

ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
DEFICIENCY IN MATERIALS VERIFICATION
NCR 2054R
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

This deficiency was uncovered while retrieving materials documentation for the authorized nuclear inspector. The deficiency is that material verification hold points on QA documentation have been signed off by engineering personnel "as verified," when in fact no certified mill test reports (CMTR's) were on file. Recent NCR's have shown that this condition has become a repetitive problem. The deficiency was caused by several different actions. These are as follows:

1. Engineering personnel did not follow proper material verification procedures in that they did not call the records vault to ensure material certifications were on file before signing off the hold point.
2. Vault personnel have misunderstood engineering personnel requests for material certification verification and have given out information that certifications were on file when in fact they were not.
3. Heat number material certifications were verified properly, but subsequent transfer of these heat numbers when loose material was cut was not properly witnessed. As a result digits were left out or the wrong digit was stamped, making the new number wrong.
4. Information listed on material certifications has been misinterpreted as being or as not being part of the heat number. This has resulted in letters being added to or subtracted from documentation entries, making them not agree with the actual certifications.
5. Certain heat numbers have been covered up or partially covered up by the welding process, making subsequent checks impossible.

Safety Implications

If this deficiency had remained uncorrected, it is possible that unverified materials could have been used in a safety-related system. Thus, a severe accident may have led to a failure in a piping system which contained unverified materials. This in turn could have adversely affected the safety of the plant.

Corrective Action

All materials for which CMTR's cannot be located will be cut out and replaced with materials which have a CMTR. The individual subassemblies for which CMTR's cannot be located will be handled as separate NCR's.

The system for verification of CMTR's will be altered so as to provide field employees with a list of materials and their applicable heat number and/or heat code. The engineering employees responsible for verification of material hold points will be reinstructed on the method of verifying heat numbers and the importance of transferring heat number information accurately. This corrective action will be complete by March 19, 1980.

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