TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

August 22, 1980

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - SEISMIC SUPPORTS FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVES - NCR EEB 8004 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector M. Thomas on July 24, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure) ✓
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
SEISMIC SUPPORTS FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVES
NCR WBN EEB 8004
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Ten control valves in the auxiliary feedwater system were installed without some required seismic support struts. TVA accepted shipment of the valves prior to completion of the seismic test program being conducted by the vendor with the agreement that the necessary struts would be supplied when the testing was completed.

The valves involved are the eight steam generator level control valves and the pressure control valve on the discharge of both auxiliary feedwater motor-driven pumps. Some support struts for two control valves cannot be installed due to interferences with other TVA equipment. The interferences were discovered due to a similar condition which exists at TVA's Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Without the struts, the valves do not meet seismic qualification criteria.

Safety Implications

All of the affected valves are classified as active valves. Because the valves were not seismically qualified, one or more of them may have failed during a seismic event. Failure of these valves could lead to the loss or degradation of the auxiliary feedwater system which could adversely affect plant safety.

Corrective Action

The struts will be used as delivered after all interferences have been removed. If it is impossible or impracticle to remove an interference, a new strut will be field fabricated to alleviate the interference problem. TVA will perform a seismic analysis to determine that all seismic criteria are met. TVA anticipates that all struts will be installed by January 30, 1981.