

**SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
ISL SATELLITE FACILITY SR-2
AMENDMENT NO. 12 TO
SOURCE MATERIALS LICENSE NO. SUA-1548**

**POWER RESOURCES, INC.
SMITH RANCH-HIGHLAND URANIUM PROJECT (SR-HUP)
CONVERSE COUNTY, WYOMING**

December 2007

DOCKET NO. 40-8964

**U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs
Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection**

Enclosure 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Description of the Proposed Action	1
1.2 Review Scope	2
2.0 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED FACILITY	2
2.1 Proposed Satellite Facility	2
2.2 Instrumentation and Control	3
2.3 Conclusions	3
3.0 EFFLUENT CONTROL SYSTEMS	3
3.1 Gaseous Effluents	3
3.2 Liquids and Solids	4
3.3 Conclusions	5
4.0 ACCIDENTS - PREVENTIVE MEASURES AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	6
4.1 Tank Failure	6
4.2 Pipeline Failure	7
4.3 Fires and Explosions	7
4.4 Transportation Accidents - Shipments of Resin	7
4.5 Conclusions	7
5.0 FINANCIAL ASSURANCE	8
5.1 Discussion	8
5.2 Conclusions	8
6.0 CONCLUSIONS	9
7.0 REFERENCES	9

Figure 1 - Power Resources Inc, Converse County, Wyoming

Figure 2 - In Situ Leach Satellite SR-2

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 11, 2006, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Power Resources, Inc. (PRI) submitted a request for approval to construct an In Situ Leach (ISL) Satellite facility (SR-2) at its Smith Ranch-Highland Uranium Project (SR-HUP), located in Converse County, Wyoming (PRI 2006a). Under Source Materials License SUA-1548, License Condition 10.1.5, PRI is prohibited from constructing new satellite facilities prior to NRC review and approval of designs and specifications for the facility. In its request, PRI indicated that the proposed satellite description, design, and location are detailed in PRI's Reynolds Ranch amendment, dated December 2004, and revised March 2006 (PRI 2004 and 2006b). Supplemental information concerning SR-2 was submitted as follows: PRI's response to NRC's request for additional information dated December 28, 2006 (PRI 2006c); PRI SR-HUP radiological dose assessment dated March 15, April 16, and May 4 (PRI 2007b, 2007c, and 2007d); and PRI's response to NRC's request for additional information concerning surety issues dated July 30, 2007 (PRI 2007e).

1.1 Description of the Proposed Action

As specified in Source Materials License SUA-1548, License Condition 10.5.1, PRI is requesting NRC's approval to construct SR-2 at the SR-HUP site. The proposed location of SR-2 is near the southwest corner of the SR-HUP permit area, in the northeast quarter of Township 35 North (T35N of the Baseline), Range 74 West (R74W of the Principal Meridian) (see Figure 1). It will be located in close proximity to future Mine Units 9, 10, 11, and 12 (see Figure 2).

1.2 Previous Safety Evaluation Reports

Safety issues related to the Smith Ranch facility and general in situ leach process and equipment have been previously evaluated in *Safety Evaluation Report for Renewal of Source Materials License SUA-1548, Rio Algom Mining Corp - Smith Ranch In Situ Leaching Facility, Converse County, Wyoming* (NRC 2001a) and most recently in *Safety Evaluation Report For Reynolds Ranch Amendment* (NRC 2007b). ISL operational safety related topics evaluated included Corporate Organization and Administrative Procedures; Management Control Program; Management Audit and Inspection Program; Qualifications for Personnel Conducting the Radiation Safety Program; Radiation Safety Training; Security; and Radiation Safety Controls and Monitoring including Effluent Control Measures, External Radiation Exposure Monitoring Program, Airborne Radiation Monitoring Program, Exposure Calculations, Bioassay Program, Contamination Control Program, Airborne Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Programs, Ground Water and Surface Water Monitoring Programs, and Quality Assurance Program. Based on the staff's review, the NRC concluded that PRI's training and experience, and its procedures related to the operation of ISL satellite facilities satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 40, Appendix A, and 10 CFR Part 20. The ISL operational safety related topics reviewed and approved in NRC (2007b) are applicable to the proposed action. Consequently, these areas will not be evaluated in this report.

