Mr. William R. Matthews Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261

SUBJECT: KEWAUNEE POWER STATION, MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3, NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2, AND SURRY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2, REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF COMPLETION DATES FOR GENERIC LETTER 2004-02 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (TAC NOS. MC4691, MC4694, MC4695, MC4696, MC4697, MC4722 AND MC4723)

Dear Mr. Matthews:

By letter dated November 15, 2007, Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc., Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., and Virginia Electric and Power Company requested for an extension of the containment sump clogging corrective actions stated in Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors," from December 31, 2007 to June 30, 2008 for Kewaunee Power Station (Kewaunee); from December 31, 2007 to November 30, 2008 for Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (Millstone 2 and 3), North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (North Anna 1 and 2), and Surry Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Surry 1); and from March 8, 2008 to November 30, 2008 for Surry Power Station, Unit No. 2 (Surry 2).

Based on the enclosed Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff's evaluation, we have extended the due date for completion of the GL 2004-02 corrective actions until May 31, 2008.

Sincerely,

#### /RA/

Siva P. Lingam, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-305, 50-336, 50-423, 50-338, 50-339, 50-280 and 50-281

Enclosures:

- 1. Evaluation for Kewaunee
- 2. Evaluation for Millstone 2 and 3
- 3. Evaluation for North Anna 1 and 2
- 4. Evaluation for Surry 1 and 2

cc w/encl: See next page

Mr. William R. Matthews Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261

SUBJECT: KEWAUNEE POWER STATION, MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3, NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2, AND SURRY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2, REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF COMPLETION DATES FOR GENERIC LETTER 2004-02 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (TAC NOS. MC4691, MC4694, MC4695, MC4696, MC4697, MC4722 AND MC4723)

#### Dear Mr. Matthews:

By letter dated November 15, 2007, Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc., Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., and Virginia Electric and Power Company requested for an extension of the containment sump clogging corrective actions stated in Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors," from December 31, 2007 to June 30, 2008 for Kewaunee Power Station (Kewaunee); from December 31, 2007 to November 30, 2008 for Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (Millstone 2 and 3), North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (North Anna 1 and 2), and Surry Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Surry 1); and from March 8, 2008 to November 30, 2008 for Surry Power Station, Unit No. 2 (Surry 2).

Based on the enclosed Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff's evaluation, we have extended the due date for completion of the GL 2004-02 corrective actions until May 31, 2008.

Sincerely,

#### /RA/

Siva P. Lingam, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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ADAMS Accession No.: ML073450594

\*transmitted by memo dated

OFFICE	NRR/LPL2-1/PM	NRR/LPL2-1/LA	NRR/DSS/SSIB/BC	NRR/LPL2-1/BC
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# EXTENSION REQUEST FOR CONTAINMENT SUMP CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH GENERIC LETTER 2004-02 KEWANEE POWER STATION DOCKET NO. 50-305

In a letter dated November 15, 2007 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML073190553), Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK) requested an extension to the corrective action due date of December 31, 2007, stated in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors" (GL 2004-02), for the Kewaunee Power Station (Kewaunee). In its letter, DEK stated that it has taken actions toward bringing Kewaunee into compliance with GL 2004-02, including replacing the sump screens with substantially larger sump strainers during the fall 2006 refueling outage. However, final documentation summarizing the results of recent strainer testing activities and the overall performance of Kewaunee's sump strainer arrangement, and the revision of downstream effects evaluations have not been completed. Therefore, an extension to the compliance due date of December 31, 2007, was requested to allow time for completion of these activities.

As stated in SECY-06-0078, proposed extensions to permit changes at the next outage of opportunity after December 2007 may be granted based on the licensee's request, if the staff determines that:

- the licensee has a plant-specific technical/experimental plan with milestones and schedules to address outstanding technical issues with enough margin to account for uncertainties, and
- 2. the licensee identifies mitigative measures to be put in place prior to December 31, 2007, and adequately describes how these mitigative measures will minimize the risk of degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and containment spray system (CSS) functions during the extension period.

The SECY also states that for proposed extensions beyond several months, a licensee's request will more likely be accepted if the proposed mitigative measures include temporary physical improvements to the ECCS sump or materials inside containment to better ensure a high level of ECCS sump performance.

In regard to the first criterion for approving an extension, DEK has a plant-specific plan, with milestones and schedules, to complete the Kewaunee GL 2004-02-required corrective actions and modifications by June 2008. Specifically, DEK plans to receive and approve its updated strainer performance documentation by April 2008, and to receive and approve a revised downstream effects evaluation by June 2008.

