CAP describes the implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.2.3.



Source Issue

5. Contact and Coil Rating of Electrical Devices

> "Problem Identification Reports (PIR) have been issued at WBN for deficiencies where the design and procurement of inductive devices contained in circuits did not consider the inductive load rating of contacts or the maximum credible voltage available at the device terminals."

Reference section 4.1.3



Torque Switch and Overload Relay Bypass Capability for Active Safety-Related Valves

"In order to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.106 (reference 8) certain active safetyrelated valves required to operate during a design basis event must have the thermal overload relays and the torque switches bypassed to ensure operability. It has been identified through employee concerns and CAQs that NE did not provide torque switch and thermal overload relay bypass capability for certain active safetyrelated valves."

Reference section

4.1.4



Source Document

PIR WBN EEB 8610 RO PIR WBN WBP 87131 RO

Resolution of Issue

The CAP describes the implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.3

NCR W-367-P R1 SCR WBN NEB 8630 R0 CATD 23701-WBN-01 CATD 23701-WBN-02 CATD 23701-WBN-03 CATD 23701-WBN-04 DR 182 DR 183 The CAP describes the implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.4.

<u>Source Issue</u>

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Source Document

7. Adhesive-Backed Cable Support Mounts (ABCSM) CAQR WBP 870481 DR 559 Resolution of Issue

The CAP describes the implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.5.

"A CAQ has been initiated to document that vendors and TVA have used ABCSM inside equipment to support and restrain wires and field cables in a neat and orderly fashion. The ABCSMs sometimes separate from the inside of the equipment, and as a result, may not properly secure the wire or cable."

Reference section 4.1.5

All source documents will be resolved for the issues under which they are listed when the CAP is completed. All issues will be resolved for the items required for unit 1 operation.

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR ELECTRICAL ISSUES CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

1. Nuclear Construction (NC) will initiate a workplan and walkdown all Class 1E flexible conduit and rework those flexible conduit found to be damaged or in noncompliance with the design output documents. Any flexible conduit that cannot be repaired or replaced to meet design requirements will be referred to NE for evaluation.

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

Each flexible conduit attached to a Class lE pipe mounted device will be inspected to ensure the required thermal/seismic movement for each device can be obtained. Those found to be in noncompliance will be reworked or referred to NE for evaluation.

COMMITMENT SOURCE

10 CFR 50.55(e) for SCR WBN 6529-S R1

Difference: CAP includes all Class lE flexible conduit. Damaged flexible conduit or loose flexible conduit will be repaired or replaced.



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IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR ELECTRICAL ISSUES CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

2. NE will provide a list of flexible conduit attached to Class 1E pipe mounted devices to identify those flexible conduits which will experience both seismic and thermal movement.

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

NE has provided to TVA's Division of Nuclear Construction and WBN Operations a list for units 1 and 2 of the flexible conduits to Class 1E pipe-mounted devices which must be inspected to assure these installations adequately compensate for combined thermal/seismic movements. These lists will be documented by design calculations. The combined thermal/ seismic movement for each device shown on the list will be provided.

COMMITMENT SOURCE

10 CFR 50.55(e) for SCR WBN 6529-S R1



IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR EQUIPMENT SEISMIC QUALIFICATION CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

retrievability

1. Documentation

SOURCE DOCUMENT

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VSR	DRs	#31,	<i>#</i> 190,
#192	, #1	.60,	#163
CAQR	WBF	890	124

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Retrieve, compile and index equipment design, procurement and seismic documents into ESQ list and complete entries into RIMS. (Reference: CAP, sections 4.1.2, 4.1.3, and 4.1.5)

Review WBNP procedures, design output and perform engineering field walkthroughs, as necessary to resolve interface discrepancies. Interface review requirements will be strengthened by revision of procedures CAP, sections 4.1.4 and 4.2.

2. Interface control among engineering disciplines and between engineering and other organizations PIR WBN NEB 8678 PIR WBN MEB 8688 NCR W-416-P NCR WBN EEB 8522 PIR WBN EEB 8665 VSR DRs, #91, #32 SCR WBN EEB 8663 PIR WBN NEB 8645 NCR W-550-P CAQR WBP 890124 CAQR WBP 871113 CAQR WBP 870216 CAQR WBP 880415 CAQR WBP 880823 CAQR WBP 890185 NRC violation 390/88-04-03/ D3.1-1 & D3.2-2 CAQR WBP 880559 PIR WBN CEB 8637 SCR WBN CEB 8684 CAQR WBP 870709 PIR WBN CEB 8551 CAQR WBP 880557 CAQR WBP 870917 CAQR WBP 880377 CAQR WBP 880785

IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR EQUIPMENT SEISMIC QUALIFICATION CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

3. Discrepancies between design documents and installed conditions

- - 4. Discrepancies between inspection documents and installed conditions

SOURCE DOCUMENT

CAQR WBP 880406 **WBN NCR 6775** WBN NCR W-476-P WBN SCR 6298-S VSR DRs #95, #35 #430, #96 #204, #503b, #569a, #616 WBN SCR W-487-PS WBN MEB 8715 **WBN NEB 8643** NCR W-415-P NCR W-405-P NRC violation 390/86-02-01 NRC violation 390/86-18-03 NRC violation 390/86-21-02 NRC violation 390/86-18-05 NRC violation 390/86-18-01 CAQR WBP 890159 CAQR WBP 880690 CAOR WBP 880763 NCR WBN 6297 CAQR WBP 870531 CAQR WBP 880655 CAQR WBP 880547 WBN NCR 6397 CAOR WBP 880636 WEN SCD W.556_DS

MDH	JOK 1	w-220	0-50
WBN	NCR	W-41	1-P
WBN	SCR	W-559	9-PS
VSR	DR #	169,	#224

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Engineering investigation and evaluation (includes field walkthroughs) will determine the extent of problem and identify obvious outliers and provide resolution. Documents will be revised. Rework/ modification/ inspections, as defined by engineering evaluation. (Reference: CAP, sections 4.1.4 and 6.0)

Engineering investigation and evaluation (may include field walkthroughs) will define the essential inspection requirements for rework/reinspection and identify obvious outliers. Applicable procedures and documents will be revised to specify the changes. (Reference: CAP, sections 4.1.4 and 4.2)

IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR EQUIPMENT SEISMIC QUALIFICATION CAP

NRC violation 390/86-21

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

CAQR WBP 880699

VSR DR #318, #107

VSR DRs #009, 019

VSR DRs #43, #50

SER Supplements

1 through 4 and

NRC letter to

CAQR WBP 880728

CAQR WBP 880788

WBN NCR 6296

- 5. Damaged Brackets for Instruments
- 6. Adequacy of Documentation
- 7. Lack of I(L) Equipment Inspection Documents
- 8. Compatibility of ESQ design criteria and licensing commitments in the FSAR
- 9. NRC SQRT audit open items
- 10. DBVP
 - 10. DBVP identified open items of ESQ design criteria

TVA dated 09/23/82 or references g through k of CAP attachment 1.

WB-DC-40-31.2 WB-DC-40-31.6 WB-DC-40-31.12 RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAP, section 4.1.4

CAP, section 4.1.4

CAP, section 4.1.6

Revise FSAR and design criteria as needed to resolve open items. (Reference: CAP, section 4.1.1)

Responses to open items have been provided to NRC. CAP paragraph 1.0. Additional action, if any, awaiting NRC response.