1.3 Review Scope

Consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 40.32 and Source Materials License SUA-1548, License Condition 10.5.1, the PRI's construction authorization request will be approved by NRC staff if, among other things:

- 1) The licensee is qualified by reason of training and experience to use the source material for the purpose requested in such a manner as to protect health and minimize danger to life and property, and;
- 2) The licensee's proposed equipment, facilities, and procedures are adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life and property.

The Safety Evaluation Report (SER), provided herein, evaluates the safety aspects of PRI's proposed equipment and facilities as it relates to the specific requirements and objectives set forth in 10 CFR 40, Appendix A (Criteria Relating to the Operation of Uranium Mills and the Disposition of Tailings or Wastes Produced by the Extraction or Concentration of Source Material from Ores Processed Primarily for their Source Material Content), and 10 CFR 20 (Standards for Protection Against Radiation). The NRC staff used the NUREG-1569 - *Standard Review Plan for In Situ Leach Uranium Extraction License Applications*, (NRC 2003) (SRP) as guidance in its review. An Environmental Assessment (NRC 2007c) has been prepared in parallel with this SER to address the environmental impacts of the proposed action.

As part of this proposed action, NRC staff evaluated PRI's existing approved Radiation Protection Program for SR-HUP to determine if it was adequate to support the additional activities requested. NRC staff has found that the existing program is adequate to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1101 and, if followed, should ensure the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1201 and 10 CFR 20.1301 are met. NRC staff also notes that the licensee should evaluate, during its periodic review, whether additional Radiation Safety Technicians (RSTs) are needed to support the increased workload at its facility.

2.0 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED FACILITY

2.1 Proposed Satellite Facility

SR-2 will contain ion exchange (IX) columns, process tanks (e.g., lixiviant and waste water storage), water treatment equipment, resin transfer facilities, numerous pumps (injection of lixiviant, transfer of waste water, etc.), radon and gamma monitoring instruments, a small laboratory, and an employee break room. The layout of SR-2 is shown in Figure 3.17 (PRI 2006). Separate ventilation systems (air duct or piping connected to the top of each process tank to exhaust fumes to the outside atmosphere) consisting of 4 to 6-inch polyvinyl chloride (PVC) piping and exhaust fans, where needed, will be installed for IX columns, process tanks, and resin transfer and reverse osmosis (RO) area sumps. To reduce pipeline and connection failure, only High Density Polyethylene Resins (HDPE), fiberglass, PVC, plastic, stainless steel (SSTL), and coated carbon steel will be used for all wetted surfaces (i.e., tanks, wells, piping and related items). SR-2 will be equipped with fiber optic (real time) based monitoring and/or control devices. Camera/video and audio monitoring facilities will also be used as appropriate.

(PRI 2007e). The SR-2 is designed for a maximum flow rate of 4,500 gallons per minute (gpm) and vessel pressures of 150 pounds per square inch (psi) during production operations.

2.2 Instrumentation and Control

Instrumentation and control at SR-2 includes pressure gauges in injection and production trunk lines leading from the satellite building. Automatic shutdown systems will be utilized throughout SR-2. High and low pressure alarms will be used inside (disposal well and IX columns) and outside (pipelines, headerhouses, and wellfields) the satellite building to automatically shut down malfunctioning equipment.

2.3 Conclusions

The staff has completed its review of the description of SR-2 equipment and design, including instrumentation and control. This review included an evaluation using the review procedures in SRP Sections 3.1.2, 3.2.2, and 3.3.2 and the acceptance criteria in SRP Sections 3.1.3, 3.2.1, and 3.3.1.

