

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37402

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

January 21, 1981


WBRD-50-390/81-09

WBRD-50-391/81-08

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80-081-034✓

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - HIGH DENSITY SPENT FUEL RACKS -
WBRD-50-390/81-09, WBRD-50-391/81-08 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. W. Wright on December 17, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR WBN CEB 8012. TVA considers 10 CFR Part 21 to be applicable to this deficiency. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to provide additional information by April 15, 1981.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills
by *RLH*

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 HIGH DENSITY SPENT FUEL RACKS WBRD-50-390/81-09, WBRD-50-591/81-08 FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of the Deficiency

The deficiency identifies written procedures which do not contain acceptable tolerance limits or were not properly implemented. These procedures provide instructions for the installation and inspection of the high density spent fuel racks in the areas of verticality, levelness, and dummy drag insertion. A description of the specific procedural problems are identified below:

1. Measurement Procedure TVA-T-198, "Verticality and Pedestal Plate Inspection Procedure for Spent Fuel Storage Racks," contains no tolerance limits and resulted in measurement data which was not repeatable. The procedure was provided by Wachter Associates, Incorporated (Wachter), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who manufactured the high density spent fuel storage racks and was utilized by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to obtain verticality measurement data for the installation of the high density spent fuel storage racks.
2. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Quality Control Procedure (WBN-QCP) 4.22, "Inspection of the Installation of the Spent Fuel Storage Racks," paragraph 6.5.2.3.3, does not identify the method of incorporating equipment tolerance limits into the measurement data. The procedure was utilized by TVA to obtain levelness measurement data for the installation of the high density spent fuel storage racks.
3. At the time this nonconformance report (NCR) was initiated, it was TVA's opinion that WBN-QCP-4.22, "Inspection of the Installation of the Spent Fuel Storage Racks," paragraph 6.5.2.3.4, had not properly been implemented. Data obtained from the oversize dummy fuel drag test was inconsistent and not conclusive. However, in the interim, it has been identified that the oversize dummy fuel insertion test device used for determining drag force data was not properly controlled in that it sustained undetected damage/distortion which affected its calibration. This condition resulted in the acquisition of inaccurate/nonrepeatable data and has been identified on NCR WBNQAB8101.

Interim Corrective Actions

TVA is presently evaluating the affected procedures to determine the necessary corrective actions. An evaluation is also being performed to determine the acceptability of the data ascertained as a result of the implementation of these procedures. TVA will identify the acceptable cells before the storage of new or reinsertable fuel in the spent fuel storage racks.