In regard to the second criterion for approving an extension, DEK has stated that various modifications, mitigating measures, compensatory measures, and/or favorable conditions are in effect at Kewaunee, minimizing the risk of degraded ECCS and CSS functions during the extension period, including a large replacement sump strainer with a 769 sq. ft. surface area, and new debris interceptors installed around the strainer arrangement.

After reviewing DEK's submittal, the NRC staff concludes that DEK has a plan to complete the remaining corrective actions and has compensatory measures in place. However, given the importance of reaching a prompt closure of GL 2004-02, the NRC expects DEK to complete GL 2004-02 corrective actions at Kewaunee by May 31, 2008.

The NRC has confidence that DEK's plan, as described in the November 15, 2007 letter, will result in the installation of final GSI-191 modifications that provide acceptable strainer function with adequate margin for uncertainties. Further, the NRC has concluded that DEK has put mitigation measures in place to adequately reduce risk for an approximate 5-month extension period. However, the NRC finds that DEK has not made a convincing case why the remaining corrective actions cannot be accomplished by May 2008. Therefore, it is acceptable for DEK to complete final documentation summarizing the results of recent Kewaunee strainer testing activities and the overall performance of Kewaunee's sump strainer arrangement, and also complete revision to the Kewaunee downstream effects evaluations by May 31, 2008. Should DEK not complete the Kewaunee corrective actions for GL 2004-02 by May 31, 2008, DEK will need to provide the NRC additional justification for the delay.

### EXTENSION REQUEST FOR CONTAINMENT SUMP CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH GENERIC LETTER 2004-02 MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-336 AND 50-423

In a letter dated November 15, 2007 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML073190553), Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) requested an extension to the corrective action due date of December 31, 2007, stated in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors" (GL 2004-02), for the Millstone Power Station Unit 2 and Unit 3 (Millstone 2 and Millstone 3). In its letter, DNC stated that it has taken actions toward bringing Millstone 2 and Millstone 3 into compliance with GL 2004-02, including replacing the sump screens with substantially larger sump strainers during the fall 2006 refueling outage and the spring 2007 refueling outage, respectively. However, completion of the downstream effects evaluations and associated acceptance reviews for components, including the vessel and the fuel, have not been completed for the two units. In addition, chemical effects testing and evaluation, and associated acceptance reviews, have not been completed for the two units. DNC also stated that determinations will have to be made as to whether any additional actions may be required based on the results of the foregoing technical evaluations and testing. Therefore, an extension to the compliance due date of December 31, 2007, was requested for Millstone 2 and Millstone 3 to allow time for completion of these activities.

As stated in SECY-06-0078, proposed extensions to permit changes at the next outage of opportunity after December 2007 may be granted based on the licensee's request, if the staff determines that:

- 1. the licensee has a plant-specific technical/experimental plan with milestones and schedules to address outstanding technical issues with enough margin to account for uncertainties, and
- 2. the licensee identifies mitigative measures to be put in place prior to December 31, 2007, and adequately describes how these mitigative measures will minimize the risk of degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and containment spray system (CSS) functions during the extension period.

The SECY also states that for proposed extensions beyond several months, a licensee's request will more likely be accepted if the proposed mitigative measures include temporary physical improvements to the ECCS sump or materials inside containment to better ensure a high level of ECCS sump performance.

In regard to the first criterion for approving an extension, DNC has a plant-specific plan, with milestones and schedules, to complete the Millstone 2 and Millstone 3 GL 2004-02-required corrective actions and modifications by November, 30, 2008. Specifically, DNC plans to complete a revised downstream effects evaluations for components, including reactor vessel and fuel, by March 31, 2008, and make a determination of, and schedule for, associated hardware and/or procedural modifications (if any) by June 30, 2008. In addition, DNC plans to complete chemical effects evaluations and bench-top testing to determine likely precipitate formation and bounding quantities precipitates by March 31, 2008, complete reduced scale (head loss) testing to determine the effects of chemical precipitate formation, if required, by September 30, 2008, and make a determination of, and schedule for, associated hardware and/or procedural modifications (if any) by November 30, 2008.

