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10 CFR 50.90

U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2
Dockets 50-282 and 50-306
License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60

Supplement to License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.3 Operability Requirements for Safety Injection (SI) Subsystem (TAC Nos. MD4209 and MD4210)

Reference:
1. License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.3 Operability Requirements for Safety Injection (SI) Subsystem, dated January 29, 2007, Accession Number ML070300113.
2. Supplement to License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.3 Operability Requirements for Safety Injection (SI) Subsystem, dated November 19, 2007, Accession Number ML073240077.

In Reference 1, Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) submitted an LAR for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) Units 1 and 2 to revise TS 3.5.3, "ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) – Shutdown" operability requirements for the SI subsystem by addition of a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Note. Pursuant to telephone discussions with the NRC Staff, this supplement provides proposed Bases page B 3.5.3-2 (for information only) which has been revised as shown in Enclosure 1 and supersedes Bases page B 3.5.3-2 submitted in Reference 2. NMC submits this supplement in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90.

The supplemental information provided in this letter does not impact the conclusions of the Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration and Environmental Assessment presented in the January 29, 2007 submittal and the November 19, 2007 supplement.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, NMC is notifying the State of Minnesota of this LAR by transmitting a copy of this letter and enclosure to the designated State Official.

Please address any comments or questions regarding this LAR supplement to Mr. Dale Vincent, P.E., at 651-388-1121.

Summary of Commitments

This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on DEC 13 2007

Michael D. Wadley
Site Vice President, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2
Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Enclosures (1)

cc: Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Prairie Island, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Prairie Island, USNRC
State of Minnesota

ENCLOSURE

Bases Pages (Markup)

(For Information Only)

B 3.5.3-2

1 page follows

BASES (continued)

LCO

In MODE 4, one of the two independent (and redundant) ECCS trains is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that sufficient ECCS flow is available to the core following a DBA.

In MODE 4, an ECCS train consists of an SI subsystem and an RHR subsystem. Each train includes the piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump.

During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is required to provide an abundant supply of water from the RWST to the RCS via the SI subsystem capable (through manual actions) of injecting into each of the cold leg injection nozzles and reactor vessel upper plenum nozzles. In the long term, a flow path is required to provide recirculation flow via the RHR subsystem from the containment sump into each of the reactor vessel upper plenum nozzles.

This LCO is modified by twoa Notes. Note 1 ~~that~~ allows an RHR train to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the ECCS mode of operation and not otherwise inoperable. This allows operation in the RHR mode during MODE 4.

Note 2 allows an SI train to be considered OPERABLE when the pump is capable of being manually started for ECCS injection from the control room.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the OPERABILITY requirements for ECCS are covered by LCO 3.5.2.

In MODE 4 with RCS temperature below 350°F and both RCS cold leg temperatures above the SI pump disable temperature specified in the PTLR, one OPERABLE ECCS train is acceptable without single failure consideration, on the basis of the stable reactivity of the