PRI has acceptably described the instrumentation and control systems for SR-2. The instrumentation allows for continuous monitoring and control of systems, including total inflow to the plant, total waste flow exiting the plant, and tank levels. Appropriate alarms (excessive high or low pressure) and automatic shutdown components are part of the instrumentation systems to provide protection against releases of leaching solutions or other fluids.

Based on the information provided in the application, the staff concludes that the proposed ISL satellite processing facilities and instrumentation and controls are acceptable and are in compliance with 10 CFR 40.32(c), which requires PRI's proposed equipment and facilities to be adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life and property; 10 CFR 40.32(d), which requires that the issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and 10 CFR 40.41(c), which requires PRI to confine source or byproduct material to the location and purposes authorized in the license.

3.0 EFFLUENT CONTROL SYSTEMS

3.1 Gaseous Effluents

The primary gaseous effluent released from ISL satellite facilities is radon-222. To address this effluent, the SR-2 building design includes ventilation systems for all indoor, non-sealed process tanks, and resin transfer and RO area sumps to control the release of radon-222 [PRI 2004 (Section 4.1) and 2006b]. Where needed, exhaust fans can pull air from the top of the tanks or from a sump and discharge the air to the outside through the ventilation system. Radon daughters will be routinely monitored on a monthly basis at the SR-2 building using a Gilair Air Pump. PRI has indicated that from 1988 to 1993, weekly and monthly monitoring at SR-HUP has shown radon daughters are less than 10 percent of the regulatory limit of 0.33 working level (WL) found in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B. Consequently, PRI has determined that routine exposure of workers to radon daughters only needs to be determined for Smith Ranch Central Processing Plant (CPP) workers and Dryer Operators. This is consistent with the findings of

NUREG/CR-6733, *A Baseline Risk-Informed Performance-Based Approach for In Situ Leach Uranium Extraction Licenses* (NRC 2001b), which concluded that the potential for significant radiological risk at ISL facilities was in the yellowcake thickening, drying, and packing areas.

With the addition of SR-2, PRI will be operating three ISL facilities at its Smith Ranch facility including CPP and ISL Satellite SR-1 (SR-1). In addition, two satellite facilities are operating at the adjacent Highland site. The cumulative radiological impacts (i.e., gaseous radon-222) from the entire SR-HUP operation, including SR-2, were evaluated by PRI using the MILDOS-AREA, dispersion mode (PRI 2007b, 2007c, and 2007d). NRC staff evaluated the model results and has determined that the cumulative radiological dose for the nearest resident and members of the public, meets the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1301. Specifically, the total effective dose equivalent for members of the public will be less than 100 mrem/yr.

3.2 Liquids and Solids

Liquid effluents from the SR-2 operation will include production bleed stream, plant wash-down water, ground water restoration equipment effluent, restoration bleed, and facility sanitary waste [PRI 2004 (Section 4.2) and 2006b]. Production bleed typically ranges from 0.5 to 1.5 percent of the production flow rate (maximum 22.5 gpm to 67.5 gpm for SR-2), while plant wash-down water is a nominal volume. The current restoration related deep disposal well estimate for the southwest portion of the SR-HUP, which includes future Mine Units 9, 10, 11, and 12, totals approximately 96.5 gpm (PRI 2007d). Production bleed stream, plant wash-down water, and ground water restoration waste water will be disposed through a deep injection well permitted under the underground injection control (UIC) program through the Wyoming DEQ-Water Quality Division (PRI 2006c). PRI currently has three such permitted disposal wells (two at the Smith Ranch facility and another at the Highland facility). Consistent with existing deep disposal well UIC permits at SR-HUP, quarterly monitoring for total dissolved solids (TDS), total alkalinity, natural U, ammonia, RA-226, and pH will be conducted. PRI expects the SR-2 related disposal well to have a 75 gpm disposal capacity, which will be a sufficient capacity to handle liquid waste effluents at the satellite (PRI 2007e).

