

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

February 6, 1981

WBRD-50-390/81-14  
WBRD-50-391/81-13

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - IMPROPERLY INSTALLED SUPPORT  
ANCHORS - WBRD-50-390/81-14, WBRD-50-391/81-13 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject condition was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
M. Thomas on January 7, 1981, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as  
NCR 2789R. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to provide  
additional information by June 23, 1981.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at  
FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure) ✓  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

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## ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
IMPROPERLY INSTALLED SUPPORT ANCHORS  
WBRD-50-390/81-14, WBRD-50-391/81-13  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

### Description of Condition

In at least two previous NCR's on Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, TVA reported deficiencies associated with the installation of support anchors used on cable trays and seismically qualified piping. The final reports on these NCR's (CAQR E5 and CAQR M31) were transmitted from J. E. Gilleland to J. P. O'Reilly on July 10, 1979, and May 15, 1979, respectively. The problem with support anchors is not, however, limited to cable tray and pipe supports, but rather to any support installation that uses surface-mounted plates and self-drilling expansion anchors. Recent nonreportable NCR's have been written on conduit supports and HVAC duct supports. There have also been a large number of nonsignificant NCR's written on specific areas of the plant. The reported occurrence of NCR's indicates that the overall problem may not have been adequately identified by TVA.

The common installation deficiencies that have been identified include:

- (1) Anchors that have been cut short.
- (2) Cut off bolts or improper length bolts which may result in insufficient thread engagement.
- (3) Cutting of concrete reinforcing rods (as reported on NCR 2755).
- (4) Anchors not set to the proper depth.
- (5) Improperly enlarged base plate holes.

An inspection program initiated in response to IE Bulletin 79-02 has been testing anchors on safety-related pipe supports, but this program does not address other support installations that use surface-mounted plates and self-drilling anchors such as supports for cable trays, conduit, and HVAC ducting.

### Corrective Action

TVA is initiating an inspection program similar to the program on safety-related piping initiated in response to IE Bulletin 79-02. The program will begin with the inspection of a sample of support base plates and anchors in the reactor building, control building, auxiliary building, and the diesel generator building. This inspection will identify the extent of the problem and will be used to determine what corrective action is appropriate.