In regard to the second criterion for approving an extension, DNC has stated that various modifications, mitigating measures, compensatory measures, and/or favorable conditions are in effect at Millstone 2 and Millstone 3, minimizing the risk of degraded ECCS and CSS functions during the extension period, including large replacement sump strainers with a 6,000 sq. ft. surface area for Millstone 2, and a 5,000 sq. ft. surface area for Millstone 3, both with some margin for chemical effects. Further, DNC stated that for Millstone 2 it had replaced some calcium silicate insulation from the steam generator cavities that could contribute to a limiting strainer debris bed (so that the remaining calcium silicate insulation is located outside the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) zone of influence, jacketed to prevent damage from containment spray, and would not become submerged during an accident). DNC also stated that for Millstone 3 it had implemented a modification to delay the start time of the Recirculation Spray System (RSS) pumps using a Lo-Lo Refueling Water Storage Tank level switch rather than a timer to ensure that the replacement sump strainers are submerged prior to pump start (with the Millstone 3 RSS pumps being the only pumps that take suction from the sump during recirculation and long-term cooling).

In regard to the third criterion for approving an extension, DNC has installed very large strainers in the containment sumps for both Millstone 2 and Millstone 3, and therefore, this criterion is considered to be met.

DNC provided a risk evaluation for Millstone 2 and Millstone 3, which compared the increase in Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) from a large-break LOCA to total plant CDF and LERF risk values and showed that these values could be categorized as "small" in accordance with the criteria stated in Regulatory Guide 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis."

After reviewing DNC's submittal, the NRC staff concludes that DNC has a plan to complete the remaining corrective actions and has compensatory measures in place. However, the plan is open-ended (based on the chemical effects hardware and/or procedural change decision point in November, 2008). Further, the NRC views the scope of the additional activities required to demonstrate compliance with GL 2004-02 as achievable by May 31, 2008.

The NRC has confidence that DNC's plan, as described in the November 15, 2007 letter, will result in the installation of final GSI-191 modifications that provide acceptable strainer function with adequate margin for uncertainties. Further, the NRC has concluded that DNC has put mitigation measures in place to adequately reduce risk for an approximate 5-month extension period. However, the NRC finds that DNC has an open-ended plan, and has not made a

convincing case why the remaining Millstone 2 and Millstone 3 corrective actions for GL 2004-02 cannot be accomplished by May 2008. Given the importance of reaching a prompt closure of GL 2004-02, the NRC expects DNC to complete GL 2004-02 corrective actions at Millstone 2 and Millstone 3 by May 31, 2008. Should DNC not complete the Millstone 2 and Millstone 3 corrective actions for GL 2004-02 by May 31, 2008, DNC will need to provide the NRC additional justification for the delay.

# EXTENSION REQUEST FOR CONTAINMENT SUMP CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH GENERIC LETTER 2004-02 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-338 AND 50-339

In a letter dated November 15, 2007 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML073190553), Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion) requested an extension to the corrective action due date of December 31, 2007, stated in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors" (GL 2004-02), for the North Anna Power Station Unit 2 and Unit 3 (North Anna 1 and North Anna 2). In its letter, Dominion stated that it has taken actions toward bringing North Anna 1 and North Anna 2 into compliance with GL 2004-02, including replacing the sump screens with substantially larger sump strainers during the fall 2007 refueling outage and the spring 2007 refueling outage, respectively. However, completion of the downstream effects evaluations and associated acceptance reviews for components, including the vessel and the fuel, have not been completed for the two units. In addition, chemical effects testing and evaluation, and associated acceptance reviews, have not been completed for the two units. Dominion also stated that determinations will have to be made as to whether any additional actions may be required based on the results of the foregoing technical evaluations and testing. Therefore, an extension to the compliance due date of December 31, 2007, was requested for North Anna 1 and North Anna 2 to allow time for completion of these activities.

As stated in SECY-06-0078, proposed extensions to permit changes at the next outage of opportunity after December 2007 may be granted based on the licensee's request, if the staff determines that:

- the licensee has a plant-specific technical/experimental plan with milestones and schedules to address outstanding technical issues with enough margin to account for uncertainties, and
- 2. the licensee identifies mitigative measures to be put in place prior to December 31, 2007, and adequately describes how these mitigative measures will minimize the risk of degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and containment spray system (CSS) functions during the extension period.

The SECY also states that for proposed extensions beyond several months, a licensee's request will more likely be accepted if the proposed mitigative measures include temporary physical improvements to the ECCS sump or materials inside containment to better ensure a high level of ECCS sump performance.