Perform calculations to support DBVP review of ESQ Design Criteria. (Reference: CAP, section 4.1.1.)

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR EQUIPMENT SEISMIC QUALIFICATION CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

CAP submittal to NRC replaces previous commitment

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

- 1. In response to violation No. 390/86-21-02, TVA committed to define corrective actions and implementation plan by September 1, 1987.
- In response to violation No. 390/86-18-01, TVA committed to provide an assessment and corrective action program, by SWEC, to replace the commitment item (1) above.

COMMITMENT SOURCE

TVA Letter to NRC (L44870316805)

TVA Letter to NRC (L44870629808)

IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR FIRE PROTECTION CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

1.	Separation of redundant	CAQR	WBP	870978	RO
	safe shutdown equipment				
	and cables compromised by				
	fire barrier penetrations				
	without fire rated dampers.				

2. Various issues raised at SQN by former TVA contract employee may be applicable to WBN due to similarity of design. NRC Inspection Reports 50-327/88-24 50-328/88-24 50-327/88-37 50-328/88-37 RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Perform Appendix R type analysis to determine what plant modifications may be required to achieve compliance with Appendix R, Section III.G. (Reference: CAP, section 4.1.2)

Perform a review of the issues raised at SQN for applicability to WBN with a determination of corrective actions. CAQRs in accordance with NEP 9.1 may be required. (Reference: (CAP, section 4.1.3)

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR FIRE PROTECTION CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

COMMITMENT SOURCE

N/A

з I

N/A

N/A

1 1

	SOURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
1.	As-Built (Walkdown) data	Industry Practice	Piping and the associated supports will be walked down (WP-32) for piping systems to be rigorously analyzed. (CAP, section 4.1.1) (31.7, section 4.2).
2.	Combination of Response Spectra Analysis Results	PIR WBN CEB 8542	Seismic response due to simultaneous applications of two horizontal and one vertical response spectra will be combined by SRSS. (31.7, sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4).
3.	Effects of Environmental Temperature on Piping	CATD 21801-WBN-01	Normal environmental temperatures will be considered in both the pipe stress and support design loads. Emergency/faulted environmental temperature will be considered to calculate support design loads. (31.7, section 3.2.4.1).
4.	Effects of Environmental Temperature on Pipe Supports	CATD 22011-WBN-01 PIR WBN CEB 8536	Thermal expansion due to any environmental condition will be considered for support members that frame directly between structures or rigid structural elements (i.e., wall, floors, slabs). 31.9, section 3.9).
5.	Effects of Friction on Pipe Supports	IFLP 390/88-04-03, item D3.3-1	Normal loads will be used in calculating the friction force in the design of category I and I(L) pressure boundary retention piping supports. (31.9, section 3.5).

	SOURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
6.	Effects of Support Mass on Piping Analysis	CATD 21806-WBN-01	Significant support masses will be considered in the piping analysis. (31.7, section 3.1.2.3).
7.	Effects of Support Mass on Support Design	CAQR WBP 880628P	When significant, support mass effect will be included in the design of pipe supports. (31.9, section 3.3).
8.	Equipment Flexibility	CAQR WBP 870542 INPS 390/86-22 sample 25	Flexibility of the equipment (natural frequency less than 33 hz) will be considered in the piping analysis. (31.7, section 3.1.6).
9.	Evaluation of Fluid Transients	CATD 21804-WBN-01	All piping system will be reviewed for significant fluid transient events and will be considered in the piping analysis. (31.7, section 3.2.8) (5.49, attachment B).
10.	Evaluation of Operating Modes	CATD 21801-WBN-01 CAQR WBP 880401 NCR WBN CEB 8215 PIR WBN CEB 8704 PIR WBN MEB 8625	Thermal operating modes will be reviewed and considered in the piping analysis. (31.7, section 3.2.4) (5.49, attachment B).
11.	Identification and Documentation of Design Inputs	CAQR WBP 871048 NCR WBN CEB 8215	The design input for piping analysis will be documented and will be reconciled with the piping analysis. (5.49) (5.38, section 2.12).

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	SOURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
12.	IE Bulletin 79-02	CATD 11300-WBN-04 IFLP 390/88-04-03, item 04.3-8	Compliance to IE Bulletin 79-02 requirements will be met during the evaluation of category I engineered supports. (CAP, section 1.0) (31.9, sections 3.21.2 and 3.24.1).
13.	Integral Welds	CAQR WBA 871200802 IFLP 390/86-25-08 NCR W-518-P PIR WBN CEB 8625 PIR WBN CEB 8659 PIR WBN CEB 8663 SCR WBN CEB 8692	Welded attachments will be walked down (per WB-32) for all piping which is to be rigorously analyzed. The attachments will be evaluated appropriately for any violations. (31.7, section 4.1.3) (31.9, sections 3.16.1.2.3 and 3.16.1.2.4c).
14.	Localized Pipe Stress due to Support Components	PIR WBN CEP 8657 NRC IE Information Notice No. 83-80	Stiff clamps will be investigated for significant localized pipe stresses. (31.9, section 3.19.3.1b).
15.	Piping Analysis Model Termination	CAQR WBP 870455 NCR WBN CEB 8221 CATD 21807-WBN-01 PIR WBN CEB 8682 ECP-86-KX-165-01	The boundaries of all rigorously analyzed piping will be reviewed for proper model termination per piping analysis design criteria. (31.7, section 3.1.1) (5.38, section 4.3.4a).
16.	Piping System Functionality	Industry Practice	The functionally of piping systems that are required to be operational during or after an emergency/faulted event in GE document NEDO 21985. (31.7, section 4.1.10).

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

17.	Pipe and Pipe Support	CAQR WBP 871223	Piping welds were addressed
	Welds	PIR WBN WBP 8760	by the Watts Bar Welding
		CATD 22207-WBN-01	Program Task Group. Any
		PIR WBN WBP 8782	piping weld which cannot
			cannot be repaired and was
			accepted "as-is" will be

18.	Pipe Support	Component
	Substitution	

- 19. Rigid Range Effects on Dynamic Analysis
- 20. Substitution of Piping Components

PIR WBN WBP 8758 CATD 22204-WBN-01 CATD 11102-WBN-02 SCR WBN CEB 8654 NCR W-462-P

CATD 21803-WBN-01 CATD 21806-WBN-01 SCR WBN CEB 8553

Industry Practice

associated with the piping to be rigorously analyzed and evaluated for the new loads. (WP-32, sections 5.3.19 and 5.3.20) (31.9, sections 3.16.1.2.3b and 3.16.1.2.4f). Sampling program will be conducted to verify the design adequacy of the components. (CAP, section 4.1.6). The contribution of dynamic

identified as discrepant weld (per WBEP 5.49, attachment B) and evaluated. The piping support weld will be walked

down for all supports

response due to higher modes will be included in the piping analysis. 31.7, section 3.4.5).

The piping components will be identified during the walkdown of the piping systems. Where the piping component substitutions are identified, the piping analysis will be updated. (WP-32).