Liquid effluent monitoring systems include high and low pressure alarms that automatically shut down pipelines, headerhouses, wellfields, disposal wells, and/or IX facilities depending on the location and scale of the alarm. Sumps are available in the Satellite building to contain liquid releases (e.g., tank leak, overflow, or failure). In the event of a liquid release, appropriate site personnel, including applicable managers, environmental and radiation safety personnel, and site managers are immediately notified. Corporate personnel will be notified in accordance with PRI's corporate internal notification procedures. In addition, if lixiviant, pregnant liquor, acid, solvent, process waste water or any similar stream, is released into, or threatens to enter, water of the State, or the release is in excess of 420 gallons, the Wyoming DEQ-Land Quality Division will be notified within 24 hours. The NRC will be notified within 24 hours of any spill that may have a radiological impact on the environment. This notification will be followed within 30 days by a written report to the NRC Project Manager, describing the event and corrective actions taken.

Facility sanitary waste will be disposed through a drain field. On-site evaporation or land application of liquid effluents has not been proposed for SR-2.

Non-radioactive solid wastes are disposed at the SR-HUP existing solid waste disposal facility as authorized by the Wyoming DEQ. For contaminated solid wastes generated during facility operations (e.g., piping, equipment, and sediments removed from process pumps and vessels), PRI has a disposal agreement with Pathfinder Mines Corporation (PMC) to dispose 11e.(2) byproduct material wastes (including byproduct material from SR-2) at the Shirley Basin ISL disposal facility (Source Materials License SUA-442). PRI estimates that the combined SR-HUP operation currently generates about 100 to 300 yd³ of radioactive solid waste per year.

3.3 Conclusions

The staff has completed its review of the effluent control systems, including gaseous effluents, liquid effluents, and solids. This review included an evaluation using the review procedures in SRP Sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.2 and the acceptance criteria outlined in SRP Sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.3.

PRI has acceptably described the ventilation systems and the types of effluents released to the atmosphere. PRI has provided for monitoring and control systems (i.e., ventilation) for the types of effluents generated (i.e., radon). PRI has specified acceptable monitoring criteria and has located the facility monitoring and control systems for the required functions to optimally assess worker exposure in locations of likely maximum concentrations as determined by the applicant's analysis of airflow patterns. PRI has demonstrated that ventilation systems are acceptable to prevent radon gas buildup where recovery solutions enter the satellite building and tanks are vented during the extraction process. By providing information on the health and safety impacts of system failures and identifying contingencies for such occurrences, PRI has acceptably shown that effluent control systems will limit radiation exposures under both normal and accident conditions. PRI has committed to occupational radiation doses and doses to the general public that meet regulatory dose limits and "as low as is reasonably achievable" (ALARA) goals.

PRI has acceptably described the common liquid effluents generated at the satellite facility, from water treatment of wellfield production bleed and restoration water, and satellite building wash-down water. Deep well injection has been identified as the appropriate liquid control method in accordance with License Condition 10.1.8 of Source Materials License SUA-1548. PRI will obtain an Underground Injection Control Program permit from the Wyoming DEQ-Water Quality Division to operate the injection. PRI has provided acceptable plans and procedures to address contingencies for all reasonably expected system failures. The satellite building will be provided with sumps to contain the contents of any tank that may leak, overflow, or fail. The satellite facility has acceptable alarms to notify the operator of pressure transients within the wellfield pipeline systems. The information provided by PRI demonstrates that the effluent control systems will limit radiation exposures under both normal and accident conditions. PRI has acceptable procedures in place to document and report leakage and spill events. PRI has acceptable plans for both the storage and disposal of contaminated solid wastes generated during facility operations (piping, equipment, and sediments removed from process pumps and vessels). Contaminated waste materials and the effluent control systems will be managed to ensure that occupational doses and doses to the general public are in compliance with the limits of 10 CFR 20 and are ALARA. Material/contaminated equipment that cannot be

decontaminated for unrestricted release will be disposed in an NRC-licensed facility. In this regard, PRI has a disposal agreement with an NRC-approved facility (Shirley Basin ISL disposal facility).