In regard to the first criterion for approving an extension, Dominion has a plant-specific plan, with milestones and schedules, to complete the North Anna 1 and North Anna 2 GL 2004-02-required corrective actions and modifications by November 30, 2008. Specifically, Dominion plans to complete a revised downstream effects evaluations for components, including reactor vessel and fuel, by March 31, 2008, and make a determination of, and schedule for, associated hardware and/or procedural modifications (if any) by June 30, 2008. In addition Dominion plans to complete chemical effects evaluations and bench-top testing to determine likely precipitate formation and bounding quantities precipitates by March 31, 2008, complete reduced scale (head loss) testing to determine the effects of chemical precipitate formation, if required, by September 30, 2008, and make a determination of, and schedule for, associated hardware adtermine the effects of chemical precipitate formation, if required, by September 30, 2008, and make a determination of, and schedule for, associated hardware and/or procedural modifications (if any) by June 31, 2008, complete reduced scale (head loss) testing to determine the effects of chemical precipitate formation, if required, by September 30, 2008, and make a determination of, and schedule for, associated hardware and/or procedural modifications (if any) by November 30, 2008.

In regard to the second criterion for approving an extension, Dominion has stated that various modifications, mitigating measures, compensatory measures, and/or favorable conditions are in effect at North Anna 1 and North Anna 2, minimizing the risk of degraded ECCS and CSS functions during the extension period, including large replacement sump strainers with a total of 6,400 sq. ft. surface area for North Anna 1 and a total of 6,300 sq. ft. surface area for North Anna 2, it had either removed or replaced the Microtherm insulation within the containment, and for North Anna 1 and North Anna 2, it had either removed or replaced the calcium silicate insulation in the stream generator and pressurizer rooms. Dominion further stated that it conducted various modifications to ensure strainer submergence.

In regard to the third criterion for approving an extension, Dominion has installed very large strainers in the containment sumps for both North Anna 1 and North Anna 2, and therefore, this criterion is considered to be met.

Dominion provided a risk evaluation for North Anna 1 and North Anna 2, which compared the increase in Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) from a large-break LOCA to total plant CDF and LERF risk values and showed that these values could be categorized as "small" in accordance with the criteria stated in Regulatory Guide 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis."

After reviewing Dominion's submittal, the NRC staff concludes that Dominion has a plan to complete the remaining corrective actions and has compensatory measures in place. However, the plan is open-ended (based on the chemical effects hardware and/or procedural change decision point in November, 2008). Further, the NRC views the scope of the additional activities required to demonstrate compliance with GL 2004-02 as achievable by May 31, 2008.

The NRC has confidence that Dominion's plan, as described in the November 15, 2007 letter, will result in the installation of final GSI-191 modifications that provide acceptable strainer function with adequate margin for uncertainties. Further, the NRC has concluded that Dominion has put mitigation measures in place to adequately reduce risk for an approximate 5-month extension period. However, the NRC finds that Dominion has an open-ended plan, and has not made a convincing case why the remaining North Anna 1 and North Anna 2 corrective actions for GL 2004-02 cannot be accomplished by May 2008. Given the importance of reaching a prompt closure of GL 2004-02, the NRC expects Dominion to complete GL 2004-02 corrective actions at North Anna 1 and North Anna 2 by May 31, 2008. Should Dominion not complete the North Anna 1 and North Anna 2 corrective actions for GL 2004-02 by May 31, 2008, Dominion will need to provide the NRC additional justification for the delay.

## EXTENSION REQUEST FOR CONTAINMENT SUMP CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH GENERIC LETTER 2004-02 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281

In a letter dated November 15, 2007 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML073190553), Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion) requested an extension to the corrective action due date of December 31, 2007, stated in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors" (GL 2004-02), for the Surry Power Station Unit 2 and Unit 3 (Surry 1 and Surry 2). In its letter, Dominion stated that it has taken actions toward bringing Surry 1 and Surry 2 into compliance with GL 2004-02, including replacing the sump screens with substantially larger sump strainers during the fall 2007 refueling outage and the fall 2006 refueling outage respectively. However, completion of the downstream effects evaluations and associated acceptance reviews for components, including the vessel and the fuel, have not been completed for the two units. In addition, chemical effects testing and evaluation, and associated acceptance reviews, have not been completed for the two units. Dominion also stated that determinations will have to be made as to whether any additional actions may be required based on the results of the foregoing technical evaluations and testing. Therefore, an extension to the compliance due date of December 31, 2007, was requested for Surry 1 and Surry 2 to allow time for completion of these activities.

