TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

August 19, 1980

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - SAFETY-RELATED PIPING AND LOCATIONS - NCR 2424R - FINAL REPORT

The subject condition was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector M. Thomas on July 21, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
SAFETY-RELATED PIPING CONFIGURATIONS AND LOCATIONS

10CFR50.55(e)

NCR 2424R

FINAI REPORT

Description of Deficiency

This NCR deals with the generic concerns of multiple deficiencies in the configuration and location of safety-related piping, TVA Class A, B, C, D, G, and M, from that shown on approved drawings. These deviations were made without a field change request being prepared and approved. The condition was discovered when verifying final pipe locations and/or installing permanent pipe hangers.

Cause of the deficiency include:

(1) Crafts working from field sketches which had not been adequately reviewed by engineering personnel.

(2) Crafts routing piping to miss interferences without consulting engineering personnel.

(3) Engineering personnel failing to obtain and document proper approval for field changes.

(4) Engineering personnel not inspecting piping for configuration and location while it was being installed and/or upon completion of installation.

(5) An accumulation of fabrication allowable tolerances which resulted in an out-of-tolerance condition.

Safety Implications

These deficiencies could not have gone undetected because:

(1) WBNP-QCP-4.28 has been issued requiring inspection and documentation of piping location and configuration.

(2) WBNP-QCP-4.23 has been issued requiring the inspection documentation of all pipe hanger locations.

These QCP's are applicable to piping and pipe hangers installed before the QCP's issuance.

Corrective Action

Piping will be reinstalled in the locations and configurations specified on approved drawings or left "as is" with the nonconforming condition approved, ensuring there is no safety or seismic problem with the new configuration or location.

Piping inspection employees have been instructed to:

(1) Perform complete dimensional checks prior to approving field sketches.

(2) Make inspections of piping locations while the piping is being installed and upon completion of installation.

Craft employees have been instructed to:

(1) Install pipe in accordance with approved drawings.

(2) Request engineering assistance when piping cannot be installed as shown on approved drawings.