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	SOURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
21.	Support Flexibility	ECP-86-KX-165-01	The support will generally be modeled as rigid in the piping analysis. The deflection of pipe support will be limited to 0.0625 inch based on dynamic/ seismic component of upset or faulted load and 0.125 based on the total design load. (31.7, section 3.1.2.2) (31.9, section 3.7.1a).
22.	Surface Plate Welded to Embedded Plated	Industry Practice	Surface mounted baseplates with mixed bolt and weld attachments will be identified during the walkdown (per WP-32) and qualified such that the entire shear load is taken by the weld. (31.9, section 3.21.3).
23.	Temperature Cutoff for Piping Analysis	CATD 21801-WBN-01	For piping to be rigorously analyzed all operating modes will be considered. For alternately analyzed piping, thermal expansion will not be considered if the piping is subjected to temperatures ranging from 20°F to 130°F; however, the piping configuration is reviewed for adequate flexibility. (31.7, section 3.2.4.1).

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	SOURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
24.	Tolerances	CAQR WBP 870727	As specified in TVA construction specification G-43 and N3C=912, tolerances are adequate and comparable to industry accepted values. As-built conditions will be reconciled with the rigorous piping analysis. Tolerances for pipe supports shall be considered when as-built dimensions are not known. (31.7, section 4.2) (31.9, section 3.13).
25.	Uplift on Rod Supports	Industry Practice	Rigid rod supports will be checked to assure that they are subjected to tensile loading only in any loading condition. (31.9, section 3.19.4).
26.	Use of Vendor Load Rating for Standard Component Support	Industry Practice	Service level loading conditions (instead of "normalized loads") will be considered in the selection or reconciliation of standard support components. (31.9, section 3.8 and Appendix B).

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

27. Variable Damped Spectra Used with Multiple Group Support Motion

Missing Pipe Support

Use of Epoxy Grouted

Calculations

28.

29.

Anchors

DR-193 PIR WBN CEB 8552

CATD 21201-WBN-01

CATD 22001-WBN-01 CATD 80201-WBN-02

SCR WBN CEB 8531

SCR WBN CEB 8570

DR-25

NCR 3567

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

ASME Code Case N-411 damping values will be used only with the single zone (enveloped response spectra) method for seismic analysis. For Design Basis Accident (DBA), the steel containment vessel will be considered as one zone and the spectra for all attachments to SCV will be enveloped (other structures do not respond to DBA and, therefore, acceleration levels will be considered insignificant). (31.7, section 3.4.2).

TVA will ensure all existing pipe support calculations for unit 1 are complete and stored in RIMS. TVA will prepare and issue calcs for all missing or incomplete calculations to provide assurance that they meet the applicable design criteria.

Construction Specification G-32 was revised on August 25, 1982, to preclude the use of epoxy grouted anchors (NCR 3567); all safety-related support designs will be reviewed under HAAUP for adequacy (SCR WBN CEB 8570).

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	SOURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
30.	Inadequate Support Shown on Valves	SCR WBN CEB 8684	Typical valve support drawings (47A054-41 and -42) will be revised and new supports to existing valve installations will be added per revised drawings. (U1 ECN 6659).
31.	Oversize Relief Valve	SCR WBN MEB 8616	The existing valve will be replaced by the appropriate size and affected piping will be evaluated. (UI ECN 6184).
32.	Upgrade Containment Cooling Piping Class	SCR WBN NEB 8663	Piping will be evaluated to upgraded class. (Work package YCY000).
33.	NRC Inspection Report	<u>390/86-22</u>	
	Pipe Whip Design as a result of generic exception to Reg Guide 1.46.	Sample 6	Pipe rupture criteria (WB-DC-40-31.50 R4) was revised to address this issue of pipe break locations on reanalyzed piping. FSAR section 3.6A.2.1.2 will be revised.
	Compliance with licensing and schedule completion of rigorously analyzed piping. Review of all other piping analysis problems that utilized simplified analysis approach using TPIPE version 4.6D and special postprocessor version 6.0C.	Sample 12	Rigorously analyzed piping will be reanalyzed using corrected version of TPIPE computer program and new class 2 postprocessor. Simplified piping analysis will be reviewed for deficiencies identified with TPIPE version 4.6D and special postprocessor version 6.0C. All work will be completed before fuel load date.
	Provisions were not made to incorporate pump dynamic characteristics in the piping analysis.	Sample 25	Piping analysis will incorporate pump dynamic characteristics. (See issue No. 8).

	SOURCE ISSUE	<u>sou</u>	RCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
34.	NRC Inspector Follow-up Item	3 <u>(SQ</u>	90/88-04-03 N 50-327/86-27)	
	Seismic qualification documentation that ensures "New valve stem extensions do not invalidate the existing seismic qualifications for the valve, piping or associated components." was not available.	a.	Item D3.2-2 PIR WBN CEB 8637	Remote valve extension operator will be identified and seismic qualification assured.
	Design information specified in 47B001- series drawings is not always compatible with requirements found in CEB reports 75-18 and 77-42.	b.	Item D3.2-4 PIR WBN CEB 8693	Evaluate CEB report 75-18 and revise drawing 47B001-10 if necessary.
	Pipe support friction design	c.	Item D3.3-1	Friction in support design (see issue No. 5).
	Baseplate design criteria	đ.	Item 04.3-8	Resolve 79-02 commitments for unit 1 as part of HAAUP

LEGEND

CAP	Hanger and Analysis Update Program Corrective Action Plan
CAQR	Condition Adverse to Quality Report
CATD	Corrective Action Tracking Document (Employee Concern Program)
DR	Discrepancy report identified during Vertical Slice Review (VSR)
IFLP	NRC Inspector Follow-up Item
INPS	NRC Inspection Report
WP-32	WBEP-WP-32, "Walkdown of As-Built Piping System Under Scope of HAAUP"
31.7	WB-DC-40-31.7, "Design Criteria for Analysis of Category I and I(L)
	Piping Systems"
31.9	WB-DC-40-31.9, "Criteria for Design of Piping Supports and Supplemental
	Steel in Cat. I Structures"

OTHER OPEN ITEMS

The following open items are related to minor deficiencies identified in piping analysis, support design, and pipe rupture areas. The HAAUP program will address and provide resolutions to these open items before fuel load. The completion of the work will be tracked using TVA's TROI system.

