

WEPClosure
StatementEvaluation
ReportQUALITY INDICATOR GROUP CLOSUREREWORK OF SAFETY-RELATED
PROTECTIVE DEVICESWEP GROUP IDENTIFIER QI-SPL-1Page 1 of 3Date 01/22/87Revision 0WEP Group No 217

Approved _____

Date _____

Reviewed A.P. Bradford 1-23-87Prepared Luther Hayes

Address the following items in the space remaining on this page and on additional pages as needed (see Standard Practice WEP 3.1.10 for specific instructions).

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| 1. Employee Concern(s)/Quality Indicator(s) | 5. Findings |
| 2. Characterization of Issue | 6. Conclusions |
| 3. Summary | 7. References |
| 4. Evaluation Methodology | |

1. Employee Concern(s)/Quality Indicator(s) (Reference 7.1)

Nonconforming Condition Report 3523 R0.

Nonconforming Condition Report 3001 R3.

Nonconforming Condition Report 3325 R1.

2. Characterization of Issue

Welds on protective devices (PDO) may not conform to specified requirements because of incomplete weld repairs and incomplete documentation of the reinspection.

3. Summary

Not applicaable.

4. Evaluation Methodology

In accordance with DOE/WEP Assessment Plan 217 (Reference 7.2), a review of TVA documentation consisting of inspection data was completed to determine if the TVA reinspection and rework of safety related PDOs in the Reactor Building No. 1 complex was adequate to ensure acceptable quality level. The components involved in this assessment are jet impingement and pipe restraint devices used to protect against damage to surrounding equipment in the event of pipe rupture.

WEPClosure
StatementEvaluation
ReportQUALITY INDICATOR GROUP CLOSUREREWORK OF SAFETY-RELATED
PROTECTIVE DEVICESWEP GROUP IDENTIFIER QI-SPL-1Page 2 of 3Date 01/22/87Revision 0WEP Group No 217

The safety related PDOs encompassed by this assessment are those units installed in the Reactor Building No. 1 complex. These include all PDOs inside containment and in the north and south valve rooms. Areas included and the pertinent drawings are as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Systems</u>	<u>Drawings</u>
Inside Containment	Main Steam (MS) and Feedwater	48W1700-01 through 30
Inside Containment	RHR and SIS	48W1701-01 through 18
Inside Containment	SIS, blowdown system, chemical and volume control	48W1702-01 through 19
Inside Containment	Pressurizer surge line	48W1703-01 through 14
Inside Containment	UHI	48W1706-01 through 13
South MS Valve Room	MS, feedwater, auxiliary feed-water discharge, feedwater bypass, auxiliary feed-water steam supply	48W1707-01 through 27
North MS Valve Room	MS & feedwater	48W1708-01 through 15

5. Findings

The DOE/WEP research of Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) documentation identified various Nonconforming Condition Reports (NCRs) and associated memoranda which outline a major TVA weld reinspection/rework effort on PDOs in the Reactor Buildings of Units 1 and 2 to identify and correct weld deficiencies. The initiation dates of these NCRs range over a period from February 18, 1981 to October 14, 1982. Partial Releases from Nonconforming Status were processed over a time period from January 6, 1982 to April 19, 1983.

The NCR 3001R (R2) lists the PDOS which were to be reinspected and reworked as necessary during the TVA effort. All of the listed assemblies are inside containment and in the north and south valve rooms. The applicable TVA drawing series are listed in Section 4 above. All of the PDOs listed in NCR 3001R (R2), with the exception

WEPClosure
Statement-----
Evaluation
ReportQUALITY INDICATOR GROUP CLOSUREREWORK OF SAFETY-RELATED
PROTECTIVE DEVICESWEP GROUP IDENTIFIER QI-SPL-1Page 3 of 3Date 01/22/87Revision 0WEP Group No 217

of PDO2-10 through PDO2-19, were reinspected under Civil Engineering Unit accountability.

The documentation of inspection data for PDOs PDO2-10 through -19 was handled somewhat differently, as they were inspected and documented as part of the TVA Hanger Engineering Unit (HEU) Accountability Program with no Civil Engineering Unit involvement. The inspection for each of the PDOs was documented using the typical hanger inspection document format, with these records maintained in the TVA HEU files. Additionally, the HEU records were transferred to IBM computer cards, which are kept in permanent storage in the Document Control Vault.

The DOE/WEP review of PDO weld reinspection documentation (Reference 7.3) was confined to the Unit 1 safety related PDOs in the containment building and north and south valve rooms, and excluded all restraints and structural steel members (beams, trusses, etc.) peripheral to the PDO components and assemblies in these areas.

6. Conclusions

A complete review of all TVA drawings pertaining to Unit 1 PDOs was completed by DOE/WEP to identify all safety-related PDOs contained within the containment building, north valve room and south valve room. Additionally, all available TVA NCRs and supporting documentation were reviewed to verify completeness of the formal TVA program established to reinspect the welds of all safety-related PDOs installed prior to January 1981 and rework welds as necessary. It was determined that all of the subject safety-related PDOs were addressed, and complete inspection records are available for each of the reinspected PDOs in TVA's permanent records storage (Document Control Vault).

DOE/WEP considers this group closed.

7. References

- 7.1 Employee Concerns listed in Section 1.
- 7.2 DOE/WEP Assessment Plan 206 and 217, Revision 0, March 31, 1986.
- 7.3 EG&G Idaho, Inc. Notegram to A. E. Bradford from R. J. Roberts, May 27, 1986.

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