

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

September 16, 1980

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3400
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DISCREPANCY IN TWO MK-71 EMBEDDED
PLATES - NCR 2508R - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
M. Thomas on August 15, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Enclosed
is our first interim report. We expect to provide additional information
by November 21, 1980.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at
FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure) ✓
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
DISCREPANCY IN TWO MK-71 EMBEDDED PLATES
10CFR50.55(e)
NCR NO. 2508R
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During the chipping of cracked concrete (reference NCR 2163R) behind two MK-71 embedded plates at azimuth 24° and 156° in unit 1 containment building, it was discovered that the horizontal rows of anchors for these two plates were different, when they should have been the same. After further investigation, it was determined that the existing E dimension for the MK-71 plate at 156° was three spaces of 6 inches totaling 1 foot 6 inches with four concrete anchors, when it should have been six spaces of 3 inches totaling 1 foot 6 inches with seven concrete anchors as shown on the original embedded plate schedule.

After ascertaining the difference between the two MK-71 embedded plates, a further fabrication inequity was discovered. The two specified MK-71 plates were required to be double-studded concrete anchors, but the plates were fabricated with only single studs.

Corrective Action

TVA is evaluating this problem and will supply further information to the NRC by November 21, 1980.

TVA has investigated Sequoyah Nuclear Plant for possible implications and found none.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37402

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

September 16, 1980

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Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
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10CFR50.55(e)
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