CAQR	WBF	870034	CAQR	WBP	880)540P		PIR	WBN	CEB	8706
CAQR	WBF	870241	CAQR	WBP	880	608		PIR	WBN	MEB	8664
CAQR	WBP	870189	CAQR	WBP	880	615		PIR	WBN	MEB	8671
CAQR	WBP	870219	CAQR	WBP	880	0707		PIR	WBN	MEB	86122
CAQR	WBP	870221	CAQR	WBP	880)734		PIR	WBN	MEB	86125
CAQR	WBP	870247	CAQR	WBP	880)785		PIR	WBN	MEB	86128
CAQR	WBP	870260	CAQR	WBP	890	057P		PIR	WBN	MEB	8709
CAQR	WBP	870268	CAQR	WBP	890)177		PIR	WBN	WBP	8744
CAQR	WBP	870355	CAQR	WBP	890)181		PIR	WBN	WBP	8764
CAQR	WBP	870425	CAQR	WBP	890)189		PIR	WBN	WBP	8788
CAQR	WBP	870487	CAQR	WBT	870)330		PIR	WBN	WBP	87102
CAQR	WBP	870490	CAQR	WBT	870)582		PIR	WBN	WBP	87157
CAQR	WBP	870517	CAQR	WBT	871	L139					
CAQR	WBP	870620	CAQR	WBT	880)429		NCR	W-4]	L1-P	
CAQR	WBP	870621						NCR-	-6592	2	
CAQR	WBP	870627	CATD	2120)2-b	VBN-01		NCR-	-6597	7	
CAQR	WBP	870647	CATD	2180)1-h	VBN-02	1	NCR-	-6599	•	
CAQR	WBP	870703	CATD	2181	11-b	VBN-01		NCR-	-6910)	
CAQR	WBP	870713						NCR	WBN	4068	3
CAQR	WBP	870720	PIR W	BN (CEB	8518		NCR	WBN	6297	7
CAQR	WBP	870722	PIR W	VBN (CEB	8547		NCR	WBN	CEB	8223
CAQR	WBP	870724	PIR W	VBN (CEB	8550		NCR	WBN	CEB	8515
CAQR	WBP	870725	PIR W	BN (CEB	8551		NCR	WBN	SWP	8247
CAQR	WBP	870750	PIR W	VBN (CEB	8603					
CAQR	WBP	870772	PIR W	VBN (CEB	8608		SCR	W-51	L8–PS	5
CAQR	WBP	871013	PIR W	VBN (CEB	8626		SCR	WBN	6592	2–S
CAQR	WBP	871015	PIR W	BN (CEB	8639		SCR	WBN	6599	9–S
CAQR	WBP	871044	PIR W	BN (CEB	8640		SCR	WBN	6910)-S
CAQR	WBP	871045	PIR W	BN (CEB	8645		SCR	WBN	CEB	8576
CAQR	WBP	871234	PIR W	BN C	CEB	8646		SCR	WBN	CEB	8604
CAQR	WBP	871267	PIR W	BN (CEB	8664		SCR	WBN	CEB	8677
CAQR	WBP	871299	PIR W	VBN (CEB	8666		SCR	WBN	CEB	8680
CAQR	WBP	871332	PIR W	BN (CEB	8674		SCR	WBN	CEB	86102
CAQR	WBP	880044	PIR W	VBN (CEB	8685		SCR	WBN	MEB	8604
CAQR	WBP	880173	PIR W	BN C	CEB	8686					
CAQR	WBP	880225	PIR W	VBN (CEB	8688					
CAQR	WBP	880231	PIR W	VBN (JEB	8697					
CAQR	WBP	880279	PIR W	BN (EB	86100					
CAQR	WBP	880394	PIR W	BN (EB	86101					
CAQR	WBP	880430	PIR W	/BN (CEB	8701					





The following deficiencies were identified by the vertical slice review. The HAAUP program will address and provide resolution. The completion of the work will be tracked using TVA's TROI system.

DR-12	DR-248
DR-26	DR-251
DR-30	DR-254
DR-42	DR-263
DR-52	DR-325
DR-63	DR-328
DR-71	DR-331
DR-95	DR-392
DR-111	DR-411
DR-113	DR-430
DR-114	DR-441
DR-115	DR-457
DR-116	DR-488
DR-118	DR-489
DR-151	DR-491
DR-153	DR-494
DR-156	DR-523
DR-157	DR-561
DR-159	DR-587
DR-194	DR-615
DR-195	DR-635
DR-201	DR-636
DR-244	DR-641
DR-245	DR-650
DR-247	DR 651



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IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR HANGER AND ANALYSIS UPDATE PROGRAM CAP

	CAP COMMITMENT	PREVIOUS COMMITMENT	COMMITMENT SOURCE
•	<u>Seismic Damping</u> (CAP, section 4.1.1.2)		
	ASME Code Case N-411 meeting the requirements specified in Regulatory Guide 1.84 will be used for single zone.	N-411 with 2-D earthquake and multiple zones will be used.	FSAR Table 3.7.2
	Regulatory Guide 1.61 will be used for multiple zones.	Criteria A (.5%, 1%) or Criteria B (1%, 2%; 2%, 3%) will be used.	FSAR Table 3.7.2

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* As part of the Hanger and Analysis Update Program (HAAUP), the design criteria for piping analysis and support design were updated (CAP, sections 2.0 and 4.2.2) to incorporate the resolution of several technical and/or procedural issues. This revised design methodology will be used to evaluate the safety-related piping and associated support design. In several cases, the revised design methodology is different from FSAR. FSAR will be revised to reflect this updated design methodology.



IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR HEAT CODE TRACEABILITY CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

2.

 Some Class 3 materials may have been installed in Class 2 systems without adequate documentation.

Some material may have been

1 systems without meeting

installed in ASME Code Class

Class 1 material requirement.

SOURCE DOCUMENT

CAQR CATD CATD CATD CATD CATD CATD CATD	WBP 880431 R0 40700-WBN-05 40700-WBN-06 40700-WBN-07 40700-WBN-08 40700-WBN-09 40700-WBN-10 40700-WBN-11 40700-WBN-14
CATD CATD	40700-WBN-14 40700-WBN-17

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Certain product forms, e.g., seam welded piping without filler metal, are required by either the Material Specification (ASME Code Section II) or ASME Code Section III to have NDE performed for use in ASME Class 2 and Class 3 applications. ASTM, ASME Section II, and ASME Section III materials which have been upgraded to ASME Section III Class 2 and Class 3 will be reverified as meeting all other requirements of the ASME Code (Section III) on a statistical sampling basis. If a particular technical attribute of a sampled item is found to be discrepant, that particular attribute will be isolated and verified for the entire population. (Reference CAP, section 4.1.2)

Class 1 piping material is required to have 100 percent surface nondestructive examination (NDE) performed. To satisfy Class 1 NDE requirements, liquid penetrant examinations have been or will be performed for all such material installed in Class 1 applications. (Reference: CAP, section 4.1.1)

CAQR WBP 880432 R0

CATD 40700-WBN-02

CATD 40700-WBN-03

CATD 40700-WBN-04

CATD 40700-WBN-05

CATD 40700-WBN-06

CATD 40700-WBN-07

CATD 40700-WBN-08

CATD 40700-WBN-09

CATD 40700-WBN-10

CATD 40700-WBN-11

CATD 40700-WBN-14 CATD 40700-WBN-17

IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR HEAT CODE TRACEABILITY CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

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SOURCE DOCUMENT RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

3.	ASTM material have been reclassified and installed in ASME Code Systems without verifying that the manufacturers of the material had an acceptable ASME QA program in place at the time of manufacturing.	CAQR CATD CATD CATD CATD CATD CATD CATD CATD	WBP 880433 R0 40700-WBN-05 40700-WBN-06 40700-WBN-07 40700-WBN-08 40700-WBN-09 40700-WBN-10 40700-WBN-11 40700-WBN-11 40700-WBN-17 80104-WBN-01	The acceptability of ASTM material will be determined by verifying the material has an equivalent ASME specification, was supplied with an acceptable Quality Assurance program, and had the necessary NDE performed as applicable for the particular ASME applications. (Reference: CAP, section 4.1.3)
4.	ASTM plate material may have been improperly used as integral attachment material to ASME piping.	CAQR CATD CATD CATD CATD	WBP 880437 R0 40700-WBN-06 40700-WBN-08 40700-WBN-11 80104-WBN-01	The acceptability of ASTM material will be determined by verifying the material has an equivalent ASME specification, was supplied with an acceptable Quality Assurance program, and had the necessary NDE performed as applicable for the particular ASME applications. (Reference: CAP, section 4.1.3)
5.	Sections of the FSAR applicable to material traceability do not clearly indicate WBN's Code of Record.	CATD CATD	40700-WBN-12 40700-WBN-13	Sections of the FSAR applicable to material traceability will be revised as necessary to clearly indicate WBN's Code of Record. Technically justified FSAR revisions will be submitted to the NRC, if required, to incorporate any exceptions to the ASME Code. (Reference: CAP, section 4.3)

