

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

November 25, 1980

U.S. NRC
DISTRIBUTION SERVICES
BRANCH

1980 DEC 3 AM 11 04

DISTRIBUTION
SERVICES UNIT

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

50-390
50-391

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - INSUFFICIENT ANALYSIS OF 3-INCH
FIRE PROTECTION LINES - NCR WBN CEB 8005 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
M. Thomas on June 6, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Interim
reports were provided on July 23 and September 3, 1980. Enclosed is our
final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at
FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure) ✓
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

B019
S
1/1

8012040

An Equal Opportunity Employer

422

5

ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
INSUFFICIENT ANALYSIS OF 3-INCH FIRE PROTECTION LINES
NCR WBN CEB 8005
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

TVA has discovered that a 3-inch fire protection line, located in the auxiliary building was not properly analyzed. The layout drawings did not provide sufficient dimensions, and the line was thought to be two inches in diameter when, in fact, it was three inches in diameter and thus should have been rigorously analyzed.

Safety Implications

The purpose of seismically qualifying fire protection lines is to protect safety-related equipment from the effects of a pipe break. Thus, had this condition gone uncorrected, a seismic event could have led to pipe break which could have damaged safety-related equipment. In addition, the effectiveness of firefighting systems could be reduced.

Corrective Action

The 3-inch fire protection line has been rigorously analyzed, and it has been determined that 16 additional supports per unit need to be added. The new supports will be installed before fuel loading of the respective unit.