Based on the information provided in the application, the staff concludes that the effluent control systems for SR-2 are acceptable and are in compliance with 10 CFR 20.1101, which requires that an acceptable radiation protection program that achieves ALARA goals is in place: 10 CFR 20.1201, which defines the allowable occupational dose limits for adults; 10 CFR 20.1301, which defines dose limits allowable for individual members of the public; 10 CFR 20.1302, which requires compliance with dose limits for individual members of the public; 10 CFR 20.2007, which requires that disposal by injection in deep wells must also meet any other applicable Federal, State, and local government regulations pertaining to deep well injection; and 10 CFR 40, Appendix A, Criterion 2, which requires that the applicant provide an estimate of the amount of contaminated material that will be generated and objective evidence of an agreement for disposal of these materials either in a licensed waste disposal site or at a licensed mill tailings facility to demonstrate nonproliferation of waste disposal sites.

4.0 ACCIDENTS - PREVENTIVE MEASURES AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

4.1 Tank Failure

Numerous process vessels and tanks will be present within the SR-2 building and PRI has considered failure of these vessels in its satellite building design. Alarms and automatic controls are used to monitor and keep tank fluid levels within prescribed limits. If there is a failure of a process vessel or tank at the SR-2 building, the fluid or resin would be contained within the building, collected in floor sumps, and pumped to other tanks. The area would then be washed down with wash water that would be contained in a similar manner, minimizing any environmental impact from the failure. There is little risk of airborne release of uranium since it will remain fixed to the resin.

Bulk storage of carbon dioxide and oxygen will be located outside the SR-2 building and segregated from areas where licensed materials are processed and stored. Hydrochloric acid tanks will be located in the outdoor storage area as ground water restoration commences in nearby well fields. These tanks will be contained within secondary containment structures which will contain the liquid material in the event of a tank failure.

Non-process related chemical storage at ISL Satellite SR-2 will include petroleum (gasoline, diesel) and propane. Due to the flammable and/or combustible properties of these materials, all bulk quantities of petroleum substances will be stored outside the satellite building. All gasoline and diesel storage tanks are located above ground and within concrete curbed secondary containment structures.

Failure of a resin tank outside the SR-2 building (e.g. during transport) could result in the spill of resin/leach solution. The resin/leach solution liquids would be contained and then pumped to another tank. Any contaminated soils or material requiring controlled disposal would be removed and disposed of in accordance with NRC and/or Wyoming State requirements.

4.2 Pipeline Failure

The rupture of a pipeline between the SR-2 building and a wellfield could result in a loss of either pregnant or barren solutions to the surface. To minimize the volume of lost fluid, the pipeline systems at SR-HUP are equipped with high pressure and low pressure shutdown systems and flowmeters. The systems also are equipped with alarms so the operator will be alerted immediately if a major malfunction occurs. Pipeline bell holes (open subsurface sections of pipelines accessible for repair) will be equipped with "wet sump" detectors that alarm to the SR-2 building. If the volume and/or concentration of the solutions released in such an accident did constitute an environmental concern, the area would be surveyed and the contaminated soils would be removed and disposed of according to NRC and/or State regulations.

4.3 Fires and Explosions

Fire and explosion hazards at SR-2 will be minimal as the facility does not use flammable liquids in the recovery process. Bulk storage of carbon dioxide, oxygen, and petroleum related products will be located in an outdoor storage area. Given its remote location to the satellite building, fires or explosions related to this storage area would not be expected to disperse uranium or daughter products to the environment in a significant amount. Natural gas used for building heat would be the primary source for a potential fire or explosion in the ISL Satellite building. However, uranium in the facility will be in solution or absorbed on to resin. Consequently, an explosion or fire would not appreciably disperse the uranium to the environment. Spilled liquids and resin would be collected in sumps and placed in a temporary storage tank.