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR HEAT CODE TRACEABILITY CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

COMMITMENT SOURCE

N/A

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N/A

N/A

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

- 1. Design criteria has incomplete requirements in several areas.
- CAQR WBP 871029 (50.55[e]) WBRD-50-390/87-21 WBRD-50-391/87-25 Vertical Slice Review (VSR) Discrepancy Report (DR) 4(c), DR 4(f), DR 4(d), DR 4(1), DR 4(ki) DR 167(a), DR 4(kii) DR 167(i), DR 167 (f)

WBRD-50-390/86-54

WBRD-50-391/86-52

DR 4(a), DR 4(b), DR 4(m), DR 4(n),

CAQR WBP 880543,

DR 167(b), DR 167(c)

- 2. Design criteria lacks adequate justification or documentation in certain areas including discrepancies between test data and design criteria requirements.
- Design criteria was used SCR WBN MEB 8631 3. in design of heavy gauge duct but criteria did not cover this type of duct construction.
- 4. Typical pipe/conduit support drawings allow their attachment to duct flanges without considerations of duct movement.
- 5. Duct support typical 47A055-35 static deflection exceeds design criteria allowable.

PIR WBN CEB 8708

CAQR WBP 880038

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAP section 4.1.1 -"The design criteria and FSAR will be revised as required to establish a complete and technically adequate design basis."

SCR WBN CEB 8559 (50.55[e]) CAP section 4.1.1 -"Calculations have been identified which are required to support the above design criteria. The calculations are identified in section 5 of reference 1." (Reference 1 is WB-DC-40-31.8) These and other calculations will be prepared as part of the HVAC CAP.

> Criteria has been revised, modifications identified, and design changes made. Modifications will be tracked through normal CAQ process.

The issue becomes a critical case attribute which will be evaluated in accordance with section 4.1.4 of the CAP.

CAP section 4.1.2 -"Existing HVAC duct support designs will be reviewed for correctness and revised as necessary to bring them into compliance with the design criteria."

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

SCR W-580-P-S

- HVAC ducts have not been CAQR WBP 870818 evaluated for differential movement between buildings.
- Supports not installed per design output and/or inspection documentation.
- CAQR WBN 870308 CAQR WBN 870316 DR 151, DR 171(a), DR 179, DR 180, DR 304(b), DR 305, DR 172(a), DR 173, DR 174, DR 176(b), DR 178, DR 317, DR 387(a), DR 499(a) (b) and (e), DR 171(b), DR 304(d), DR 306, DR 354, DR 387(b), DR 172(b), DR 176(a) NRC Violation 390/87-07-01
- Design output drawings are not in agreement with the design input.

CAQR WBP 880104 DR 167(k)

 Contrary to design criteria, some typical supports are not designed to transfer reaction loads primarily by shear into member webs. CAQR WBP 880544 DR 4(1)



Section 4.1.1 of CAP requires that the HVAC criteria be complete. Section 4.1.2 of the CAP requires updating of the duct design. Section 4.1.4 of CAP requires critical case evaluation.

Section 4.1.4 of CAP outlines critical case evaluation of existing installations. Configuration discrepancies are an attribute in the walk-through.

CAP section 4.1.2 -"Existing HVAC duct support designs will be reviewed for correctness and revised as necessary to bring them into compliance with the design criteria." Critical case evaluation of installed duct and duct supports is required by section 4.1.4 of CAP.

CAP section 4.1.2 -"Existing HVAC duct support designs will be reviewed for correctness and revised as necessary to bring them into compliance with the design criteria." Critical case evaluation of installed duct and duct supports is required by section 4.1.4 of CAP.

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<u>S</u> (OURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
10.	Lack of a QA materials handling program for ducts resulting in unknown strength properties of installed duct.	PIR WBN WBP 88015 DR 68	CAP section 4.1.1 requires criteria updating. Section 4.1.2 requires preparation of specifications to define structural requirements for HVAC ductwork.
11.	Interaction of local stress with total stress in ductwork not considered.	DR 4(e)	See items 1, 4, and 5.
12.	Failure to consider support and duct span tolerance in the design.	DR 4(g), DR 167(d)	See items 1, 4, and 5.
13.	No design calculations for qualification of all joints and seams of ductwork under all loads.	DR 4(h)	See items 1, 4, and 5.
14.	No calculations to support assumption that sealant in a penetration provides support.	DR 4(j)	See item 2.
15.	Change in duct frequency due to presence of accessories was not considered.	DR 4(kv)	See items 1, 4, and 5.
16.	Installation details for grilles, dampers, etc., are guides and allow field modification.	DR 4(0)	CAP section 4.1.2 requires review and updating of design output documents to bring them into compliance with the design criteria.

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<u>S</u>	OURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
17.	Support typicals based on spans shorter than criteria allowed. Thus, support loads may be under estimated.	DR 167(e)	CAP section 4.1.2 requires review of existing duct support typicals to bring them into compliance with the design criteria.
18.	All loads on HVAC duct and supports were not considered.	DR 167(g), DR 167(1)	See items 1, 4, and 5.
19.	Calculations for axial supports at 90° bends cannot be found. Axial support calculations do not compare duct length and loads with maximum criteria spacing nor axial loads on 47A055 typicals.	DR 167(h)	See item 8.
20.	Connection of duct to support has not been designed.	DR 167(m)	See items 1, 4, and 5.
21.	Support design did not consider shear/torsion interaction for bolt anchors.	DR 167(o)	See items 1, 4, and 5.
22.	Supports and/or ducts exhibit physical damage.	DR 171(c), DR 304(c) CAQR WBP 890111 DR 4Kiii CAQR WBP 880001	See item 4.
23.	No calculation exist to verify the adequacy of the tornado damper ductwork.	PRD WBP 880574P	See items 1 and 4.

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR HEATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR CONDITIONING (HVAC) CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

Develop and implement a critical case evaluation of installed safety-related HVAC duct and duct supports (section 4.1.4 of HVAC CAP). "since there have been several CAOs identifying discrepancies between installed configurations and the SVS documentation, the accuracy of such documentation must be verified. Therefore, an engineering walk-through to address those issues, as well as the other identified deficiencies will be implemented." The above quote from the CAP could be interpreted to imply that the verification of the documentation discrepancies will result in configuration reconciliation. The intent is to verify structural adequacy but not to revise the drawings in all cases to match the as built configuration. This is a deviation from the previous commitment.

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

Review HVAC hanger location drawings for agreement with inspection documentation with regard to typical support numbers. Document and resolve discrepancies. Reinstall missing support 1030-DW920-02H-0109 (if required).

