

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

April 10, 1981

WBRD-50-390/81-27
WBRD-50-391/81-26



Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - INSUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION FOR
PROTECTIVE DEVICES - WBRD-50-390/81-27, WBRD-50-391/81-26 - FIRST INTERIM
REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
R. V. Crlenjak on March 13, 1981, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as
NCR 3001R R1. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to provide
additional information by May 20, 1981.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at
FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure) ✓
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
INSUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION FOR PROTECTIVE DEVICES
WBRD-50-390/81-27, WBRD-50-391/81-26
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

TVA has recently discovered that there has been insufficient documentation on the installation and fabrication of all pipe whip and jet impingement protective devices (PD's). The PD's provide protection, as required, to safety system components (pipes, equipment, walls, etc.) from the effects of postulated high energy pipe breaks. The detailed description of the deficiency is as follows:

- (a) No weld inspection documentation is available for PD's other than those in valve rooms and the feedwater system in the unit 1 reactor building.
- (b) Where weld inspection documentation is available, it is incomplete because it cannot be determined whether an entire assembly was accepted or only part of it.
- (c) No fitup documentation is available for any welded connections; i.e., there is no inprocess documentation available.
- (d) Location acceptance is based upon plus or minus 1/2" tolerance on PD's whereas piping systems protected are given plus or minus 2" tolerance. Piping systems have not been, on an average, within PD tolerance.
- (e) There is incomplete documentation on embedment or testing of anchor bolts.
- (f) No documentation is available for friction-type bolted connections.

The affected PD's are located in the following systems: Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Safety Injection (SIS), Upper Head Injection (UHI), Chemical and Volume Control (CVCS), Reactor Coolant (RCS), Main Steam (MS), Feedwater (FW), Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW), and Blow Down (BD) Systems.

Corrective Action

TVA is continuing the investigation into this matter to more clearly define the causes of the deficiency and to develop the necessary corrective actions.