As stated in SECY-06-0078, proposed extensions to permit changes at the next outage of opportunity after December 2007 may be granted based on the licensee's request, if the staff determines that:

- 1. the licensee has a plant-specific technical/experimental plan with milestones and schedules to address outstanding technical issues with enough margin to account for uncertainties, and
- the licensee identifies mitigative measures to be put in place prior to December 31, 2007, and adequately describes how these mitigative measures will minimize the risk of degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and containment spray system (CSS) functions during the extension period.

The SECY also states that for proposed extensions beyond several months, a licensee's request will more likely be accepted if the proposed mitigative measures include temporary physical improvements to the ECCS sump or materials inside containment to better ensure a high level of ECCS sump performance.

In regard to the first criterion for approving an extension, Dominion has a plant-specific plan, with milestones and schedules, to complete the Surry 1 and Surry 2 GL 2004-02-required corrective actions and modifications by November 30, 2008. Specifically, Dominion plans to complete a revised downstream effects evaluations for components, including reactor vessel and fuel, by March 31, 2008, and make a determination of, and schedule for, associated hardware and/or procedural modifications (if any) by June 30, 2008. In addition, Dominion plans to complete chemical effects evaluations and bench-top testing to determine likely precipitate formation and bounding quantities precipitates by March 31, 2008, complete reduced scale (head loss) testing to determine the effects of chemical precipitate formation, if required, by September 30, 2008, and make a determination of, associated hardware and/or procedural modifications (if any) by March 31, 2008, complete reduced scale (head loss) testing to determine the effects of chemical precipitate formation, if required, by September 30, 2008, and make a determination of, associated hardware and/or procedural modifications (if any) by November 30, 2008.

In regard to the second criterion for approving an extension, Dominion has stated that various modifications, mitigating measures, compensatory measures, and/or favorable conditions are in effect at Surry 1 and Surry 2, minimizing the risk of degraded ECCS and CSS functions during the extension period, including large replacement sump strainers with a total of 8,400 sq. ft. surface area for Surry 1 and a total of approximately 3,500 sq. ft. surface area for Surry 2 (the remaining approximate 5, 000 sq. ft. of strainer surface area is to be installed in the spring 2008 Surry 2 refueling outage under an NRC approved extension). Dominion also stated that for Surry 2 it had modified the Inside Recirculation Spray (IRS) pumps start signal to ensure strainer submergence. Further, Dominion stated that for Surry 2 it had added a time delay to the Outside Recirculation Spray pumps start signal to reduce the load impact on the diesel generators and to allow sufficient time for the IRS pumps piping to fill and attain stable operation. Dominion stated that was installing the same modifications for Surry 1 during its fall 2007 refueling outage.

In regard to the third criterion for approving an extension, Dominion has installed very large strainers in the containment sumps for both Surry 1 and Surry 2, and therefore, this criterion is considered to be met.

Dominion provided a risk evaluation for Surry 1 and Surry 2 which compared the increase in Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) from a large-break LOCA to total plant CDF and LERF risk values and showed that these values could be categorized as "small" in accordance with the criteria stated in Regulatory Guide 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis."

After reviewing Dominion's submittal, the NRC staff concludes that Dominion has a plan to complete the remaining corrective actions and has compensatory measures in place. However, the plan is open-ended (based on the chemical effects hardware and/or procedural change decision point in November, 2008). Further, the NRC views the scope of the additional activities required to demonstrate compliance with GL 2004-02 as achievable by May 31, 2008.

The NRC has confidence that Dominion's plan, as described in the November 15, 2007 letter, will result in the installation of final GSI-191 modifications that provide acceptable strainer function with adequate margin for uncertainties. Further, the NRC has concluded that Dominion has put mitigation measures in place to adequately reduce risk for an approximate five-month extension period. However, the NRC finds that Dominion has an open-ended plan, and has not made a convincing case why the remaining Surry 1 and Surry 2 corrective actions for GL 2004-02 cannot

be accomplished by May 2008. Given the importance of reaching a prompt closure of GL 2004-02, the NRC expects Dominion to complete GL 2004-02 corrective actions at Surry 1 and Surry 2 by May 31, 2008. Should Dominion not complete the Surry 1 and Surry 2 corrective actions for GL 2004-02 by May 31, 2008, Dominion will need to provide the NRC additional justification for the delay.

Kewaunee Power Station, Millstone Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3, North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, and Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 & 2

CC:

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CC:

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