COMMITMENT SOURCE

CATD 11103-WBN-06 (T41 870216 891)

IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR INSTRUMENT LINE CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

 Instrument Sense Line Slope - A number of sense lines were found that did not conform to the minimum slope requirements specified on design output drawings. (Reference: section 4.1.2.1)

- 2. Thermal Effects on Instrument Lines -It was determined that instrument lines and associated supports were not designed to consider the effects of thermal expansion. (Reference: section 4.1.2.2)
- 3. Compression Fittings -It was determined that various compression fitting installations were not in accordance with the fitting manufacturer's installation requirements. (Reference: section 4.1.2.4)

SOURCE DOCUMENT

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NCR 6172 R1;
50.55(e),
WBRD-50-390/85-50
CATD 17300-WBN-01,
-02, -03;
NCR W-417-P;
Notice of Violation
IR 50-390/86-25-01;
Vertical Slice Review
(VSR) Discrepancy
Report (DR) 147 R1,
item 1C; 392 RO;
411 RO; 441 RO, item 5a:
457 RO; 489 RO;
491 RO; 523 R1, item 5a;
615 RO; 92 RO; 199,
item 1
```

SCR WBNEEB8572 R1; 50.55(e), WBRD-50-390/86-13; CATD 17300-WBN-15 DR 392 R0; 411 R0; 457 R0; 489 R0; 491 R0; 523 R1, item 5a; 615 R0

SCR 6278-S; 50.55(e), WBRD-50-390/85-43; CATD 17300-WBN-08

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

The CAP describes an existing corrective action implementation program. (Reference: section 4.1.4.1)

The CAP describes an existing corrective action implementation program. Refer to section 4.1.4.2. The CAP makes a <u>commitment</u> to perform a reconciliation between the existing analysis and the updated HAAUP design criteria.

The CAP describes the corrective action program. Reference: section 4.1.4.4. The CAP makes a <u>commitment</u> to pressure test instrument lines designated as seismic category I and I(L).
SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

4. Installation
Discrepancies - NCR
W-334-P documents a
condition in which some
instrument line support
documentation was
determined to be lost
or incorrect. (Reference:
section 4.1.2.5)

NCR W-334-P; 50.55(e), WBRD-50-390/86-29; CATD 17300-WBN-14; CATD 22301-WBN-01; DR 392 RO; 411 RO; 441 RO, item 5a; 457 RO; 489 RO; 491 RO; 523 R1, item 5a; 615 RO

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

The CAP describes an existing corrective action implementation program which is documented on NCR W-334-P. Refer to section 4.1.4.5. The CAP makes a <u>commitment</u> to review existing NE calculations SD3-017 and SD3-023 with updated design input and design criteria requirements.

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR INSTRUMENT LINE CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

Instrument lines designated as seismic category I or I(L) will be pressure tested in accordance with appropriate piping code requirements as specified in site-implementing procedures. Reference: NC0880294010

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

For unit 1 safety-related instrument panels not having been pressure tested TVA plans to inspect the panels for leaking compression fittings during initial heatup. Reference: NC0850474008

COMMITMENT SOURCE

TVA letter to NRC dated July 30, 1986, 10 CFR 50.55(e) (L44 860730 816)

IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR PRESTART TESTING CAP

14

SOURCE ISSUE

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SOURCE DOCUMENT RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

N/A

N/A

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR PRESTART TESTING CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

COMMITMENT SOURCE

N/A

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N/A

SOURCE ISSUE

 Deficiency in the Site Records Vault

2. Slow or Difficult

Records Retrieval

SOURCE DOCUMENT

SCR WBN 7215-S

CAQR WBP 870036 CAOR WBP 870307

CAQR WBP 871000

CAQR WBP 871129

CAQR WBP 880188

CAQR WBQ 880546

CAOR WBQ 871002

CATD 717-NPS-14

CATD 11200-NPS-02

CATD 30201-WBN-01

CATD 80409-WBN-01

CAQR WBA 870026 D01 CATD 80517-WBN-02 NCR W-203-P

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

- 1. Vault modifications
 will be made.
 Records will be
 placed in qualified
 storage (vault or
 microfilm) (Reference:
 CAP, section 4.1)
- 2. A Records Retrieval Guide will be developed. Records index will be enhanced. A study will be conducted to determine the effectiveness of retrievability system enhancements (Reference: CAP, section 4.2)

- 3. QA Records Quality (e.g. incomplete, technically and/or administratively deficient records)

CAQR WBA 870876729 CAQR WBP 880428 CAQR WBA 890013907 CAQR WBP 870036 CAOR WBP 870059 CAQR WBP 870191 CAQR WBP 870216 CAQR WBP 870304 CAQR WBP 870528 CAQR WBP 870551 CAQR WBP 870736 CAQR WBP 870985 CAQR WBP 871123 CAQR WBP 880153 CAQR WBP 880175 CAQR WBP 880188

3. Open CAQs will be screened to consolidate resolution of all identified records quality issues. Identified issues will be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Results will be subjected to a trend analysis to identify need for additional recurrence control actions. (Reference: CAP, section 4.3)

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SOURCE ISSUE

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SOURCE DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

CAQR WBP 880450
CAQR WBP 880475
CAQR WBP 880542
CAQR WBP 880670
CAQR WBP 880676
CAQR WBP 880702
CAQR WBQ 870698
CAQR WBQ 870712
CAQR WBQ 870852
CAQR WBQ 871002
CAQR WBQ 871147
CATD 10200-WBN-02
CATD 11103-WBN-03
CATD 11103-WBN-08
CATD 11300-WBN-01
CATD 17300-WBN-14
CATD 22301-WBN-01
CATD 80209-WBN-03
CATD 80213-WBN-01
CATD 80214-WBN-02
CATD 80516-WBN-02
CATD 85-373-NPS-02-10
CATD SWEC-WBN-67-001
NCR W-334-P
NCR W-510-P
NCR WBN 6433
NCR WBN 6463
NCR WBN 6722
PRD WBP 880774P
WBA 860017D03
SCR W-476-P-S
SCR W-559-P-S
SCR W-576-P-S
SCR WBN 6433-S
SCR WBN 6722-S

IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTÍNG BASIS FOR QA RECORDS CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

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SOURCE DOCUMENT RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

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SOURCE ISSUE

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SOURCE DOCUMENT

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RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

DR 529 DR 530 DR 531 DR 532 DR 533 DR 534 DR 535 DR 536 DR 537 DR 538 DR 539 DR 540 DR 541 DR 543 DR 544 DR 545 DR 546 DR 562 DR 563 DR 580 DR 581 DR 582 DR 585 DR 589 DR 590 DR 591 DR 608 DR 609 DR 618 DR 619 DR 620

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR QA RECORDS CAP

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CAP COMMITMENT

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

COMMITMENT SOURCE

N/A

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N/A

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

10 CFR 50.55(e)

10 CFR 50.55(e) NCR W-269-P R1

10 CFR 50.55(e)

NCR W-269-P R1

NCR W-269-P R1

Revised final report

Revised final report

Revised final report

Revised final report

10 CFR 50.55(e)

NCR W-269-P R1

- Q-List does not differentiate between safety-related and special feature.
- 2. Various 1E valves are listed in the Q-List in columns not considered safety related.
- 3. The general notes to the WBN Q-List are not consistent with NP's approach to the 10 CFR 50 Appendix B QA program.
- 4. No motors are listed on the CSSC Q-List.



- 5. The Q-List notes are too general.
- Revised final report 10 CFR 50.55(e) NCR W-269-P R1
- 6. The CSSC Q-List is not EC 20901-WBN, accurate and complete. WB-CAR-85-45 WBP 870639
- 7. Q-List contains incorrect component identification.

EC 20901-WBN, NCR WBN 6326, W-269-P R1, PIR WBNMEB8653

WBP 880095

WBP 880814