4.4 Transportation Accidents - Shipments of Resin

The operation of SR-2 requires that the resin used for IX operations be transferred from the Satellite building to the Smith Ranch CPP. Resin is transported in specially designed 500 to 700 ft³ aluminum tanks. The tanker trucks typically haul 500 ft³ of loaded resin. An accident involving vehicles transporting resin could result in some of the resin being spilled. If an accident causes the release of resin and process water, all resin, ponded liquids, and contaminated soils would be removed and processed through the elution circuit or disposed of in a licensed facility. All disturbed areas would then be reclaimed in accordance with all applicable State and NRC regulations. There is little risk of airborne release of uranium since it will remain fixed to the resin. There have been no spills from resin transport to date from operations at the SR-HUP.

4.5 Conclusions

The staff has completed its review of the effects of potential accidents at SR-2. This review included an evaluation of the methods that will be used to evaluate effects of potential accidents involving radioactivity, using the review procedures in SRP Section 7.5.2 and the acceptance criteria outlined in SRP Section 7.5.3. PRI has acceptably described all likely significant effects of accidents from facility operations involving radioactivity. PRI has provided an acceptable analysis of potential accidents and their consequences that reflect the facility design, site

features, and planned operations. PRI has identified likely environmental impacts from such accidents and has described measures to mitigate accident impacts. The accidents evaluated have considered past operating experience from similar facilities. Adequate response and remediation procedures have been identified or referenced, and the facility personnel will be qualified to implement them. PRI's response program will comply with the notification requirements of 10 CFR 20.2202 and 20.2203. Under Source Materials License SUA-1548 License Condition 12.1, PRI is required to maintain documentation on spills of source or 11e.(2) byproduct materials (including processing solutions) and process chemicals. Documented information shall include, but not be limited to: date, spill volume, total activity of each radionuclide released, radiological survey results, soil sample results (if taken), corrective actions, results of post-remediation surveys (if taken), and a map showing the spill location and the impacted area. The licensee shall have procedures that will evaluate the consequences of the spill or incident/event against 10 CFR 20, Subpart "M," and 10 CFR 40.60 reporting criteria. If PRI is required to report any spills of source, 11e.(2) byproduct material, or process chemicals, a report shall be made to the NRC Headquarters Project Manager (PM) by telephone or electronic mail (e-mail) within 24 hours. This notification shall be followed, within thirty (30) days of the notification, by submittal of a written report to NRC Headquarters, per License Condition 9.2 of Source Materials License SUA-1548, detailing the conditions leading to the spill or incident/event, corrective actions taken, and results achieved.

Based on the information provided in the application and the detailed review conducted of the accidents considered for SR-2, the staff concludes that PRI has demonstrated compliance with 10 CFR 40.32(c), which requires the applicant's equipment, facilities, and procedures be adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life or property; and 10 CFR Parts 20.2202 and 20.2203, which define response program requirements for radiological accidents.

5.0 FINANCIAL ASSURANCE

5.1 Discussion

PRI has added financial assurance surety estimates for SR-2 to its Smith Ranch surety. This includes equipment removal and disposal costs (\$30,097), building demolition and disposal costs (\$178,315), and access road reclamation (\$101,213). Additional costs include well abandonment costs associated with the southwest area deep disposal well (\$62,044) (PRI 2007f).

5.2 Conclusions

PRI has added financial assurance surety estimates for equipment removal and demolition of SR-2 and associated equipment to its Smith Ranch financial surety. The method used to estimate these costs is consistent with the method used in previously approved sureties for SR-HUP. PRI has assured that sufficient funds would be available for completion of the reclamation plan by an independent contractor. PRI has included in the financial analyses all activities outlined in Sections 6.1 through 6.4 of the SRP. PRI has based the assumptions for financial surety analysis on site conditions, including experiences with generally accepted industry practices, research and development at the site, and previous operating experience.

