

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

January 19, 1981

SQRD-50-328/81-09  
WBRD-50-390/81-08  
WBRD-50-391/81-07

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 AND WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 -  
STEEL CONTAINMENT PENETRATION ASSEMBLY - SQRD-50-328/81-09, WBRD-50-390/  
81-08, WBRD-50-391/81-07 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
F. Cantrell on December 19, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as  
NCR's SQN CEB 8041 and WBN CEB 8014. Enclosed is our first interim report.  
We expect to provide additional information by April 7, 1981.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at  
FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure) ✓  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE  
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2  
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
STEEL CONTAINMENT PENETRATION ASSEMBLY  
SQRD-50-328/81-09, WBRD-50-390/81-08, WBRD-50-391/81-07  
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

The residual heat removal (RHR), main steam, and main feedwater pipes penetrate the steel containment vessel (SCV) by means of a free-floating bellows penetration assembly. Maximum internal pressure inside the SCV after a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) is 12 lbs/in<sup>2</sup> and 15 lb/in<sup>2</sup> for Sequoyah and Watts Bar, respectively. The axial load due to high containment pressure on the effective area of the SCV penetration opening was not considered in the RHR, main steam, and main feedwater piping analysis.

Corrective Action

TVA is reanalyzing the affected piping in order to determine if the present design of the penetration assemblies and pipe rupture restraints is adequate to carry all loads.