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

New Q-List format to clearly indicate safetyrelated and special features (draft ONP STD 9.1.14).

Revised existing notes to clarify and new Q-List format will clearly indicate class 1E (draft ONP STD 9.1.14).

General notes to the existing Q-List and AI-7.6 were revised (Reference: CAP, section 4.0)

The new Q-List will list motors separately. A calculation has been issued to identify 1E motors and the CSSC Q-List has been deleted (DNES STD 8.41 R1). (Reference: CAP, section 4.0)

Existing Q-List notes were revised to add clarity. (Reference: CAP, section 4.0)

Deleted CSSC Q-List and will issue new Q-List. (Reference: CAP, section 4.0).

Issue new Q-List based on documented selection criteria. (Reference: CAP, section 4.1.3)

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

- Q-List list different from CSSC Q-List.
- Quality Evaluation Report QE-85-09, W-269-P R1, EC 20901-WBN
- The Q-List is not as detailed as needed by WBN organizations.

CAQR WBP 870751 NMRG Audit Finding R-86-02-NPS-E-1 and R-82-02-NPS-G-5 RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Delete CSSC Q-List (CAP section 4.0). Use a single Q-List. (Reference: CAP, section 4.4)

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Develop new Q-List identifiers from design output drawings in accordance with approved procedures. (Reference: CAP, section 4.1.2)

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR Q-LIST CAP

CAP COMMITMENT

- The scope of the 1. Q-List includes quality-related plant civil/ structural, mechanical and electrical systems required for unit 1 operations. The Q-List will include those Class 1E motors necessary to support the needs of WBN Q-List User Organizations.
- 2. The review as specified in the 50.55(e) report is being implemented by the development of a new Q-List. This approach was taken to alleviate difficulties ...in interpreting the data fields. ("SPEC REQ" data field to be eliminated.)

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

Revise the Q-List to identify <u>all</u> motors (except valve operators) and their functional requirements.

COMMITMENT SOURCE

Revised final report for NCR-W-269-P R1, WBRD-50-390/85-56, WBRD-50-391/85-32

In the long term, revise the Q-List to consistently identify class 1E valves, i.e., enter a 4 under "SPEC REQ")...do a complete review of the Q-List. Revised final report for NCR-W-269-P R1, WBRD-50-390/85-56, WBRD-50-391/85-32



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IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR REPLACEMENT ITEMS PROGRAM CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

1.	WBN lacked a program for	CA
	engineering evaluation of	CA
	purchases and dedication of	CA
	commercial upgrade items	CA
	for use as basic components.	

CAQR WBP 871258 CAQR WBP 880668 CAQR WBP 890132 CAQR WBP 871098 **RESOLUTION OF ISSUE**

An engineering group and associated procedures has been established for providing appropriate requirements, including dedication, for current and future replacement part procurements. Refer to CAP plan section 4.1.1. Also an engineering review is being performed on inventory and installed parts under Site Director Procedure AI-5.19. (Reference: CAP, sections 4.1.2, 4.1.3, and 4.1.4)

An engineering review will be performed to determine the adequacy of installed construction procurements. (Reference: CAP, section 4.1.4.) New procurements are being reviewed as described under Issue 1.

The identification and verification of critical characteristics for commercial-grade items is now being performed for current and future procurements. Reference: CAP, sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2)



3. WBN has not implemented a process to identify and verify critical characteristics for commercial-grade items for use as basic components for new procurements or items issued from inventory. CAQR WBE 880302801

CAQR WBP 870981

CAQR WBF 870069

URI 391/86-21-04

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR REPLACEMENT ITEMS PROGRAM CAP

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CAP COMMITMENT

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

COMMITMENT SOURCE

N/A

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N/A

IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR SEISMIC ANALYSIS CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

Concern with integration time step used to perform the time-history analysis. The time step used may be too large to calculate high frequency response adequately.

EPC-87-KX-009-01			
(L77	870608	804)	
DR-27	70–5A		

CAQR WBF 870038R1 sign of (B05 870706 300) neralizer

analysis for the design of the pile foundation for Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator Building. analysis may not reflect the maximum loading condition for the piles and the soil spring constants used in analysis may not be realistic.

Concern with soil structure

interaction (SSI)

Concern with SSI analysis for the design of pile foundation for the Additional Diesel Generator Building. The concern is similar to that of Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator Building analysis.

CAQR WBF 870039R1 (B05 870729 306) DR-320-5A, 5B, 5C, 5E RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Perform study to determine effects. Preliminary results show original seismic responses are adequate. Any new analysis will use a time step to calculate the high frequency response adequately as documented in the CAP.

Perform study to more accurately consider the piles. Preliminary results indicate the design of the structure The and piles is adequate.

Perform reanalyses using the Set B and Set C criteria as defined in the CAP. The envelop of Set B and Set C results will be used to evaluate the CAQR and for new designs or modifications.



IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR SEISMIC ANALYSIS CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

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SOURCE DOCUMENT RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

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Concern regarding the soil modulus for crushed stone for Diesel Generator Building and Waste Packaging Area.	CAQR WBP 870369R0 (T42 870528 975)	Perform study of the waste packaging area considering the appropriate modulus. Preliminary results indicate the design of the structure is adequate. For the Diesel Generator Building, perform reanalyses using Set B and Set C criteria as defined in the CAP. The Set B results will be used to evaluate the CAQR. The envelop of Set B and Set C will be used for new designs or modifications.
Concern about the mechanics of how TVA originally modeled structures with eccentric masses and the methodology used in calculating torsion constants for open cross sections.	PIR WBN CEB 8801R0 DR-271-5A	Perform reanalyses of the ICS, and ACB taking into account eccentric mass modeling and revised torsion constants as described in the CAP.
Modify requirements for response spectra generation.	DR-270-5B	This reanalysis of vertical Category I structures defined in the CAP and the revised design criteria WB-DC-20-24 will resolve this Vertical Slice Review (VSR) item.
Confirm overturning/ stability using seismic responses from the seismic CAP reanalysis.	DR-270-5C	This reanalysis of Category I structures in the CAP will resolve this VSR item.
Confirm ICS north-south basemat reaction.	DR-270-5D	The reanalysis of Category I structures defined in the CAP will resolve this VSR item.

IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR SEISMIC ANALYSIS CAP

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SOURCE ISSUE	SOURCE DOCUMENT	RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