Based on the information provided in the application, the staff concludes that the proposed measures are in compliance with 10 CFR 40.32(c), requiring the applicant's proposed equipment, facilities, and procedures be adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life and property; and 10 CFR 40, Criterion 9, which requires financial surety arrangements be established by each uranium recovery facility operator.

6.0 CONCLUSIONS

Based on the staff's detailed safety review, as provided herein, the NRC concludes, pursuant to 10 CFR 40.32(d), that the addition of SR-2 to the license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

In a parallel environmental review, the staff has also determined that SR-2 will not have a significant impact on the environment (NRC 2007c). Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, the staff has determined that PRI's request to construct SR-2 is acceptable.

7.0 REFERENCES

Power Resources Inc. (2004) Reynolds Ranch Amendment, Volumes I through IV. December 2004 [Adams Accession No. ML050390095, ML050390126, ML050390168, and ML050460389]

Power Resources, Inc. (2006a). Correspondence from J. McCarthy to P. Michalak, NRC requesting approval to construct of Satellite SR-2 at Smith Ranch-Highland Uranium Project. October 11 [Adams Accession No. ML062930232]

Power Resources, Inc. (2006b). Correspondence from K. Milmine to G Janosko, NRC containing Response to NRC's Request for Additional Information (TAC LU0082) March 15 [Adams Accession No. ML060940386]

Power Resources, Inc. (2006c). Correspondence from J. McCarthy to P. Michalak, NRC containing response to requested information concerning ISL Satellite SR-2. December 28 [Adams Accession No. ML070100517]

Power Resources Inc. (2007a) Southwest Area Regional Hydrologic Test. February 21. [Adams Accession No. ML070960170]

Power Resources Inc. (2007b) Correspondence from John McCarthy to Paul Michalak, NRC containing MILDOS Determination of Radiation Doses from Power Resources Inc. Smith Ranch - Highland Uranium In-Situ Leaching Operation. March 15. [Adams Accession No. ML071380284]

Power Resources Inc. (2007c) Correspondence from John McCarthy to Paul Michalak, NRC containing Revised MILDOS Determination of Radiation Doses from Power Resources Inc. Smith Ranch - Highland Uranium In-Situ Leaching Operation. April 16. [Adams Accession No. ML071100064]

Power Resources Inc. (2007d) Correspondence from John McCarthy to Paul Michalak, NRC containing Additional MILDOS information for Smith Ranch-Highland. May 4. [Adams Accession No. ML071510592]

Power Resources Inc. (2007e) Correspondence from John McCarthy to Paul Michalak, NRC containing responses to SR-HUP surety issues. July 30. [Adams Accession No. ML072200503]

Power Resources Inc. (2007f) Smith Ranch 2007-2008 Surety Estimate. June 29. [Adams Accession No. ML071900050]

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2001a) Safety Evaluation Report for Renewal of Source Materials License SUA-1548, Rio Algom Mining Corp - Smith Ranch In Situ Leaching Facility, Converse County, Wyoming. April. [Adams Accession No. ML011290179]

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2001b) NUREG/CR-6733 A Baseline Risk-Informed Performance-Based Approach for In Situ Leach Uranium Extraction Licenses. September

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2003) NUREG-1569 - Standard Review Plan for In Situ Leach Uranium Extraction License Applications. Final Report. June

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2007a) Review of Southwest Area Regional Hydrologic Test - Smith Ranch Highland Uranium Project Source Materials License SUA-1548. March 27. [Adams Accession No. ML070860069]

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2007b) Safety Evaluation Report Amendment 11 to Source Materials License SUA-1548 Addition of Reynolds Ranch ISL Satellite Facility. January. [Adams Accession No. ML0622710343]

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2007c) Environmental Assessment – Construction and Operation of In Situ Leach Satellite SR-2 – Amendment No. 12 to Source Materials License SUA-1548. December. [Adams Accession No. ML073460771]