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

Docket Nos.: 50-390/391

Mr. H. G. Parris
Manager of Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
500 A Chestnut Street, Tower II
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Dear Mr. Parris:

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL AGENDA ITEMS FOR ICSB MEETINGS ON THE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

Attached is a second set of discussion items for the ICSB meetings with TVA concerning the Watts Bar review. A draft of this attachment was forwarded to your staff on June 16, 1981. The first four items were given to TVA during the June 4 - 5, 1981 NSSS review meeting at Westinghouse and were partially addressed there. The remaining items are new. We request that TVA address as many of these items as possible during the June 29 - July 2, 1981 BOP review meetings.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:
Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director
for Licensing
Division of Licensing

cc: See next page

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NRC FORM 318 (10/80) NRCM 0240 **OFFICIAL RECORD COPY** ★ USGPO: 1980—329-824

WATTS BAR

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58. Table 7.5-2 Note 1. What environmental effects are included in accuracy?

59. Page 7.3-11. Please provide a discussion of accuracy, or a reference to supplement the "typical" accuracy information given. Relate the accuracy requirements of the plant, such as for the safety analyses, to demonstrated equipment accuracy.

60. Page 7.2-35, last paragraph. Does the current design still provide for actuation of the pressurizer spray or relief valves upon a single instrument failure?

61. Page 7.2-36. The first sentence implies that a turbine trip may open the pressurizer code safety valves. Please discuss.

62. Section 7.3, first paragraph. Please clarify the Amendment 40 change.

63. Page 7.3-5; item 2, valve position. Is the valve position display based on actual sensed stem position for any valves other than the accumulator isolation valves? Describe the redundancy and separation throughout valve position indication channels.

64. Table 7.1-1 Note 2, Question 31.75, and Question 040.10. The note concerning R. G. 1.22 position does not mention jumpers, and the question responses state that test plans were incomplete but that jumpers may be used for testing. Please update and finalize. Also discuss deletion by Amendment 41, on page 7.3-17, of the material on overlap testing between the SSPS input relays and containment pressure instruments, that was added in response to Question 31.75.

65. Page 7.3-12. Supplementing Question 50, please confirm that the reference to be provided for FMEA of the ESFAS includes (1) all BOP scope and (2) design changes subsequent to the design analyzed in the WCAP.

66. Pages 7.3-14 and -15. List and discuss the "untestable" devices that cannot be tested without causing plant upset.

67. Sections 4 and 5 provide confusing information concerning the importance to safety of instruments and controls relied upon for achieving and maintaining plant shutdown for various conditions. For example, section 7.4.2, page 7.4-7, states that several Chapter 15 accident analyses depend on the assumption that the instruments and controls indicated in sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 are available. However, section 7.4 states that its scope is limited to non-accident conditions; the description of monitoring indicators in 7.4.1.1 is restricted to non-accident conditions; and consideration of controls in 7.4.1.2 is based on the assumption that all automatic systems (ref. 7.2 and 7.7) continue functioning. As another example, Table 7.5-2 is restricted to "Normal Operation" and Table 7.5-1 applies to Condition II, III, and IV Events." This distinction implies that unless an instrument is fully qualified for the worst Category III and IV events, it is only useable for normal operation, with no intermediate categories. Please clarify the bases applicable to use of instruments and controls for achieving and maintaining plant shutdown.

68. Page 7.4-2, sections 7.4.1.2.1-4 and 7.4.1.2.2-1. Is the positioning of valves by handwheel annunciated or displayed in the control room? What is the plant priority structure concerning use of handwheels?

69. Page 7.4-3, Control Room Ventilation. What is the priority structure for operating the inlet dampers from inside vs. outside the control room?

70. Page 7.4-5, section 7.4.1.4. Explain the reliance placed on unqualified equipment among those items listed in this section in reaching and maintaining cold shutdown. Similarly, for section 7.5.3.3.8, what reliance is placed on non-class 1E power? Consider the time interval during as well as after the accident in the response.

71. Page 7.4-6. The footnote refers to the possible need for modifying several systems to provide for operation external to the control room. Please address and update. Also please identify the displays to be available to the operators together with the basis they will be given for assessing the operability of each (e.g., type qualification, class 1E power source, etc.).

72. Section 7.5.3 and Table 7.5-1 provide criteria appropriate to the construction permit stage (e.g., "the T_{hot} channels must be on separate power supplies from the T_{cold} channels.") Please describe how the design satisfies these criteria.

73. The response to Question 030.12 (last paragraph) and the Amendment 42 change to Table 7.5-1 imply that Essential Raw Cooling Water flow (item 11 in Table 7.5-1) and AFW flow (not listed in Table 7.5-1) are not recorded by safety grade equipment and may not even be displayed by safety grade equipment. Please clarify.

74. Page 7.6-6 and Figure 7.6-4. Please identify the listed valves, with reference to P & I drawings. Describe for each the power sources, isolation, and separation for the contacts used to prevent a single failure from causing loss of a safety function. Also describe the impact of auxiliary control capability (from outside the control room).

75. Section 7.7.1.7 and Figure 7.7-6 conflict concerning the basis for programming steam generator water level. Please confirm our understanding that nuclear power is used, not turbine impulse stage pressure, and correct the FSAR as appropriate.