Review seismic analysis calculations of all buildings for modal mass contribution from rigid modes.	DR-270-5E	The reanalysis of Category I structures defined in the CAP will resolve this VSR item.
Revise dynamic analysis for ICS, ACB, and NSVR for modulus of elasticity and shear modulus consistent with those used in design.	DR-271-5B	The reanalysis of the Category I structures defined in the CAP will resolve this VSR item.
Calculations to show proper section properties in model of ICS.	DR-271-5C	The reanalysis of the ICS as defined in the CAP will resolve this VSR item.
Address vertical floor flexibility issues.	DR-271-5D	Perform a study to address the floor flexibility as noted in the Table 2 of the CAP.
Perform ICS analysis using coupled ICS and NSSS model. Spectra and ZPA comparisons will be made to confirm the mass lumping approach used in the analysis of record.	DR-271-5E	The analysis of the ICS as defined in the CAP will resolve this VSR item.

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR SEISMIC ANALYSIS CAP

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CAP COMMITMENT

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

COMMITMENT SOURCE

N/A

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N/A

IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING BASIS FOR VENDOR INFORMATION CAP

SOURCE ISSUE

Inadequate Control of Vendor Information

SOURCE DOCUMENT

NRC Violation 390/87-05-01 NRC Violation 390/86-18-01 NCR W-415-P, SCR WBN MEB 8715 NRC Violation 390/85-53-03 CAQR WBF 870063 WBP 870148 WBP 870083 WBP 870701 WBP 870724 WBP 880153 WBP 880405 SCR WBN EQP 8610 50.55(e), 390/81-66 SCR WBN MEB 8660 SCR WBN EEB 8724, R1 NCR W-476-P EC 30804 WBN 01 EC 20404 WBN 01 Audit QWB-A-87-0015-D06 Audit QWB-A-87-0015-D07 CAQR WBP 871126 DR 201 DR 230 DR 375 DR 385 DR 650 DR 651

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

The vendor manual update program will establish a clear, well-defined and proceduralized mechanism to address the vendor information concerns indicated in NRC GL 83-28 and the source documents listed. The program will provide adequate assurance that safetyrelated vendor documents are current, complete, configuration controlled, and that engineering requirements in these safety-related vendor documents are issued in design input or as design output for implementation in plant instructions and procedures.

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR VENDOR INFORMATION CAP

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CAP COMMITMENT

PREVIOUS COMMITMENT

COMMITMENT SOURCE

N/A

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N/A

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SOURCE ISSUE

Several hundred Employee Concerns were reviewed to evaluate their applicability to welding problems and to establish groupings. These are found in the Weld Evaluation Project Aggregate Results of Weld Assessment Report, DOE/IE-10175-8, and Weld Evaluation Project Formation of Homogeneous Groupings of Welds, DOE/IE-10175-2.

Approximately 8,000 quality documents such as NCRs and 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports were reviewed to determine possible problem areas. The types of documents reviewed are discussed in Weld Evaluation Project Formation of Homogeneous Groupings of Welds DOE/1D-10175-2. The individual listing of each document is in the master list of Quality Indicators reviewed by DOE/WEP in January 1987. This is available to NRC upon request.

SOURCE DOCUMENT

Master list of Quality Indicators DOE/ID-10175-2 DOE/ID-10175-8

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Section 4.2 of CAP Phase II Report ECSP subcategory report 50400

SOURCE ISSUE

SOURCE DOCUMENT

Discrepancies in Radiographs for ASME Welds

Shear lugs did not have complete penetration as required by drawings

Safety-related duct work was installed without specific welding requirements

Welds on wall-mounted Instr. Panels do not meet drawings.

Welds on Structural Platform elev. 741.0 did not meet design

Documentation missing for NDE of Thermocouple removal areas

Vendor Welds

Linear Indication found during PT.

SCR WBN NEB 8651

WBP 870552 L44 880707 808 390/86-17-02 390/86-09-01 390/86-17-04 390/87-19-02 390/87-09

SCR W-518-P L44 890515 800 390/86-25-08

SCR WBN MEB 8714 SCR WBN MEB 8721 L44 880421 806 390/86-24-01 390/86-24-02 VSR-004-P

SCR W-559-PS L44 880921 806 390/86-18-04

SCR WBN CEB 8689 L44 870811 800 390/86-17-07 390/86-17-13

WI-85-053-003 NCR-W-599-P

WBP 880075 WBP 890099 WBP 880096 WBP 880750 WBP 880190 390/86-17-10

WBP 880117

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Attachment 4, item 2; Attachment 5, item 6 of CAP; Phase II Report, item 7.3

Attachment 4, item 3 of CAP; Phase II Report, item 7.4

Attachment 4, item 5 of CAP; Phase II Report, item 7.6

Attachment 4, item 4 of CAP; Phase II Report, item 7.5 Attachment 4, item 1 of

CAP; Phase II Report, item 7.2

Attachment 4, item 7 of CAP; Phase II Report, item 7.8

Attachment 5, item 5

Phase II report, section 5.6.3

SOURCE ISSUE

2

SOURCE DOCUMENT

WBP 880430

Ground A	Areas	
Violate	Min.	Wall

Deviations or apparent deviations identified out-of-scope of the DOE/WEP assessment plans (IDRs). The individual deviations are described in each CAQ. WBP 871295 WBP 871315 WBP 880025 WBP 880085 WBP 880086 WBP 880331 WBP 880440 WBP 880001 WBP 880446 NCR WBN 6463-S WBP 880104 WBP 871061 WBP 880038 W-518P WBP 880540P WBP 871270 WBP 871223 WBP 870668 NCR-W-580-P WBP 880450 NCR-W-334-P WBP 880214 DCN-P00541A ECN 6685 DCN-P-00479-A WBP 880197 WBP 880188 WBP 870036 SCR WBN NEB 8651 WBN 870316 WBP 880592 PIR WBN CEB 8641 WBP 871269 MR-A-605820 WBP 871296

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

Attachment 4, item 7 of CAP; Phase II Report, item 7.8

Attachment 4, item 10 of CAP; Phase II Report, items 5.6.8 and 7.13

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RESOLUTION OF ISSUE

1.

SOURCE ISSUE

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SOURCE DOCUMENT

ASME Section III Weld Evaluations	PIR WBM MEB 8669	Phase II Report, item 5.6.3
Code applicability for work performed after completion of N-5 data reports	390/86-14-07 L44 881013 808	Attachment 5, item 3 of CAP
Code of record — use of later editions	L44 890306 802	Attachment 5, item 4 of CAP
Fillet weld adequacy	390/86-21-05	Attachment 5, item 7 of CAP

IDENTIFICATION OF CAP CHANGES TO COMMITMENTS TO NRC FOR WELDING CAP

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	CAP COMMITMENT	PREVIOUS COMMITMENT	COMMITMENT SOURCE
1.	R.T. of ASME Welds two welds do not meet ASME Section III	FSAR Section 3.8.2.2.1 Containment Penetrations providing Pressure boundary ASME Section III class 2.	FSAR
2.	Piping shear lugs for ASME class 2&3 will be reanalyzed using code case N-318.	FSAR did not allow use of this code case.	FSAR
3.	HVAC duct work discussion refers to 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports which commit to revise FSAR to clarify commitment to ANSI-N509.	FSAR originally referenced SMACNA as modified by ORNL-NSIC-65. it also referenced ANSI-N509 but was not specific for welding requirements.	FSAR
4.	Wall mounted panels As a result of the disposition of SCR W-559-PS a revision to FSAR was necessary to allow qualification by testing.	FSAR Para 3.10.1 stated "This Panel is qualified to the same criteria as the local panels by analysis.	FSAR
5.	Classification of containment liner welds. In the process of dispositioning CAQRs 870561, 870562, 870563 it was noted that code case 1768 needed to be added	FSAR did not reference the code case.	FSAR



to FSAR Para 3.8.2.2.1.

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ENCLOSURE 2

LIST OF COMMITMENTS

The previously docketedcommitments will be revised through resubmittal of the 10 CFR 50.55(e) response, violation response, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) amendment, etc.

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